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The Dynamics of Violent Escalation and De-escalation: Explaining Change in Islamist Strategies in Egypt and Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

The main goal of this project is to illuminate when, how and why Islamist groups change what tactics they employ and legitimize in dealing with the political system. The study is driven by two main research questions: First, how does change happen within Islamist organizations? Second, what causal mechanisms underlie violent escalation and de-escalation?

The project argues that Islamist groups are both principled and strategic, and that their evolution is determined by the interaction of five factors: ideology, policy convergence, government policies towards the organization, public norms of resistance and organizational dynamics. Incentives for action are derived from the founding principles of the organization, the extent to which government domestic and foreign policies are convergent with the vision and goals of the group, and the level of political inclusion and toleration by the regime. The ways in which these incentives for action translate into particular strategies depends on organizational dynamics and on the prevalent norms of resistance.

The study examines the development of four groups: the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyyah (Egypt), the Darul Islam (Indonesia), and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah (Indonesia). The analysis employs process-tracing and counterfactual analysis to examine how the process of change occurred, and what causal mechanisms lead to violent escalation or de-escalation in the four organizations. Extending the logic of principled and strategic adjustment to non-violent Islamist groups, the discussion also provides some preliminary insights into the political oscillations and considerations regarding the appeal of the political process in the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah, as well as the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia.

The empirical analysis finds that the process of violent escalation is driven by the logic of grievances. Government repression, low policy convergence and salient threats to the Muslim community lead to escalating grievances. These grievances are aggravated by the pervasiveness of violent norms of resistance and by intra-organizational competition over authority. In such a context, any perceived external aggression can serve as a catalyst for violent escalation. There is a powerful slippery slope of politicization and militarization that can lead to the acceptance and adoption of violent tactics, as well as to a shift from foreign targets to domestic political actors and ultimately civilians. Revenge and fear, as well as a sense of mistrust of the government and betrayal by the national leadership are powerful causal mechanisms of violent escalation.

De-escalation primarily follows the logic of disillusionment. An organizational crisis and widespread public condemnation of the group can lead to a re-evaluation of the cost of violence, and a re-thinking of the vision as a whole, which prompts the group to de-escalate its tactics. When groups have several exit options away from violence and public condemnation is not as acute, organizations may metamorphose into different entities that temporarily prioritize non-violent activism, without categorically rejecting violence as a possibility in the future.

This project moves beyond the prevalent bifurcation of ideology and strategy in much of the literature on political violence, and offers an understanding of the Islamist groups under investigation as complex and adaptable organizations that are both principled and pragmatic. By examining the processes of both escalation and de-escalation, the analysis solves some of the theoretical puzzles regarding the role and impact of repression and organizational strength, and offers insights into the mixed effects of societal, organizational and governmental pressures. The study seeks to open new lines of inquiry that integrate insights from terrorism studies, comparative politics and the literature on conflict resolution and peace studies.

**THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION:
EXPLAINING CHANGE IN ISLAMIST STRATEGIES IN EGYPT AND INDONESIA**

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The main goal of this project is to understand the dynamics of change within Islamist organizations, and in particular what makes groups adopt or abandon violent tactics. Recent research has shown that the processes that drive groups towards or away from violence are not just mirror images of each other. This underlines the need to closely examine both violent escalation and de-escalation in order to better understand what factors pull and push Islamist organizations in different directions.

Starting from the premise that Islamist groups are not static entities, the dissertation seeks to illuminate when, how and why Islamist groups revise their ideologies and change what tactics they employ and legitimize in dealing with the political system. The study is driven by two main research questions: First, how does change happen within Islamist organizations? Second, what causal mechanisms underlie the escalation or de-escalation of violence in an organization's strategic outlook?

The project argues that we can understand changes in Islamist strategies through the framework of principled and strategic adjustment. Based on their founding ideology and organizational dynamics, groups adjust to external pressures and incentives and adopt whatever tactics are available and most effective in a particular social and historical context. Incentives for action are derived from the founding principles of the organization, the extent to which government domestic and foreign policies are convergent with the vision and goals of the group, and the level of political inclusion and toleration by the regime. The ways in which these

incentives for action translate into particular strategies depends on organizational dynamics and on the prevalent norms of resistance.

This process of principled and strategic adjustment is evidenced through an examination of the developments within four groups: the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Chapter three), al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah (Chapter four), the Darul Islam (Chapter five), and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah (Chapter six). Chapter seven extends the logic of principled and strategic adjustment to non-violent Islamist groups as well, and explores when and why groups decide to enter, abstain from or exit formal politics. The discussion provides some preliminary insights into the political oscillations and internal debates and considerations regarding the appeal of the political process in the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah, the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) and the Nahdlatul Ulama.

The Importance of Violent Escalation and Disengagement from Violence

Understanding when and how Islamist groups change their strategies towards the political system is particularly relevant today. A growing number of Islamist opposition groups that have once resorted to violent tactics have subsequently revised their strategies and their ideological tenets. In the 1940s, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had a military wing that sent volunteers to fight in the Arab-Israeli war, and which also attempted several political assassinations domestically. Since the 1970s, however, the organization has been committed to non-violent Islamic activism, growing into one of the most important and influential civil society groups in Egypt. After the 2011 protests, Egypt's first democratically-elected president was a Muslim Brother, and the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a powerful non-violent political actor, seeking to promote its agenda through electoral politics.¹ Since the ousting of the Brotherhood

¹ After the Brotherhood was deposed from power by the military in July 2013 accusations that the organization incited violence and terrorism abounded. These were largely politicized statements and need to be taken with a grain

from power in June 2013, questions about the appeal of violent tactics in response to repression and exclusion have re-emerged. Even though the evidence of direct organizational involvement in violence remains unconvincing, the military regime has designated the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, and nearly seven hundred members have been sentenced to death (King 2014).

Also in Egypt, during the early 1990s, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah (GI) was one of the most violent groups, declaring a holy war against the government and killing scores of tourist. By 1997 the group embarked on a non-violence initiative, undertaking since then comprehensive ideological revisions and altering its stance on violence and on the political process. In 2011 the group established a political party, becoming fully committed to non-violent political participation in post-revolutionary Egypt. Since the ousting of the Brotherhood, the Gama'a has joined supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood into the National Alliance for the Defense of Legitimacy, calling for political reconciliation and for the army to return to the barracks (al-Dosoki 2014).

In other instances, groups have only temporarily denounced violence or the leadership continues to be split over the choice of tactics. Such is the case for example with the Indonesian al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah (JI), which has been connected to the Bali bombings and attacks against tourists in 2002. Several of its leaders have revised their views on violence, and are now working with the authorities to re-educate other members and promote non-violence. The organization as a whole, however, has not officially renounced violent tactics, even though in recent years it has focused much more on Islamic proselytizing than armed struggle.

of salt. In spite of individual initiatives, at the organizational level the Brotherhood continues to remain committed to pursuing its goals through non-violent tactics.

Movements towards the renunciation of violence reflect an important phenomenon that remains largely understudied and eclipsed by research that focuses solely on violence and is mainly event-driven (Cronin 2006; Bjorgo and Horgan 2009). Even though violent tactics can take many forms and there are significant ethical and legal differences among various targets of violence, since 9/11 a large portion of theoretical contributions on the dynamics of violence have been produced within the burgeoning literature on terrorism studies. In this line of research, most studies on armed groups and Islamist extremist groups are based on the assumption that if we understand the roots and causes of violence we can also understand how to prevent it or stop it. However, this prevailing supposition in security studies suffers from several weaknesses.

First, scholars have shown that armed groups can decline for a variety of reasons, many of which are unrelated to the causes of violence. Cronin, for instance, suggests that there are many factors that can cause terrorist groups to implode, such as failures to transition to the next generation or loss of popular support (Cronin 2006). At the individual level, scholars have also shown that individuals disengage from extremist groups for a variety of reasons that are unrelated to the initial decision of taking up arms, which reinforces the fact that the factors that explain why people engage in hostilities are not helpful for understanding why individuals renounce violence (Barrett and Bokhari 2009; Horgan 2009a). Similarly, research on Colombian guerillas also shows that the motives of outsiders to join an insurgent group are different than the motives of insiders to stay active within the group (Florez-Morris 2010).

Second, while scholars historically have regarded external pressures such as repression and relative deprivation as the major causes of violence, recent research suggests that repression can account for both the adoption and the abandonment of violent tactics (Ashour 2009). What remains disputed is under what conditions repression leads to violent radicalization, and under

what conditions it fosters disengagement from violence. Ashour suggests that repression can be sufficient for radicalization, but that it can lead to de-radicalization when it is accompanied by three other necessary conditions: charismatic leadership, selective inducements, and social interaction of the movement with others (Ashour 2009, 139). For this argument to be logically consistent, there has to be either a temporal conditionality to the necessity and sufficiency conditions, which should be explored more in-depth, or the concepts of radicalization and de-radicalization have to be distinct phenomena that can occur at the same time rather than symmetrical opposites.² In either case, what is needed is a study that explores both processes in their historical sequence and clarifies through what causal mechanisms external factors such as repression lead to one outcome versus another.

Last but not least, the emphasis since 9/11 primarily on violent jihadi groups and on their extremist discourse which is to be countered with alternative narratives (Baran 2005; Casebeer and Russell 2005; Corman 2006) ignores the fact that even the most radical ideologies are not static and that some of the most violent groups have themselves undergone ideological revisions and changed their stances on violence. Perhaps even more importantly, some of the leaders of these de-radicalized groups have been actively involved in working with the authorities to undermine violent jihadi ideologies and promote non-violent tactics. This phenomenon holds great potential for undermining violent extremism, and it calls for a more thorough theoretical understanding of when, why and how extremist groups revise their ideologies.

² In the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, Ashour's argument makes sense if we can consider radicalization as outcome y and de-radicalization as a distinct phenomena z, so that x is sufficient for y and x is also an INUS condition for z. When we see x then, we will always see y, and if the other conditions are present then we might also see z. What is needed then both for theoretical clarification and for better informed policy recommendation is an understanding of the relationship between y (radicalization) and z (de-radicalization) and of the causal mechanisms through which x leads to one outcome versus another.

The existing over-emphasis on violent outcomes obscures important lessons to be learned about what causes groups to abstain from or renounce violence. This project seeks to move the literature beyond the myopic focus on the “immediate threats” and offer a theoretical discussion that can help devise innovative policies to prevent and reduce violence. The main goal of this project is to offer a rich and nuanced analysis that can answer why Islamist groups employ and legitimize violence at certain points in time and why they de-legitimize and abandon it in other contexts.

The analysis relies on process-tracing the evolution of four groups: the Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), the Gama’*a* Islamiyyah (Egypt), the Darul Islam (Indonesia) and the Jama’*a* Islamiyyah (Indonesia). The comparison of these cases allows us to examine (1) why within the same national context different Islamist groups pursue opposite strategies at particular points in time, and (2) why in different regional contexts similar groups follow different trajectories when confronted with comparable external pressures. The study examines both outcomes, by explaining why Islamist groups adopt violent or nonviolent strategic outlooks, and processes, by exploring the dynamics of what scholars have referred to as organizational radicalization and de-radicalization.

As will be explained in more detail in the next chapter, the project adopts the language of escalation and de-escalation instead of radicalization and de-radicalization, and it examines both what causal mechanisms account for organizational and ideological change, and why the outcomes we expect don’t always occur. The project provides one of the first cross-regional qualitative analysis of both the escalation towards violence and the de-escalation from violence in the strategic outlook of Islamist groups.

Escalation is defined as a process through which a group increases its commitment towards violent tactics on an ideological, behavioral and institutional level. Ideologically, escalation occurs when a group revises its ideology so as to include a principled justification of violence as a legitimate mean of organized collective action. Behaviorally escalation occurs when a group engages in violent tactics. Institutionally escalation occurs when a group forms an armed wing.

De-escalation on the other hand is understood as the process through which a group reverses these commitments to violent tactics at the three levels. Ideological de-escalation implies a principled renouncement of violence as a mean of organized collective action. At the institutional level de-escalation implies a dismantling of any armed entities, whereas behavioral de-escalation implies the abandonment of violent tactics.

In addition to differentiating among the three dimensions of commitment to violence – ideological, behavioral and institutional – we can also distinguish among different types and targets of violence within each of these categories. Violence against soldiers and military targets, for instance, is different from violence against unarmed civilians. Therefore, within each arena of commitment to violence, we can also speak of escalation or de-escalation in terms of targets and types of violence, as will be revealed throughout the empirical analysis of the case studies.

What We Know about “Radicalization” and “De-radicalization”

The language of “radicalization” and “de-radicalization” started being used in terrorism studies in recent years primarily to refer to psychological processes at the individual level, whereas the organizational level has received relatively little attention in the literature. Much of the research was initially interested in examining the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism and the radicalization of Muslims in the West (Wiktorowicz 2004; Sageman 2008; Silber and Bhatt

2007). Scholars disagree on whether there are any individual characteristics that predispose people to radicalization, and diverge on the importance of organizations and networks in “creating” jihadists. However, there is some consensus that identity crisis and relative deprivation (in particular group-based feelings of injustice) are important determinants of individual radicalization (King and Taylor 2011).

More general research that has emerged on radicalization outside of the narrow focus on jihadists in the West has underlined the fact that radicalization can occur at the individual, the group and the societal level (McCauley and Moskalkenko 2008; Taylor and Horgan 2006). Individuals are radicalized by personal grievances as well as group grievances, whereas groups can be radicalized when they experience isolation and threat, when they compete with other groups over support, in response to state repression, or as a reaction to internal competition and disagreements (McCauley and Moskalkenko 2008). More broadly, society can be radicalized by “jijitsu politics,”³ the dehumanization of the “other” and the notion of martyrdom (McCauley and Moskalkenko 2008).

We can draw several important lessons from this line of inquiry. First, unlike much of the research on radicalization in the West, McCauley and Moskalkenko suggest that radicalization is not linear, and that there may be multiple and diverse pathways to radicalization. Similarly, Taylor and Horgan (2006) argue that there is not one route to terrorism, but that there are various individual routes instead. Therefore, Horgan proposes that “in understanding the terrorist, our focus ought to change from the pursuit of *profiles* to the mapping of *pathways*, and from the search for *root causes* to the identification of *route qualities*” (Horgan 2009a, 1).

³ “Jijitsu politics” refers to the tactic of using the enemy’s strength towards one’s own advantage. In the case of violent groups, this usually refers to staging attacks that provoke a harsh response from the state, which would make it easier for the groups to mobilize public support.

Second, there is a consensus that it is crucial to understand the context in which an individual operates and the cycles of action-reaction. Taylor and Horgan (2006), for example, regard radicalization as a process, which implies that the analysis needs to focus not just on the individual but also on the relationship between settings events, personal factors and the social, political and organizational context.

Third, this research also points out that it is important to differentiate between radicalization in beliefs and in behavior, and not assume that one necessarily leads to the other (Horgan 2009a; Horgan and Braddock 2010; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). In presenting terrorism as a process that unfolds in stages, Horgan, for example, distinguishes between radicalization as an increased commitment to extremist political or religious ideology and violent radicalization, which includes the involvement with a terrorist group. Radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence, but it is one of the risk factors required for violent radicalization (Horgan 2009a, 152).

Beyond terrorist tactics, understanding the adoption of violence as a process that proceeds in stages enables us to consider not just what leads an individual to radicalize, but also what factors lead to disengagement from different types of violence. These issues have historically received little attention in security studies, and only recently have scholars attempted to fill this gap.

Just as radicalization can be examined at the individual and at the collective level, de-radicalization can also be a personal or an organizational feature. At the individual level, most of the scholarly discussion has focused on disengagement, rather than de-radicalization. The distinction is significant: de-radicalization implies renouncing the commitment to violence and abandoning violent activity altogether; disengagement refers to shifting to a different role or

function within an extremist group and reducing one's direct participation in violence (Horgan 2009a).⁴ Given the fact that all research at the individual level has been developed deductively and that all de-radicalization programs have been faced with the problem of recidivism, the scholarly focus on individual disengagement rather than de-radicalization is understandable.

Horgan notes that disengagement is a complex and non-linear phenomenon that can often be gradual and which implies different things for different people (Horgan 2009a). However, a common theme that emerges among disengaged individuals is disillusionment with the group and the cause, which often emerges after a period of reflection and introspection brought about by imprisonment. Physical disengagement can occur for a variety of reasons ranging from arrests to changes in personal life. Psychological disengagement, on the other hand, is spurred by changing personal priorities, a feeling of being burned out, and disillusionment that stems from the incongruence between the initial ideals and the actual experience; from disagreement over tactical issues; or from strategic, political or ideological differences (Horgan 2009b).

Bjorgo suggests that individual disengagement is a process that combines push factors that make the clandestine group unattractive (such as negative social sanctions, disillusionment with group, tactical disagreements, etc) and pull factors, which attract a person to more rewarding alternatives (such as longing for a normal life, wanting to build a career, etc.) (Bjorgo 2009). Research on the demise of left-wing extremism in Netherlands suggests that individual disengagement was possible because (1) members had an exit option and were able to slide back into normal life, (2) members could easily find non-militant outlets for political energy and (3)

⁴ Just as disengagement doesn't always lead to a complete renouncement of violence, it is important to note that the abandonment of violence doesn't always imply ideological moderation. Research on former paramilitary loyalists in Northern Ireland, for example, finds that while they are working at a grassroots level to reduce violence, they have not necessarily changed their ideologies but merely adopted a more pragmatic approach (McAuley, Tonge, and Shirlow 2010).

former members were accepted in society and in political life and were not demonized (de Graaf and Malkki 2010).

In other Western European countries, disengagement from right-wing extremist groups was also facilitated by the existence of exit options, the emphasis on attaining socio-economic security after disengagement, and specialized programs to help former extremist normalize their lives and overcome addiction or depression (Bjorgo, Van Donselaar, and Grunenbergh 2009). Similarly, in Colombia successful disengagement was dependent on the existence and implementation of reincorporation programs and on a weakening of criminal networks (Ribetti 2009).

Research that examines why individuals do not disengage from groups until the whole organization is demobilized seems to support this argument. Florez-Morris, for instance, suggests that individuals remain in a group because of (1) their political, military, economic and social dependence on the group, (2) the political ideals and values of brotherhood and self-sacrifice shared with other members, (3) their clandestine life style makes it difficult to leave the group and (4) they feel important in the group (Florez-Morris 2010).

Socio-economic reintegration into society has also been a central feature of some programs that have aimed at de-radicalization rather than disengagement. Barrett and Bokhari note that the most successful de-radicalization programs in the Muslim world involved family members, employ ideological tools such as fatwas or dialogue with well-known imams, socio-economic reintegration and post-release monitoring to avoid recidivism (Barrett and Bokhari 2009). These programs focus on re-education and rehabilitation and providing an alternative lifestyle as well as opportunities to express frustrations in nonviolent manner (Barrett and Bokhari 2009).

The literature on individual de-radicalization has been primarily focused on describing the existing programs implemented around the world to promote de-radicalization rather than on developing theoretical arguments about the causes of individual de-radicalization (Horgan and Braddock 2010; Kruglanski, Gelfand, and Gunaratna 2010; Meilahn 2008; Woodward, Amin, and Rohmaniyah 2010). Part of the problem, of course, is that it is difficult to know to what extent individuals are truly de-radicalized, and as a recent RAND study observes, there is “not enough reliable data to reach definitive conclusions about the short-term, let alone long-term, effectiveness of most existing deradicalization programs” (Rabasa et al. 2010, xvi).

A common thread that emerges in the discussions of both individual disengagement and de-radicalization is that collective de-radicalization and organizational disengagement is essential. The RAND study on the de-radicalization of Islamist extremists, for example, argues that “collective deradicalization is the most efficient way to change the behavior and beliefs of a large number of militants at once and ultimately discredit the extremist ideology” (Rabasa et al. 2010, xx). Similarly, even though Horgan’s analysis is centered on individuals, he suggests that this is a necessary first step, but terrorism cannot be explained at this level of analysis. Rather, “the mindset should be considered a product of the terrorist groups: expressed more formally, it is a reflection of repeated social and psychological interactions with an ideology (however diffuse or unstructured), the community of practice it engenders and the meaning that is derived by the individual terrorist from sustained involvement and engagement with the group and activity” (Horgan 2009, 8).

In spite of the importance of organizational de-radicalization, this phenomenon has received relatively little attention in the literature. Perhaps even more puzzling is the fact that the emergent research has come to somewhat contradictory conclusions about what factors are most

conducive to de-radicalization. At the organizational level, some scholars argue that de-radicalization occurs when the group is weak and there are internal factions and conflicts because of disagreements over the use of violence, ideology or leadership (Bjorgo 2009; Della Porta 2009). Research on the Egyptian cases, for example, has revealed that some of the reasons behind the de-radicalization of the Gama'a and Al Jihad have been the stagnant leadership and the inability of these groups to attract young recruits (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010). Other scholars, however, suggest that strong charismatic leaders have been essential for ideological revisions and for starting and carrying out the processes of de-radicalization in these very groups (Ashour 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011). Similarly, Rashwan argues that a strong organization structure has been in fact beneficial for the de-radicalization of the Egyptian groups because it has enabled leaders to have authority over members (Rashwan 2009, 129).

A second contested issue is the role of state repression and incentives. Some scholars have emphasized that repression leads to radicalization and violence because it creates grievances and delegitimizes the ruling regime (Hafez 2003), while also leading to strong feelings of solidarity and an increased commitment to action from group members (Della Porta 2009; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). Incentives, on the other hand, are argued to help the state defeat terrorist groups (Della Porta 2009). Following this logic, the Indonesian government, for example, has encouraged the social activities of the Jama'a Islamiyyah, hoping to wean members off violence by giving them space in politics and in civil society (Abuza 2009, 211). If we look at other cases of de-radicalization, the Tajik IRP has *only* abandoned violence when it was finally included in a power-sharing agreement and when indiscriminate repression ended. Perhaps even more telling is the fact that in countries like Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood is

generally believed to have systematically *abstained* from violence because the regime allowed it to participate in politics and co-opted the group.

Other scholars, however, have argued that repression can be one of the factors leading to the demise of terrorist groups (Cronin 2006), and that severe security policies can lead jihadist groups to admit military defeat and reconsider the usefulness of violence (Rashwan 2009). Hamzay and Grebowski (2010) suggests that the decisive defeat at the hands of the security forces has prompted the ideological revisions of the Gama'a Islamiyyah and the Al Jihad in Egypt, but that the refusal of the regime to reintegrate group members into the country's social and political fabric has been a major obstacle to the implementation of de-radicalization. Thus, some of the more recent contributions to the literature regard the combination of repression with selective incentives and soft-line measures as the most effective policies to promote de-radicalization (Ashour 2008; 2009; 2010; Rabasa et al. 2010). It is important to note, however, that while Ashour proposes that de-radicalization occurs as a result of a combination of charismatic leadership, repression, interaction with others and selective inducements, he also suggests that in terms of policy recommendations repression has few benefits because "it initially produces violent radicalization of many of these groups, and later leads to group fragmentation, decentralization, and further violent radicalization for others" (Ashour 2011, 319).

Empirically, Islamist groups have remained non-violent in both repressive and non-repressive regimes, they have resorted to violence even if there was no pervasive repression, and de-radicalization has occurred under both the presence and absence of repression. This reinforces the need for a study that can explore what causal paths have led to the adoption of both non-violent and violent strategies, and which moves beyond the limited focus on repression and relative deprivation as explanatory factors.

Towards a New Understanding of Collective Violent Escalation and De-escalation

In light of the conflicting findings in the literature on collective de-radicalization, this dissertation seeks to provide a more systematic cross-regional investigation of the effects of both organizational factors and repression on the strategic outlook of an Islamist group, and examine under what conditions these factors lead to violent escalation and when they foster de-escalation. The analysis relies primarily on process-tracing in order to explore in what circumstances particular groups adopt either violent or non-violent strategies, as well as what causal mechanisms and dynamics underlie the processes of violent escalation and de-escalation. The insights from each case are compared to each other, in order to evaluate what mechanisms and dynamics travel across regions and historical time periods. Such an examination of causal mechanisms can help us understand what triggers make repression foment violent escalation and what pathways make it lead to the abandonment of violence.

While this dissertation is focused on the dynamics of collective escalation and de-escalation, it recognizes the importance of understanding individual psychological processes, and builds on some of the insights from the literature on individual disengagement. First, if we recognize that the adoption of violent tactics is best understood as a process and that there are multiple pathways towards and away from the use of violence, then it becomes essential to examine both the dynamics of engagement with and disengagement from violence. Second, if we take seriously the fact that exit options are important for members, and that disengagement from a violent role is a relevant and frequent precedent to ‘de-radicalization,’ then it is necessary to examine what options members have for non-violent action both within and outside the groups.

This suggests that the analysis needs to move beyond the myopic focus on whether a group adopts violent tactics or not, and examine in more detail what other activities the group is

involved with, and what other tactics it promotes to fulfill its goals. A group with a broad organizational structure and a network of social services, for example, can offer its members many possibilities of becoming involved beyond violence. Just as individuals can remain engaged with a group but disengage from violence, collectively the group can also remain devoted to a cause, but renounce violence and pursue its goals through alternate means that it finds acceptable or effective. In other words, to understand what determines the strategic outlook of Islamist groups, we need to inspect closely the organizational goals and examine the possibility and effectiveness of both violent and non-violent tactics.

Following this logic, the project starts from the premise that both agents and structures are essential for understanding group strategies, and that both ideology and context matter. While most of the literature tends to emphasize one aspect at the cost of the other, this research offers a framework that integrates ideational, structural and organizational factors. Islamist organizations are both principled and strategic, committed to their religious vision and mission, but also strategic and pragmatic in the day-to-day interpretation of their principles. Particular religious interpretations provide important filters through which the social and political reality is interpreted, and cost benefit calculations are not made in absolute terms but rather in relation to religious aspirations.

The assumption is that Islamic law provides a diverse “toolkit” of social and political strategies from which Islamist groups can draw and adopt distinct ideologies. These ideologies have practical implications, and define the goals and priorities of an organization, as well as the acceptable tactics. Once these preferences and the acceptable set of tactics are established, which strategies Islamist groups adopt at particular points in time is determined by the complex interaction between the group, the state and the rest of the society. These interactions make

groups adapt and change every-day practices, and it can also lead to more fundamental ideological revisions, which can take the form of either violent escalation or de-escalation.

While Islamist groups are at some level strategic rational actors similar to any other opposition group or political movement, they are also distinct in that any ideological revision has to still fit within a theological framework that is consistent with Islamic law. Thus, unlike secular revolutionary movements that can adopt or abandon violence depending on its social and political cost, Islamist movements have to justify their particular tactics much more rigorously for their constituents. Given the wide variety of non-violent social and political tools promoted in Islamic law and the rigid conditions for when violence is justified, it is important to note therefore that violent escalation is in many ways a much more puzzling outcome than de-escalation or non-violence. This makes it ever more important to study the dynamics of both violent escalation and de-escalation.

The project argues that the strategies of Islamist opposition groups are determined by the complex interaction of five factors: ideology, policy convergence, government policies towards the organization, public norms of resistance and organizational dynamics. The founding principles of a group, the extent to which government domestic and foreign policies are convergent with the vision of the group, and the regime's policies towards the organization all provide incentives for action. These incentives for action are in turn translated through organizational dynamics and prevalent norms of resistance.

The ideological framework on which an Islamist group is founded determines the set of overarching goals of the group and defines what set of tactics are acceptable. However, depending on the social and political context, not all goals are always achievable, and not all

tactics are feasible or effective. In their day to day practice groups adjust to the context, and over time these adjustments can lead to ideological revisions.

The extent to which government policies in domestic and foreign affairs are convergent with the mission and vision of an Islamist group provides the impetus for action, and affects the level of antagonism towards the regime. This antagonism, however, can be mollified if the regime attempts to include Islamists in the political process, or aggravated if the groups are excluded from politics or repressed.

The impact of these external pressures and incentives are translated through two important transmission belts: public norms and organizational dynamics. Prevalent norms on the legitimacy of particular tactics affect the cost benefit calculations of an organization.

Organizational dynamics such as strength of leadership, organizational structures and generational gaps, determine a group's propensity and ability to adapt its strategic outlook.

This dissertation proposes that the process of violent escalation is driven by the logic of grievances. Government repression, low policy convergence and salient threats to the Muslim community lead to escalating grievances. These grievances are aggravated by the pervasiveness of violent norms of resistance and by intra-organizational competition over authority. In such a context, any perceived external aggression, such as the regime striking against the organization, can serve as a catalyst for violent escalation.

Unlike violent escalation, the argument set forth in this project is that the process of de-escalation follows primarily the logic of disillusionment. An organizational crisis and widespread public condemnation of the group can lead to a re-evaluation of the cost of violence, and a re-thinking of the vision as a whole, which in turn prompts the group to de-escalate its tactics.

The project suggests that the question of Islamist strategies needs to go beyond examining only organizational characteristics or only state policies towards the specific groups under study, which has been the trend with most works on Islamist use of violent tactics. Ultimately, this is a question about the contestation of state identity, an arena where Islamist opposition groups figure prominently across the world. But their success and their strategies are dependent on the broader dynamics and cleavages within the society. It is these social dynamics that this dissertation seeks to bring front and center.

In addition to bringing into focus broader state-society relations that expand the focus beyond Islamist groups, this dissertation also seeks to extend the analysis beyond the Middle East, and examine these questions from a cross-regional perspective. This can provide important variance on questions of state vulnerability and legitimacy as well as on regime types, and explore whether there are any regional characteristics that affect Islamist policy preferences.

Cases and Methodology

The project seeks to accomplish two major goals: (1) offer a theoretical framework that explains why we see certain violent or nonviolent outcomes; and (2) uncover the dynamics and the causal mechanisms underlying the processes of violent escalation and de-escalation. To accomplish this, the project focuses on four case studies from Egypt and Indonesia.

Given the ambition of the project to uncover *how* escalation and de-escalation unfold, the analysis relies first and foremost on process-tracing, a qualitative method that “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206). As scholars have emphasized, process-tracing is employed “when we want to gain a greater understanding of the nature of causal relationships that can be provided by other

social science case study methods” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 5). The method is “particularly important for generating and assessing evidence of causal mechanisms” (George & Bennett 2005, 214). Unlike large-*n* studies, which rely on a probabilistic logic of inference, and where the emphasis is on understanding the average effects of causes, process-tracing relies on what Beach and Pedersen define as a “mechanismic understanding of causality,” where the focus of the analysis is on how “causal forces are transmitted through the series of interlocking parts of a causal mechanism to contribute to producing an outcome” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 25).

The project is structured around four case studies, each of which relies primarily on process-tracing to draw causal inferences. In two of the cases, counter-factual analysis is also employed to complement process-tracing, in order to test the strength of the findings and to examine the relative impact of non-systematic factors and case-specific conjunctions or catalysts. Whereas the analysis strives to explain the dynamics of change within the particularities of each case, the project also seeks to find parsimonious pathways and causal mechanisms that can be generalizable across cases. The four cases chosen for the analysis make for relevant comparisons that can offer insights into what causal mechanisms travel across cases.

Egypt and Indonesia offer appropriate cases to compare because both countries share a history of military rule and regimes that paid some homage to Islamic principles, yet who explicitly sought to keep Islamic organizations out of politics. Polity IV, for instance, ranks Egypt from 1952 (which corresponds to Nasser’s ascent to power) until 2004 the same as Indonesia under the New Order (1959-1998), with both countries receiving the lowest score possible on democracy. Other quantitative measures of repression, such as the Political Terror Scale based on Amnesty International reports and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (which ranks countries based on their use of torture, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and

disappearance) also report that since the mid-70s and 1980s both countries have witness serious abuses of state power, with Indonesia many times ranking even lower than Egypt on certain aspects. Yet Indonesia has successfully transitioned away from its authoritarian past, consolidating as a democracy, whereas Egypt has failed to transition to a democratic system and it continues to face many political challenges. This offers important variation in terms of regime type that is difficult to find among Muslim countries in the Middle East, and it allows us to compare the strategies of Islamist groups in both democratic and un-democratic contexts.

Egypt and Indonesia also have some of the most influential and largest Islamic movements in the world. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is perhaps the most well-known Islamist movement, and what Saad Eddine Ibrahim calls the “mother of all modern Islamic movements” (Ashour 2009, ix). Indonesia is home to both Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and to Muhammadiyah, the two largest mass-based Islamic organizations in the world, which claim around 40 million and 30 million affiliated members respectively (Arifianto 2012, 80). Munhanif suggests that Egypt and Indonesia represent one of the few instances of political Islamic movements in different countries sharing almost identical historical formative processes, but subsequently developing very differently (Munhanif 2010).

The cases chosen for this analysis have both within case variation on the outcome of interest, which allows for the use of process-tracing to explore the dynamics of change and uncover causal mechanisms, and also make for appropriate cross-case comparisons. The latter method can test whether the causal mechanisms are unique or hold across cases, and it can examine why groups react so differently to the same national context, and why similar groups but in different national contexts respond differently to comparable external pressures.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a crucial case to examine in-depth on its own terms, and a relevant case to compare to both al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah and the Darul Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood can be considered the exemplar Islamist movement. It has established offices in most Muslim countries around the world, it has included some of the most influential Islamist thinkers whose writings have been the foundation of numerous Islamist groups worldwide, and it has had a significant impact on the social and political landscape of Middle East.

The group is arguably the most important branch of the Brotherhood worldwide, and is by far the most widely studied branch. To understand the roots of the organization, the subsequent ideological and theological developments and reforms, and where the founders of most other branches received their training and original indoctrination, one must understand the dynamics and evolution of the Egyptian Brotherhood.

Besides being a crucial case, however, the Muslim Brotherhood struggled with the choice of violent tactics during its early period, which offers an excellent opportunity to examine what dynamics prevent the adoption of violence and lead to splinters and to violent or non-violent legacies. Even though Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb⁵ emerged from the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and his writings were the inspiration for many subsequent violent groups, the Brotherhood eventually consolidated as a moderate, non-violent movement.

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah (GI) in Egypt makes for a particularly relevant case to compare to the Muslim Brotherhood in order to check whether the same causal mechanisms of violent escalation occur during subsequent historical periods, and to examine why different groups react to external factors in divergent manners. However, GI also offers one of the clearest instances of

⁵ Chapter three discusses in greater detail some of the ideological tenets of Sayyid Qutb, their impacts on various segments of the Muslim Brotherhood and the emergence of justifications for political violence based on his writings.

intentional violent de-escalation among Islamist groups. The organization not only stopped its attacks and explicitly renounced violence, but it revised its ideology and completely re-invented itself, transforming into a political party after the fall of Mubarak. In that sense, GI is substantively and theoretically important for understanding the process of violent de-escalation.

The two Egyptian cases are used to uncover potential causal mechanisms of violent escalation and de-escalation. The two Indoensian cases chosen for the analysis can verify whether the same causal mechanisms occur in other regional and historical contexts. The early period of the Muslim Brotherhood makes for a particularly relevant comparison with the Darul Islam (DI) movement, because in spite of drastically different ideological programs and national contexts, both groups underwent a similar gradual shift from fighting external enemies to opposing the national government. Tracing these dynamics in both cases allows us to explore whether similar causal mechanisms occurred in both instances, in spite of the differences.

The Egyptian Gam'a al-Islamiyyah makes for a well-suited comparison with the Indonesian Jama'a (JI) because both organizations had a similar founding ideology, both engaged in violence, and both were severely repressed. Yet whereas the Egyptian group disengaged from violence, the Indonesian group was faced with internal debates and divisions around the use of violent tactics, but never officially revised its strategic outlook or opted for entering the legal political process.

The focus of the analysis lies on understanding the dynamics of violent escalation and de-escalation. However, the study also briefly considers what happens after de-escalation and what considerations inform the choices of non-violent organizations. In Egypt the issues of violence and politicization are woven together in the histories of the Brotherhood and al-Gama'a, whereas in Indonesia these are distinct issues and the mainstream Islamic and Islamist groups never

considered employing violence against the state, whereas violent groups never considered political participation. The investigation therefore follows the political oscillations of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah, but also briefly examines two Indonesian groups that have never employed violence against the state: the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) that emerged from the tarbiya student movement, and the Nahdlatul Ulama.

The tarbiya movement in Indonesia, which was strongly inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood both in terms of ideology and in terms of organization structure, and which continues to have a strong affinity with the Egyptian organization, makes for a fascinating contrast to the Egyptian experience. Even in the face of repression it never considered the use of violence. Within its nonviolent repertoire, the group also remained distinctly a-political until after the fall of Soeharto, when it decided to form a political party. But even as a political party (PK/PKS), the organization followed a very different trajectory than the Egyptian Brotherhood, and had a very different fate.

The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, attracting an estimated 50 million members (Bush 2009, 2). The organization started out as a mass movement focused on Islamic education and social services, and seeking to protect the interests and authority of the traditional *ulama* in the face of the rising modernism movement. NU became gradually politicized, first joining Masyumi in the 1940s and subsequently establishing its own party in 1952. During Suharto's era, however, the forced imposition of the Pancasila state ideology and the repressive regime policies eventually pushed the NU to exit politics and once again prioritize social services and religious education. Since 1998, however, the organization has once again reconsidered its stance on political participation and has fluctuated in its

relationship to the PKB party. These political oscillations make for a particularly interesting comparison to the Muslim Brotherhood and the PKS, and also make for a relevant initial examination of why Islamic groups might exit politics and detach themselves from political parties.

As mentioned earlier, one of the main contentious issues in the study of radicalization and de-radicalization is the relationship between repression and violence. Table 1 summarizes how the cases chosen for this analysis vary in relation to state repression and violent escalation.

Table 1 The Distribution of Cases Based on Presence of Repression and Use of Violence.

		Repression of Groups	
		YES	NO
Group Resorts to Violence	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MB 1940s, 1950s • Qutbist faction 1960s • GI before 1997 • JI before 1998 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Darul Islam (early period) • JI after 1998
	NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MB after 1965 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MB early 1970s

The dissertation seeks to uncover the causal mechanisms of violent escalation by exploring the cases in the (1,1) repression/violence cell, as well as the case in the (0,1) no repression/violence cell, which tackles the issue of equifinality and allows for an examination of what other paths can produce violent outcomes even in the absence of repression. Process-tracing is particularly well-suited for this type of investigation because it “offers the possibility of identifying different causal paths that lead to a similar outcome in different cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 215). The analysis also explores cases in the (1,0) repression/no violence cell in order to examine the scope condition of escalation and understand why repression leads to escalation in some factions but not in others.

Within the non-violent repertoire Islamist groups also have various options, and can choose between political and non-political tactics. The study briefly explores why groups chose to enter the political process and why they choose to abstain from politics even when there is a democratic opening. Table 2 shows how the cases are distributed on this dimension.

Table 2 The Distribution of Cases Based on the Availability of a Democratic Opening and the Choice to Participate in Politics

		Democratic Opening	
		YES	NO
Group Participates in Formal Politics	YES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muslim Brotherhood as Freedom and Justice Party 2011-2013 • GI as Building and Development Party after 2011 • PKS after 1998 • Nahdlatul Ulama 1952 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nahdlatul Ulama 1965-1984 • Muslim Brotherhood 1984 -2011 <p>[without a minimal level of political opening in the system, this cell would be a logical impossibility]</p>
	NO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JI post 1998 • Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) post 1998 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JI pre 1998 • Tarbiyah movement (precursor to PKS)

The study briefly explores the cases in cell (1,1) democratic opening/participation, cell (0,0) no democratic opening/no participation and cell (0,1) no democratic opening/participation in order to explore whether the logic of principled and strategic adjustment also holds in relation to participating in politics. The study also briefly touches on the case in cell (1, 0) democratic opening/no participation in order to examine under what conditions groups do not choose to enter the political process.

Whereas the cases and methods chosen for this study hold important benefits, this type of investigation also has some limitations, in particular regarding the generalizability of its findings. The project can offer important insights into the dynamics of change within the four case studies,

and it can reflect on what causal mechanisms carry across the four cases and withstand regional or historical differences. Beyond this, however, this type of investigation cannot make any claims about the necessity or sufficiency conditions of these causal mechanisms at the level of the population. The extent to which the causal mechanisms revealed in these case studies can explain other Islamist groups would have to be tested.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation seeks to explain both outcomes (why certain Islamist groups adopt violent or nonviolent strategic outlooks) and processes (violent escalation and de-escalation). This point is explained in greater detail in chapter two, which develops the theoretical framework of the project, and reviews the major competing explanations.

Chapter three focuses on the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. First, the chapter examines what causal mechanisms account for the increasing use of violence within the organization, paying close attention to time sequence and to moments at which the Brotherhood was faced with tactical choices and refused to adopt a violent outlook. Second, the chapter examines what can explain the divergent legacies of repression and the concurrent consolidation of the Brotherhood as a non-violent organization and rise of violent Qutbist thought.

Chapter four examines al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah. The first part of the chapter narrows in on the initial period of violent escalation and examines causal mechanisms. The second part traces the process of de-escalation and ideological and tactical revisions.

Chapter five follows a similar structure, examining the emergence of the Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia, and exploring whether the same causal mechanisms that accounted for the escalation of violence in Egypt also occurred in the 1950s in newly independent Indonesia. The

chapter focuses primarily on the rebellion in West Java, and also briefly investigates what accounts for the defeat or “end” of the DI.

Chapter six focuses on al-Jama’ a al-Islamiyyah in Indonesia, and compares the evolution of the group with the developments in the Egyptian Gama’a. Here the chapter also focuses on the dynamics of violent escalation, but also asks why the Indonesian organization never underwent a systematic de-escalation of tactics or a definitive change in strategic outlook.

Chapter seven extends the analysis to the realm of non-violent tactics to explore whether the logic of strategic adjustment can also explain why non-violent groups chose to enter, exit or stay out of the political process. To answer these questions the analysis considers the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah, al-Jama’ a al-Islamiyyah, the PKS and Nahdlatul Ulama.

The conclusion ties all the arguments together by addressing more explicitly what we can learn from the cross-regional comparison. The chapter presents what mechanisms hold across cases and what mechanisms are unique to particular organizations or specific historical conditions. The conclusion also addresses what we can learn from this study about the effects of repression and organizational characteristics, and how the puzzles emerging from the literature on radicalization and de-radicalization can be solved. Last but not least, the chapter also addresses policy implications and outlines avenues for future research.

Implications

This dissertation seeks to open new lines of inquiry in the field of contentious politics, by shifting the focus away from solely examining violent outcomes and promoting methodologically nuanced ways to examine what causal mechanisms underlie organizational changes in strategy. The theoretical framework proposed integrates insights from various strands

of literature, and moves beyond the bifurcated treatment of ideology and context. This approach helps avoid the static view of groups as either inherently violent or non-violent, or as either rigidly ideological or perfectly rational. The project strives to offer a more in-depth understanding of Islamist groups as both religious and strategic actors, by offering an account of how change has occurred in four specific organizations that are theoretically and historically relevant. As an increasing number of Islamist groups are vying for power in the Muslim world, understanding what dynamics underlie their choice of strategies is crucial for both American foreign policy and more generally for devising policies that promote nonviolence. This project sheds new light on the dynamics of violent escalation and de-escalation, and aspires to serve as a stepping stone towards future research that explores the extent to which these insights apply to other Islamist organizations.

Chapter 2

Violence, Nonviolence and the Escalation and De-Escalation of Strategies

This project strives to offer a nuanced analysis that can answer why Islamist opposition groups change their strategies towards violence or non-violence, and in particular why they legitimize tactics such as violence or political participation at certain points in time and de-legitimize them in other contexts. The study is motivated by two questions. First, what determines what tactics Islamist groups employ towards the state/political system? Second, what causal mechanisms underlie ideological and strategic revisions? The project thus attempts to understand the dynamics of violent escalation and de-escalation, and reveal why some groups remain non-violent whereas others adopt violence when confronted with similar external pressures.

This chapter employs typologies and deductive reasoning to develop a theoretical framework for understanding what factors shape the strategic outlook of Islamist opposition groups, and what dynamics characterize the processes of collective violent escalation and de-escalation. By moving beyond the narrow focus on violence and asking more broadly under what circumstances Islamist groups employ non-violent or violent tactics, the framework seeks to offer some answers to the emerging debate about whether organizational cohesion and repression foster or inhibit “de-radicalization.”

The theoretical framework developed here takes religion and ideology seriously, but argues against a frequently implicit assumption that Islamist movements are ontologically predisposed to violence or that de-escalation is more difficult for religious groups (Pluchinsky 2008; Rabasa et al. 2010). Instead, I regard religious discourse as providing a diverse “toolkit”

for political mobilization and action, and the context being a key determinant of which tactics are chosen and whether a group moves towards violence or towards de-escalation. From this perspective, the religious aspect of these groups in fact holds great potential for the use of non-violent tactics and for disengagement from violence.

Last but not least, while the primary goal is to explain collective escalation and de-escalation, the framework develops a theoretical argument that draws on insights from the literature on individual disengagement from violence. The analysis is sensitive to the recent findings that underline the importance of exit options (Bjorgo, Van Donselaar, and Grunenberg 2009; de Graaf and Malkki 2010; Ribetti 2009) and of non-violent modes of expressing frustration (Barrett and Bokhari 2009) for individual disengagement from violence.

Definitions

Before expanding on the theoretical framework and providing hypotheses, it is first important to define some of the main concepts of this study. At the center of my analysis are Islamist groups. Accepting Ashour's definition, Islamist groups are sociopolitical organizations "that base and justify their political principles, ideologies, behaviors and objectives on their understanding of Islam or on their understanding of a certain past interpretation of Islam" (Ashour 2009, 4). A few important clarifications are in order.

First, unlike Ashour I try not to use the concepts of "group" and "movement" interchangeably, because movements are often used to invoke the image of mass-based social movements, such as the civil rights, the women's movements or the more recent "Occupy Wall Street" movement. This is indeed an accurate description of some Islamist groups, but not of all, and it is certainly not a defining characteristic of an Islamist group.

Nonetheless the Islamist groups under study are formal organizations, to the extent that they have a leadership, a structure (hierarchical or de-centralized, simple or complex), and a membership base. Hierarchical structures, for example, are those where decision-making is a top-down process, flowing from the leadership to the members. A de-centralized structure implies several semi-autonomous entities within an organization and a bottom-up decision-making process. Organizational structures can also change from simple to complex when there are several distinct units or branches developed within an organization, who have their own internal hierarchy of authority. For instance, some Islamist groups establish a political branch, a social service branch or a military branch, and the authority and individual motivations for joining the different branches are very different. Similarly, some Islamist groups have a narrow membership base and rely on the actions of a few devoted individuals, whereas other groups have a broad membership base.

In addition to being formal organizations, Islamist groups also have an ideology and what I call a “strategic outlook.” Defining and differentiating between these two concepts is important in order to avoid circular arguments as we attempt to explain escalation and de-escalation of beliefs and practices. In order to define ideology, I follow Gerring’s framework (Gerring 1997), who suggests that the first core attribute of the concept should identify the location of ideology as either in thought, language or behavior. This question is not one of measurement (as it is indeed impossible to operationalize and measure thought that is not expressed through language), but one of ontology. Taking that into consideration, I argue that the location of Islamist group ideology is thought, as expressed and measured through language. In other words, the ideology of Islamist groups consists of a set of fundamental beliefs, values, principles and ideals that are derived from particular theological interpretations of Islam.

Adopting Seliger's bifurcated model of ideology (Seliger 1970), Klein points out, however, that Islamist groups such as Hamas often display two sets of principles: long-term principles and absolute goals, and short-term reactions to the immediate constraints and circumstances (Klein 2007). As Seliger suggests, for any party or movement holding or competing for power, "the need for a more or less frank restatement of the immediate goals inevitably arises," so that in response to prevailing circumstances "no party has ever been able to avoid committing itself to lines of action which are irreconcilable with, or at least doubtfully related to, the basic principles and goals in its ideology" (Seliger 1970, 326). What emerges then is not just a conflict between thought and action, but within ideology itself, which leads to action-oriented thought. Aside from the fundamental principles then, a new line of argument emerges, which Seliger calls "operative ideology," whose purpose is to justify particular policies that are executed by the party. Operative ideology pays more attention to prudence, expediency and efficiency than to the absolute principles of the group, and it is more concerned with technical prescriptions than overarching moral prescriptions. In other words, the difference between the fundamental and the operative ideology is one between "the original doctrine" and "the twists of application" (Seliger 1970, 329).

This is an important nuance that becomes particularly relevant when we discuss Islamist groups and their justifications for violence. Therefore, I also propose to differentiate between fundamental thought and operative thought. I argue that fundamental principles define a group's ideology, whereas operative principles, along with behavior, are a measure of a group's strategic outlook. Thus, the strategic outlook of an Islamist group consists of the operative discourse and the set of practices of the group.

Following Seliger's definition of ideology, fundamental principles can be understood as a set of ideas by which groups "posit, explain, and justify ends and means of organized social action, with the aim to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given reality" (Seliger 1970, 325). In other words, the ideology of an Islamist group includes fundamental principles, major organizational goals, and a set of acceptable means of action.

In terms of the subject matter of these fundamental principles, which is Gerring's second suggested core attribute, I argue that the ideology of Islamist group is primarily political.⁶ As Ashour's definition of Islamist groups also suggests, they project their theological interpretations onto the political sphere, and as Clarke underlines, they seek "to actively extend and apply Islam beyond what is commonly regarded as the private realm to affect the public realm" (Clark 2004, 168). Islamist groups are premised on a particular theological interpretation that religion and politics are inseparable, and that state legislation needs to be based on Islamic *shari'a* law. That being said, groups differ in how strictly they interpret *shari'a* laws, and whether they seek to promote them through education and a gradual Islamization of society, through taking the responsibility in their own hands to "promote the good and forbid the evil," through participation in politics and direct political pressure, or through a take-over of the state. These differences are grounded in divergent theological interpretations.

Islamist groups are state-centric and are interested in the political process rather than withdrawing from all forms of politics and being inward-looking. They fall into what Yavuz classifies as having vertical rather than horizontal goals, regardless of whether they are reformist and use legitimate means of contestation, or revolutionary and resort to illegitimate means.

Yavuz suggests that reformist groups want to participate in politics "in the hope of controlling

⁶ Gerring suggests that the subject matter can be either (1) political, (2) pertaining more broadly to relations of power and domination or (3) a complete belief system about the world at large.

the state or shaping policies through forming their own Islamic party,” whereas revolutionary groups reject the system and confront the state with violence and intimidation (Yavuz 2004, 274). Both these groups classify as Islamist opposition group.⁷

To sum up this discussion, Islamist groups are understood here as socio-political entities that have (1) a formal organization, (2) an ideology, (3) a strategic outlook. Their ideology consists of fundamental principles derived from specific theological interpretation, which are primarily concerned with the political realm, and which posit long-term goals and acceptable means of collective action. The strategic outlook consists of an organization’s practices and operative principles.

Beyond the Static Model: The Diversity of Strategies and the Dynamics of Change

One of the major premises of this project is that Islamist groups are not static organizations in terms of what strategies they adopt towards the political system. Just as it is problematic to think of a group as inherently or permanently “radical” or violent, it can also be misleading to define any group that has stopped violence as categorically non-violent. Instead, the project suggests that it is more helpful to look at the strategic outlook of an organization at particular points in time and in particular contexts, recognizing that while strategies might be stable over long periods of time, they are not deterministically fixed. Understanding when and how the process of change happens within organizations is therefore one of the main motivations of this dissertation.

In terms of strategic outlook, at the most basic level we can differentiate between violent and nonviolent strategies. In terms of violent outlook, there are differing levels of commitment to

⁷ It should be noted that this definition of Islamist groups as being oriented towards the political process might raise suspicions as to whether the Nahdlatul Ulama can classify as an Islamist group, given the fact that the organization has at least on paper distanced itself from party politics, and the group has also abandoned its earlier push for *shari'a* laws, currently being a major proponent of the Pancasila principle of secular government. In fact, we could see the NU as shifting from an Islamist to an Islamic party.

violence at any particular point in time, depending on the extent to which a group employs and legitimizes violent tactics. Ashour provides a helpful framework for thinking about such differences by suggesting that we examine three dimensions: ideology, behavior and organizational capacity.

Distinguishing groups based on these three facets of commitment to violence adds an important nuance to the discussion, but it does not differentiate among various types and targets of violence. Yet such distinctions can have important ethical and legal implications. For instance, criminal types of violence such as kidnapping can be considered less severe than killing state officials, which in turn are fundamentally different from intentional attacks on unarmed civilians. Similarly, both international law and Islamic writings on warfare clearly distinguish between targeting military targets, foreign troops and occupying forces from attacking domestic targets and political opponents in one's own country. From a religious perspective, it is considered a duty to defend oneself, the Muslim community and Muslim lands if they are under attack, much like in just war theory defensive acts of violence and guerilla tactics are seen as categorically different from targeting unarmed civilians.

Such distinctions are taken into consideration in the empirical discussion of the case studies, and a shift from military to civilian targets is treated as an instance of escalation. But at a more general level, changes in types and targets of violence can also occur at the ideological, behavioral or institutional level. Therefore, for the purpose of categorization, the discussion here remains focused on whether at a particular point in time a group (1) resorts to violent attacks (regardless of whether they succeed or fail), (2) displays an ideological justification for violence,

and (3) maintains a military wing or military stockpiles. All possible combinations of engagement with violence are presented in Table 2.1.⁸

⁸ This table focuses on different types of strategic outlook based on their level of engagement with violence. Because of this, the non-violent strategic outlook only represents one cell in the entire typology, and is not meant to reflect upon the actual distribution of Islamist groups, who are more frequently nonviolent than violent. Furthermore, within the non-violent repertoire, Islamists groups can also choose to pursue their goals through different types of tactics, such as political or non-political. Chapter seven touches upon these dynamics and briefly examines when and why groups chose to participate in the political process. The main focus of the dissertation, however, is the issue of engagement with and disengagement from violent, hence the emphasis here on variation in strategic outlook based on the levels of violent escalation.

Table 3. Strategic Outlook Based on Levels of Engagement with Violence

	OPERATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE		NO OPERATIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE	
	VIOLENT TACTICS	NO VIOLENT TACTICS	VIOLENT TACTICS	NO VIOLENT TACTICS
ARMED WING	A ACTIVELY VIOLENT	B PASSIVELY VIOLENT	C ACTIVELY VIOLENT	D PASSIVELY VIOLENT
	Ideological, Institutional and Behavioral commitment to violent tactics	Ideological and Institutional commitment to violent tactics but not behavioral Group is deterred or incapacitated	Institutional and behavioral but no ideological commitment to violent tactics Group is incoherent/ fragmented	Institutional but not ideological or behavioral commitment to violent tactics Group is dormant/ latent OR fragmented and incoherent
NO ARMED WING	E ACTIVELY VIOLENT	F PASSIVELY VIOLENT	G ACTIVELY VIOLENT	H NONVIOLENT
	Ideological and behavioral but no institutional commitment to violent tactics Group engages in sporadic violent campaigns but violence not institutionalized	Ideological commitment to violent tactics, but no institutional or behavioral commitment	Behavioral commitment to violent tactics, but no ideological or institutional commitment Violent elements within constituency but no official organizational commitment to violence	No institutional, behavioral or ideological commitment to violence

Table 3 reinforces the idea that a strategic outlook can be violent or nonviolent, and that there are various combinations of commitments to violent tactics. Some groups adopt one

particular strategic outlook for their entire life span. However, for many other groups, the strategic outlook moves across the quadrants throughout the cycles of the organization. For example, in terms of resistance to occupation and foreign troops, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt started out in quadrant F, but then by the early 1940s it formed an armed wing and began attacking British troops and participating in the fighting in Palestine, thus shifting its strategic outlook to quadrant B and A, before reverting to quadrant F once again after the group eventually dismembered its armed wing. In terms of violent tactics employed domestically against the state, political enemies or civilians, however, the Muslim Brotherhood started with the strategic outlook in quadrant H, in the late 1940s and early 1950s it shifted to quadrant C, as its armed wing began shifting its target to domestic political opponents and not just foreign troops, even though the organization provided no ideological justification for such tactics, and these acts caused rifts in the leadership.

Quadrant H is the only type of strategic outlook that can be classified as nonviolent according to the framework offered. However, it is important not to conflate the absence of a commitment to violence with commitment to nonviolence or pacifism. Additionally, nonviolent tactics can take politically participatory and non-participatory forms, and groups may choose to form a political party and “enter” politics, or they may choose to refrain from forming a political party, or even “exit” politics and detach themselves from a party. These are nuances and shifts that are briefly explored in chapter seven. The main focus of the dissertation, however, remains the question around engagement with violence.

The “ideal type” of violent strategic outlook is represented by quadrant A, where an organization develops the institutional capacity to systematically employ violence, it employs violent tactics, and it also deploys operational justifications for such tactics. It is important to

note, however, that as quadrant B suggests, as long as a group justifies violence and maintains an armed wing, even if it ceases violent operations for a prolonged period of time, we can continue to classify it as violent but recognize that it is inactive and only institutionally and ideologically committed to violence, which suggests that the organization is probably temporarily either deterred or incapacitated.

When a deterred or incapacitated group maintains an armed wing yet renounces justifications of violence (as in quadrant D), we can assume that the group is either dormant (and potentially plans on resuming and justifying violence again in the future) or completely incoherent or incapacitated, such as in cases where the leadership renounces justifications of violence but it is incapable of dismantling the armed wing, or when the organization is incapacitated by repression but the armed wing continues to technically exist in a weak form. As long as the institutional capacity to undertake violence remains, we cannot regard such groups as nonviolent.

Last but not least, quadrant F also reflects a passive violent strategic outlook, even though the commitment to violent tactics is only on an ideological level, and the organization does not engage in or have any institutional commitments to violent tactics. Such a group does not employ violent tactics or maintain an armed wing, but it displays an operational discourse that justifies violent tactics in particular circumstances. Why would an organization see it necessary to justify violence if it does not commit it or if it doesn't have an armed wing? One answer might be to gain public appeal. We see for instance groups such as the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood at times deploy a discourse that justifies violent tactics in the Palestinian Territories, even though the group itself has no intention of engaging in such violence. Another possibility might be that

the group is moving towards violent escalation, but it has not developed the institutional capacity to undertake violence yet.

Just as there are different levels of commitment to violent tactics, when a group shifts its strategic outlook, the escalation or de-escalation of its strategies can reflect different levels of commitment. While I draw on the insights of the literatures that discuss both individual and organizational radicalization and de-radicalization, these concepts often tend to carry with them assumptions about what a “radical” or a “de-radicalized” individual or group might look like, that might eclipse the real nuances in terms of the three types of commitments.

Ashour (2009), for instance, provides the most nuanced discussion and offers the most comprehensive definitions of group de-radicalization to date. According to him, de-radicalization is a process in which “a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralism context” (Ashour 2009, 5–6). This definition reflects how it becomes difficult to talk about de-radicalization without an implicit discussion of ideological moderation, which moves the analysis beyond issues of violent and non-violent tactics and crosses the line into arguments about views regarding democracy or social life. However, the issue of violence is conceptually different from the discussion of moderation in views, and should be treated as such.

There are other dangers inherent in treating groups as radicalized or de-radicalized. Based on these dimensions of de-radicalization, Ashour suggests that there are three different types of de-radicalization processes: (1) comprehensive de-radicalization- which occurs at the ideological, behavioral and the organizational level, (2) substantive de-radicalization- which occurs at the ideological and behavioral level but not at the organizational level, and (3)

pragmatic de-radicalization- which occurs at the behavioral and organizational level, but not ideologically. If we map his three types of de-radicalization onto table 3, we can see that according to his conceptualization a group in quadrant D could have undergone the process of substantive de-radicalization, a group in quadrant F might have witnessed pragmatic de-radicalization, and a group in quadrant H might have undergone comprehensive de-radicalization. This is problematic because it risks defining deterred, incapacitated or fragmented violent groups as “de-radicalized.” In addition to the problems of what additional implicit assumptions might be attached to such a label in terms of “moderation” of views, the distinction is important also for policy prescriptions that can be generalizable beyond Islamist groups. Examining the case of the ETA, for example, Alonso argues that by wrongly assuming that the group was de-radicalized rather than temporarily deterred and incapacitated, the government’s move towards negotiation was counter-productive and only gave the group incentives to use violence (Alonso 2009, 93).

Given these problems with the labels of “radicalization” and “de-radicalization,” this project strives to offer a more precise and nuanced discussion by suggesting instead that we specify the “escalation” and “de-escalation” of the commitments to violent tactics. Using these slightly more neutral terms makes it easier to isolate escalation in terms of ideological, institutional or behavioral commitments, without having to entertain debates about what constitutes “radical.”

There is an important distinction between outcomes and processes. Actively violent, passively violent and nonviolent strategic outlooks are outcomes that define the three types of strategic outlook of an Islamist group at a particular point in time. Escalation and de-escalation, on the other hand, are processes. *Escalation is the process through which a group increases its*

level of commitment to violent tactics. De-escalation is the process through which a group reduces its level of commitment to violent tactics.

The goal of this project is to offer a theoretical framework that can help us understand both why groups adopt violent or nonviolent strategic outlooks, and how the processes of escalation or de-escalation in terms of commitment to violent tactics unfold and come about. The cases examined are chosen to cover (1) various types of shifts along the typology and explain rising and decreasing levels of commitment to violent tactics, as well as (2) different forms of nonviolent strategies and changing commitments to politically participatory or non-participatory strategies.

Before elaborating the theoretical framework, the next section first offers a review of the various arguments made in the literature regarding the determinants of Islamist choice of strategies.

Alternative Explanations of Islamist Strategies

Religious and Cultural Arguments

After the 9/11 attacks, much of the public shock and outrage manifested itself in a pervasive question of how such violence could be possibly undertaken in the name of religion. In reaction to this discourse, the academia also began paying closer attention to the radical theological interpretation and justifications of various Islamist movements. Authors examined the ideological roots of Islamic fundamentalism, exposed the genealogy of radical interpretations that justify violent tactics and examined how Islamist discourses evolved over time and across contexts (Ben-Dor and Pedahzur 2003; Wiktorowicz 2004, 2005). The implicit question that such works raise is to what extent such religious interpretations and ideological tenets *cause* violence, and to what extent they are used to *justify* particular strategies.

Scholars differ greatly in the extent to which they assign religion or culture a causal power. Some authors see religion and culture as being autonomous forces that directly shape group behavior (Hamid 2007; Phares 2008). Others recognize and underline the legitimizing and mobilizing power of religion, but understand the emergence of Islamist groups and their strategic choices within a broader sociological, political and economic context (Esposito 2002, 2006; Juergensmeyer 2006, 2008).

A variant of the culturalist argument that re-emerged after 9/11 explains jihadists groups as engaging in a “war of ideas” against the Western paradigm of democracy (Phares 2008). For Phares, “ideologies may start as an expression of age-old desires, such as lust for territory and domination, but as history evolves, they become self-fueled as a desire in itself, an autonomous wish to accomplish an idea regardless of its irrelevance” (Phares 2008, xv). In this account, Islamist groups from all schools of thought share the same ideological tenets that call for the re-creation of the caliphate and are fundamentally opposed to the principles of classical liberal democracy. However, while this ideology can explain why groups resort to violence, Phares argues that it can also explain why groups employ nonviolent tactics such as political participation: to crumble democratic pluralism from the inside out. In other words, while this ideology is the defining characteristic of these Islamist “jihadis”, they might use either violent or non-violent tactics depending on the context and the practical necessity.

Arguments that conflate Islamism with a desire for world domination and an inherent tolerance of violence are counteracted by scholars who understand the power of religion within its historical and political context. For Juergensmeyer the religious language, imagery and ideas play a very important role in turning conflicts into sacred, cosmic struggles; nonetheless, he regards local economic and political tensions as being the initial and primary causes of tensions.

Religious conflicts are ultimately caused by a “sense of a loss of identity and control in the modern world,” and religion is merely the language and ideology of protest (Juergensmeyer 2006, 140). Islamic fundamentalism is a similar phenomenon to other forms of religious activism, and primarily a response to the failures of secular nationalism, which tends to be regarded as a legacy of colonial rule and as a type of “religion” peculiar to the West. Thus, he suggests that contemporary religious activism “is the result of an almost Hegelian dialectic between two competing frameworks of social order: secular nationalism (allied with the nation-state) and religion (allied with large ethnic communities, some of them transnational)” (Juergensmeyer 2008, 17). Within this framework, violent tactics can be easily legitimized because images of violence are central in all religions, and all religious historical narratives tend to be bloody.

Along similar lines, Esposito also suggests that religion provides “a powerful source of authority, meaning, and legitimacy” (Esposito 2006, 155), which is why he pays careful attention to the genealogy of radical views and of the legitimation of violent tactics (Esposito 2002). However, the analysis is presented against the historical background that weaves in the failures of nationalist ideologies, expanding state repression and authority over religious leaders as well as the economics of the petrodollars.

None of these works that have examined the religious underpinnings of Islamist violence have expanded their analysis to also study the recent ideological revisions of groups that have denounced violence. Authors that see Islamist groups as ontologically predisposed to aggression would most likely dismiss such revisions as temporary strategic adaptations and denounce the very concept of de-radicalization as a phenomenon. Scholars who pay attention to the religious discourse because of its legitimizing potential could offer much needed insight into how notions

of cosmic conflicts are revised and how absolutized tensions are de-escalated. Unfortunately, such analyses remain eclipsed by the fascination with the religious underpinnings for violence.

Socio-psychological Approaches

Perhaps one of the most prevalent arguments in the study of political violence and social protest (Islamist and otherwise) is the logic of grievance-based revolt. Gurr initially developed the “relative deprivation” argument in 1970, arguing that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is frustration, especially in response to the perceived discrepancy between one’s expectation and reality (Gurr 1970). According to Gurr, the more intense and prolonged the feeling of frustration is, the greater the probability of aggression, even though he also suggests that groups take into consideration the perceived utility of violence, based on the success of previous violent campaigns.

Within the study of Islamist movements as well as in contentious politics and terrorism studies, the grievances and relative deprivation arguments manifest themselves in the form of arguments that sociological and structural pressures are the root causes of violence (Al-Azm 2005; Crenshaw 1981; Guazzone 1995; Kepel 2004, 2006; Lawrence 1989; Midlarsky 2011; Mockaitis 2007; Roy 2006a, 2006b). In her seminal article on the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw emphasizes structural causes, but distinguishes between preconditions and precipitants of terrorism. Permissive causes include modernization, urbanization, and social norms that sanction the use of violence, whereas more direct motivations for violence include (1) concrete grievances and relative deprivation, (2) lack of opportunity for political participation, (3) elite disaffection, and (4) a precipitating event, such as persecution, or killings (Crenshaw 1981). Similarly, Mockaitis suggests that periods of increased social, economic, and/or political instability tend to lead to increased terrorist violence, but groups need ideology to integrate discontent and focus on

suitable targets (Mockaitis 2007). Mulaj argues that all non-state actors, regardless of whether they are religious or not, employ violence primarily to achieve political goals, but are also influenced in their strategies by historical animosities, grievances and religious or cultural factors that legitimize violence (Mulaj 2009).

Sidahmed and Ehteshami look more explicitly at Islamic fundamentalism and argue that it has emerged in the context of an ideological vacuum and of deep social tensions and discontent, and it has been significantly shaped also by international economic factors (such as the oil boom in the 1970s) and international ideological forces (such as the Iranian revolution). While the authors don't directly address the question of why actors chose violent strategies, they hint at the fact that whether groups resort to such tactics depends on state policies and on the credibility of more radical groups (Sidahmed and Ehteshami 1996). In his comparative study of religious fundamentalism, Lawrence argues that all fundamentalist movements are a response to the material aspect of modernity and to modernism as the ideological reshaping of human experience, but Islamic fundamentalism more specifically arose as a response to the failures of Muslim nationalism (Lawrence 1989). This appraisal is shared by Midlarski, who suggests that all forms of political extremism emerge out of a sense of ephemeral gain (disillusionment after some temporary gains and heightened aspirations) combined with the salience of mortality (Midlarsky 2011). More recent studies of global jihadist movements suggest that neofundamentalism today is caused by deculturation and individualization, and it appeals primarily to "an uprooted, often young, well-educated, but frustrated and already disgruntled youth" that is comprised of cultural outcasts, living at the margin of society in either their countries of origin or their host country (Roy 2006b, 160–163).

These socio-psychological approaches seem to suggest that violent escalation is bound to happen in the face of disillusionment, relative deprivation and social tensions and discontent, and they generally have little to say about why grievances lead to aggression in some instances but not in others, why different groups react to the same structural strains in different manners, or why groups change their preferences and strategies even when grievances and relative deprivation persists. In response to this weakness, some authors have developed the grievance argument into a more specific thesis about the effects of repression and political inclusion, which will be reviewed next. Others, however, have pointed out that the link between disenfranchisement and militancy is problematic, and that the social reality of the contemporary Middle East reflects a move towards post-Islamism, and tendency of social movements and of Islamists to reinvent themselves and envision alternative solutions to their problems and their disillusionment (Bayat 1996, 2007, 2010).

Bayat suggests that in countries such as Iran, where the appeal and legitimacy of Islamism is exhausted, the public is pushing for a resecularization of religion (Bayat 1996). Beyond Iran, out of the Islamist experience a different discourse is emerging, one that is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic, but rather post-Islamic, a discourse that abandons violence and seeks to “fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty,” and “transcend Islamism as an exclusivist and totalizing ideology, seeking instead inclusion, pluralism, and ambiguity” (Bayat 2010, 236). However, Bayat recognizes that Islamism and post-Islamism can develop simultaneously, and there is no clear indication as to what specific conditions or factors lead some groups to move towards a post-Islamist trajectory and others to remain attached to conservative or militant ideologies. While Bayat is concerned with broader social processes and discourses, his discussion of the parallel evolution of Islamism and post-Islamism underlines the

need for a comparative study of what processes underlie both the adoption and the abandonment of violence.

The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis

Scholars have employed insights from comparative politics and democratization theory to explore the extent to which certain state policies either moderate or radicalize Islamist groups. Two general lines of argument are made: one argument is that repression leads to radicalization and violence, the other argument focuses on the moderating effects of political inclusion. Some scholars argue that state repression radicalizes groups and leads to violence because it generates grievances, it denies activists the opportunity to expand material and organizational resources, it delegitimizes the ruling regime, and it disempowers and discredits moderate voices (Gurr 1993; Hafez 2003; Sánchez-Cuenca and De la Calle 2009). Non-democratic regimes more broadly lack institutional means for expressing grievances, whereas in democratic regimes groups such as ethnic minorities can express their grievances and do not have to resort to rebellion and violence (Cleary 2000).

Drawing insights from a comparative case study of Algeria and Egypt, Hafez concludes that “Muslims rebel because of an ill-fated combination of institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and on the other, reactive and indiscriminate repression that threatens the organizational resources and personal lives of Islamists” (Hafez 2003, 21–22). Hafez suggests that this combination of political exclusion and reactive and indiscriminate repression “is both necessary and sufficient to explain the timing and scale of Islamist rebellion” (Hafez 2003, 23).

Exclusionary and repressive state policies force groups to develop exclusive mobilization structures and anti-systemic ideologies, which are both conducive to violent tactics and protracted conflict.

Other scholars point out that repression can also reduce violence by crushing groups, imposing high costs and forcing moderation (Kramer 1997; Wickham 2004). Thus, repression can lead to both violent escalation and capitulation, and what we might have in reality is an inverted “U” relationship between repression and the use of violent tactics: at lowest levels of repression groups are not provoked enough to employ violent tactics, and at highest levels of repression the groups might be too incapacitated to be able to undertake violence.⁹

Inclusion in the political process, on the other hand, is argued to lead to moderation among Islamist groups. Scholars have proposed different causal mechanisms to explain why this might occur. The socialization argument poses that incorporation in the political process can encourage respect for democratic norms and for moderate tactics (Rustow 1970), and the interaction between Islamist leaders and their secular counterparts can lead to changes in values and world views (Wickham 2004). What remains unclear in these works, however, is why the norm of nonviolence should take precedence and exert most socializing effect, especially in instances when the regime itself uses violence, and where there are numerous groups employing violence. Similarly, it also remains unclear why we are to assume that only Islamists learn from secular leaders, and not the other way around.

The extent to which a group *can* be socialized into non-violent norms also depends on organizational characteristics and the nature of the leadership. On one hand, one cannot ignore the extreme case of Sudan, where the National Islamic Front (NIF) still resorted to a complete take-over of the state apparatus, even after it had participated in electoral politics in Sudan’s brief intermittent experimentations with democratic rule. On the other hand, as Sinno and Khanani

⁹ This suggestion follows the logic of Acemoglu and Robinson, who propose that there is an inverted “U” relationship between inequality and push for democratization. At the lowest levels of inequality social unrest is not attractive enough, and at the highest levels of inequality elites have too much to lose from democratization, so they employ heavy repression that prohibits mobilization (Acemoglu and J. Robinson 2006).

point out, even the decision on whether to participate in elections in the first place depends on both the quality of political opening and organizational structure. Thus, the authors argue that Islamist organizations that are “intertwined with complex social structures” are more likely to contest elections than “centralized and networked organizations” (Sinno and Khannani 2009, 30).

Other arguments suggest that inclusion in the political process can lead to moderation by providing institutional checks and balances present in electoral politics, and alternative legitimate outlets for addressing grievances (Li 2005; Schwedler 2007). But once again, the extent to which institutions in the Middle East can truly provide checks and balances that can lead to moderation is questionable, given the fact that most regimes are either authoritarian or hybrid regimes.

Last but not least, many scholars point out that inclusion can lead to moderation because political participation is a much less costly path to social change than violence (Elman 2008; Hafez 2003; Langhor 2001). Yet given the predominance of hybrid regimes over consolidated democracies, “inclusion” in the political process is usually also accompanied by waves of arrests, repression, violence, control over free speech and other forms of political closure. Not only is the cost of political participation therefore often high, but the appeal of violence can also remain high in many instances. For this reason, it is important to look beyond the question of whether a group is “included” in politics or not, and to examine more in-depth what tactics are possible and effective, the cost of violence and the cost of repression within a particular context. These are dependent not just on the nature of the regime and on the nature of domestic politics, but also on the level of international threats to the regime.

Some of the most recent contributions to this strand of research have argued that inclusion in the political process is neither necessary nor sufficient for moderation. Instead,

change within religious political parties more broadly happens in response not just to political inclusion but also to a variety of internal factors, such as the structure of the party and the nature of the internal decision-making process, as well as to external factors, such as demographic change, constitutional and legal changes, electoral competition, public attitudes and opinions, secularization processes and international context (Brocker and Kunkler 2013).

Some scholars suggest that the state can encourage Islamist groups to adopt peaceful strategies by providing opportunities for political participation, and it can discourage violent, anti-systemic strategies by ensuring law and order and a measure of education and social services (Chernov-Hwang 2009). The argument is that by providing public goods, the state maintains a positive presence in the lives of its citizens and gains legitimacy, whereas in the context of an ineffective state, Islamist groups (both violent and non-violent) have an opportunity to provide services and security and gain legitimacy. Thus, in order to promote peaceful Islamist mobilizations, it is important to have both political inclusion and state capacity.

From Hwang's perspective, effective participatory states witness primarily peaceful mobilization, whereas ineffective authoritarian states are faced with significant violence opposition. In all other circumstances (effective authoritarian and ineffective participatory states), she expects both violent and non-violent mobilization, mostly determined by the level of "law and order." Yet it remains unclear what leads groups to respond in different manners, and what the line between "law and order" and repression is. Thus, her innovative cross-regional analysis of structural incentives for peaceful mobilization would be nicely complemented by a framework that examined the interaction of structural and organization variables. As Sanchez-Cuenca and De la Calle point out, if within group moderates cannot control radicals, then state concessions might not reduce violence. Thus, the works that are broadly situated within the

inclusion-moderation debate can benefit from paying closer attention to organizational factors, the role and meaning of violence and both the domestic and international strategic environments in which Islamists operate (Sánchez-Cuenca and De la Calle 2009).

Another weakness that underlies almost all arguments in the inclusion-moderation camp is the assumption that all Islamist groups are interested in political participation. Yet, as already mentioned, there are some groups for whom political participation is an unacceptable tactic. The theoretical framework provided here argues that in certain circumstances, such groups might in fact revise their ideologies and legitimize political participation as a tactic, when it is the only or the most effective option available for them. That being said, it is important to keep in mind that in some circumstances participation simply cannot provide the incentives suggested by the inclusion-moderation thesis because of the ideological beliefs of the group.

The general premise of the inclusion-moderation argument is also found in the field of peace research and conflict studies, and is centered on the question of “spoilers” of peace processes. While the definition of “spoilers” is highly contested, perhaps the most frequently employed conceptualization comes from Stedman, who defines spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997, 5).

Violence is generally understood to serve a largely instrumental purpose. Violent escalation within the context of a peace process emerges when certain actors are left out of the negotiations, when the agreements are either detrimental or not advantageous enough, or when the process is uncertain (Dudouet 2009; Maney et al. 2006; Stedman 1997; Zahar 2003). Other scholars argue that violent strategies are primarily driven by domestic competition and an actor’s position in the domestic balance of power (Greenhill and Major 2007; Pearlman 2009). Last, but

not least, spoiling behavior also occurs when the regime lacks legitimacy and there is no institutionalized system of legitimate representation (Pearlman 2009).

Given the problem of “spoiling,” the predominant perspective is that in order to de-radicalize these actors and drive them to a renunciation of violence, it is important to turn “spoilers” into stakeholders by including them in the negotiations or through power-sharing agreements (Dudouet 2009; Maney et al. 2006; Mattes and Savun 2009; Zahar 2003). The logic is that this will provide a disincentive to sabotage negotiations and consolidate loyalty to the peace process. Some scholars, however, argue that loyalty to the peace process is not enough; it is equally important for custodians of peace to impose compliance and credibly commit to punishing the use of violence (Greenhill and Major 2007). As Stedman proposes, depending on the type of spoiler, one might resort with (1) inducement, (2) socialization into established norms in order to change behavior, or (3) coercion (Stedman 1997).

The “spoiler” literature has provided us with a more nuanced understanding of why some groups might resort to violence and oppose a peace process, and it has emphasized the importance of examining the impact of domestic political competition and audience costs on the propensity to use violence. Much of the literature, however, has been split on whether external conditions or spoiler type are most important in determining strategies. Yet, to a certain extent, both agents and structure must matter. Some groups, for example, are much more ideologically inflexible than others, regardless of the external incentives or pressures. Thus, a comprehensive examination of de-escalation needs to take into account both external pressures and organizational characteristics.

Rational Actors and the Political Effectiveness of Violence

Within terrorism studies,¹⁰ some scholars have followed a somewhat similar logic to the “spoiler” literature, suggesting that “spoilers” and terrorist groups more broadly are comparable. These scholars also regard violent actors as rational and strategic and violence as serving an instrumental purpose. Pape for example regards violence as a form of coercion and armed pressure that ultimately works (Pape 2003, 2005). Groups resort to violence in response to unfavorable state policies, foreign troops or occupation, and violence is employed because it raises the cost of these policies and succeeds in forcing concessions. Bloom regards violence as a form of armed propaganda and an instrument of mobilization (Bloom 2004, 2005). Thus, it is the domestic competition among groups that determines the use of violent tactics, and violence is a way to “outbid” the opposition and mobilize support.

Following a similar logic, Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson suggest that one of the motivations for undertaking terrorist attacks is to provoke a harsh response from the government, which in turn can radicalize the population and increase public support for the group (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007). Expanding on these arguments about the strategic logic of violence, Kydd and Walter suggest that terrorist tactics are a form of “costly signaling” and they identify five strategic logics of employing terrorism (Kydd and Walter 2006). The five strategic uses of violence are: attrition (to persuade the enemy that the group is strong enough to impose significant costs), intimidation (to convince the population that the group is strong enough to punish disobedience), provocation (to induce the enemy to respond with indiscriminate

¹⁰ Even though there is a long-standing debate on the definition of terrorism, in general the literature is concerned with a particular category of violent groups: political organizations that employ violent tactics against civilians. Insights from terrorism studies, however, are often applied beyond this narrow category to more general discussions of contentious politics, as this project also seeks to do.

violence), spoiling (to undermine peace processes and moderates), and outbidding (to persuade the public that the group has greater resolve than its rivals).

What these works have in common are two underlying assumptions: (1) public opinion matters and can be an important determinant of strategic choices, and (2) competition with other groups can inspire more aggressive strategies. Invoking the logic of Hirschman's *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Hirschman 1970), Crenshaw points out that in a competitive environment where exit from the group is an option, groups might be inspired to escalate their actions in order to distinguish themselves, retain existing members and attract new recruits (Crenshaw 1987, 24). While splintering has occurred in many groups, and in countries such as Egypt it has led to much more radical groups emerging, it is nonetheless unclear why the emphasis is only placed on the exit threat of radical factions and not of moderate constituents as well, and why violence is automatically seen as the most effective way to outbid competitors. To a certain extent, there is an inherent bias in the discipline of terrorism studies itself, as it is primarily concerned with violent groups. However, if we take the logic of competition seriously, we cannot ignore the appeal of nonviolent modes of dissent and the impact of moderate constituents, especially in light of recent moves among International Security scholars to recognize the effectiveness of nonviolent tactics (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). What is in order, then, is a refinement of the strategic logic of violence argument, which also takes into consideration the strategic logic of nonviolence, and looks more broadly at what tactics are salient, available and effective for any group in a particular context and at a particular point in time.

Focusing primarily on the instrumentality of violence also leaves other questions unanswered. If violence is an effective way of mobilization and of coercion, why do groups in the same national context respond to state policies, to foreign actors and even to domestic

competitors so differently? In Egypt, for example, by the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood developed drastically different strategies towards domestic and external issues than its competitors such as the Gama'a or Al-Jihad. Clearly, grievances or domestic competition cannot tell the entire story. But neither can ideology alone, because groups with identical ideological roots have adopted different strategies in different national contexts, some endorsing the use of violent tactics, others condemning them, as for instance the divergent evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria and Jordan evidences.

It is important therefore to examine the interaction of structural and organizational factors, as well as of domestic and international factors. Furthermore, the question is not only what ideology a group displays and whether that ideology justifies the use of violence, but also how much the organizational ideology diverges from the ideology of the state at any particular point in time. Thus, rather than examining organizational discourses alone, it is more helpful to examine policy convergence, or the extent to which state policies “fit” with the ideology and goals of an organization.

Organizational Dynamics

The strategic logic of violent tactics has been disputed not only by scholars who suggest that terrorism is in fact ineffective (Abrahms 2006), but also by scholars who emphasize that processes within an organization are more responsible for the choice of tactics than external pressures and strategic considerations (Abrahms 2008). As McCormick points out, a terrorist organization is “not a black box but a living system, subject to a range of influences that may be only tangentially related to its stated objectives” (McCormick 2003, 486).

Abrahms suggests that terrorists rarely achieve their political goals and they are “social solidarity maximizers” more than strategic actors, joining violent groups to develop strong

affective ties (Abrahms 2006, 2008). There are many individual motivations for joining a violent cause, ranging from reputation, comradeship and excitement to material benefits and social status (Crenshaw 1987, 19). Along similar lines, Sageman suggests that for the participants in what he terms the “global salafi jihad” movement, social bonds and “in-group love” are more important than “out-group hate” and external factors (Sageman 2004, 135). These internal dynamics and the structure of the network affect not just the strategies of the group, but also group flexibility, survival and success. In addition to these internal dynamics, the fact that this movement has become a “leaderless jihad” consistent of small, local and self-organized groups with no physical site, formal organization and physical assets, gives the movement few incentives to ever moderate or move beyond violent strategies (Sageman 2008).

The clandestine nature of most violent groups also encourages internal dynamics that reinforce a bias towards action. The need for secrecy isolates groups from their larger social and political surroundings, which fortifies “auto-propaganda” and the belief among members that they are acting as soldiers in the defense of a larger community whose integrity is at risk (McCormick 2003, 487). In such conditions, groups are also vulnerable to group-think, and as the organization distances itself from mainstream society it becomes increasingly resistant to internal dissent (McCormick 2003, 489).

The strategic choices of a group are not only influenced by these internal dynamics, but also by the resolve and vision of their leaders, and by the balance between moderate and radical factions. Leaders, who are critical for the formation of an organization, create and manipulate incentives, mobilize resources and promote their vision. For this reason, many scholars and members of the intelligence community, for example, believe that capturing Al-Qaeda’s leadership is essential for incapacitating the organization and disrupting its violent strategies

(Hoffman 2008). Leaders, however, are also responsible for dealing with internal dissent and defections, maintaining organizational cohesion, and preventing factions from exiting and joining other groups. This concern with fragmentation can have a significant impact on group strategies, and as Crenshaw points out, when faced with competition groups often escalate their violence in order to retain their members and gain new recruits (Crenshaw 1987, 24).

The organizational approach to explaining the resort to violent tactics offers important insights and brings an important critique to the purely instrumental view of terrorism. However, as Crenshaw points out, this approach is more complex but less coherent, and therefore “it may be less satisfying intellectually because the act of terrorism appears to be the random result of unpredictable interactions” (Crenshaw 1987, 28). What is therefore in order, is a more systematic evaluation of how organizational dynamics affect and interact with instrumental considerations.

Social Movement Theory

Perhaps the clearest attempt to merge existing insights from the literature and explain why violence occurs in certain instances and not in others is provided by social movement theorists. Increasingly, scholars are employing social movement theory to explain the emergence and evolution of Islamist movements and why they resort to violence (Gunning 2008; Hafez 2006; G. Robinson 2004; Wiktorowicz 2004). This approach builds on the cultural, structural, and rationalist research traditions within the field of contentious politics, and argues that Islamist strategies are primarily determined by three factors: mobilizing structure, political opportunity structure,¹¹ and cultural framing.

Violent tactics are a response to external pressures, and they are legitimized through ideological frames that are resonant with the public. As Wiktorowicz suggests, “movements

¹¹ It should be noted that scholars applying social movement theory often conceptualize and operationalize the notion of “political opportunity structures” in different ways, which makes cross-case comparisons difficult.

construct frames that diagnose a condition as a problem in need of redress,” they “offer solutions to the problem, including specific tactics and strategies intended to serve as remedies to ameliorate injustice,” and they “provide a rationale to motivate support and collective action” (Wiktorowicz 2004, 16). The extent to which groups are capable of employing violence, however, also depends on their organizational capacity, resources and mobilizing structures.

Hafez explores the links between the individual, organizational and the societal level in his examination of why Palestinians resort to suicide terrorism. He argues that the three most important conditions for suicide terrorism are a culture of martyrdom, a strategic decision by the organization to employ this tactic, and a political context that generates a supply of recruits (Hafez 2006).

Social movement theory provides a comprehensive framework that has enabled a more in-depth understanding of many Islamist movements. However, it remains unclear why groups choose violent or nonviolent tactics in the first place and what processes affect the strategic choices of an organization. Furthermore, while the notion of framing has been useful conceptually, contributions adopting social movement theory have failed to explain why in the context of competing framing efforts that are all culturally resonant, justifications for violence ever become more appealing to the public than justifications for nonviolent resistance.

The Arguments Compared

For an easier comparison of all the competing arguments presented, the following table captures some of the most important differences that are relevant for understanding violent escalation and de-escalation.

Table 4 The Arguments in the Literature Compared

Approach	Examples of works	Why groups use violence	Why groups use nonviolence	Why groups change strategies	Why groups revise ideologies	Implicit assumptions about violence	Causal mechanisms radicalization	Causal mechanism de-radicalization
Ideological arguments	Hamid 2007, Phares 2008	Radical religious beliefs	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	There are ontological predispositions towards violence	Radicalized belief	<i>Not explained; implied: exposure to moderate views</i>
	Juergensmeyer 2006, 2008	Identity crisis or local grievances interpreted as "cosmic war" through religion	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	At its core an instrumental choice, but sacralized as a tactic	Religious justifications augment grievances to cosmic war scale	<i>Not explained</i>
Socio- psychological arguments	Crenshaw 1981, Gurr 1970	Grievances, external pressures, relative deprivation	<i>Not explained</i>	Change in external conditions	Not explicitly addressed and of secondary importance	Violence is primarily instrumental in reaction to external pressures	Frustration-aggression	<i>Not explained; implied: fulfillment of goals, elimination of grievances</i>
	Siddhant & Ehteshami 1996	Discontent, international factors, ideological influences	<i>Not explained</i>	Implied: state policies, credibility of different actors	International influences, ideological vacuum	Violence is primarily instrumental in reaction to external pressures	Disillusionment, frustration-aggression	<i>Not explained; implied: change in context and/or ideological influences</i>
	Bayat 2010	External grievances and radical beliefs	Non-violent, post-Islamic discourse	Change in discourse	Sociological changes; public discourses; disillusionment	Violence is not the default <i>modus operandi</i>	<i>Not explicitly addressed</i>	<i>Learning; change in public discourse</i>

Approach	Examples of works	Why groups use violence	Why groups use nonviolence	Why groups change strategies	Why groups revise ideologies	Implicit assumptions about violence	Causal mechanisms radicalization	Causal mechanism de-radicalization
The inclusion-moderation thesis	Hafez 2003, Langhor 2001, Elman 2008	Repression and exclusion from political process	Political participation is less costly than violence and can bring material benefits	Changes in repression and political inclusion	<i>Implied:</i> changes in repression and political inclusion, ideologies are epiphenomenal	Under repression violence is only or one of few tactics left for pursuing social change; all groups willing to forgo violence for political participation	Grievances, loss of political power, moderates disempowered	Access to politics, institutional bargaining and competition
	Wickham 2004	Repression and exclusion from political process	Access to political system; revised ideologies; sometimes repression	External incentives, bargaining, ideological moderation	Socialization and learning, strategic calculations	Used mainly for instrumental purposes, but ideological justification also important; all groups willing to forgo violence for political participation	Frustration, aggression, grievances, lack of political power	Socialization, strategic calculations, bargaining
	Chernov-Hwang 2009	Because state is ineffective in providing goods and authoritarian	Access to political participation; state provides law and order, public goods	Changes in access to politics and state provision of goods	<i>Not explained</i>	Violence is only one of several modes of mobilization available at all times	State is delegitimized, violent movements are delegitimized; lack of law and order	Violent movements are delegitimized (state is legitimate)

Approach	Examples of works	Why groups use violence	Why groups use nonviolence	Why groups change strategies	Why groups revise ideologies	Implicit assumptions about violence	Causal mechanisms radicalization	Causal mechanism de-radicalization
Strategic actors approach	Pape 2003, 2003	Violence is effective form of coercion against unfavorable polities, foreign troops, occupation	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not explained; implied: goals achieved</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	Violence is most effective form of resistance if militarily inferior	Grievances; military inferiority	<i>Not explained; implied: goals achieved</i>
	Bloom 2004, 2005	To outbid competitors	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not clear; implied: change in domestic competition</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	Violence has public appeal	Competition	<i>Not explained</i>
	Kydd & Walter 2006	Attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling, outbidding	<i>Not explained; implied: inability to undertake violence</i>	Change in external circumstances	<i>Not explained</i>	Violence effective and has public appeal	Grievances; radical beliefs	<i>Not explained; implied: goals achieved or group weakened</i>
Organizational dynamics approach	Abrahms 2006, 2008, Sageman 2004, 2008	Group solidarity and grievances	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	<i>Not explained</i>	Violence most effective for building solidarity	Solidarity, auto-propaganda	<i>Not explained</i>
Social movement theory	Wiktorowicz 2004, Hafez 2006, Gunning 2008	Structural pressures, ideological justifications, mobilized resources	<i>Not explained</i>	Changes in context or mobilization potential	<i>Not explained</i>	Groups are inherently violent or non-violent; public easily persuaded of appeal of violence	Grievances, ideological justification	<i>Not explained</i>

When we compare the diverse body of literature on Islamist movements and political violence based on the various assumptions about violence, explicit or implicit causal mechanisms for escalation and de-escalation of commitment to violence, and explicit or implicit arguments about why groups change their strategies or revise their ideologies, several interesting observations emerge. First, it becomes immediately evident that most scholars are more concerned with explaining specific outcomes (in particular violent strategies) than examining processes and dynamics of change, be it behavioral or ideational. Second, ideological revisions receive much less attention than tactical revisions, and there seems to be a significant split in the literature about the relevance of ideology versus external or instrumental pressures in determining strategic choices. Few scholars take both ideology and instrumentality seriously.

Third, nonviolent tactics receive much less attention than violence, and de-escalation is not explicitly addressed by most works. This is particularly problematic, as there also seems to be an overwhelming tendency to see violence as being very effective, having wide public appeal, and usually being the default modus operandi for expressing grievances and staging resistance. Among the authors reviewed, however, Bayat and Chernov-Hwang explicitly recognize that there are multiple discourses occurring simultaneously, that violence is just one of several options available at any time, and that the publics are not easily acceptant of aggressive tactics.

This dissertation seeks to provide a theoretical framework that accommodates both ideological and strategic considerations, and which can offer an explanation of both outcomes and processes. The theoretical model seeks to (1) bridge the gap in the literature between terrorism studies, contentious politics, and peace studies, (2) understand why it is that scholars have found repression to lead both to radicalization and to de-radicalization, and (3) offer a more nuanced reformulation of the inclusion-moderation thesis.

Principled and Strategic Adaptation: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding

Outcomes and Processes


The theoretical framework of principled and strategic adaptation is developed in three stages. First, a general framework offers the overarching logic of what determines the strategic outlook of Islamist groups. Second, the argument expands on how the process of ideological change occurs. Third, the dynamics of escalation and of de-escalation are presented in more detail.

Explaining Outcomes

In terms of explaining outcomes, I argue that the strategic outlook of Islamist opposition groups is determined by the interaction of five factors: (1) the organization's founding principles, (2) the extent to which the regime's domestic and foreign policies are convergent with the vision of the organization, (3) the extent to which the groups is included in the political process and/or repressed, (4) internal organizational dynamics, and (5) public norms of resistance.

The interaction of the first three variables provides incentives for actions, whereas organizational dynamics and public norms are powerful transmission belts through which these incentives and pressures are translated into a violent or non-violent strategic outlook. These dynamics are captured in figure 1.

Figure 1. Explaining Outcomes: The Determinants of Strategic Outlook



Founding Principles and the Importance of Religion and Ideology

At first sight, figure 1 might be interpreted as presenting an argument of primarily rational decision-making in response to internal and external pressures and incentives, where ideology mainly affects the founding principles, but is otherwise eclipsed by a myriad of other considerations. The role of religion and ideology, however, is a lot more complex than that, even though it is difficult to represent it graphically, especially in any linear fashion. As Jung poignantly argues in her discussion of Indonesian religious groups, “Muslim organizations behave rationally, but behind their rational behaviors are the religious and social missions they seek to fulfill” (Jung 2009, 20).

The theoretical framework presented here assumes that actors are both principled and strategic, and that it is crucial to understand the religious principles and founding ideology of an organization. They determine the vision and goals of the group and they impact the way that the regime is perceived and the context is interpreted. As the subsequent discussion will reveal, however, ideological principles are not fixed or static, but they can change over time.

The role of religion and ideology remains a contested issue in international security and in the study of Islamist groups. Many scholars, perhaps appalled by the “clash of civilization” thesis and suspicious of arguments that regard Islamist organizations as rigid and ideologically fixed, tend to see ideological tenets as epiphenomenal and place most causal weight on the political context. A recent edited volumes debating the issue of context versus ideology concludes that the ideology of Islamist groups “remains significant, but mainly at a rhetorical level, thinly concealing politics and responses that are formed by the contextual reality” (Hroub 2010, 9–10).

On the topic of de-radicalization Ashour (2009) also starts from the premise that structural factors provide the initial impetus for change, and suggests that “once the processes of change occur within the agent(s) as a result of structural conditions and stimuli, those same structural conditions will be responsive to the new agent behavior, which has itself been produced by the processes of change” (12).

The point that structural conditions provide the impetus for change is well-taken; however, the over-emphasis on external pressures at the cost of ignoring the ideological tenets and the diversity of goals and tactics of Islamist groups leads Ashour to interpret de-radicalization as a form of military defeat rather than a strategic adjustment and re-prioritization of alternative goals and tactics. He explains the lack of violence as a response to harsh repression and as primarily the initiative of leaders to revise the ideology after strategic calculations prompted by selective inducements and after political learning based on the interaction with non-jihadists.

The model of principled and strategic adjustment presented here suggests that organizations typically have an array of acceptable tactics for achieving their goals and their religious missions, and the context determines which tactics are effective, and which goals should be prioritized. The nuances are subtle, but important. Strategic adjustment can occur in response to a variety of external pressures and incentives, not just repression, thus emphasizing the need to look at the presence and efficacy of alternative tactics and the importance of religious discourse for providing a diverse toolkit for political action. Furthermore, without an understanding of the importance placed in Islam on continuously evaluating the costs and the benefits of any action on the Muslim community, it is difficult to capture the real importance of

evaluating the effectiveness of violent or nonviolent tactics in their broader social context, just as it might lead to the conflation of a nonviolent strategy with a pacifist strategy.

It is important to note that while most research has focused on violent Islamist groups and religious justifications for violence, Islamic religious teachings include a wide array of social and religious duties that call for nonviolent action, and provide several techniques for nonviolent resistance, such as tolerance, persuasion, civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts and emigration (Abu-Nimer 2000). Islamic law is in fact very strict about the conditions under which violence is an acceptable tactic (Abu-Nimer 2000; Ali and Rehman 2005; Paige, Satha-Anand, and Gilliatt 1993). The notion of *jihad* itself is highly contested among jurists, and while some regard it as an offensive and aggressive element, many scholars and jurists emphasize the duality of the concept as being both spiritual and physical, and being primarily defensive in nature (Ali and Rehman 2005; Esack 1997; Paige, Satha-Anand, and Gilliatt 1993).¹² Furthermore, as Mohammed Abu-Nimer notes, “Islamic scripture and religious teachings are rich sources of values, beliefs, and strategies that promote the peaceful and nonviolent resolution of conflicts” (Abu-Nimer 2000, 3).

This is important to keep in mind, because even for violent Islamist groups, violence is usually just one of several tactics employed to pursue its goals. This suggests that under external pressures, if violence becomes impossible or inefficient, there are usually other tactics that can be prioritized. Thus, the diverse toolkit of nonviolent methods in Islamic teachings, and the strong emphasis on helping the poor and the needy, provide Islamist groups with a strong “exit option” away from violence. Of course, not all groups are founded on the same religious interpretations or give the same weight to Islamic goals such as *da'wa* (preaching). But in

¹² In the American discourse, the concept of *jihad* has become highly politicized, which makes it more difficult to appreciate that its defensive variant holds some interesting similarities to the notions of legitimate self-defense present in just war theory, which also proscribes a set of conditions when war is justifiable (*jus ad bellum*).

general, Islamist groups are somewhat different than secular groups, because the religious precepts and discourse provides them with the potential to shift priorities and change strategies yet still be able to claim allegiance to the faith.

For an extremist leftist or right-wing group, for example, suddenly abandoning the political struggle and focusing on social services or the education of the public might seem odd at best, if not a complete defeat. For many Islamist groups, on the other hand, such a change of priorities can seem like a normal adjustment. That being said, the perspective of principled and strategic adjustment also implies that groups with a narrow mission have a harder time adjusting and revising their strategies than groups that pursue a variety of goals, for whom emphasizing the most effective tactics is much easier. This is a significant aspect omitted by analyses that focus exclusively on external pressures and on the learning and calculations of leaders.

For this reason, this project pays close attention to the goals of each group under analysis, and starts from the premise that it is important to study not just the extent to which the state represses the Islamists but also the extent to which state policies are in line with the goals and vision of the particular Islamist groups. While structural conditions provide Islamist groups with different pressures and incentives, these external stimuli are interpreted through the ideological principles driving organizational behavior. Islamist opposition groups are both principled actors, whose theological interpretations are essential in determining organizational priorities and interpreting structural conditions, and strategic rational actors, interested in survival and pursuing concrete social and political goals.¹³ As Rashwan notes:

“Islamist groups may differ in how they relate their intellectual, political or social enterprise to Islam and its principles, and they may disagree in their interpretation of some of these principles, but

¹³ That Islamists are motivated by religious beliefs while also being strategic in their activism is consistent with the conclusions of many experts on Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas (Gunning 2008; Mishal and Sela 2006; Bloom 2004; Robinson 2004; Wickham 2013).

they all believe that their enterprise is related to Islam and they describe it as 'Islamic.' While an intellectual foundation is important for every political or social movement, it is particularly important for Islamic movements. For some of them it constitutes a sacred religious text that they aspire to apply without amendment or interpretation, while for others it is the major frame of reference that takes precedence over all others. The decisive influence of intellectual foundations extends to all aspects of Islamist movements, from their names, the symbols and terms they adopt, their organizational structures, to their strategies and operational tactics. This distinguishes them from other social and political movements.”(Rashwan 2009, 116)

Sidahmed and Ehteshami point out that the common underlying feature of all Islamist opposition groups is that they seek to establish an Islamic state and institute *shari'a* laws, but that “apart from this insistence on the *shari'a* there is no monolithic approach toward what should constitute an authentic Islamic order” (Sidahmed and Ehteshami 1996, 9). However, not all Islamist groups understand *shari'a* in the same manner, or pursue it with the same insistence. Furthermore, Islamists are also often sensitive to foreign policy, or other issues that might be salient in the particular domestic context. Thus, there is no a-priori standard for evaluating Islamist policy goals. Rather, in order to have a nuanced understanding of specific organizational goals, I will pay attention to the ideology and platform set forth by organizational leaders at the specific times of the analysis.

Policy Convergence

Policy convergence refers to the extent that state policies on the major issues of concern are in broad concordance with an Islamist group. For all Islamist groups these issues can be broadly categorized as domestic religious policies and foreign policies of the regime. The more religious policies conform to the vision of a group, the higher the domestic policy convergence. In foreign affairs, the main priority for all Islamist groups is the perceived threats to the Muslim

community. If government foreign policies are perceived to be defending the *umma*, then their convergence is high. If the government is perceived as subservient to foreign powers, or ineffective in the face of external threats, then policy convergence on foreign affairs is low.¹⁴

When policy convergence is high there are arguably few incentives for a principled group to oppose, let alone use violence against the regime. If policy convergence is very high and the government is for example already in the process of implementing *shari'a* laws, then we can also expect tactics such as political participation to be less important for the organizational goal of establishing *shari'a* laws. This is particularly relevant if the regime is not democratic and places severe restrictions on political participation.

If state policies are in opposition to the principles of a group, on the other hand, and policy convergence is low, the organization has arguably strong reasons to oppose the regime through any tactics that are possible and effective. In such instances, extreme tactics such as violence might be seen as effective if they put pressure on the regime and push it towards adopting policies that are more in line with the principles of the group.

Carrots and Sticks: The Role of Repression and Inclusion

While Islamist groups come to politics with specific principles and policy goals, they are nonetheless also rational, strategic actors, who respond to the pressures and incentives produced by their external environment. As already mentioned, one of the main propositions of the inclusion-moderation thesis is that repression leads to violent outcomes through a variety of causal mechanisms. Yet, three additional aspects need to be taken into consideration when evaluating the impact of repression on Islamist strategies.

¹⁴ Regime policies can have different levels of convergence on domestic and foreign policies. Therefore overall policy convergence can range from low (when both domestic and foreign policies diverge from the vision of the group), to medium (when some policies are convergent and others are divergent) and high (when regime policies are convergent with the Islamist vision in both domestic and foreign affairs).

First, most Muslim majority countries are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, which means that regimes often combine some measures of political inclusion with some measures of repression. As the literature on “competitive authoritarianism” and “hybrid regimes” points out, authoritarian regimes can introduce some openings and liberalize to a certain extent, mollifying dissent and pressures for reform (Levitsky and Way 2002). Elections in such environments can provide mechanisms for co-opting elites and managing defection, establishing a divided structure of contestation, providing the regime with some legitimacy and ultimately reducing the probability of violent removal from office (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).

Second, precisely because of these dynamics in hybrid regimes, it is important to examine Islamist groups within the broader context of opposition to the regime. How particular Islamist groups are treated and where they stand in comparison to other political actors impacts the appeal, availability and effectiveness of different tactics. In other words, it matters whether a regime targets a specific Islamist group for repression and political exclusion, and whether it attempts to co-opt it or give it preferential treatment in relation to other political actors. How all the possible combinations of inclusion and repression in relation to other actors affect the consideration of a group and its propensity towards violence is explored in greater depth through the use of typological theory in Appendix 1.

Third, aside from considering whether a regime employs repressive tactics at a particular point in time, it is equally if not more important to consider whether these measures come after a period of preferential treatment of the group, or if they are in fact an improvement compared to previous policies. If a regime employs repressive measures after it had either included or co-opted an organization, this psychological let-down can reinforce mistrust and a sense of betrayal,

and instill a sense of fear in the organization. These dynamics can provide powerful incentives for violent tactics, as the discussion on escalation will explain in more detail.

Organizational Dynamics

The factors examined so far are all argued to play an important role in providing incentives and pressures for a group to take violent or non-violent political action. Yet how these external pressures translate into action depends on organizational dynamics and on public norms of resistance. In terms of organizational dynamics, two aspects are particularly important: (1) organizational cohesion and (2) the nature and breadth of constituency.

The breadth of the constituency affects an organization's sensitivity to political participation and to violence, as well as the ability of members to reintegrate into society if they disengage. Complex organizations that provide social services, are active in civil society, and draw from a broad base of supporters, can also count on doing well in elections, which is why they are much more sensitive to political inclusion. This follows the logic of Sinno and Khanani, who point out that networked organizations depend on the recruitment of ideologically committed members, and are not focused on the provision of services for large constituencies, which also makes them much less inclined to contest elections than complex organizations that are active in civil society (Sinno and Khannani 2009). The broad base of constituency also means that audience costs are higher (Zahar 2003) and that the cost of violence is high. This is particularly the case, since the broader the audience, the less likely it is that the constituency supports violent tactics, given public apprehension towards both violence and government retaliation.¹⁵ At the same time, members of groups with a broad base of support and who are visible and active members of civil society can also have more exit options if they chose to

¹⁵ Even if the public was to support violent tactics and violence would be used as a mobilization tool, organizations that already appeal to a wide constituency are less likely to use violence because it carries decreasing marginal returns.

disengage, and can be easier reintegrated into society than members of narrow, clandestine organizations.

Organizational cohesion affects primarily the ability of a group to control its cadres, prevent defection and implement change. Cohesive groups are able to control factions and implement change, whereas fragmented group are prone to splintering and are incapable of implementing change that is widely accepted.

Based on these two characteristics, we have different organizational incentives and dynamics, as reflected in Table 5.

Table 5. Different Preferences of Islamist Groups, Based on Organizational Cohesion and Constituency.

	Organization is fragmented	Organization is cohesive
Broad domestic constituency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitive political participation bc. broad base of support can translate into votes • Broader exit options, easier integration in society • Broad constituency makes cost of violence high • Fragmented, incapable of controlling factions and implementing change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sensitive political participation bc. broad base of support can translate into votes • Broader exit options, easier integration in society • Broad constituency makes cost of violence high • Cohesive, can control factions and implement change
Narrow domestic constituency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not sensitive to political participation bc. not likely to win in elections • Few exit option, social integration difficult • Narrow constituency makes cost of violence lower • Fragmented, incapable of controlling factions and defection; difficult to implement change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not sensitive to political participation bc. not likely to win in elections • Few exit option, social integration difficult • Narrow constituency makes cost of violence lower • Cohesive, can control factions and implement change

Public Norms of Resistance

The second transmission belt included in the theoretical framework of strategic adjustment consists of public norms of resistance. Aside from being both principled and strategic, Islamist groups get cues from the rest of society about what tactics are acceptable and

feasible in a particular context. If there are other political actors with armed factions, if violent resistance is widespread or if the state is perceived as being illegitimate, the adoption of such tactics does not alienate the group from the rest of society. On the other hand, if either the regime benefits from high legitimacy, or if the public strongly condemns violent tactics, then the adoption of a violent strategic outlook carries an additional cost for an organization.

The issue of public acceptance is important both from a strategic and from an ideological perspective. In terms of rational calculations, losing public support can indeed reduce the strength of the organization. Beyond these calculations, however, if the founding principles of an Islamist group are concerned about the religious precepts of avoiding harm and protecting the Muslim community, then public condemnation carries a particularly heavy cost.

Explaining Ideological Revisions

So far the discussion has focused on what factors and dynamics can explain violent or non-violent outcomes. Yet, as has already been emphasized, neither ideologies nor strategies are static. In order to understand the *process* of change, this section will develop an argument about how ideological revisions can come about, and the next section will explore more in-depth what dynamics reinforce the move towards either escalation or de-escalation.

Escalation and de-escalation of commitments to violence have an ideological dimension to them, and suggest that groups can indeed move from a principled justification of violent tactics to a principled refutation of violent tactics. The process through which a group revises its ideologies, and changes its strategic outlook from the ideal type quadrant A to the ideal type quadrant H is nonlinear, and can be more closely approximated by the circular graph in figure two.

Figure 2 The Process of Ideological Revisions.



In light of the definitions of ideology and strategic outlook that I have offered, I suggest that a group starts out with some fundamental principles inspired by a particular theological interpretation, which prescribes a set of primary goals and acceptable means of pursuing those goals. Once a group starts acting on its principles within a particular context, it might also have to engage in operational justifications of its behavior, and it is forced to evaluate its overall strategic outlook and the extent to which it is able to pursue its goals and remain true to its long-term vision. Such an evaluation can lead to a rethinking of the very fundamental principles on which the group is founded. When the fundamental principles change so as to legitimize violence as a means of collective action, such a process can be understood as an escalation towards violent strategic outlook. When the fundamental principles change so as to delegitimize violence as a means of collective action, such a process can be understood as a de-escalation of the violent strategic outlook.

The process of revisions and change is conceptualized as an ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of different tactics towards fulfilling the most important goals of an organization. Based on the founding ideology, a group has a set of goals, and a set of tactics that are acceptable to pursue in order to achieve those goals. Over time, however, external factors such as

governmental policies or internal factors such as organizational cohesion and constituency affect the extent to which a particular tactic is possible or effective. As certain tactics become impossible or ineffective, the organization is forced to adjust and either narrow its array of tactics or if necessary change its priorities and adopt new tactics. Strategic adjustment in response to these external pressures and organizational dynamics can cause the group to rethink its very ideology.

As the empirical chapters will show in more detail, Islamist groups have some overarching goals that constitute their main mission, such as establishing an Islamic state, instituting *shari'a* law, and *da'wa* (preaching). In order to fulfill these goals, different groups employ different tactics. Violence is one such tactic that is accepted by some Islamist groups at particular points in time; however, it rarely (if ever) is the only tactic. Given the importance of religious outreach in Islam, many groups also seek to provide social services and promote religious education. Alternatively, some Islamist groups extend the outreach to the political realm and participate in politics, whereas others seek to implement the concept of commanding good and forbidding evil by developing vigilante entities designed to monitor social behavior or to police a particular community. Governmental policies, organizational capacity and societal considerations all affect the costs and the benefits of these various tactics.

The adjustment to the external context is strategic, to the extent that groups weigh in their options and pursue the most effective strategies. The adjustment, however, is also principled, to the extent that the alternative tactics are evaluated in relation to their ability to promote a particular religious mission and vision. This principled and strategic adjustment can lead groups either towards more violent options, or it can in fact force groups to renounce violent tactics.

These adaptations to the environment can be temporary “acts of desperation;” however, when a group revises its ideology or adjusts its organizational structures the adjustments are more definitive. If an organization forms an armed wing and starts legitimizing violent tactics we can expect at least an attempt for a sustained violent campaign. On the opposite side of the spectrum, if a group disbands its armed wing, de-legitimizes violence and revises its ideology, we can be confident that violent tactics are abandoned for the long-run. What dynamics lead to either violent escalation or to de-escalation and disengagement from violence is explained in greater depth next.


Explaining Violent Escalation and De-escalation

So far, the theoretical argument developed here has offered a framework for understanding outcomes in general terms, and has proposed that ideological revisions can come about in response to an adjustment and re-evaluation of the context. Yet the operational ideology and the re-evaluation of the strategic outlook are pushed towards escalation or de-escalation by different dynamics and different combination of factors.

The Dynamics of Violent Escalation

The general framework for understanding outcomes suggests that founding principles, policy convergence and a group’s repression and political inclusion provide incentives for actions that are translated through organizational dynamics and public norms. Yet the dynamics that lead to a process of violent escalation occur in response to particular configurations of these variables, as captured in figure three.

Figure 3 The Process of Violent Escalation



There are three conditions that lead to an accumulation and escalation of grievances within groups that is conducive to violent escalation: repression and/or political exclusion, low domestic policy convergence and perceived external threats to the Muslim community. Repression and political exclusion are particularly powerful when they occur after a period of political inclusion, co-optation or accommodation. Following the logic of relative deprivation, in these instances the switch to repressive or exclusionary measures reflects a drastic reversal in political fortunes and implies a negative trajectory for the relationship with the regime. This reinforces mistrust of the government, and can lead to a sense of betrayal, concern for organizational survival, and arguably a desire for revenge among many individual members. These sentiments are severely amplified when the regime also adopts policies that are divergent with the social and religious vision of the organization, and when there is a perceived external threat to the Muslim community.

The combination and interaction of these factors lead to an accumulation of grievances. The literature has already shown that grievances can lead to the rise of support for more militant tactics within an organization. The argument here is that these growing grievances and even the rising support for violent tactics within an organization only lead to violent escalation when there


is competition over authority within the organization and when society at large tolerates or even condones violent tactics. In such instances, any perceived external aggression, such as a strike against the organization and/or a close ally, or salient attacks on Muslims, can be a catalyst for violent escalation. In turn, once a group employs violent tactics, the tit-for-tat violence between security forces and the organization can lead to an ever escalating cycle of violence.

When and how does the cycle of violence end? Under what conditions do group reconsider the usefulness or even legitimacy of violent tactics and purposefully disengage from violence? The theoretical framework of strategic adjustment suggests that this occurs primarily as a result of changes in organizational dynamics and in public norms.

The Dynamics of De-escalation

Whereas organizational dynamics and public norms of resistance are treated as transmission belts in the overall framework that explains outcomes, and are also transmission belts in the dynamics of escalation, they play much more powerful causal roles in the determinants of de-escalation. When organizational fragmentation and weakness reach a point of crisis, a group is forced to reconsider the effectiveness of its tactics and its overall strategic outlook. If this happens in a context where there is widespread public condemnation of the organization undertaking violence, the group is much more likely to renounce these tactics and de-escalate its strategic outlook. Figure four captures this process.

Figure 4 The Process of De-escalation



This argument accepts Ashour's conclusion that repression forces an organization to reconsider the cost of violence, but it argues that the more powerful mechanism through which repression leads to such calculations is by causing an organizational crisis. This is an important nuance, because an organizational crisis can be caused by various factors, not just repression. Yet the crisis itself is what drives a group to re-evaluate its strategic outlook. Furthermore, the social milieu and public norms of resistance within which such a re-evaluation occurs is also essential. When there is widespread public condemnation of the group undertaking violence, the organization is much more likely to de-escalate its tactics.¹⁶

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that Islamist groups are both principled and strategic, and that their strategies are determined by the complex interaction between internal dynamics and external pressures and incentives. The main concern of this project is to understand how the process of violent escalation and de-escalation happens, therefore being able to assess when and why Islamist groups adopt or renounce violent tactics. Yet the logic of principled and strategic adjustment can also help our understanding of various non-violent choices, such as whether to enter or exit the political process.

The subsequent empirical chapters investigate the dynamics of violent escalation and de-escalation in Egypt and Indonesia by looking at the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood, the evolution and changes within al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, the rise of the Darul Islam and the emergence and transformation of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah. These cases seek to test whether the theoretical explanations offered here hold true, uncover the causal mechanisms of escalation and de-escalation, and inform us about what dynamics prevent, stall or counter-act these processes.

¹⁶ As the examination of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah in chapter six will reveal, there can be widespread opposition to violence, but not public condemnation of the group undertaking violence. What is driving the re-evaluation process is the public condemnation of the group, and not simply public opposition to violence.

Chapter seven will extend the analysis to explore to what extent the logic of principled and strategic adjustment can also explain when and why Islamist groups choose to enter or exit politics, and why they might abstain from forming a political party when given the political freedom to do so.

Chapter 3

The Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Potential for Violent Escalation

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the oldest and most influential Islamist organizations in the world, and the spiritual home of both Hassan al-Banna, a major thinker typically associated with gradual Islamic reform, and Sayyid Qutb, who has provided the inspiration and religious justification for many Islamist groups to adopt violent tactics. Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim considers that “the Brotherhood has managed to politicize Islam as no other indigenous popular movement has ever done in Egypt’s history” (Ibrahim 1988, 640).

Historically, the Brotherhood has adopted primarily non-violent tactics in domestic politics. However, in its early history, the movement experienced internal debates over the legitimacy and usefulness of violence. Whereas the non-violent preference prevailed at the organizational level, Sayyid Qutb’s writings grew increasingly revolutionary and anti-systemic, and some members of the Brotherhood eventually joined violent factions. Therefore, the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood has a dual legacy: it offers both a model for gradual, non-violent Islamist mobilization, and the kernel of subsequent violent movements.

This chapter seeks to shed light on both of these legacies. The first part examines the early period of the Muslim Brotherhood and explores what factors led to the emergence of the violent option and what mechanisms account for an escalation in the organization’s strategic outlook, paying close attention to the period between 1935 and 1954. The subsequent section looks at the divergent legacies of repression, and asks what accounts for the rise of two distinct movements and ideological trajectories from in Nasser’s prison: one non-violent and gradualist and another one violent and revolutionary.

Each section employs process-tracing to tell the causal story. To that end, the two parts of the chapter first provide an overview of the outcome that is to be explained (i.e. the changes in strategic outlook), after which they attempt to trace back the causal process by systematically investigating each hypothesized factor and paying close attention to the sequence of events. In order to further test the argument about the necessity of any individual explanations, the chapter also makes use of counterfactual analysis. The conclusion reviews what causal mechanisms emerge as the most substantiated explanations of the instances of escalation and de-escalation under review.

The Early History of the Muslim Brotherhood and Its Troubled Relationship with Violence: 1935-1954

The Muslim Brotherhood was established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in Ismailiya, a relatively small town in Egypt's Suez Canal zone. Gamal al-Banna recalls that the idea of the Brotherhood emerged when Hassan al-Banna, at the time a twenty-two year-old primary school teacher, would meet in coffee shops with six laborers from the Suez Canal Company and discuss Islam. Inspired by his understanding of Islam as a way of life, these young men encouraged al-Banna to establish an organization in order to spread their ideas and educate the public on religious matters.¹⁷ Over the subsequent five years, the organization grew rapidly and established branches all over the country, transforming into a grassroots movement.


The Brotherhood was established to serve primarily as a social, educational and religious organization. However, in the 1940s the organization also became increasingly vocal and active both in domestic opposition to the British presence and in the revolt in Palestine.¹⁸ By the late

¹⁷ Interview with Gamal al-Banna, Cairo, June 17, 2012.

¹⁸ From the perspective of the Brotherhood and in some cases also from the perspective of the courts at the time, as evidenced by the verdict of the "Jeep trial" (which will be discussed in more details below), these tactics did not constitute violence but rather legitimate resistance to external occupation. This distinction between violence and

1940s, members of the organization were also implicated in attacks on domestic targets and politicians.¹⁹ Figure 5 provides a concise overview of the escalation of tactics during this early period of the organization.

Figure 5 The Escalation of Tactics Employed by the Muslim Brotherhood (1935-1954)



This project focuses primarily on understanding what causes actors to use violence against domestic targets. However, in order to understand the violent escalation of strategic outlook within the Muslim Brotherhood, it is necessary to explore how the tactics and rhetoric of

resistance was also emphasized by a former Muslim Brother in an interview, as to this day most members do not consider resistance in Palestine as a form of violence but as a legitimate act of defense against an external occupier. Anonymous interview, June 28, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁹ There continues to be disagreement over the extent to which these acts represented the organization as a whole versus individuals associated with it, and to what extent some of these acts were staged by the regime to frame the Brotherhood. In an interview with an Egyptian Islamist who self-identified as not belonging to any organization but sympathizing with both the Brotherhood and with Salafi preachers, the interviewee was adamant that the Brotherhood as an organization never promoted or used violence against Egyptians, and that the attempt on Nasser was staged by the government in order to be able to arrest the Brothers. From his perspective, history books and the media have purposefully blamed violence on the Brotherhood, in order to demonize the Islamist movements. Anonymous interview, June 8, 2012, Cairo.

the organization escalated in regards to British forces, Palestine and national politics, paying close attention to the formation of the armed wing within the Brotherhood. Therefore, the discussion of the organization's strategic outlook during this early period is focused on three issues: the tactics employed externally towards the Palestinian cause, the formation and activities of the Secret Apparatus, and the debate over using violence against domestic targets, both before and after Hassan al-Banna's death. While these might be distinct issues, there is an important temporal dimension to them, with targeting civilians being the last step in the sequence, as well as the strongest point of escalation from the perspective of this study.

The Brotherhood and the Palestinian Cause

The early history of the Brotherhood reflects a gradual politicization and transformation of tactics and strategic outlook. It is difficult to point to a concrete moment in time at which the organization switched from merely educational, social or religious activities to politicized actions of dissent and opposition, but perhaps the best estimate for the earliest signs of entry into the arena of political dissent is 1935, when the Brotherhood first became explicitly interested in the issue of Palestine. Before the Arab revolt in Palestine started in 1936, Hassan al-Banna's brother already traveled to Jerusalem and met the Mufti and chairman of the Supreme Council at the time. At the third general conference of the Brotherhood in March 1935, Hassan al-Banna appealed for money to assist the Arab cause and established a committee in charge of addressing this issue through letters to the authorities, speeches and pamphlets (Mitchell 1993, 55). In the subsequent years, during the Arab revolt in Palestine between 1936 and 1939, the Brotherhood gave speeches on behalf of the Palestinian cause, raised money, published pamphlets and organized demonstrations (Mitchell 1993, 16). In addition to being vocal supporters of the

Palestinian cause, the Brotherhood also started sending volunteers to fight in Palestine, and Zollner suggests that this occurred as early as 1936 (Zollner 2008, 12).

In the 1954 trials of the Muslim Brothers, Hindawi Dweir (at the time a leader in the armed section of the Brotherhood in Cairo and Alexandria) confessed that in 1936 he bought two hundred rifles which he had taken to Ismailia and from there to El Arish for use in the Palestine war.²⁰ A secret dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo indeed states that “For about the first eight years the Ikhwan do not seem to have come to the notice of the British security authorities. During the Palestine Rebellion, however, they were reported to be sending funds and arms to the rebels, making propaganda on their behalf, and trying to organize the making of explosives for them.”²¹

By the end of the 1930s, Hassan al-Banna also wrote “On Jihad,” which later became one of the five tracts that captured his thinking and embodied perhaps his most important ideological statements. In this work, al-Banna presents resistance against foreign occupation as not only a legitimate tactic but also as a duty, invoking the notion of *jihad*. However, violent tactics were only justified in the case of resistance against external forces and occupation.

The Formation and the Activities of the Secret Apparatus

As the discussion on organizational dynamics will reveal in more detail, by the early 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood established an armed wing, also known as the Secret Apparatus. A dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo suggests that several months before the estimated formation of the Secret Apparatus, the Brotherhood contemplated a campaign of non-cooperation

²⁰ Egyptian Gazette, November 30, 1954.

²¹ See the report on the Brotherhood entitled “The Ikhwan Al Muslimin reconsidered” that is included in a secret dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo on December 24th, 1942, WAS/PM, No. 1237, available in *Islam: Political Impact 1908-1972: British Documentary Sources*, edited by Jane Priestland. Slough, England: Archive Editions, 2004, volume 7: 1940-1949, pp.59 – 65.

against the British and the Wafd, modeled after Ghandi's movement in India.²² Given the tensions between the Brotherhood and British forces, as well as the general alarmist tone pervasive in both British documents and media reports on the Brotherhood at the time, this piece of evidence can be seen as quite credible. What this suggests is that (1) the Brotherhood was open to learning from the successes of other movements worldwide, and (2) the organization did at the very least consider non-violent options before it established an armed wing.

The main goals of the Secret Apparatus were to resist British troops and fight in Palestine. From the beginning Hassan al-Banna was clear about the fact that this entity should be conceptually and institutionally different from the main organization, and that there is a clear separation between the da'wa (preaching) and the military aspects. It is for this reason that he placed the Secret Apparatus under the leadership of Abdelrahman al-Sanadi.²³

Mitchell suggests that the Brotherhood began "to play the part of defender of the movement against the police and the government of Egypt" as early as 1943, while in the subsequent year the secret apparatus also began to infiltrate the communist movement (Mitchell 1993, 32). Mitchell suggests that one of the major reasons that the Brotherhood began using this armed wing internally was the "sense of betrayal of the national leadership" (Mitchell 1993, 32). Nonetheless, during the early 1940s, the main foci for the secret apparatus, and the main military concerns for the Brotherhood were Palestine and the British forces in Egypt. In fact, the Brotherhood even established ties with the military, which helped with technical training and the acquisition of arms (Hussaini 1984, 126). Hussaini also suggests that militarism developed because in addition to foreign aggression, the party disputes in Egypt were not in conformity

²² See the report on the Brotherhood entitled "The Ikhwan Al Muslimin reconsidered" that is included in a secret dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo on December 24th, 1942, WAS/PM, No. 1237, available in *Islam: Political Impact 1908-1972: British Documentary Sources*, edited by Jane Priestland. Slough, England: Archive Editions, 2004, volume 7: 1940-1949, pp.59 – 65.

²³ Anonymous interview, Cairo, June 28, 2012.

with the Muslim Brotherhood and because of the lack of party reform. In fact, Hussaini goes as far as making a counterfactual argument and stating that “If it were not for these causes, the movement would most likely have been a purely religious body” (Hussaini 1984, 96).

Throughout 1945, 1946 and 1947, the Muslim Brotherhood became an important player in both anti-Zionist and anti-British demonstrations, which became frequent occurrences in Egypt, and at times escalated into looting and attacks on Jewish or British properties. However, even the New York Times, which at the time labeled the Brotherhood as “one of the most fanatical Muslim organizations,” made note of the fact that Hassan al-Banna called for rioters to remain calm,²⁴ and that he spoke about the distinction between tolerance for Judaism as a religion and opposition to Zionism.²⁵ When demonstrations escalated to burning English books and stores on November 26, 1946, Hassan al-Banna was out of the country, on pilgrimage (Mitchell 1993, 50).

On October 8, 1946 Hassan al-Banna wrote a letter to the king pleading for a national adoption of *jihad* (Mitchell 1993, 49), and on October 21st he also called for a cultural boycott against the English (Mitchell 1993, 50). Mitchell also suggests that starting in 1946 the Brotherhood also became involved in bomb assaults on British cars, establishments and enclaves, and that the organization “used this kind of operation as ‘training test’ for the personnel of the secret apparatus” (Mitchell 1993, 60).

Anti-Zionist and anti-British riots were sponsored not just by the Brotherhood, but also by the Wafd, the Young Muslim Man Association and the Young Egypt Movement.²⁶ In fact, these groups had their own paramilitary formations, and boasted arms, munitions and explosives (Mitchell 1993, 60). This is important to recognize, because (1) at times members or

²⁴ New York Times, November 5, 1945.

²⁵ New York Times, March 6, 1946.

²⁶ New York Times, March 1, 1946.

sympathizers of these groups came into violent conflict with each other and with Muslim Brothers during riots,²⁷ and (2) it suggests that the Secret Apparatus was formed during a time of political tension when political dissent was frequently sensitive to violent escalation.

The military involvement of the Secret Apparatus in Palestine reached its peak in 1948. According to Mitchell, al-Banna had ordered the branches of the Brotherhood to start preparing for *jihād* already in October of 1947. On October 20, 1947 the first ‘battalion’ “went on display” (Mitchell 1993, 56), and on April 25, 1948 the first battalion of volunteers set out for Al-Arish (Mitchell 1993, 57). At the time, Nuqrashi approved of the military training of volunteers if it was done by the army, and the Arab League²⁸ also supported this movement and supplied volunteers with arms and training (Hussaini 1984, 20; Mitchell 1993, 57). In addition to sending volunteers to fight in Palestine, in May 1948, the Brotherhood also demanded all Arab governments to declare *jihād* against the Zionist forces (Hussaini 1984, 20).

The Debate over Targeting Domestic Actors

While 1948 marks the major military involvement of the Secret Apparatus volunteers in Palestine, that same year also marks the major turning point for the Brotherhood in terms of the Secret Apparatus extending its violent tactics towards domestic targets. Anti-British demonstrations sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood were already clashing with the police in 1947, even to the point where Hassan al-Banna was shot in the hand in August 1947.²⁹ In January 1948, the government arrested some Muslim Brothers for having bombs and arms and conducting military training in the Moqattam hills, but then it immediately released them (Mitchell 1993, 61). In this growing tension between the state and the Brothers, on March 22,

²⁷ New York Times, April 19, 1946.

²⁸ The position of the Arab League was interesting; it considered the fighting in Palestine a case of civil war and therefore officially opposed the involvement of regular troops and state forces, but sympathizing with the Arab cause it supported the involvement of volunteer forces.

²⁹ The Times (London, England), August 23, 1947.

two members of the Muslim Brotherhood's Secret Apparatus assassinated Ahmad al-Khazindar Bey, vice-president of the Cairo National Court of Appeal, because he had sentenced a Muslim Brother to prison for attacking British soldiers in a club in Alexandria (Hussaini 1984, 113; Mitchell 1993, 62).

There are reports from Hassan al-Banna's prison inmates that he had expressed revulsion at the assassination of al-Khazindar Bey and that he feared the members of the Secret Apparatus were no longer under his control (Mitchell 1993, 62). Mitchell suggests that it is important to be aware of the fact that while the members of the Brotherhood in general repudiated the assassination, they still considered the judge guilty of imprisoning a patriot that was opposing a much hated occupation (Mitchell 1993, 62).

After the assassination of al-Khazindar Bey, the government began to increasingly raid and reveal the stockpiles of arms and the military training within the ranks of the Brotherhood. The validity of these reports has to be taken with a grain of salt, as the media largely reflected the view of the state, which started to actively undermine and demonize the Brotherhood. Why the government adopted this policy rather than co-optation and accommodation is unclear, but the most plausible explanation is that the Brotherhood was beginning to emerge as one of the strongest and most vocal critics of its foreign policy and most ardent opponents of the British forces. The organization seemed capable of undermining relations and negotiations with Britain, and with the assassination it also proved capable of harming national political leaders. Whereas the military initially silently endorsed the participation of the Brothers in Palestine, where its own forces were weak, after the assassination of al-Khazindar Bey it must have been clear that the members of the Secret Apparatus were difficult to control and could easily turn against the

government. After all, even Hassan al-Banna was beginning to fear that he was losing control over the armed group of the organization.

In October 1948 the government reported to have discovered a cache of arms and ammunition in Ismailiya on the estate of Shaykh Muhammad Farghali, a leader of the battalions in Palestine, and in November 1948 the famous “jeep” incident exposed for the first time the existence of a secret armed wing (Mitchell 1993, 64).³⁰ Hassan al-Banna was once again out of the country on pilgrimage when these raids and disclosures occurred (Mitchell 1993, 65).

In this context, the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved on December 8, 1948, even though when the jeep trial concluded in March 1951, the verdict was sympathetic to the defense council’s argument that the Brotherhood was only collecting arms to defend Palestine, and that the arms and ammunition were collected with the knowledge and permission of the authorities.³¹ Not even three weeks after the dissolution of the Society, a Muslim Brother assassinated Prime Minister Al-Nuqrashi.

Once again, it is disputed whether the assassination of Nuqrashi represents an individual act, the collective decision of the Muslim Brotherhood or at least of the Supreme Guide, or the decision of a faction within the Secret Apparatus. Gamal al-Banna, the brother of Hassan al-Banna, suggests that the assassination was undertaken by the organization in revenge for the dissolution order.³² In the subsequent trials, the person who assassinated Nuqrashi, Abdul Meguid Ahmed Hassan, confessed that he was given a fatwa by Muslim Brother Sheikh Sabek, saying that he would go to heaven and that such a murder is justifiable,³³ but there were no

³⁰ On November 15, 1948 government authorities seized a jeep that had documents about the military activities of the Brotherhood, along with arms, ammunition, and explosives. This case became known as the “jeep case” and received a lot of attention in the media.

³¹ Egyptian Gazette, March 18, 1951.

³² Interview with Gamal al-Banna, June 17, 2012, Cairo.

³³ Egyptian Gazette, May 8, 1949.

claims that he represented or operated in the name of the Brotherhood as a whole.³⁴ Some suggest that when the Brotherhood was dissolved, Hassan al-Banna spoke out against Nuqrashi, which al-Sanadi interpreted as an order and took it upon himself to organize the assassination of Nuqrashi, an act that caused al-Banna to “pull out his hair” out of despair.³⁵ Indeed, after the assassination, Hassan al-Banna immediately repudiated the act and condemned the escalation of violence, trying to reach a settlement with the new government that would result in waving the ban on the Brotherhood, releasing the confiscated assets and freeing the arrested members (Mitchell 1993, 68). Al-Banna argued that the Brothers who engaged in violence were regrettable acts of individuals and had no orders to do so, in fact misunderstanding the aims of the organization (Zollner 2008, 14).

Al-Banna’s attempt at reconciliation with the government was undermined by the accusations that a bomb was placed by a Muslim Brother in the National Court of Appeal on January 13, 1949.³⁶ Once again the Supreme Guide was quick to denounce the violence, publishing a statement that actors using such tactics are neither Brothers nor Muslims, and appealing to the youth to cease committing acts of violence (Mitchell 1993, 68). He even went as far as stating that he would regard any such attacks as directed against his person and would insist on bearing the legal consequences (Mitchell 1993, 69).

While al-Banna was attempting to save the image of the Brotherhood, the media compared the Brotherhood’s march in Cairo during the parliamentary election to Mussolini’s march on Rome, and talked about “sensational plans to seize power in Egypt”.³⁷ Once al-Banna realized that a settlement with the government was unfeasible, he wrote and distributed

³⁴ Egyptian Gazette, May 17, 1949.

³⁵ Anonymous interview, June 28, 2012, Cairo.

³⁶ Egyptian Gazette, February 20, 1949.

³⁷ Egyptian Gazette, February 2, 1949.

clandestinely a pamphlet that condemned the dissolution of the Brotherhood and argued that most charges against the organization were fabrications as the arms were acquired with the blessing of the government and the Arab League and the society could not be held responsible for the actions of individual members (Mitchell 1993, 70). However, al-Banna did not have much time to save or reform his organization, because he was assassinated on February 12, 1949.³⁸

After the death of Hassan al-Banna, the government escalated even more its wave of arrests, confiscation of ammunition, and the media denouncement of the Brotherhood as attempting to collect arms, seize power, and even collaborate with communists.³⁹ Brotherhood members also attempted the assassination of Prime Minister Ibrahim Abd Al-Hadi, but they were immediately apprehended (Mitchell 1993, 72), and this marked the last attempt at the escalation of tactics for the next couple of years. The Brotherhood did not resume any violent tactics against domestic or foreign targets until 1951.

The Debate over Violent Tactics after al-Banna's Death

When the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was abrogated in 1951, Muslim Brotherhood battalions became once again active against the British forces in the Suez Canal Zone, but as before with the support of the Egyptian army. One of the Brotherhood publications called for *jihad* against the British on October 17, and Brothers in the Islamiliya office also declared *jihad* against the British (Mitchell 1993, 89). However, even though these calls for resistance carried on the ideology of al-Banna, when Hudeiby became the new Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood he did not recognize the call for *jihad* as an official stance of the organization, while also denying the

³⁸ As Mitchell notes, the “evidence presented in the numerous trials and investigations held later indicated with little doubt that the assassination was an act planned, or at least condoned, by the prime minister (with the probably support of the palace), and executed by members of the political police (Mitchell 1993, 71).

³⁹ See for example the May 1, 8, 9, 23, 27 and 29 issues of the Egyptian Gazette in 1949.

involvement of Brotherhood battalions in the Canal Zone, emphasizing that the organization sought to spread its message peacefully (Mitchell 1993, 89–90). Experts suggest that individual Muslim Brothers were most likely also present in the violent riots that broke out on January 26, 1952, even though the organization as a whole was not responsible for organizing the demonstrations or inciting violence and destruction of property, and Hudeiby denounced the acts (Mitchell 1993, 93; Zollner 2008, 24).

After the attacks undertaken on political figures in 1948, the next episode when Muslim Brothers reached center stage and were associated with violence was on October 26, 1954, when Brotherhood member Mahmud Abd Al-Latif attempted to assassinate Abdul Nasser.⁴⁰ As with all previous attacks, the extent to which we can consider this incident an individual act, a collective decision of the Brotherhood or an initiative from a Brotherhood faction remains debated. Some Brotherhood members and sympathizers suggest that this attack was staged by Nasser in order to frame the Brotherhood, whereas others believe that the orders to assassinate Nasser did come from within the organization, but from the Secret Apparatus and not the Supreme Guide himself.⁴¹ The confessions during the trials reveal not just a hierarchical command structure, but also a dual command structure and splits in the leadership and authority of the Brotherhood, as will be discussed in more detail below. Perhaps the most convincing argument is that Hudeiby was aware that the idea of assassinating Nasser had surfaced, but even

⁴⁰ In 1950 Gamal Nasser was elected as the chairman of the Free Officers Movement, and he was considered one of the masterminds of the 1952 Free Officers Movement coup d'état against King Farouk. The Free Officers reconstituted themselves as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and General Mohammed Neguib became commander in chief and president of the RCC. Over the subsequent years Nasser and Neguib competed over power, which culminated with Nasser placing Neguib under house arrest in February 1954, and temporarily assuming the Premiership. In response to large-scale protests, which included members of the Brotherhood, Neguib was reinstated in March, and Nasser became the Deputy Prime Minister. In 1956, Nasser became the President of Egypt. For an overview of Nasser's rise to power, see Woodward 1992, Hofstadter 1973 and Vatikiotis 1978.

⁴¹ Anonymous interview, June 8, 2012, Cairo and anonymous interview, June 28, 2012, Cairo. See also Al-Sayyid 2003, p. 11.

though he was opposed to any unilateral acts of violence and armed demonstrations, the leaders of the Secret Apparatus decided to stage the attack on Nasser anyway.

So far the discussion has provided an overview of how the Brotherhood's strategic outlook has shifted during the period of 1935-1954, which describes the change in the dependent variable that is to be explained. Next, the analysis will explore the extent to which these changes have been determined by ideological principles, levels of policy convergence, government policies, the effectiveness of different tactics or organizational factors. Each of these dynamics is explored in detail, seeking to uncover the causal mechanism underlying tactical escalation.

The Founding Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood

To what extent were the actions of the Brotherhood derived directly and principally from their founding ideology, and how much of the change in strategy does this ideational dimension explain? The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation suggests that actors are both principled and strategic, and that calculations of costs and benefits are made in relation to the founding principles and primary goals of the organization. Therefore, it is important to understand (1) what the main goals and priorities of the Brotherhood were, and (2) what tactics the organization perceived as appropriate and legitimate to pursue its goals.

Hassan al-Banna envisioned the Muslim Brotherhood as having two fundamental goals: (1) freeing "the Islamic fatherland" from all foreign domination and (2) establishing a "free Islamic state" that is to act "according to the precepts of Islam," apply its "social regulations," proclaim "its sound principles" and broadcast "its sage mission to all mankind" (al-Banna 1978, 31–32). Given the specific socio-economic and political conditions in Egypt, in addition to the two primary long-terms goals, al-Banna also proposed several additional goals: education

reform; “war against poverty, ignorance, disease and crime;” and the establishment of an exemplary Islamic society (al-Banna 1978, 33).

In order to pursue the first goal of defending the Muslim *umma*, the Muslim Brotherhood viewed guerilla tactics as legitimate actions against foreign occupation. In al-Banna’s writings on *jihad*, it is clear that he refers to the military understanding of the concept, suggesting that warfare, like prayer and fasting, is one of the Pillars of Islam (al-Banna 1978, 135), and is not to be undermined by the notion of the jihad of the heart (155). Al-Banna points out that fighting is detestable and peace is preferable, but that jihad is nonetheless a great duty (al-Banna 1978, 133). This fight is “not as a tool of oppression or a means of satisfying personal ambitions, but rather as a defense for the mission [of spreading Islam], a guarantee of peace, and a means of implementing the Supreme Message” (151). He emphasizes the defensive element by suggesting that “God has forbidden aggression” (153) and “it is forbidden to slay women, children, and old men [...] or to disturb monks and hermits, and the peaceful who offer no resistance” (154). Al-Banna’s distinction between resistance to foreign occupation/troops and the targeting of innocent civilians is analogous to the distinctions made in just war theory between guerilla warfare and terrorism (Ganor 2002; Walzer 2006).

Whereas violent tactics against foreign occupation were seen as legitimate, al-Banna never expressed any support for using such a strategy domestically or for pursuing the second goal of establishing an Islamic state through a violent revolution. In fact, in a letter to the king he writes that “God has delegated rulership over [the] nation” to the king, making the ruler therefore responsible before God for the country’s interests and affairs (al-Banna 1978, 103–104). As mentioned above, al-Banna also reinforced the need to keep riots non-violent, and after the assassinations undertaken by Brotherhood members he denounced these attacks and

disassociated the larger organization from these individual initiatives. While this strategy could have had an element of political expediency, there is no doubt that the infamous article calling the young men committing the violence “neither Brothers nor Muslims” was at least partly principled, as al-Banna always emphasized the need for gradual reform and for convincing society of the value of Islam.

Regarding the second goal of establishing a “free Islamic state,” al-Banna pursued a two-fold strategy. On one hand, he outlined concrete policy preferences for the governance of Egypt and actively advocated for their adoption through letters to the king and other officials. On the other hand, al-Banna envisioned a gradual Islamization of society, so that eventually his countrymen would embrace his agenda and organically develop the Islamic state he propagated. For Al-Banna the revival of the Muslim community depended on gradual reform that proceeds from the individual to the family and then society, and eventually would lead to the reestablishment of the umma and the revival of the caliphate (al-Banna 2002, 46). This gradual progress would need to proceed through three stages: propaganda, mobilization and action (Hussaini 1984, 39).

Al-Banna’s vision was to go beyond charitable actions and establish a more activist organization. He subscribed to the notion of ‘comprehensive Islam’ as a “perfect system of social organization which encompasses all aspects of life” (al-Banna 1978, 30) in which it is impossible to differentiate between religion and politics (al-Banna 1978, 36). Because of this, he became very disillusioned with the fact that the predominant Muslim civic organizations at the time, Al-Gam’iya al-Shar’iya and the Young Men’s Muslim Association, confined themselves to charitable services and purposefully stayed out of politics.⁴²

⁴² Anonymous interview, July 25, 2012, Cairo.

The Brotherhood actively advocated for fighting government corruption, establishing a ministry of social affairs, reducing unemployment and expanding public enterprises, implementing an Islamic banking system that would offer interest-free loans, protecting domestic industries, diversifying agriculture, reforming labor legislation to protect workers, improving water supplies and improving living standards for peasants through initiatives such as introducing health and literacy programs (Lia 2006, 209–211). In the famous letter to King Farouk, “Toward the Light,” al-Banna calls for forms such as ending party rivalry, conforming laws to Islamic legislation, strengthening the armed forces, surveying the conduct of employees, changing work hours so that they do not conflict with prayer times, “conditioning the people to respect public morality,” ending prostitution, gambling and drinking, punishing fornication, segregating male and female students, censoring plays, films and music, introducing religious instruction in schools, protecting the masses from monopolistic companies, encouraging agricultural and industrial counseling and prohibiting usury (al-Banna 1978). As Hussaini notes, the Brotherhood had nationalist socialist tendencies on economic issues, arguing that the state should prohibit monopolies, tap private wealth, prohibit foreigners from acquiring property and collect *zakat* to solve poverty (Hussaini 1984, 57).

In order to establish an Islamic society and educate the population, the Brotherhood promoted religious education and preaching; writing and publishing and the establishment of educational institutions. The Brothers were active in mosques, published and distributed a variety of newspapers and magazines, and formed a number of schools including day schools for the memorization of the Qur’an, night schools for workers and peasants, schools for boys and schools for girls (Hussaini 1984). In order to reduce poverty, disease and crime, the Brotherhood established a broad network of social services, built hospitals and set up several economic

enterprises, such as the Brethren Spinning and Weaving Company, the Commercial and Engineering Works Company and the Islamic Press and Daily Newspaper Company (Hussaini 1984, 56).

From this brief overview of the religious interpretation and vision that inspired the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood we can see that while the Brotherhood ideology had from the beginning a revolutionary element, there is also a disconnect between the gradualist view of the revival of the Muslim community, which emphasized education and social cohesion, and some of the attacks on Egyptian political figures that Muslim Brothers were accused of.⁴³ Several points therefore stand out about the possible impact of ideology.

The Brotherhood was founded as a non-violent activist organization that emphasized the importance of a wide variety of social and educational activities. The religious inspiration, with its emphasis on preaching (*da'wa*) and supporting the Muslim community (*ummah*) offered a model of many non-violent forms of activism and dissent, in which violent opposition is only acceptable against foreign aggressors. Of course, depending on the political context, not all tactics are always available or effective, as will be discussed in more detail. However, the larger point is that the founding ideology of the Brotherhood did not provide an explicit justification and motivation for attacking Egyptian political figures, and that given the emphasis on alternative forms of activism, one can say that the Brothers undertaking the attacks on Egyptian political figures did *so in spite of the founding ideology*, and in spite of both al-Banna's and al-Hudeiby's gradualist vision that denounced violence against fellow citizens.

⁴³ It is worth noting that decades later, in a writing of 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, the blind sheikh who became the spiritual leader of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, he quotes the Brotherhood lawyer 'Abd al-Qadir 'Awda (who was hanged in 1954 for allegedly participating in the plot to assassinate Nasser) as saying that "if continuing under the regime results in the undermining of Islam or the weakening of its position, then the lesser of the two evils must be revolt and nothing less" (Euben and Zaman 2009, 352).

Given the fact that the organization as a whole never justified in ideological terms the use of violence against domestic factors, we can in fact conclude that *ideological principles were not necessary conditions for violent escalation* within the organization. This is also supported by the fact that during that same time period the Muslim Brotherhood was only one of many Egyptian groups that was active and vocal in its opposition to the British forces and in its support of the Palestinian cause. During these turbulent times, many anti-British and anti-Zionist riots escalated into attacks on shops and property, fire or clashes with the police. during these demonstrations the Brotherhood never played center stage as an organization, even though individual members were likely involved.⁴⁴

In fact, it seems quite convincing that *ideology was one of the contributing factors to the avoidance of violent tactics*. In 1939 a small group of Brotherhood members defected from the organizations, and according to Mitchell, one of the causes was al-Banna's refusal to impose forceful reform within Egypt (Mitchell 1993, 18). Furthermore, two members of the Brotherhood, Ahmad Rifat and Jamat Mohammed, also pushed for the adoption of violent tactics against "moral evils," but Hassan al-Banna refused to endorse such tactics because he was a proponent of gradual domestic reform based on a bottom-up educational approach.⁴⁵ This is an important moment of principled opposition to violence that shows that ideology can in fact be an important inhibitor of the violent escalation of tactics, especially when there is a strong, charismatic leader. Of course, this principled abstention from violence was possible at least in part because the Brotherhood was a hierarchical organization with a top-down decision-making process and al-Banna was a strong and charismatic leader. One can also argue that in 1939 al-

⁴⁴ As the subsequent discussion will show, other groups such as the Young Egypt Society, the Green Shirts or the Blue Shirts were all engaged in paramilitary activity.

⁴⁵ Anonymous interview, Cairo, June 17, 2012. Also confirmed by a former Brotherhood leader in an anonymous interview on July 4th, 2012 in Cairo.

Banna still believed that negotiating with the government might be effective. However, such a strategic calculation does not have to contradict or even undermine the fact that al-Banna was principally opposed to the use of violence domestically, especially if we take into consideration the emphasis placed in Islam on considering the consequences and possible harms of one's action. The larger point to emphasize here is that we should ***not treat ideology in isolation from other dimensions such as organizational dynamics or government policies.***

Aside from the direct connection to adoption or abstention from violence, al-Banna's vision and the religious emphasis on strengthening the *ummah* did provide an impetus to develop a strong and multi-faceted organization and to emphasize physical health and training. This led to the formation of scouts and battalions, which in the context of heightened tensions in the Suez Canal Zone and in Palestine, provided an institutional structure that lend itself easily into the formation of a military wing.⁴⁶ This will be revealed in more detail in the discussion of organizational factors.

While the founding ideology of the Brotherhood therefore cannot be argued to be a direct cause of the violent escalation of tactics, the principles animating the members and leaders of the organization determine how they perceive their environment, and to what extent they perceive the government as hostile or as misguided. Given the primacy of the notion that Islam is comprehensive and one cannot distinguish between religion and politics, the extent to which government policies are convergent with the vision of the Brotherhood therefore provides an impetus for cooperation or antagonism on the part of the organization vis-à-vis the regime.

⁴⁶ Sports clubs, boy/girl scout groups and martial arts groups are fascinating actors, because in and of themselves we cannot see them as inherently prone to violence or necessarily functionally equivalent to paramilitary entities (or else every American city would be flooded with paramilitary groups). Yet, other authors have also documented that in the contexts of transitions, insecurity or conflict, such groups can easily lend themselves to evolving into criminal or paramilitary entities. A fascinating discussion of such issues in the context of contemporary Russia is offered in *Violent Entrepreneurs* (Volkov 2002).

Policy Convergence and the Logic of Resistance

Given the founding principles and goals of the Muslim Brotherhood, it becomes evident that the organization (and in particular its leaders) was highly concerned with both domestic and foreign policies from its early stage. In terms of foreign policy, the most salient issue for the Brothers was the stance of the government towards the British and later towards the situation in Palestine. In terms of domestic policies, the Brotherhood was primarily concerned with the “moral fiber” of society, seeking policies that would reinforce the religiosity and Muslim identity of the country.

On both accounts, government policies before the July 1952 revolution failed to meet the standards and the vision of the Brotherhood. The low policy convergence can be seen as a broad motivation for antagonism and opposition towards the government; however, the failure to meet the Brotherhood’s policy demands did not necessarily call for violent opposition. Therefore, low policy convergence can be seen as an enabling background condition for antagonism towards the regime and not a direct cause for the escalation or de-escalation of tactics. In fact, an interesting question that emerges is why the organization *did not* escalate tactics at particular points in time when policy convergence was especially low.

Starting with 1936, Hassan al-Banna began explicitly expressing his dissatisfaction with government policies and with the state of affairs in Egypt and in the region,⁴⁷ calling for specific reforms, and calling on King Farouk and Nahas Pasha to follow the Islamic path (Hussaini 1984, 15). In terms of domestic affairs, Egypt’s political life at the time was much more inspired by the European model than by Islamic precepts. The 1923 constitution was primarily derived from European public law, declaring Egypt a constitutional monarchy and including few references to

⁴⁷ Jansen suggests that the earliest pamphlet of the Brotherhood was written as early as June 1929, and Hassan al-Banna addressed it to the King, the Ministers, the members of parliament, the Ministry of Education and the scholars of Al-Azhar, calling for religious education in schools (Jansen 1992).

Islam, other than declaring it the State religion (Bentwich 1924). Perhaps because of the lack of religion in public policy, the King also continuously tried to control the religious administration and bring Al Azhar under his tutelage. This manifested itself in debates over the draft law to allow the Monarch to appoint the rector of Al Azhar.⁴⁸

The Brotherhood was not the only group demanding religious reforms. In March 1937, for example, several thousand of Azhar and University students demonstrated before the King's palace on the day after Muslim New Year and "begged that religious instruction should be given in the Egyptian University and that women should be separated from men in University education".⁴⁹ In January 1939, Sheikhs at Al Azhar also called on the government to close down shops that sell liquor.⁵⁰

At times the government did try to appease these calls for an increasing role of religion in public affairs, such as in January 1944, when the Minister of Justice formed a committee that consulted with representatives of different religious communities in regards to a draft law that would revise the personal status of non-Muslims in connection with inheritance.⁵¹ At other times, however, governmental fears of Azharite demonstrations resulted in violent clashes between the police and Al-Azhar students, and even the temporary arrest of several sheikhs.⁵²

The call for religious reforms animated the Brotherhood, but it was never used as a spring board for a tactical escalation. None of the events mentioned spurred any of the Brothers to

⁴⁸ See the confidential letter No. 1131 (J 4037/4037/16) from Sir Percy Loraine to Mr. A. Henderson, Dec. 17, 1930, included in the public archive *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 6, page 9.

⁴⁹ Dispatch No. 348 (158/35/37) from the Ambassador to Egypt, the British Embassy in Cairo, 19th of March 1937, available in *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 6, p. 505

⁵⁰ Extract from dispatch no. 32, 14 January 1939, available in *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 6, p. 793.

⁵¹ See "Extract from Weekly Political and Economic Report from 16th March to 22nd March, 1944," TR/PDP, 16/12/22, No. 68, available in *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 7, p. 274.

⁵² In February 1943 a group of Azharite students wanted to march to the Palace to offer birthday greetings to the king, but the police received orders (from the government, without the knowledge of the King) to disperse any masses, which resulted in violent clashes and the arrests of twenty-two students and five sheikhs. See "Political and Economic Weekly Report from February 12th to February 18th 1943," Report No. 11, TR/PM, 16/12/43; available in *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 7, p. 168.

resort to violence against Egyptian political figures. What had a much more powerful impact on the tactics of the organization and the growing militarism within its ranks were the policies of the British in Egypt and Palestine, and the failures of the regime in regards to foreign policy.

Egypt gained its formal independence in 1922, but the subsequent monarchy was practically installed by Great Britain, who retained control of much of Egypt's political system, and maintained military bases in the country (Woodward 1992). Great Britain maintained control both directly through its military presence, and indirectly through the appointed political elites. The parliament was "elected," but in practice any government needed the approval of the king and the support of the British (Woodward 1992).

A 1943 report included in a British Embassy dispatch paints a very poignant image about the extent to which Britain has taken advantage of Egypt's resources, negatively affected standards of living for Egyptians, and used Egypt as "a centre from which to control the Near and the Middle East":

*"The Egyptian Government and the Egyptian people have done the British the greatest service by remaining neutral and letting their country and its resources be used by us just as though it were our own. The country has provided food, transport and labour on a very large scale. In addition to the direct supplies of food, large quantities have been consumed by the Forces in the many restaurants and hotels which are always full of officers and soldiers. The extent to which the Egyptians have let the forces have accommodation has been so great that it has become well nigh impossible for the people of the country to rent houses or flats at reasonable rates.[...] The presence of large forces in the country has pushed up prices of every kind of consumers; commodities at such a rate that the poorer classes often find themselves in dire straits. The majority of the profits – and there is a lot of profit-making – has gone into the pockets of non-Egyptian residents. All the restaurants, bars, hotels, places of amusement shops and even the taxis where foreign money is spent do not belong to Egyptians but to Europeans and to others who have settled down in the country."*⁵³

In addition to the general state of affairs, several particular moments also stand out as being particularly infuriating to the Egyptian public in general, and to the Muslim Brotherhood in

⁵³ Report available in public archive collection *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 7, pp. 190-192.

particular. First, the 1936 negotiations with the British that resulted in the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty angered many segments of the population because it allowed for the continuation of British troops in the Suez Canal area. The nationalist Hizb al-Watani, as well as members of the Young Men Muslim Association declared the negotiations to amount to high treason and demanded the complete evacuation of British troops from the entire Egyptian territory.⁵⁴

With the start of the Palestinian rebellion, antagonism towards Britain grew even more, especially when reports of attacks on mosques or the Muslim population started emerging. Particularly controversial was the presence of British troops at the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in 1939, an act that was interpreted as a direct attack and occupation of the mosque.⁵⁵ It is no surprise then, that the first debates around the establishment of the Secret Apparatus are attributed to going back to 1939. Yet, what was perhaps particularly humiliating and revolting to the Egyptians, and in particular to Muslim Brothers, was the continued subservience of the government to the British.

For instance, in October 1941, at the request of the British officials, the Egyptian Prime Minister arrested Hassan al-Banna and other Muslim Brothers. This caused an uproar not just among Brothers but also among the general population, which eventually led to their release, but this must have nonetheless had an important impact on the perception and animosity of the Brotherhood towards the regime. Yet clearly, not strong enough to cause an immediate escalation of violence.

The February 1942 “Palace Incident,” when Britain sent troops to Cairo in order to insure the appointment of its desired candidate for Prime Minister, was another reflection of the extent to

⁵⁴ “Report on meeting of ‘Hizb el Watani’ to commemorate the bombardment of Alexandria on 11/7/1882”, Public Security Department, Special Section, No C.R/4, Cairo, 13/7/36, available in *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 6, p. 337.

⁵⁵ See the communiqué by Young Men Muslim Association, March 7, 1939, available in *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 6, p. 801.

which Britain sought to retain control of the Egyptian regime. For Egyptians, the event was seen as an instance of national humiliation, increasing the disillusion with the political system and with the pro-Western stance of the monarchy. Yet, once again, we don't see the Brotherhood turn toward any violent tactics against the regime.

The growing political tensions spilled over in January 1952, in what became known as the "Black Saturday." After British troops bombarded a police post in the Suez Canal and killed over 50 people (allegedly because the police was not acting to stop guerilla attacks), Egyptians took to the streets en masse, attacking everything British and deliberately killing British citizens. In this state of chaos, the King dismissed the Wafd government, but political instability ensued, and in the subsequent six months there were four different governments (Woodward 1992, 24). Writing about this period, Woodward (1992) concludes that "if ever a country looked ripe for a coup in terms of general unrest and violence, weak government and with an unpopular occupying army, it was Egypt in the middle of 1952" (24).

After the July 1952 revolution (or coup d'état), the Free Officers at the helm of the government started pursuing policies that were initially more accomodationist towards the Brotherhood, and somewhat more convergent with its vision. In terms of domestic issues, the Revolutionary Council turned down the Brotherhood's demands for the prohibition of gambling and alcohol, but it issued laws limiting their dangers to society (Hussaini 1984, 131). Naguib also embarked on an anti-corruption campaign that was supported by the Brotherhood, arresting former cabinet members, purging many branches of the government, and severely weakening the Wafd (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:34–53). In terms of foreign policy, the Free Officers also

adopted a strongly nationalistic and anti-British rhetoric,⁵⁶ and in September 1954 they initiated an evacuation agreement with the British. However, the Brotherhood was strongly opposed to negotiations and highly suspicious of the new Anglo-Egyptian agreement, calling for an unconditional evacuation. Among the Brotherhood objections was the fact that the agreement granted Britain the right to return to the Canal Zone and the right to occupy the base without Egyptian consent if Egypt or any Arab state is attacked (Hussaini 1984, 135-136).

Merely seven days after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed, a Muslim Brother attempted to assassinate Abdul Nasser. This timing is no mere coincidence, and the signing of the Treaty certainly had an impact on the escalation of violence. But by this point Muslim Brothers had already started to turn their attention towards domestic political targets, the leaders of the Secret Apparatus already started seeking and displaying decision-making autonomy, and the organization underwent a series of repressive episodes with the regime.

We can conclude from this brief overview that policy convergence is more of a permissive condition rather than a direct cause of violent escalation. The more important part of the story, however, is that the government's refusal to implement the policies demanded by the Brotherhood and the rather "lenient" policies towards Great Britain led to *a sense of betrayal, which became an important causal mechanism in the escalation of strategic outlook.*

Nonetheless, political opposition can be pursued through many avenues, and whether an organization like the Brotherhood adopts violent tactics or not depends on other factors as well. For one thing, though, the ability to act is influenced by the extent to which various tactics are even possible in a particular political environment.

⁵⁶ Naguib, however, after the 1952 coup altered the Company Law of 1947 to allow foreigners to control 51% of the capital of new companies and not just 49%, in order to improve the economic conditions. See Hofstadter 1973, *Egypt & Nasser*, vol. 1, p. 35.

Availability of Tactics: Repression and Inclusion

Al-Awadi points out that the history of the Muslim Brotherhood is marked by a cyclical pattern of waves of accommodation followed by waves of repression (Al-Awadi 2004, 30). For instance, he notes that the wave of accommodation of 1942-1947 was followed by repression between 1947 – 1952, then again accommodation 1952-1954 and once again repression 1954-1970. In order to trace the causal mechanisms of the escalation of violence, however, it is important to look within these periods and pay closer attention to the sequence of events during critical moments. Two main questions drive this fine-tuned investigation: does repression indeed lead to an escalation of tactics, and do we see an escalation of tactics in the absence of repression?

The government began turning against the Brotherhood as early as 1938. Lia points out that by late 1938 and early 1939 “the political activism of the Society aroused the government’s suspicion and funds from municipal authorities were cut off temporarily,” and the Brothers were “subjected to government harassment and restrictions” (Lia 2006, 218). The period between the summer of 1939 and 1942 is marked by the oscillation between repressive and collaborative measures. In October 1939, for instance, the two Brotherhood publications, al-Nadir and al-Manar, were banned, which marked the first interference with the Brotherhood’s printing (Lia 2006, 220–221). In the beginning of 1941, al-Banna was sent to Qena in Upper Egypt in response to his criticism of the government of Hussein Sirri Pasha for departing from Quranic principles, and Ahmad al-Sukkari, the deputy guide of the Brotherhood, was arrested.⁵⁷ By the

⁵⁷ See the report on the Brotherhood entitled “The Ikhwan Al Muslimin reconsidered” that is included in a secret dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo on December 24th, 1942, WAS/PM, No. 1237, available in *Islam: Political Impact 1908-1972: British Documentary Sources*, edited by Jane Priestland. Slough, England: Archive Editions, 2004, volume 7: 1940-1949, pp.59 – 65..

time al-Banna returned to Cairo in the summer of 1941, however, the Brotherhood was allowed to conduct all its activities freely (Lia 2006, 222).

The repressive measures against the Brotherhood escalated once again by the end of 1941. In October, the British requested the Prime Minister to arrest al-Banna and al-Sukkari on account that these were propagating anti-British propaganda and plans of sabotage.⁵⁸ However, protests and a student demonstration eventually forced the government to release the Brothers the following month. A report of the British Embassy suggests that the prime Minister justified releasing the Brothers on the grounds that “he could not otherwise guarantee public order at the opening of parliament two days later.” The same report continues to say that “the Ikhwan had become so strong that they could dictate, by direct threats, to Hussein Sirri’s government, which had no support in parliament, had lost the favor of the King, and was thoroughly conscious of its weakness.”⁵⁹ While this domestic politics dimension can explain the oscillation in government policies towards the Brotherhood, for the purpose of this analysis the point to emphasize here is that these early clashes *reinforced the notion that the regime could not be fully trusted, and they instilled a sense of betrayal* by the national leadership.

In response to these beginning stages of repression, Hassan al-Banna not only never considered violent escalation domestically, but was also very acquiescent in his responses. Lia suggests that al-Banna ordered his followers to “keep a low profile and not to play a conspicuous part in the disturbances which Ali Mahir encouraged” (Lia 2006, 223). February 1942 is also when the Palace Incident occurred, when the British tried to forcefully impose their choice of Prime Minister. In March, after considering running for elections, Hassan al-Banna was finally dissuaded by al-Nahas not to run, in return for a commitment from the latter that he would

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

restrict the sale of alcohol, combat prostitution and allow the Brotherhood freedom. A British report says that when Nahas Pasha subsequently introduced legislation to forbid the sale of alcohol on religious holidays, to abolish the brothel system and to impose the use of Arabic by all foreigners in their dealings with the government, al-Banna proclaimed this as a great victory.⁶⁰

Hassan al-Banna clearly preferred negotiation over conflict with the government, and he was willing to adopt whatever strategy would be most effective for the promotion of his vision and views of necessary religious reforms. In fact, a British embassy report suggests that in April 1942 the Brotherhood considered a campaign of non-cooperation against the British or Wafd, which was to be modeled after Ghandi's movement.⁶¹

By September 1942, however, the government banned all public meetings of the Brotherhood and "threatened them with further repressive measures."⁶² On October 24th, al-Banna's house was raided, and "two provincial leaders were arrested for complicity in the printing and distribution of pro-Axis leaflets."⁶³

The best estimate for when the Secret Apparatus was established places it around this same time period. If indeed the armed wing was officially established at the end of 1942, then perhaps it was also a reaction against these threats of further repression on the side of the government. However, even if this might have been one of the motivations for establishing an armed wing, this organizational development was not accompanied by any ideological

⁶⁰ See the report on the Brotherhood entitled "The Ikhwan Al Muslimin reconsidered" that is included in a secret dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo on December 24th, 1942, WAS/PM, No. 1237, available in *Islam: Political Impact 1908-1972: British Documentary Sources*, edited by Jane Priestland. Slough, England: Archive Editions, 2004, volume 7: 1940-1949, pp.59 – 65..

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

statements to promote the targeting of domestic targets, or even any suggestions that al-Banna had any intentions to escalate tactics domestically.

If part of the founding logic of the Secret Apparatus was to defend the organization against prosecution, then this would also explain why in 1948 a member of the armed wing would find it appropriate to assassinate al-Khazindar Bey, even if the order did not come from al-Banna or represent the vision of the Muslim Brotherhood. Similarly, it also explains the escalation of violent tactics in response to the ban of the Brotherhood on December 8, 1948. It is widely accepted that Nuqrashi's death was a direct response to the ban of the Brotherhood. The act itself can be regarded though as both an act of revenge and a defensive reaction and perhaps an attempt at intimidation.

In the aftermath of Nuqrashi's assassination, the government began tightening its grip over society, imposing martial law and placing a large number of Brothers under military trials for charges of conspiracy, illegal possession of weapons and membership in a terrorist organization (Zollner 2008, 13). Perhaps the culmination of the persecution was al-Banna's assassination on February 12, 1949.

For the next couple of years, the Brotherhood was in disarray and organizationally very weak. Martial law persisted until May 1951, when the Brotherhood started reorganizing, even though it was technically still banned until October 1951 (Zollner 2008, 19). That same month is also when Hassan Hudaybi was declared the new Supreme Guide.

Given the connections between the Muslim Brotherhood and some of the most prominent Free Officers, the Brotherhood's initial reaction to the July 1952 revolution was to seek cooperation with the new regime and make policy recommendations, hoping to play an advisory role. To this end, the Brotherhood published a statement outlining its policy, which called among

other things for bringing to justice all former Cabinet Ministers, re-opening investigations into al-Banna's death, promoting the teaching of religion in school, outlawing vices (like gambling, alcohol, dancing and "vicious films and magazines"), setting up a new constituent assembly, writing a new constitution that would be based on the principles of Islam, undertaking land reform, narrowing the income gap, abolishing loan interests, and modernizing the army and the police.⁶⁴

Zollner suggests that Hudaybi met with both Naguib and with Nasser, with the latter declaring a friendly cooperation between the Brotherhood and the Revolutionary Command Council (Zollner 2008, 27). However, a later communiqué by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) claims that during those meetings Hudaybi made cooperation conditional on certain policy concessions and asked for the application of Quranic law and for the authorities to submit actions to the Supreme Guide for approval first.⁶⁵ In response, Nasser is reported to have retorted that "the Revolution would not accept any guardianship over it."⁶⁶

The new regime did make some conciliatory gestures towards the Brotherhood in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. This is of particular significance because at the time, Naguib embarked on a fully repressive policy, crushing any opposition and discontent, purging many government branches, and weakening the Wafd (Hofstadter 1973). Al-Banna's investigation was briefly re-opened, but then postponed only a week later,⁶⁷ and the RCC invited the Brotherhood to present three Brothers to participate in the new constituent assembly that was appointed in December 1952. The RCC asked that al-Baqri hold one of these portfolios, but it rejected the other two candidates suggested by Hudaybi, which were Munir el Dolla and

⁶⁴ Egyptian Gazette, August 1, 1952.

⁶⁵ Egyptian Gazette, January 15, 1954.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Egyptian Gazette, November 15, 1952 and November 21, 1952.

Ashmawi.⁶⁸ In response, the Brotherhood Guidance Council decided not to enter the government, and Shaykh Hasan al-Baqri, who decided to join the constituent assembly was dismissed from the Brotherhood (Mitchell 1993, 107).

Mitchell suggests that this decision was taken because the Brotherhood feared that it would lose popularity, that their participation would raise the suspicion of foreigners and minorities towards the new regime, and that the army officers had the real power in each ministry and with only three ministries, the Brotherhood would be outvoted and compelled to lend its name to decisions that it would not support (Mitchell 1993, 108). This seems to imply that even with non-violent tactics such as political participation, the Brotherhood remained both principled and strategic, considered the effectiveness of a particular strategy, and was conscious of the impact its actions would have on its popular support and public image.

Given Naguib's repressive measures and dictatorial tendencies, and the fact that on December 10th he abolished the constitution and replaced it with a transitional government and assumed supreme executive powers (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:41), it is not very surprising that the Brotherhood was hesitant to ally unconditionally with the RCC. However, this moment represents the first turning point in the relationship between the Brotherhood and the RCC (and in particular Nasser), a relationship that was continuously "tested" over the subsequent twelve months.

The RCC made several more attempts to court and co-opt the Brotherhood. In January 1953 all political parties were banned, but the Brotherhood was not included in this category. Just before the ban, political parties were asked to submit declarations about their formation, and the RCC recommended the Brotherhood not to submit such a declaration but to "be content with

⁶⁸ Egyptian Gazette, January 15, 1954.

practicing Islamic teachings.”⁶⁹ The 1954 RCC communiqué states that after the party ban, representatives of the Brotherhood approached Nasser again to demand either seats in the new cabinet or at least an advisory role. When the latter refused, their attitude towards the government changed and they began criticizing the revolution in the press.⁷⁰ This once again reinforces the fact that the Brotherhood in the early 1950s *still opted for negotiations first and for playing an advisory role*, but that *the refusal of the regime to accommodate it reinforced the suspicion that negotiations were ineffective*.

The same communiqué also condemns the Brotherhood for attempting to infiltrate the army and the police, and reports that Nasser met with Ashmawi to warn him and ask him to stop these activities.⁷¹ In the 1954 trials of the Brotherhood, Sheikh Mohamed Farghaly confessed that there were two special secret organizations: one in the police, under the leadership of Salah Shady, and one in the army, under the leadership of Abufl Makarem Abdul Hay.⁷² Clearly, there are reasons to take the RCC and even the 1954 confessions with a grain of salt. However, other accounts also point to these developments. Hussaini, for example, suggests that Hudaybi was opposed to the formation of the Liberation Rally, because “ideological parties cannot be created by army men and policemen”(Hussaini 1984, 132). Hussaini suggests that at this point it became clear that a union between the army and the Brotherhood was unfeasible, and the Brotherhood began forming secret cells in the armed forces and the police and appealed to labor unions, hoping that this could result in a new coup. This was the main reason why the government began purging the armed forces and moving some officers to outlying districts and dismissing others (Hussaini 1984, 132).

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Egyptian Gazette, November 23, 1954.

Ultimately, whether or not the Secret Apparatus was indeed actively attempting to infiltrate the army and the police, at the very least we can be certain that there were tensions inside the Brotherhood regarding the armed wing. During the confessions of the 1954 trials of the Brotherhood, it was revealed that in May 1953 Nasser asked Hudaybi to dismantle the Secret Apparatus because some of the members succeeded to penetrate the army and the police.⁷³ In the same month, Yusef Talaat was appointed chief of the secret organization, and the order was given to dismantle the organization in the form that it is and only have a sports section.⁷⁴ At this point, the Brotherhood was divided in two factions: one who believed there was no need for a secret organization anymore, and one which supported the continuation of the Secret Apparatus because the Brotherhood had not abandoned the idea of the struggle.⁷⁵ Hudaybi was opposed to the idea of a militarist secret organization, which led him to diverge with Al-Sanadi, the first leader of the secret organization, who wanted not just the leadership of the Brotherhood but who believed in the continuation of the Secret Apparatus.⁷⁶ However, Sayyid Qutb's 1954 testimony suggested that Hudaybi was aware of the fact that General Naguib was leading a movement to return the army to the barracks and transfer the rule to the civilians, and Hudaybi believed that the Brotherhood should play "a supporting role."⁷⁷

What transpires from the events of 1953 is that Nasser and the Brotherhood gradually drifted apart once it became clear that on one hand the organization was adamant about its principles and policy demands and was not easily co-opted or silenced, and on the other hand Nasser was slowly attempting to consolidate his support and take over the control of the new regime (as is confirmed by the events that followed in 1954). If indeed the Secret Apparatus was

⁷³ Egyptian Gazette, November 21, 1954.

⁷⁴ Egyptian Gazette, November 23, 1954.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

attempting to exert its autonomy and make inroads into the armed forces, or even if there was a suspicion that this was the case, then it comes to no surprise that Nasser started regarding the Brotherhood as a potential threat and enemy that needed to be eliminated.

The student demonstrations on January 12, 1954 proved to be the perfect excuse for Nasser to attack the Brotherhood. During a demonstration to commemorate the martyrs killed by the British in the Canal Zone, student members of the Brotherhood clashed at Cairo University with student members of the Liberation Rally, which was the party the RCC had established (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:56). The next day, the government dissolved the Brotherhood, and on January 14 it declared state of emergency, and arrested four hundred and fifty Brothers (including Hudaybi), along with other students, teachers, civil servants and members of the military (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:56). Mitchell suggests that even though the Brotherhood was dissolved, its schools, hospitals and clinics continued to operate under different names, and the organization continued to operate unofficially, holding small meetings in the homes of members and building a network to aid those in prison (Mitchell 1993, 127–128).

According to Mitchell, Abdelrahman al-Banna tried to negotiate with the government to allow the Brotherhood to be reconstituted as a purely religious organization (Mitchell 1993, 128). However, in the showdown between Naguib and Nasser, which followed in February 1954, by rallying in support of Naguib and being at the forefront of the masses that surrounded Abdin Palace and demanded a return to civilian rule and parliamentary politics (Ashour 2011), the Brotherhood only deepened its rift with Nasser.⁷⁸

After Naguib was reinstated as premier on March 8th (a position that would only last one month before Nasser would take over), the RCC announced on March 25th its intention to

⁷⁸ One of the interviewees also mentioned the Abdin Palace incident as a turning point in the relationship between Nasser and the Brotherhood, and one of the reasons why Nasser subsequently tried to fabricate a conspiracy against the organization. Anonymous interview, June 8th, 2012, Cairo.

relinquish power, it abrogated the decree abolishing parties, lifted press censorship and released Muslim Brotherhood leaders (Hofstadter 1973; Mitchell 1993, 58). However, the Nasser faction of the RCC was opposed to these developments, and after a general strike by Nasser supporters in the trade unions, Naguib cancelled this decision on March 28th (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:58). All political parties were once again banned, *except* for the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leader is reported to have met with Nasser and promised to remain silent in return for the Brotherhood's restrictions and freezing of assets being lifted and its prisoners released (Hussaini 1984, 135; Mitchell 1993, 131–133).

The brief rapprochement between the Brotherhood and Nasser did not last long, however. Mitchell suggests that the Secret Apparatus began reorganizing itself at this time, even though it seems that Hedaybi was unaware of these developments (Mitchell 1993, 133–134). The government brought to trials some officers that were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which led Hedaybi to write a letter to Nasser and express *disappointment over broken promises* and call for the restoration of parliamentary life, the abolition of martial law and the restoration of freedom (Mitchell 1993, 134–135). In response, Nasser launched a massive press campaign against Hedaybi, tightened up security, increased the censorship of the Brotherhood weekly publication, and continued arrests (Mitchell 1993, 138). The tensions were running so high, that Hedaybi practically went into hiding, in order to avoid assassination or arrest (Mitchell 1993, 138).

In September, the RCC stripped six Brotherhood members of their nationality for “treason to the nation” and destroying the reputation of their country abroad (Mitchell 1993, 141). While the government continued its press campaign against the Brotherhood, Hedaybi pleaded for an end to the tension and for “allowing an honourable debate on the outstanding

issues in an atmosphere of freedom” (Mitchell 1993, 142). In addition to slandering the Brotherhood in the press, the government also tried to boost its Islamic credentials, with Sadat writing a series of articles about the true nature of Islam, al Azhar writing pronouncements against the heresies of the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser emphasizing his role in the Islamic Conference (Mitchell 1993, 143).

In this context of growing tensions and mistrust, exactly a week after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, the attempt on Nasser’s life occurred. The RCC removed Naguib from the presidency for having plotted with the Muslim Brotherhood (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:60). Nasser responded to this assassination attempt with overwhelming force, unleashing the harshest wave of repression against the Brotherhood up to that point.

The government’s oscillation between repression and accommodation of the Muslim Brotherhood during this early history of the organization reinforced mistrust between the two actors. The first measures taken against the Brotherhood in the summer of 1939 did coincide with the rise of debates among the cadres around the formation of an armed wing, but al-Banna opted for non-violence and political restraint. The first assassination that drastically affected the tensions between the Brotherhood and the regime came as a direct response to the conviction of several members. However, it occurred *after* the organization already established a Secret Apparatus, and *in spite* of al-Banna’s opposition to violent tactics. This suggests that ***repression is not a sufficient condition for violent escalation***, but that ***it might be part of an INUS condition***- in other words, when combined with other factors, the resulting dynamics can be sufficient, though not necessary, for violent escalation.

Effectiveness of Different Tactics: Legitimacy and Norms of Resistance

In order to understand the choice of tactics and changes in the strategic outlook of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is important to analyze the group in its broader social context, and not in isolation from the actions of other groups and the prevailing norms of the time. As noted in chapter one, this study is based on two assumptions that make such an evaluation of the broader context necessary: First, that group behavior is affected by a complex web of social interactions and not just the organization-government relations; second, that being both principled and strategic, organizational decision-making is influenced by prevailing social norms.

In this regard, there are two issues that are important to understand: (1) the perceived legitimacy of the state at a particular point in time (and in a particular geographical context), and (2) the prevailing norms about the legitimacy of violent tactics. Both of these issues affect to what extent the actions of a group are accepted or chastised by society. That being said, it is important to note that not all Islamist organizations are equally impacted by the level of social support. However, the Muslim Brotherhood was established as a mass-based organization for whom public acceptance and support was crucial not only because it was one of the main sources of funding, but also because of the principles and vision on which the group was established. Hassan al-Banna's ultimate goal was broad-based social reform and the Islamization of society, and he envisioned the Brotherhood as the "soul" that flows through the "veins" of the Egyptian people.

The 1930s and early 1940s in Egypt, which coincides with the period when the Brotherhood became increasingly politicized and developed an armed wing, was also a period when the country was shaken by strikes and political turmoil, and the government had very low

legitimacy. The problems were multifaceted, but particularly salient were economic problems and the British presence.

At the turn of the century, the economic system continued serving the tiny landed class, but gradually peasants with education could move into lower-middle-class occupation, as was the case with Nasser's family (Woodward 1992). However, this phenomenon, in addition to the increasing rates of population growth led to an exodus to the cities. Unfortunately, Egypt was not capable of adequately absorbing its high rates of urbanization and addressing these socio-economic changes, which resulted in high rates of unemployment, the spread of urban slums, and an increase in urban homelessness (Tal 2005). In addition to these domestic problems, the country was also affected by the global recession in the 1930s, primarily because of its cotton industry. Adding to the domestic issues, the continuing British presence and the Palestinian uprising of 1936-1939 led to many demonstrations, strikes and violent clashes against the British, Zionists and even with the police. It is therefore not surprising that an organization that was both concerned with the moral fiber and general wellbeing of society and strongly opposed to foreign forces in Muslim lands became highly politicized during this time period and gradually escalated its tactics towards violence.

Mitchell also emphasizes that between 1945-1952 the resort to violence by all groups in Egypt was widespread; much of the activity "reflected the violent expression of conflicting views about the identity and purpose of the nation" (Mitchell 1993, 316). Rioting, attacks on synagogues and lootings were prevalent in Cairo and Alexandria in 1945. At the beginning of 1946, the Finance Minister in the Wafd government, Sir Amin Osman Pasha, was assassinated by Hussein Tawfik Ahmed, the son of a former government official.⁷⁹ At times, riots resulted in high numbers of injuries and numerous deaths, such as on March 4, 1946 in Alexandria, when 17

⁷⁹ Glasgow Herald, March 15, 1946.

people died and 299 were injured.⁸⁰ The year 1948, which is the year when Brotherhood members first employed violence against domestic political figures, was also very tumultuous, and included wide-spread police strikes in April that resulted in clashes with the Army. The decades before the 1952 coup were marked by “economic difficulty, social dislocation, political turmoil and cultural ambivalence” (Vatikiotis 1978, 57).

At the time that the Secret Apparatus was formed not only was the violent escalation of demonstrations frequent, but most political organizations had their own paramilitary factions. The Young Egypt Society, for example, which was marked by socialist idealism, with fascist overtones and developed a paramilitary movement, the Green Shirts, was particularly popular, including with members of the Free Officers movement (Hopwood 1982, 22). In 1936 the Wafd also formed its own youth movement, the Blue Shirts, which started as a militaristic organization but then in December 1937 it forbade the carrying of arms by its members.⁸¹ Vatikiotis (1978, 47) concludes that even the military academy graduates of the years 1938-1942 (which formed the core of the Free Officers movement) “constituted a critical group of army officers, for they had entered the academy with some experience in street politics and a smattering of undigested nationalist views which they had acquired from conservative Islamic and radical quasi- fascist groups in the turbulent years 1933-36.”

Such *militarization of political dissent on one hand enabled violent escalation of tactics through the mere presence of ammunition and technological know-how*, but on the other hand also *de-sensitized the public and made such violence more publicly acceptable*. From a strategic

⁸⁰ See Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1945. *Chronology of International Events and Documents*, volume 2, issue 6. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

⁸¹ See extract from Foreign Office Research Department Report, 7 January 1948, available in *Islam: Political Impact*, vol. 7, p. 626.

point of view then, at least as far as public condemnation goes, the cost of violence was decreased.

After the July 1952 revolution, the new regime under Naguib was highly repressive of all forms of dissent, sending army tanks and armored cars to suppress the cotton mills workers demonstration near Alexandria in August 1952, arresting former cabinet members as well as people charged of hindering the reform program, and purging the diplomatic corps, the officer corps and the civil service (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:34–40). However, after Nasser negotiated the withdrawal of the British troops and signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1954, “public satisfaction in Egypt was overwhelming” (Hofstadter 1973, Volume 1:62), and Nasser began to capture the imagination of the masses, and in spite of continuing political turmoil and tensions. Accordingly, when a Brotherhood member attempted to assassinate Nasser we see wide public condemnations of the attacks, and a clear shift in public attitudes against the Brotherhood, which was exacerbated by Nasser’s propaganda campaign to associate the Brotherhood with terrorism.

Reviewing the Arabic press, the *Egyptian Gazette* for instance writes that “all Arabic newspapers published editorials expressing their denunciation of the would-be assassin, and paid tribute to the Premier for the remarkable example of courage he set at a moment when his own life was at stake.”⁸² At a workers rally in Cairo, participants decided to “write a pledge with drops of their blood to support Prime Minister Gamal Abdul Nasser and to sacrifice their lives and the lives of theirs sons for the sake of the Revolution and its men.”⁸³ The Senior Ulama Council also issued a manifesto that repudiated the Muslim Brotherhood, declaring that “Islam is a religion of monotheism, unity, peace and safety,” and that while “there had been nothing to arouse the suspicion of the people in the Moslem Broterhood when it first came into existence

⁸² Egyptian Gazette, Oct. 28, 1954.

⁸³ Egyptian Gazette, October 30, 1954.

[...] most unfortunately, a faction of the Brotherhood had deviated from the right path specified in the holy Koran and conspired to assassinate innocent loyal and patriotic men, to terrorise the people and to cause an insurrection.’⁸⁴

In this case, the extent to which prevalent norms and practices of resistance and political expressions provide an enabling environment or lead more directly to an emulation and diffusion of particular tactics is difficult to assess. Muslim Brotherhood members were quick to point out in interviews that at the time the Brotherhood formed the Secret Apparatus all major parties had paramilitary wings; however, they were also equally adamant that the Brotherhood never copied or modeled its behavior after any other group, but acted out of its own principles and out of the necessities driven by the context. Yet a British Embassy report also reveals that in April 1942 – a timing that suggests right before the establishing of the Secret Apparatus – the Brotherhood did consider a campaign against the British and the Wafd modeled after Ghandi’s movement in India.⁸⁵ But Ghandi’s was not the only model that was making headlines at the time – in fact the fascist and militaristic movements in Europe were not only more salient but were also allegedly studied in detail by both the Brotherhood and other groups in Egypt.

We can infer that if the Brotherhood was inspired by the tactics of other groups, it wasn’t by copying any one particular group, but experimenting with the effectiveness of different tactics, and certainly at the very least considering non-violent tactics before resorting to more violent alternatives. What tactics were ultimately adopted, however, hinged to a great degree not just on the external environment, but also on the internal developments and dynamics within the movement.

⁸⁴ Egyptian Gazette, November 18, 1954.

⁸⁵ See the report on the Brotherhood entitled “The Ikhwan Al Muslimin reconsidered” that is included in a secret dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo on December 24th, 1942, WAS/PM, No. 1237, available in *Islam: Political Impact 1908-1972: British Documentary Sources*, edited by Jane Priestland. Slough, England: Archive Editions, 2004, volume 7: 1940-1949, pp.59 – 65..

Organizational Dynamics

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded as a mass-based religious organization. As such, it appealed to quite a diverse audience, and in particular to the urban, middle class, modern-educated professionals, especially those in the civil service (Mitchell 1993, 329). Lia suggests that the professionals, civil servants and students were primarily among the leaders and decision-makers in the organization, but that the group appealed primarily to peasants, small land-owners and petty traders and artisans (Lia 2006, 200). However, Mitchell notes that the rural membership and urban lower class members “were seldom more than a backdrop for the urban activists who shaped the Society’s political destiny” (Mitchell 1993, 329). A dispatch of the British embassy also reports that the Brotherhood drew support primarily from school teachers and “the more educated of the lower-middle class.”⁸⁶ Some point out that the Muslim Brotherhood started out mostly as a movement of the petite bourgeoisie, whose constituency drew from rural and urban migrants and middle class professions.⁸⁷

This broad-based membership base in the Brotherhood was consistent with al-Banna’s vision to bring about social reform, Islamicize society and eventually bring about an Islamic state but not by coming to power and imposing particular policies, but through the hegemony of the Brotherhood ideology. Al-Banna did not want the Brotherhood to come to power; he wanted the Brotherhood ideology to come to power.⁸⁸

The founding vision and the ***initial constituency of the Brotherhood was in fact contradictory to the idea of a military take-over and coup mentality***, and it should have posed a ***roadblock to any militarization tendencies*** within the organization. Furthermore, the broad-based constituency also provided incentives for ideological moderation, and implied that violent

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Anonymous interview, June 7th, 2012, Cairo.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

tactics would have very high audience costs if the regime would repress all sympathizers and members.

This glimpse at the founding constituency of the Brotherhood confirms that the escalation of tactics and establishment of an armed wing was a break from the original vision, which probably wouldn't have happened if it weren't for the specific regional and international context at the time, which made the organization turn its focus to the issue of defending the Muslims against foreign aggressors. This might also explain why al-Banna did envision the Secret Apparatus as a separate entity that should have its own leadership and should be separate from the main mission of *da'wa*.

Given the continued presence of British troops, the specificities of the regional context, the increasing militarism of the Egyptian nationalist groups and the rising repression of the organization by the national regime, it comes to no surprise that the Brotherhood chose to establish a military wing and become a relevant player and political actor also in the domain of foreign policy not just education and religious reform. What is interesting, however, is that the existence of battalions and rovers that had been established for non-military purposes facilitated the transformation of some of these organizational structures into an armed faction. The establishment of the Secret Apparatus in 1942 constitutes a critical juncture in the development of the Brotherhood, because subsequently the Secret Apparatus began taking a life of its own, developing its own logic and forming a dual command structure within the organization. Thus, what we witness after the formation of the armed wing is ***the emergence of a dual command structure*** within the organization, and ***a slippery slope of tactical escalation***.

From the very beginning al-Banna emphasized physical fitness and developed a scout division within the organization. By 1936, the organization also developed rover groups, and in

1937 it developed battalions, which emphasized “communal training and rigorous night vigils of prayer and meditation” (Mitchell 1993, 31). Some suggest that during the late 1930s, the idea of forming an armed wing emerged within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, even though it did not materialize for a few more years. The idea behind establishing a secret apparatus was primarily so as to be able to fight in Palestine and to defend against the British troops in Egypt.⁸⁹

A “Secret Apparatus” was eventually instituted in the Brotherhood in the early 1940s, with most experts suggesting that 1942 or 1943 are perhaps the most accurate estimate, even though some suggest that it might have started in the mid to late 1930s.⁹⁰ During the 1954 trials of the Brothers, Khamis Hamids, at the time Deputy Chief of the Brotherhood, is reported to declare that the Secret Organization was formed in 1942.⁹¹ A British Embassy secret dispatch on the Brotherhood states that in September 1942 Hassan al-Banna “is reported to have said that he had 2000 picked armed men ready to obey his orders.”⁹²

Before the establishment of the Secret Apparatus, any attempts to start using violence against domestic targets were quickly dismissed by Hassan al-Banna, which was possible at least partly because the Brotherhood was from the very beginning a hierarchical organization with a top-down decision-making process. Indeed this led to some factions breaking away both in 1932 and in 1939, but al-Banna managed to maintain his leadership role and domestically continued to pursue preaching and non-violent calls for reform. It should be noted that Hassan al-Banna was by far the most charismatic leader the organization has ever had, and a figure whose posthumous reputation reached almost legendary proportions.

⁸⁹ Anonymous interview, Cairo, June 17, 2012.

⁹⁰ Anonymous interview, Cairo, June 17, 2012; also Mitchell 1993, p. 30.

⁹¹ Egyptian Gazette, November 23, 1954.

⁹² See the report on the Brotherhood entitled “The Ikhwan Al Muslimin reconsidered” that is included in a secret dispatch of the British Embassy in Cairo on December 24th, 1942, WAS/PM, No. 1237, available in *Islam: Political Impact 1908-1972: British Documentary Sources*, edited by Jane Priestland. Slough, England: Archive Editions, 2004, volume 7: 1940-1949, pp.59 – 65..

Al-Banna's leadership style was, however, at times criticized. The most important moment in this regard is 1947, which Mitchell suggests "marked a year of crisis and schism" (Mitchell 1993, 52). Debates over the dismissal of the Brotherhood Secretary-General and over a possible alliance with the Wafd party led to more defections among the leadership and to what Mitchell identifies as a "rebellion against Banna's continued exercise of arbitrary power" (Mitchell 1993, 54). Thus, when we see Brothers turn towards violent tactics domestically in 1948, it is important to note that this happened in an organizational context in which (1) there had been defections among leaders and open criticism of al-Banna's leadership, (2) the Secret Apparatus was its own entity, gradually following its own logic, and (3) the Brotherhood as a whole, starting with the implementation of the family cell model in 1943, was undergoing a process of de-centralization.

These problems only exacerbated after the death of Hassan al-Banna. In terms of leadership succession, after more than two years of the Brotherhood being suppressed and without an official Supreme Guide, Hudaybi's nomination in 1951 was contested by Ashmawi, who after al-Banna's death was technically the top figure, and as Zollner points out, "seemed the most probable successor to the vacant post of the Murshid" (Zollner 2008, 17). Ashmawi had been the head of the Secret Apparatus, and in 1950 he was also involved in a dispute with Mustafa Mu'min, a prominent figure within the Brotherhood who wanted to "democratize" the organization and negotiate with the Wafd in order for the Brotherhood to resume activities (Mitchell 1993, 81–82). Ashmawi accused Mu'min of selling out to the Wafd, holding "unorthodox views" and trying to assume the leadership of the Brotherhood. Eventually, Ashmawi succeeded in dismissing Mu'min from the Brotherhood (Mitchell 1993, 82).

Exacerbating these problems was the fact that Hudaybi lacked the charisma and vision of Hassan al-Banna, and was primarily chosen as the new Supreme Guide in a strategic attempt to mend relations with the government and distance the Brotherhood from the image of violent organizations (Mitchell 1993, 85; Zollner 2008, 19–20). In this context, under Hudaybi's leadership the Secret Apparatus became increasingly autonomous.

The 1954 attempt on Nasser's life therefore occurred in a context of organizational disarray and leadership tensions. While the timing of the 1948 attacks suggests that revenge, betrayal and perhaps intimidation were the primary motives of the attacks, the 1954 attacks (if we accept that they were not fully staged by Nasser) can be regarded as less of an impulsive reaction and more of a premeditated, strategic response to a government policy. Such a response, however, was not reflective of the Supreme Guide or the mainstream organization, but was more clearly the act of an armed faction that began following its own logic, and started making inroads into the army and police forces.

Looking at these organizational developments in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it is telling that Gamal al-Banna stated that the idea of the Muslim Brotherhood died with Hassan al-Banna.⁹³ Subsequent sections and chapters will show how the nature, logic and ideology of the Brotherhood developed since al-Banna's death. The removal of the founder and major charismatic leader provided an opening for a new vision. Under the brutal repression in Nasser's prisons, two alternative visions emerged, which by the late 1970s provided the backdrop to two different forms of Islamist activism in Egypt. Before surveying these developments in the remaining sections of this chapter, the causal mechanisms and arguments of this section will be summarized.

⁹³ Interview with Gamal al-Banna, June 17, 2012, Cairo.

The Causal Mechanisms of Escalation

The historical overview of the early developments within the Muslim Brotherhood suggests that there were four causal mechanisms that account for the escalation of tactics:

- Politicization - growing sense of need for political activism and rising grievances in response to external threats to the Muslim community and to low policy convergence;
- Betrayal – growing sense of betrayal by the national leadership because of repressive measures and government behavior is seen as serving foreign interests;
- Mistrust – mistrust of government because of refusal to accommodate organization's policy demands and punitive measures towards the organization;
- Slippery slope of organizational structure - increasingly autonomous and aggressive Secret Apparatus that adopts domestic mission.

To summarize the arguments presented so far and more clearly expose the operation of these causal mechanisms, the following graphs present visually the key sequence of events and dynamics of escalation during four critical time periods: 1935 – 1939, 1941- 1943, 1947 – 1948, and 1952 – 1954.

Figure 6. The Causal Mechanisms of Escalation during 1935 – 1939




Figure 7. The Causal Mechanisms of Escalation during 1941 – 1943




Figure 8. The Causal Mechanisms of Escalation during 1947 – 1948





Figure 9. The Causal Mechanisms of Escalation during 1952 – 1954



These graphs highlight on one hand how the interaction of foreign pressures, regime policies towards the Brotherhood and organizational dynamics led to an escalation of tactics. This escalation first manifested itself in armed action in Palestine, then resulted in a debate on forming an armed wing, which ultimately led to the establishment of the Secret Apparatus. The last stage of escalation occurred when this entity turned its attention towards domestic targets. The graphs also briefly allude to the fact that the sense of betrayal and mistrust was at times counteracted by a belief that negotiations or non-violent tactics might work. However, the repeated disappointments and the cumulating feelings of mistrust and betrayal, combined with the growing autonomy and strength of the armed wing eventually led to violent escalation.

The regime oscillated in its policies towards the Brotherhood. However, al-Khazindar's assassination led to the dissolution of the organization, which in turn led to growing mistrust and animosity between the regime and the Brotherhood. As already mentioned, the assassination was not ordered by the organization as a whole and there are reports that Hassan al-Banna strongly condemned this use of violence. This brings up the possibility of asking a counter-factual question: would the organization have followed the same path of growing animosity and escalation of tactics towards domestic tactics if the two Muslim Brothers would not have assassinated al-Khazindar? This is briefly explored in the next section.

A Counterfactual Argument

The question posed here makes for a strong counter-factual because it calls for a minimal re-write of history that doesn't necessitate imagining drastically different realities or complex changes in the system, but a rather plausible alternative course of events where the two Brothers would not have attempted or at the very least not have succeeded in assassinating al-Khazindar.

Would the Brotherhood have followed a different path if al-Khazindar had not been assassinated?

The process-tracing undertaken in this chapter suggests that the answer is no, primarily because the Brotherhood was already on a path of growing mistrust towards the regime and it had already developed an organizational structure that was beginning to take a life of its own. At the time that the Secret Apparatus was formed, other political groups also had armed factions that were active in the domestic arena. This meant that the model of transforming the scope of the armed faction to include domestic targets was widely salient in society, even though Hassan al-Banna had been opposed to an armed revolution by the organization. As this group's leadership became increasingly autonomous and competed for power both within the organization and within the domestic political arena, there is also a strong theoretical expectation that this faction would have eventually employed violence. This could be either because of the logic of outbidding its political competitors (Bloom 2004), or for the purpose of intimidation or provocation (Kydd and Walter 2006).

What this brief counterfactual exercise underlines is the critical role played by the dynamics of organizational slippery slope, especially when combined with oscillatory policies by the regime that reinforce mistrust, and with the prevalence of violent factions and militaristic public attitudes in the society. If the escalation of tactics within the Brotherhood was bound to happen after the Secret Apparatus was established, then what explains the consolidation of the organization as a non-violent movement? This question is explored in more detail next.

Divergent Legacies of Repression: The Non-violent Brotherhood and the Rise of the Violent Outbist Thought

After the dissolution of the Brotherhood in 1954, the organization became practically non-existent, with most of its leaders and many members arrested and its structure disintegrated. The only elements of the Brotherhood that persisted through the repression were the “Muslim Sisters,” who under the leadership of Zaynab al-Ghazali offered aid to the prisoners that were released in 1956, visited Sayyid Qutb and other Brothers in prison, and acted as the main mode of communication between activists inside and outside of the prisons (Kepel 1985, 30).

In 1957 and 1958, some of the younger and lower-ranking members of the Brotherhood were released and Hudaybi’s sentence was changed to house arrest, and with the help of the Muslim Sisters the scattered groups began reorganizing (Kepel 1985, 30; Zollner 2008, 39). Zollner suggests that this re-organization did not happen in the prisons and under the direct influence of Qutb, as some scholars have suggested, but rather outside of the prisons, where several prominent members actively worked towards the revival of the Brotherhood (41). There are debates about the extent of Hudaybi’s role in the reorganization, but Zollner concludes that we can assume that at the very least he was aware of the initiative (40).⁹⁴

While this reorganization began outside of prison, ultimately leading to the formation of what was later known as Organization 1965, in the prison hospital at Liman al-Turra Qutb managed to write, revise and discuss his work on both *In the Shade of the Qur’an* and *Milestones* (Zollner 42). Through the prison hospital his work was distributed to other inmates, and his sisters also helped smuggle and distribute his work outside of the prisons (Zollner 43).

According to Zollner, the committee of Organization 1965 asked Qutb to draw up an educational

⁹⁴ As Zollner points out, some sources suggest that Hudaybi gave his blessing to the development of Organization 1965 and that at the very least he was linked to the communication network. Zollner concludes that he deliberately chose to stay in the background and tacitly accepted the developments. See Zollner 2007, 418-419.

program, and there are reasons to believe that *Milestones* “was written for the purpose of providing spiritual guidelines to members of Organization 1965” (Zollner 42). Small circles started emerging that were studying not just the Qur’an and Sunna, but also the works of Taymiyya, al-Banna and Qutb (Zollner 42-43). Zollner suggests that some of the Brotherhood leading figures, like al-Tilmisani, approached Qutb and “disclosed their concern about the implications of his ideas,” but there is no evidence of Hudaybi or the guidance council members actively speaking out against Qutb’s ideas when they first started spreading, presumably because the reconstitution of the Brotherhood was seen as a beneficial development (Zollner 2007, 417).

Zollner points out that in their memoirs, some Brothers suggest that some of the discussions in these groups did include plans to assassinate state officials, and that the mood of disillusionment was replaced by “a new spirit of Brotherhood activism” (Zollner 2008, 43). That being said, it remains unclear on whether the second assassination attempt on Nasser on 1965 was indeed plotted by the Brotherhood, or whether it was also one of Nasser’s plot to eliminate the Brotherhood once and for all and achieve internal security in light of military preparations for war (Zollner 2008, 44). Zollner suggests that while Organization 1965 did have a militant objective and was attempting to build an arsenal, it is doubtful that the group had the military capacity to organize a plot (Zollner 2007, 419). What remains clear, however, is that the new wave of arrests in 1965 completely destroyed the Brotherhood.

In the aftermath of the accusation of the 1965 plot, Hudaybi once again distanced himself from Organization 1965, and together with his close circle, he once again “tried to regain control over the Brotherhood by fighting back against an emerging radical trend” (Zollner 2008, 45). This led to a split in the Brotherhood between the revolutionary and militaristic faction that adopted Qutb’s new ideas as its ideological foundation, and the more gradualist reformist

organization, that eventually found its ideological statement in Hudaybi's *Preachers Not Judges*, and which formed the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood during the Sadat years.

What happened in Nasser's prison gets to the heart of the debate surrounding the effects of repression on Islamist strategies. On one hand, brutal repression and torture motivated Sayyid Qutb's new revolutionary and jihadi interpretations. Qutb's new framework for religious activism and his call for a vanguard that is to free society and establish an Islamic state has inspired generations of young Islamists to resort to violent tactics, but it has also left an important imprint on the subsequent developments of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is an aspect that remains rarely examined in the literature.⁹⁵ On the other hand, the prisons were also the backdrop to the Brotherhood's conviction that violence is futile and commitment to gradual and non-violent change, as expressed in Hassan Hudaybi's later response to Qutb, *Preachers Not Judges*.

While most scholars recognize that repression can have these opposite effects, few studies have explored in detail what precisely determines these divergent outcomes. The goal of this section is to take up this challenge and examine why some segments of the population were attracted to the revolutionary response to repression, and why the core of the Brotherhood consolidated its commitment to non-violence. To do that, this section first provides an overview of the arguments made in Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones* and in Hassan Hudaybi's *Preachers Not Judges*. The goal is to understand how these visions continued or departed from the founding

⁹⁵ The discussion of Qutb's relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood is usually framed as an issue of the Brotherhood's propensity towards violence or role as a conveyor belt for extremism (Lynch 2010). What is missing in the literature is a more nuanced discussion of how the Qutb legacy has impacted subsequent developments of the Brotherhood's ideology and vision, which is what this section seeks to achieve, and what is picked up again in a subsequent chapter. What exactly Qutb's legacy on the Brotherhood is remains an uneasy topic for the Brothers, primarily because in the West Qutb is associated with jihadism. Yet as a scholar pointed out in an interview, the Brotherhood's development in the last decades has been impacted by five legacies: the al-Banna legacy, the Qutbist legacy, the Azharite legacy, the Salafi legacy and the legacy of the modernist democratic reformers. Anonymous interview, June 7, 2012, Cairo.

ideology of the Brotherhood, as well as the implications for what goals should be prioritized and what tactics are legitimate and acceptable. These two interpretations, however, need to be analyzed within the broader social and political context. Ultimately the analysis will show how the effects of repression were mediated through organizational dynamics, suggesting that demographic differences and psychological dynamics are the most convincing dimension that can explain the different reactions to repression.

Ideological differences: Sayyid Qutb and Hassan al-Hudaybi

After the Brotherhood was dissolved in 1954, Qutb was sent to prison in 1955 for a twenty-five year term. During his prison years, when he was severely tortured and where he also witnessed the torture and execution of fellow Brothers, Qutb wrote *In the Shade of the Qur'an* between 1953-1964, and in 1962 he also began writing *Milestones* (or *Signposts along the Road*), which was completed and published in 1964, when he was temporarily released after the intervention of the President of Iraq (Bergesen 2008, 3–4).⁹⁶ Many scholars suggest that the brutality of Nasser's prisons led to the radicalization of his ideas (Bergesen 2008, 4), and that “the torture showed him that secular, materialist culture also unleashed the most brutal and barbarous aspects of human beings” (Calvert 2008, 141).

To a certain extent, Qutb's thought continues in the footsteps of Hassan al-Banna's vision, by adopting a view of Islam as a comprehensive system that should dictate all aspects of life, and by calling for comprehensive social and political reform and the adoption of an Islamic system of government. Yet Qutb's final blueprint for Islamic activism, as expressed in *Milestones*, is much more revolutionary, top-down and militant than Hassan al-Banna's vision. There are four ideas that stand out and define this new model of revolutionary activism: (1) the

⁹⁶ Eight months later, however, he was jailed again on charges of terrorism, and he was hung on August 29, 1966 (Bergesen 2008, 4).

notion that sovereignty can only belong to God; (2) the notion that the contemporary society can be defined as *jahiliyyah*, or pre-Islamic and uncivilized; (3) the differentiation between nominal Muslims and true believers based on action, and the implicit ability to declare nominal Muslims as unbelievers (*takfir*); and (4) the need for a vanguard to undertake the struggle and bring about the Islamic order.

Starting from the concept that God is the Creator and human beings are his creatures, Qutb regards sovereignty over human beings as a fundamental attribute of divinity (Bergesen 18). The implication is that any “forms of systems which are based on the concept of the sovereignty of man; in other words, where man has usurped the Divine attribute, any system in which the final decisions are referred to human beings, and in which the sources of all authority are human, deifies human beings by designating others than God as lords over men” (Calvert 2008, 37). For Qutb, this is nothing short of a “rebellion against the authority of Allah,” which in turn leads to the oppression of God’s creatures (Calvert 2008, 139).

The next step in Qutb’s line of thought is to declare any such society which does not obey God’s rules and does not implement *shari’a* laws as being *jahiliyyah*, since “Islam only knows two kinds of societies, the Islamic and the jahili” (Qutb 2005, 64). Qutb not only devoids the notion of *jahiliyyah* of its chronological content, but he also emphasizes that even a Muslim country where people are free to attend mosques can be considered *jahili* if it does not implement Islamic legislation to order daily affairs (Qutb 2005, 64). While some scholars have suggested that this interpretation was inspired by Mawdudi, Khatab (2006) argues that this interpretation of *jahiliyyah* became evident in Qutb’s writing long before Mawdudi was translated in Arabic, and was in fact more closely inspired by other Egyptian intellectuals that were also referring to

jahiliyyah as a condition of society, such as Muhammad Farid Wajdi and even Muhammad Abudh (Khatab 2006, 106–107).

The reason why this interpretation of *jahiliyyah* as being a condition of society rather than a historical period is very important is because according to Qutb any jahili society is “un-Islamic and illegal” (Qutb 2005, 55). Furthermore, the accusation of being un-Islamic also extends to individuals and not just societies, because “no individual or group of individuals can be truly Muslim until they wholly submit to God alone in the manner taught by the messenger of God – peace be on him, thus testifying by their actions that there is no deity except God and that Muhammad is God’s Messenger” (Qutb 2005, 60). Scholars suggest that Qutb was inspired by Ibn Taymiyya’s line of reasoning that the Mongol rulers who invaded Baghdad were not really Muslims because they did not implement *shari’a* (Bergesen 2008, 8). What this means is that the highly severe charge of being a non-believer (*kafir*), which has traditionally only been done by established jurists, can be raised by anyone and against anyone if they do not support the implementation of *shari’a* laws. As Bubalo and Fealy point out, what this meant in effect is that Qutb “provided a discourse that envisaged as entirely legitimate a jihad against one’s own ruler, and potentially against one’s own nominally Muslim society” (Bubalo and Fealy 2005, 19).

Milestones goes beyond espousing these views and is conceived as a manifesto for revolutionary Islamic activism. As such, Qutb calls for the rise of a divinely-inspired vanguard that can take up the struggle and bring about the Islamic order. This vanguard should “separate itself from the jahili society, becoming independent and distinct from the active and organized jahili society whose aim is to block Islam” (Calvert 2008, 36), and should use “preaching and

persuasion for reforming ideas and beliefs” and “physical power and jihad for abolishing the organizations and authorities of the jahili system” (Calvert 2008, 36).

In response to the growing appeal of Qutb’s revolutionary manifesto and to what Zollner suggests was the “post-Qutbian trend within the Muslim Brotherhood” (Zollner 2007, 425), in 1969 Hassan al-Hudaybi wrote *Preachers not Judges*,⁹⁷ which was in many ways much less influential than Qutb’s writings, but which ultimately came to represent the gradualist and much more conformist approach of the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood. *Preachers not Judges* criticizes the radical interpretation of *takfir*, *jahiliyyah* and *hakimiyya* (God’s absolute sovereignty).

Regarding the charge of unbelief, Hudaybi reinforces the traditional interpretation that the profession of faith is what defines someone as a Muslim, and that the notion of sin can act as a buffer between belief and unbelief to the extent that even a believer can in fact sin (Zollner 2008, 77). Without referring to *jahiliyyah* per se, Hudaybi also criticizes Mawdudi’s and Qutb’s interpretation that the meaning of the Qur’an could have been lost in the course of Islamic history, and argues that the Qur’an and the Sunna provide Muslims with access to religious interpretations at all times (Zollner 2007, 422).

Regarding the issue of God’s sovereignty, *Preachers not Judges* differentiates between religious obligations and regulations of social life, and argues that humans are created with a capacity for decision-making, and human reasoning does not constitute an illegitimate challenge to divine governance as long as it does not contradict religious obligations (Zollner 2007, 422). Instead of focusing solely at the level of the state, Muslims need to apply God’s rule to their

⁹⁷ The book is generally attributed to Hasan al-Hudaybi, but Zollner suggests that it was in fact the result of a joint project that included other Brotherhood guidance council members, like Umar al-Tilmisani and Mustafa Mashur, as well as al-Azhar scholars. See Zollner 2008, 69.

daily life, which prevents divine will from being dependent on a political entity (Zollner 2007, 423).

Unlike the militant tone that is prevalent in *Milestones*, in *Preachers not Judges* the argument is that wrongdoings can be fought with the hand (which can in fact imply force), the tongue (through speech and writing) and the heart (which implies quiet non-participation) (Zollner 2008, 138). While Hudaybi does not support ultimate passivity, he also suggests that force should only be used a last resort (139).

Preachers not Judges was not published until 1977, and Zollner suggests that at that point it was mainly intended to counteract the emergence of the violent Islamist groups (Zollner 2007, 425). However, as Zollner also points out, Hudaybi's loyal companions, such as Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, Umar al-Tilmisani, Muhammad Abu al-Nasr and Mustafa Mashhur, "consolidated their position and influence in the running of the organization" and through them the idea of *Preachers not Judges* "was carried on and became an integral part of the Brotherhood's ideology" (Zollner 2007, 426).

Why do we see these two distinct ideological interpretations and these organizational splits emerge simultaneously in the same political context? The explanations emerging from the framework of principled strategic adjustment presented in this study are explored next.

Policy Convergence and the Logic of Resistance

From the first days that the Free Officers came to power, it became clear that Gamal Abdel Nasser was not going to accept any "guardianship" over the revolution and that he would not follow the policy prescriptions set forth by the Muslim Brotherhood, as has already been shown in previous discussions. On the contrary, Nasser effectively eliminated the Brotherhood as a possible political competitor, and made several symbolic gestures to try to boost his own

Islamic credentials, such as launching an Islamic Congress in 1954, launching the “modernization” project of Al Azhar in 1961 and recognizing the Islamic sources of Arab socialism in the National Charter in 1962 (Vatikiotis 1978, 189). While his religious policies were not satisfactory to the Brotherhood, Nasser did adopt a strongly nationalist and growingly anti-Western tone, he gained significant international prestige, became the image of pan-Arabism, and turned Egypt into one of the most important players in the region.

While Nasser’s reputation was growing both domestically and abroad, the main issue that deepened the rift between him and the Brotherhood was the dismantling and destruction of the organization. The divergent views that were emerging within the Muslim Brotherhood during this period of investigation were not in disagreement over issues related to policy recommendations but over more fundamental theological interpretations that had primarily tactical implications. To a certain extent, the emerging splits can be seen as a continuation of the factions that started occurring in the earlier period and were exacerbated by the creation of the Secret Apparatus. However, once Qutb joined the ranks of the Brotherhood, the militant faction of the organization that were hardened even more by the brutal repression after 1954, found an ideological justification and a spiritual leader.

Given the fact that Qutb started formulating his thinking on *jahiliyyah* already in the 1930s, at the same time that al-Banna began formulating and manifesting his vision of the Brotherhood and that other intellectuals also started talking about *jahiliyyah* as a condition of a deprived society rather than a historical period (Khatab 2006, 106-107), suggest that Qutb’s thinking was strongly impacted by his context and by the prevailing political system and government policies. From his early writings, there is no doubt that the domestic and foreign policies of the government in the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s impacted the trajectory of Qutb’s

thought, politicizing him and drawing him to Islamic activism. However, *Milestones* can be seen much more as a result of the repression and organizational developments in the Brotherhood than government domestic or foreign policies per se.

Similarly, the more moderate response offered by Hudaybi and the mainstream Brotherhood by the end of the 1970s, cannot be reduced to domestic or foreign policies. That being said, Zollner points out that 1967 posed a dilemma for the Brothers, and that it exacerbated the ideological divisions that were emerging within the organization. In preparations of the war against Israel, the Qutbists regarded Nasser as a *jahili* leader, and therefore did not support his war efforts, regarding him as a more immediate enemy than Israel (Zollner 2008, 46). The followers of Hudaybi supported Nasser's efforts, whereas a third faction that regarded itself as following al-Banna's tradition remained neutral. After the end of the war, the Qutbists broke away from the Brotherhood, whereas al-Hudaybi was faced with the task of winning back members and maintaining organizational cohesion, which was one of the incentives behind the writing of *Preachers not Judges* (Zollner 2008, 46-47).

What this suggests is that during this critical period in the history of the Brotherhood, tactical decisions and strategic outlook were not strongly influenced or determined primarily by policy convergence. Much more powerful was the impact of repression and of the organizational dynamics unfolding at the time.

Repression and the Justification of Violence

Except for a brief alleviation of their condition in 1957-1958, the period between 1954 and 1970 marked for the Brotherhood a period of severe repression, trauma and organizational destruction. After the second accusation of an assassination plot against Nasser in 1965, pervasive raids were ordered and directed against a wider circle of people affiliated with the

Brotherhood, and the mere possession of Qutb's *Milestones* was enough reason to be arrested (Zollner 2007, 419). However, Zollner also notes that in contrast to the period of 1954-1956, when the repression led to disillusionment and a sense of despair among the Brothers, the second wave of repression resulted in a clear sense of community among the detainees, and a greater sense that those receiving the death penalty were heroes (Zollner 2007, 419).

A pervasive argument in the literature on Islamist groups and in the larger inclusion-moderation thesis is that repression leads to violent tactics, either through a psychological process of radicalization, or because it leaves no other alternatives and it discredits the moderates (Ghadbian 2000; Gurr 1993; Hafez 2003). When analyzing the writings of Sayyid Qutb, often authors suggest that his thinking became much more radical during his prison years, mainly because of the torture and the heartless killings that he witnessed (Calvert 2008, 141; Bergesen 2008, 4-5). Interviews with contemporary members or sympathizers of the Brotherhood also suggest that the brutality of Nasser's prison is an important element of the organization's collective memory, and one of the first issues brought up in discussions of Sayyid Qutb. For example, as part of this collective memory are stories of dogs being released on the prisoners, and guards mocking Brotherhood members that if their God showed up, they would imprison him in the adjacent cell.⁹⁸

The argument is that in the face of such heinous crimes and such insults towards God, it was not surprising that Qutb could not regard such Muslims as true believers, and that some members would start believing in the necessity of violence rather than silence and passive acceptance.⁹⁹ Similarly, Shukri Mustapha, who at the time was a young member of the Brotherhood in his twenties, is also said to have undergone a drastic shift after watching his

⁹⁸ Anonymous interview, June 25, 2012, Cairo.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

friend die by having his head crushed. This level of brutality convinced him that no real Muslim could possibly resort to such behavior, and he began debating with the Brotherhood leaders in jail the issue of whether people could be treated as apostates or the regime and system as a whole should be seen as in need of reform, which prompted the writing of *Preachers not Judges*.¹⁰⁰

In order to assess the relative impact of repression and posture on possible causal mechanisms, we can once again ask two counterfactuals: (1) would Qutb have developed his theory of revolutionary activism and *jahiliyyah* even without the presence of repression, and (2) would his theory have had the same appeal to anyone without the impact of Nasser's prison? These counterfactual are more difficult to assess, because the absence of repression would have had a variety of effects on the organization and on society as a whole. That being said, we can still gain valuable insights from thinking through the possible outcomes and looking at Qutb's ideological trajectory and at public discourses before the onset of widespread repression,

Many scholars and Muslim Brothers would suggest that the answer to the first counterfactual question of whether Qutb would have developed his theory in the absence of repression is "probably not." However, a recent yet convincing analysis of Qutb's political thought suggests that "Qutb's phase of thought during the period of 1952-1962 is an extension, and not a negation, of the previous phase" (Khatab 2006, 60). Khatab reviews Qutb's prolific writings and shows that we can trace the beginnings of the Qutbist views on *jahiliyyah*, the sovereignty of God, the call for activism and the need for an Islamic state to the period before he went to prison and even before he joined the Muslim Brotherhood (Khatab 2006).

Khatab shows, for instance, that in his poetry and writings between 1921-1939, Qutb writes about the existing social injustices using terms like tyranny, savagery and barbarity and claims that death "is the more honourable way than what we are passing through" (Khatab 2006,

¹⁰⁰ Anonymous interview, July 25, 2012, Cairo.

62). Qutb also displays strong anti-British sentiments, mentions the need to *jihad* as early as 1929, and warns against “the dangerous call to immitate the West” (Khatab 2006, 62–63). In 1934, Qutb introduces sharp distinctions between belief and disbelief, which later becomes foundational in his theory of *jahiliyyah* and views on *takfir* (Khatab 2006, 69), and in 1935 he also emphasizes that everything in the universe needs to be in complete submission to the sovereignty of Allah (Khatab 2006, 75).

Between 1946 and 1948, Qutb also develops his idea of the need for teaching anger at politicians, writers, journalists, aristocrats, those placed in ministries, those working in radio, TV and cinema, and “at those who accepted this corrupt and distorted reality” (Khatab 2006, 111); he calls for spiritual leadership in the face of corruption (111), and for the establishment of an Islamic order (115). In 1951 Qutb already defines *jahiliyyah* as “a ‘condition’ of any place departing from the Shari’ah sanctioned by Allah” (156).

In the early 1960s Qutb wrote that the Islamic movement should not waste its time “by engaging in the current political affairs, or try to overthrow the government, or to establish the Islamic system by force” because “[t]he people themselves will ask to establish the Islamic system when they know the accurate meaning of the Islamic creed” (Khatab 2006, 160). Thus, *while Qutb’s thinking about jahiliyya and the need for an Islamic state evolved gradually over time, his views regarding the necessity and efficacy of force were inspired by the repression of the Brotherhood*. Even in the early 1960s, when he suggested not to use force, he also qualified his statement by saying that “there must be some protection for the movement against any attack from outside. What had happened to the Brothers in 1948 and 1957...should not be repeated” (Khatab 2006, 160). The ideological switch that occurred in the later prison years, as reflected in *Milestones*, is the turn towards a much more activist, proactive and militaristic program that

requires a vanguard. *The repression of the Brotherhood did not necessarily inspire new theological or ideological insights, but that it primarily changed Qutb's view on the necessity of a top-down approach to activism and social reform and on the efficacy of force.*

Regarding the second counterfactual about the likely appeal of Qutb's theory in the absence of repression, the story is also more complex than a straightforward, linear argument, but we can still conclude that *repression was a powerful catalyst for Qutb's appeal*. Khatab shows that the intellectuals of the 1930s in Cairo were increasingly talking about the appeal of an Islamic model, and were referring to the contemporary problems in terms of *jahiliyyah* (Khatab 2006, 106-107). What this suggests is that on a theoretical level, Qutb's theory would have probably had some appeal even without the prison experience, especially in the intellectual circles in Cairo. Yet in practice, these intellectual circles did not resort to violence or to the planning of a regime overthrow. In fact, as the subsequent discussion will reveal, the individuals who took up Qutb's call and later formed al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah were young students from Upper Egypt, whereas the older Brotherhood members in Cairo remained opposed to violence, even if some still considered it a legitimate tactic.¹⁰¹ This particular issue will be discussed in more detail in the discussion of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah.

The prison experience made Qutb's revolutionary activism much more appealing than it would have been otherwise to many young Egyptians, especially as Nasser was beginning to gain public support. Given the existing tensions inside the Brotherhood regarding the Secret Apparatus, we can expect that even without Nasser's destruction of the organization some element of the armed wing would have continued to fight for organizational continuity, and some of the organizational culture would have persisted among the members. Yet the brutal repression signaled the continued need for the military option, and it motivated the search for a spiritual

¹⁰¹ Anonymous interviews on June 7, 2012, and on June 17, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

guide in this pursuit. Once the ideological framework was developed by Qutb to justify militancy, the path towards violent escalation became much more appealing and feasible within the context of the repression. In the face of repression, torture, organizational decay and lack of leadership, the emergence of a spiritual leader that justified revolutionary activism helped change the mood of many Brothers, especially the young ones and those previously involved with the Secret Apparatus, from disillusionment and passivity to a new found hope and vision.

At the organizational level, banning the Brotherhood and dismantling its structure and network also made *da'wa* and non-violent forms of resistance or advocacy both unavailable and futile, reinforcing the need for underground activity and clandestine re-organization, which fit more closely both with the organizational culture of the Secret Apparatus and with the new militant ideas that were emerging among Qutbist followers. Without the repression of the prisons it is not clear that the remaining elements of the Secret Apparatus would have found a new *raison d'être* and a new spiritual guide and framework.

The question, however, is why not all the Brothers jumped on the militant bandwagon if the effects of repression were to radicalize the Islamists. There is no doubt that some of the older leaders, and especially of the Brothers who had been close to Hassan al-Banna, continued to be principally committed to the gradualist view of al-Banna. For such Brothers, whose vision was to transform society from the ground up, the cost of violence had already proven to be too high, as it destroyed the organization, and also took a heavy toll on its supporters and sympathizers. But there is of course also a pragmatic dimension to this response. In light of what these leaders saw as the main mission of the Brotherhood (and that was to reform society and promote Islamic

legislation and not to overthrow the regime per se), it became clear that violence (in fact even allegations of violence) were not just counter-productive but fatal.¹⁰²

Repression did not inspire the theological underpinnings of *Preachers not Judges*, as al-Banna's gradualist model was already existent and internalized. The writings were more of a response to the organizational need for an ideological model from the leadership. Nonetheless the crisis in the Brotherhood caused by Nasser's prison did leave a mark on the older leaders as well. The fascinating psychological dynamic that occurred is that unlike the younger generation, who was strongly motivated by revenge and a newfound vision of militancy, the older generation of Brotherhood leaders, who already had a solidified vision of reform, started looking inward, and rather than focusing on overthrowing the regime their new focus became strengthening the organization. The psychological response was not revenge but rather protecting and reinforcing the unit. In that sense, many of Qutb's ideas about the need for a vanguard, the importance of organizational strength and even the need for secrecy and detachment from society left their mark on the Brotherhood and came to define how the organization evolved after 1970.¹⁰³

The Effectiveness of Alternative Tactics

The discussion so far has already shown that between 1954 and 1970 the Brotherhood was banned and largely destroyed, which meant that it did not have many tactics readily available to pursue its vision. In fact, with the exception of the network of the Muslim Sisters and Organization 1965, who also could only operate clandestinely, the rest of the organization was completely incapacitated.

¹⁰² In addition to disbanding the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasser developed a multi-layered and powerful secret apparatus and intelligence network that was led by his hand-picked loyalists, which made opposition to the regime highly difficult and costly. See Vatikiotis 1978, 164-165.

¹⁰³ Anonymous interviews on June 7 and June 17, 2012, Cairo; and anonymous interview with Muslim Brotherhood leader, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

In addition to being severely limited in terms of availability of tactics, the Brotherhood was also losing its public appeal due to Nasser's growing popularity domestically and regionally. To a certain extent, Nasser's domestic legitimacy was puzzling, because he created an autocratic state system dominated by his most loyal army officers, and developed an intricate intelligence and security network that eliminated all political opposition (Vatikiotis 1978, 158). His union with Syria and intervention in Yemen were also largely failed policies, yet he maintained public support and remained the image of pan-Arabism in the region, until 1968, when public disappointment in the military failures of the 1967 war and frustration over economic failures spilled over in student and worker demonstrations.

Nasser was a highly charismatic leader who knew how to arouse the emotions of the masses (Vatikiotis 1978, 165), and who some historians consider "perhaps the most successful communicator with the Arab masses in modern time" (Vatikiotis 1978, 273). Nasser's leadership and charisma emerged at a time when the Brotherhood was not just organizationally weakened, but also lacked a charismatic leader and ideologue like Hassan al-Banna. Ibrahim posits that in the 1950s and early 1960s Nasserism "pulled the rug out from under the Muslim Brotherhood and appropriated the support of most of this constituency" (Ibrahim 1996, 36). The only ideologue that was beginning to emerge from the ranks of the Brothers was Sayyid Qutb, whose rhetoric was against the system, and who purposefully and explicitly did not seek to appeal to the masses, but rather sought to inspire a revolutionary vanguard towards action.

It is perhaps no coincidence that in the context of such high public approval for Nasser Qutb's ideology took such a revolutionary and Leninist tone, and that the main constituency for this new framework of Islamic activism were the young Brothers that had experienced torture in the prisons. Yet it is difficult to argue that this domestic environment provided anything more

than a fertile ground for these developments. A much more convincing account of what explains the violent and the mainstream reactions to repression is offered by organizational and demographic dynamics.

Organizational Dynamics and the Impact of Demographics

After the Brotherhood was disbanded in 1954, the organization suffered greatly not just because its structure was destroyed, but also because in this time of crisis there was no leadership to inspire the rank and file, and no ideologue to offer a response to the context. As Zollner suggests, in the aftermath of the 1954 repression the Brothers lost trust in the organization's leadership and turned inward "to engage in self-assessment" (Zollner 2007, 415). This lack of leadership and prevailing sense of disillusionment opened the space for the rise of an ideologue like Sayyid Qutb.

As suggested earlier, repression was the catalyst that made Qutb re-evaluate the effectiveness of force, and it was perhaps the main impetus behind the growing appeal of this new militant model among the young Brothers that were released from prison. However, the timing and content of *Preachers not Judges* suggests that it was not written in response to repression, but rather in response to the growing appeal of Qutb's ideology among Brotherhood members, which further undermined Hudaybi's leadership, as Zollner argues (Zollner 2007, 2009). The first edition was only published in 1977. This was *after* most of the historical leaders were released from prison and during a time period when the Brotherhood was re-organizing and gaining significant ground in society, but also when hard-line groups were starting to mushroom and appeal to youth. This is examined in more detail in the next chapter on the rise of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah.

This critical time in the history of the Brotherhood also provides us with the opportunity to examine what made a particular constituency attracted to the Qutbist versus the Hedaybi models. As has already been suggested, the major differences between those who formed Organization 1965 or later defected from the Brotherhood and adopted a Qutbist ideology, and those who remained committed to the gradualist approach of the Brotherhood as expressed in *Preachers not Judges* were age and the role in the organization.

Qutb's *Milestones* appealed primarily to the young members of the Brotherhood, and those who were mainly lower rank and file, whereas the older leaders, and in particular those who had been close to Hassan al-Banna from the very beginning, were committed to the gradualist approach. The backbone of Organization 1965 were the younger Brothers who were released in 1957-1958 (Zollner 2008, 42). Zollner reports that a list of forty-three members of Organization 1965 included twenty-seven members between age 20-30, seven members between the age of 30-40 and only six members over 41 (Zollner 2008, note 189, page 161).

There are several possible explanations for these generational differences. On one hand, the younger Brothers had become involved with the organization during a period when the Brotherhood was already politicized, whereas older members, and in particular those that had been close to Hassan al-Banna (like Umar al-Tilmisani) might have placed more emphasis or been more marked by the initial focus on the educational and spiritual aspect of the Brotherhood, while also being more committed to al-Banna's vision of gradual and peaceful domestic reform. As a member of the Brotherhood suggested, "having an ideology, a worldview and belief system when you are jailed protects you from going the wrong way."¹⁰⁴

Another possible explanation is that youth in general tend to be much more revolutionary and prone to escalating tactics, as was evidenced by the frequent eruption of violence during the

¹⁰⁴ Anonymous interview, July 1, 2012, Cairo.

student protests of the 1930s and 1940s, whereas older leaders could have a more mature and principled response to repression. Last but not least, we can also assume that higher ranking leaders have a longer time-horizon and evaluate the impact of tactics on the stability and future of the organization and on their own leadership, whereas younger and lower-ranking members can be prone to more impulsive or reactionary tendencies and more highly motivated by personal revenge.¹⁰⁵

Whatever psychological dynamics were at work, a clear generational split emerged between the followers of Organization 1965 and the mainstream leaders and followers of the Brotherhood. This generational split also affected which aspects of the Qutbist ideology they adopted and internalized. As already mentioned, the revolutionary aspect of Qutb had great appeal for the younger Brothers, whereas the leaders reacted to the repression by focusing on organizational survival and the cohesion of the unit, adopting from *Milestones* some of the arguments about the need of a socially isolated yet divinely inspired vanguard.

Conclusion

The analysis of the early period of the Muslim Brotherhood reveals several insights. First, the organization acted consistently as both principled and strategic. An ideological commitment to gradual reform prevented the violent escalation several times under al-Banna's rule, and its religious vision underlined the importance of preaching and education above its violent

¹⁰⁵ This is not to say that all revolutionary tendencies have to manifest themselves violently. As seen in 2011, Egyptian youth were at the forefront of the uprising against Mubarak's regime, and they did so non-violently, explicitly rejecting violent escalation. Similarly, large segments of the youth members of the Brotherhood also defected from the organization after the January 2011 revolution, in protest of the Brotherhood's top-down decision-making and conservative policies. Yet when tensions between the pro- and against Morsi camps escalated in late 2012 and January 2013, it was young Islamists who were accused of resorting to violence against the protestors, and mainly students who in January 2013 formed the "Black Bloc," which was described by the Prosecutor General as a "terrorist group" and responsible for the escalating violence of the protests in Tahrir square (El Gundy 2013). What this suggests is that we cannot regard youth as either inherently violent or non-violent, but rather as (1) being prone to revolutionary ideas, (2) highly sensitive to the context and more prone to be reactive, and (3) having a shorter time horizon and being more focused on immediate results and change.

alternatives. The historical overview also shows that time and again both Hassan al-Banna and Hassan Hudaybi were willing to compromise, and in fact always chose negotiation with the government first, but they were willing to compromise in return for policy concessions on the religious issues of importance to them and in return for freedoms for the organization, and were not easily and unconditionally co-opted.

A second insight we can deduce from the analysis is that repressive measures alone are not enough to lead to an escalation of tactics. However, the continuous oscillation between attempts at co-optation and repression reinforced mistrust between the organization and the government, and provided an additional motivation for developing an armed wing. Once the armed wing began acting more autonomously from the main organization, repressive measures were the main reasons for the escalation of violence in 1948.

A third lesson we can learn from the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood is that once an armed wing is formed, it can develop a logic of its own, develop a dual command structure and evolve autonomously from the main organization. The weakening of al-Banna's leadership in 1948, and then the leadership crisis under Hudaybi, reinforced the push of the Secret Apparatus to act and develop independently of the Supreme Guide and the main decision-making apparatus.

Last but not least, the sequence of events suggests that international factors played a crucial role for the politicization and escalation of tactics in the first place. Domestic interactions and tensions between the regime and the Brotherhood impacted the decisions of the Secret Apparatus, but the main reason why this wing was formed in the first place had to do primarily with the British presence in Egypt and the crisis in Palestine. In addition to the perceived external threats to the Muslim community providing an impetus for action, when political leaders

act in ways that are seen as subservient to foreign interests, or when they rescind on previous accommodationist policies, a sense of betrayal and of mistrust provides the causal mechanism for the escalation of tactics.

Examining the divergent views that emerged within the Brotherhood during the later period between 1954 and 1970, we can conclude that repression forced the organization towards clandestine activity, and that it was a powerful catalyst for the militarization of Qutb's ideology as well as one of the main reasons for his appeal among young Muslim Brothers. However, repression was not the main reason why the older generation of leaders and the mainstream Brotherhood consolidated its commitment to gradual reform and published a new ideological statement in *Preachers not Judges*, which contrasted the militant tone of the Qutbist model. Hedaybi and the other leaders were mostly responding to the growing dissent and defections within the organization at a time when the Brotherhood had a second chance to develop as a grassroots movement and to make inroads into society.

The divergent responses to repression are mostly attributed to the age of the different constituencies, and their role within the organization. Younger and lower ranked Brothers were more attracted to the revolutionary tone of the Qutbist model, whereas older leaders, who were more committed to the gradual reform vision set forth by al-Banna, and who were also more focused on long-term change and organizational survival, took a more accommodationist approach.

This analysis of the developments during the early period of the Brotherhood reveals that some of the causal mechanisms that have been identified to operate at the individual level, such as victimization and political grievance (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), also operate collectively at the organizational level to push towards politicization and violent escalation.

Political grievances alone, however, are not enough to cause the organization to use violence against domestic targets. Instead, a sense of betrayal and mistrust of political leaders is what drives certain members to justify the escalation of tactics against domestic target. But one of the most powerful causal mechanisms at the organizational level is the slippery slope that occurs once an armed wing is established. This organizational feature took on a life of its own, led to competition over authority and to the escalation of violent tactics towards domestic targets. Both historical episodes examined in this chapter underline that external pressures are translated through organizational dynamics and public norms to affect shifts and adaptation in strategic outlook.

Chapter 4

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah: From Radicalization to Domestication

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah (GI) as an organization developed out of the Islamic student movement that emerged in the mid to late 1970s on university campuses across Egypt, and which was initially more generally referred to as the *gama'a Islamiyya*, or the Islamic group. The Islamic associations on campuses initially operated independently of each other, and while some scholars suggest that they had no official ties with organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood (Meijer 2009, 191–192), others point out that it was difficult to distinguish between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic societies on campuses (Abdo 2002, 126). By 1978-1979 the distinctions became more apparent, and a split occurred among the members of the student movement. The moderate factions joined the Muslim Brotherhood, and the more radical elements formed al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah as a resistance movement (Abdo 2002, 128–129).

Over the subsequent two decades, GI became one of the most violent groups in Egypt, escalating its tactics from clashes with police officers in Upper Egypt to attacks against tourists. After the regime showed its heavy hand and practically incapacitated the organization, by 1997 the historical leaders revised their ideological tenets, asked for the dissolution of the armed wing, and published extensive volumes explaining why their tactics had been wrong. The GI therefore represents one of the clearest cases of disengagement from violence and ideological revision of an Islamist movement that had used violence.

This chapter explores the dynamics of both escalation and de-escalation, investigating why the organization developed as an armed group, and why it renounced and denounced the use of violent tactics.

The Emergence of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah and the Violent Escalation of Tactics: 1978 – 1997

The student associations from which the GI emerged did not employ any violent tactics, and were initially largely religious study groups. They studied the Qur'an, printed and studied Islamic literature (including Sayyid Qutb's *Milestones*), organized summer camps, and offered free services to students, such as gender-segregated transportation, copies of lectures and tutoring (Abdo 2002, 125; Meijer 2009, 192; Sageman 2004, 29). Members of these Islamic societies ran in student union elections, and in 1976 their candidates won control in eight out of twelve student unions in universities across the country (Abdo 2002, 124).

As these student groups were becoming more visible and powerful on campuses, and as they perceived a growing threat from the spread of communist student movements, the tactics also gradually started escalating. As a former member of such a student group recalls, by 1980 the Islamic societies had full control of university campuses and felt like they could do anything, which is why they resorted to tactics like closing down book fairs and burning literature that was deemed as un-Islamic.¹⁰⁶ While the focus was initially on the community and on fighting corrupt behavior, by the late 1970s these groups also became increasingly antagonistic towards the state, organizing demonstrations and sit-ins, which led to clashes with the authorities and an escalating cycle of contention (Meijer 2009, 195).

The GI emerged as an organization during a turbulent period, when both ethnic tensions between Christians and Muslims became salient and clashes with the police escalated, especially around broader demonstrations, such as the 1977 food riots, 1978 demonstrations against Camp David and 1980 demonstrations against the Shah of Iran. The start of the GI as an organization that was distinct from the student movement is somewhat murky. Therefore it is difficult to point

¹⁰⁶ Anonymous interview, July 25, 2012, Cairo.

to concrete escalations of tactics in the late 1970s, even though the young Islamists from Upper Egypt who later became the backbone of GI were involved in all these clashes.

Sadat's assassination in 1981 was the first violent escalation undertaken by GI as an organization. Yet the group that organized this attack represented two different factions, which had different visions and ideological commitments. The group that after the assassination became the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) believed in overthrowing the regime through a coup d'état, whereas the group that became al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah sought to overthrow the regime through a popular revolution (Meijer 2009, 197). Whereas al-Gama'a wanted to serve society but direct its anger at the government, EIJ did not wish to serve anyone but rather focused mainly on training and building the power necessary to overthrow the regime.¹⁰⁷ EIJ was elitist and believed that a military coup was needed to come to power, whereas GI believed in the necessity of preaching and reaching out to the masses.¹⁰⁸ GI developed both a military and a social service branch, whereas EIJ focused more on the immediate goal of eliminating the Egyptian regime (Blaydes and Rubin 2008). While GI was inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979 and focused on open activism, EIJ was a secret conspiratorial organization that believed in the need of a vanguard to stage a coup (Meijer 2009, 197).

After Sadat's assassination, all GI members were arrested and the organization was largely incapacitated. When the first wave of members was released in 1984 the organization began extending its network and gained popularity in Upper Egypt by providing social, educational and health services and acting as power-brokers in community conflicts (Meijer 2009, 199). The period between 1983 and 1987 was one of relative calm, during which Al-Sayyid argues that there was a "tacit understanding that local security forces would tolerate al-

¹⁰⁷ Anonymous interview, July 25, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁰⁸ Anonymous interview, June 7, 2012, Cairo.

Jama'a al-Islamiyya as long as the group limited its activities to preaching in Upper Egypt" (Al-Sayyid 2003, 14). He contends that "senior police officers met with some leaders of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya to convince them of the benefits they would get if they ceased armed operations," whereas "al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya leaders asked for the release of their colleagues in prison and an end to the practice of torture," adopting a policy of restraint in order to "deter the government's attacks on members of the organization" (Al-Sayyid 2003, 14).


After 1987, however, the organization escalated its tactics and adopted a much more aggressive strategic outlook. In 1987, the organization established a military wing (Al-Sayyid 2003, 14), and in the subsequent two years it was increasingly involved in riots and violent clashes with the police, which resulted in a vicious cycle of harsh repression and escalation of tactics. In 1988 there were nine violent clashes with the police and five attacks that involved knives and grenades, whereas in 1989 there were nineteen riots and fourteen bloody clashes with the police that resulted in 8,000 arrests (Al-Awadi 2004, 118). In 1989 al-Gama'a attempted to assassinate Interior Minister Zaki Badr, and in 1990 it tried to assassinate Interior Minister Abdel-Halim Moussa, but it killed the Parliamentary speaker Rifaat Mahgoub by mistake.

The early 1990s mark a new stage of violent escalation, when al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah shifts from clashing with the police and targeting the Interior Minister (a political figure responsible for the repression of the group) to targeting at first Egyptians that were considered apostates, and by the mid 1990s targeting tourists. Thus, on June 8, 1992, GI assassinated secularist writer Farag Foda, in 1993 it made an abortive attempt on the life of Information Minister Safwat El-Sherif, and in November 1994 a GI member stabbed in the neck Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz. On June 26, 1995 al-Gama'a made an unsuccessful attempt on Mubarak's life after his arrival at the African Unity summit in Addis Ababa.

The early 1990s were also marked by heightened attacks on Copts, though the GI was not generally identified as the main perpetrator. When ten Coptic youth were killed in an attack on a church in southern Egypt in February 1997, the police accused the GI, but the organization denied involvement in the attack (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). Starting with 1996, however, the GI started targeting tourists. On April 18, 1996 eighteen Greek tourists were killed in Cairo, and on September 18, 1997 eleven German tourists were killed outside the Egyptian Museum in Tahrir square. By far the most devastating attack, and in fact the last major attack of the organization occurred on November 17, 1997 in Luxor.¹⁰⁹ According to the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, six gunmen opened fire on a group of tourists, which resulted in the death of fifty-eight tourists, four Egyptians and six GI assailants. This was the last violent incident that was claimed or attributed to GI before the leaders of the organization began embarking on a process of ideological revisions that resulted in the renunciation of violent tactics. The escalation in strategic outlook is briefly captured in figure 4.1.

¹⁰⁹ Given the trauma of the Luxor attack, Morsi's appointment of a former Gama'a member as the governor of Luxor was seen as particularly controversial (Steinvorth 2013).

Figure 10. Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah and Violent Escalation



In order to examine the process of violent escalation that has been briefly overviewed here, the rest of the section proceeds in a similar manner to the discussion of the violent escalation in the Muslim Brotherhood, examining the ideological underpinnings of the organization, the impact of repression, of public norms and of organizational dynamics.

The Ideological Underpinnings of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah

Ideologically, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah follows in the footsteps of Sayyid Qutb's notions about the un-Islamic nature of the contemporary society and state. As a Gama'a member suggested, during the early period of development, when GI was merged with the EIJ, there were no distinct ideological lines that had formed, and before Sadat's assassination there was "a union of thought based on making the revolution."¹¹⁰ For this reason, *The Neglected Duty*, which was written by Abd al-Salam Farag in 1981 (and which later became the manifesto of EIJ), as well as statements

¹¹⁰ Anonymous interview, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

made by Sheikh Abd El-Rahman, who was the spiritual leader of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, provide important insights into the founding views of the organization.

Farag's main contention is that the *jihad* of the sword is an essential individual duty that has been neglected. As Euben and Zaman point out, Farag redefines *jihad* in a radical way that "eliminates all textual ambiguities and interpretive complexities in an effort to delegitimize the multiple meanings *jihad* has carried for Muslims past and present" (Euben and Zaman 2009, 321). Farag emphasizes both the aggressive and the political aspect of *jihad*, suggesting that the physical fight is a necessary aspect of the struggle and not a temporal stage (Euben and Zaman 2009, 341), that "the best form of *jihad* is a word of truth (spoken to) a tyrannical ruler" (330), and that it is an individual duty to fight against the enemy of Islam that is embodied in the "rulers who have (illegally) seized the leadership of the Muslims" (341).

This call for the overthrow of the rulers rests on two important assumptions: (1) that preaching and *da'wa* are insufficient tactics for bringing about the necessary change, and (2) that the contemporary rulers, even though they are nominally Muslim, can be treated as infidels. Regarding the first point, while Farag recognizes that prayer, *zakat* (paying of alms) and charitable works are important and necessary, he suggests that by themselves these tactics cannot bring about an Islamic state, and that they reproduce the subjection of society to state control and instructions (Euben and Zaman 2009, 329). Furthermore, "nonviolent propaganda" cannot be effective when "all means of (mass) communication today are under the control of the pagan and wicked (state)" (Euben and Zaman 2009, 331). Similarly, political participation is also an ineffective tactic because "it means building the pagan state and collaborating with it" and it implies participation "in the membership of legislative councils that enact laws without consideration for God's Laws" (330).

Regarding the issue of treating Muslim rulers as infidels, Farag draws the analogy between the Egyptian rulers and the Mongols in Ibn Taymiyya's writings, suggesting that they share the same characteristics (Euben and Zaman 2009, 328). Not only that, but the near enemy is also a more immediate threat than the far enemy (336), and the first step has to be "the extermination of these infidel leaders" and their replacement with "a complete Islamic order" (337). Based on these assumptions, Farag comes to the same conclusion as Sayyid Qutb, that what is needed is a vanguard, a "believing minority" (331) that can help establish an Islamic state.

In "The Present Rulers and Islam: Are they Muslim or Not?", Umar Abd al-Rahman adopts a similar line of argument, focusing on the reason for treating the contemporary rulers as infidels, and the justification for the need to remove them by force. Citing Ibn Taymiyya, who says that it is *kufir* (unbelief) and *shirk* (polytheism, idolatry) to permit what Allah has forbidden and forbid what Allah has permitted, which implies "following human beings at the expense of religion" (Euben and Zaman 2009, 354), Abd al-Rahman emphasizes that it is not permissible to be ruled by secular law (353). Thus, he suggests that "the ulama are unanimously agreed that the Muslims should, as a general rule, depose their leaders (*khulafa*) for corruption, or indeed for any other justifiable reason," such as social disorder or undermining religion (350).

Abd Al-Rahman takes the argument of the need to remove such leaders a step further, arguing that any social discord that might arise would not be *fitna* (discord, disorder) but rather "a struggle for reform because its ultimate aim would be the elevation of Truth, the uprooting of corruption, and the reaffirmation of Islam" (Euben and Zaman 2009, 350).¹¹¹ Along similar lines, he also counteracts arguments about the need for patience towards leaders by emphasizing

¹¹¹ We can assume that by addressing the issue of discord, Abd al-Rahman is responding to one of the critiques raised by Islamic thinkers against Farag, which is that maintaining the unity of the community is essential, and is one of the reasons why Muslims must not rebel against a ruler even if he violates Islamic norms.

that this is true as long as it is not detrimental to Islam and the Islamic community (351). Citing ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awda, a Muslim Brother who was involved in the Secret Apparatus, Abd El-Rahman underlines that if continuing under the regime undermines Islam, “the lesser of the two evils must be revolt and nothing less” (352).

After al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad split into two distinct organizations, GI continued following the same lines of reasoning regarding the need for an Islamic state and the removal of illegitimate rulers, but it adopted a more “flexible view of activist praxis” that emphasized not just jihad but also preaching and commanding good while forbidding wrong (Meijer 2009, 204), as reflected in the *Islamic Action Charter*, which became the central ideological document of the organization. The call for commanding good while forbidding wrong was used as a justification for various vigilante activities, from attacking Christians to forcefully imposing Islamic dress codes (Blaydes and Rubin 2008).

GI’s main ideological tenets offered a much stricter, militaristic and revolutionary interpretation and framework than the Muslim Brotherhood. Even though after the split from EIJ, al-Gama’a emphasized the importance of *da’wa* in addition to *jihad*, its vision of Islamic activism was much more anti-system, more pro-active and more focused on top-down change than the mainstream vision of the Brotherhood to change society primarily from the bottom-up. The organization was much more limited in what tactics it perceived as being effective or necessary, and much more cynical about solely relying on non-violent tactics and accepting the political system. On the other hand, however, as will be shown in the subsequent sections, clashes with the police occurred in Upper Egypt before the emergence of the GI, and independently of religious debates. Similarly, ethnic tensions also systematically erupted in Upper Egypt, before the emergence of the GI and independently of the GI, even though the GI

members often exacerbated the sectarian tensions and clashes. Therefore, *we cannot consider ideology per se as the cause of clashes with the police or with Christians*. However, the *ideological framework promoted by the organization helped exacerbate these social cleavages and tensions, and it offered a justification for escalating the tactics and turning the attention towards the state as a target of violence*.

It is difficult to argue that in the absence of repression and the crisis of legitimacy of the regime, the ideological tenets of the GI would have found as many followers, and would have caused the same level of systematic and organized violence that Egypt witnessed in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. The interaction between repression, state legitimacy and organizational dynamics is explored in more detail in the next sections.

Policy Convergence and the Logic of Resistance

When Sadat came to power, he adopted a set of domestic and foreign policies that were based on four main principles: economic liberalization (Open Door), democratization, alliance with the West and conciliation with Israel (Ibrahim 1996, 37). Under this set of policies, Sadat sought to integrate Egypt in the world capitalist system, seeking massive infusion of US economic aid and giving Egyptian, Arab and foreign investors free hand to operate, to the extent that sixteen percent of investments were by foreign capital (Ibrahim 1996, 37). In 1972, Sadat expelled 1,500 Soviet advisors from Egypt, and starting with 1974 he began openly criticizing the Soviet Union while strengthening ties with the U.S., until he unilaterally cancelled the friendship treaty in 1976 (Ibrahim 1996, 38). Starting with 1971 he also signaled that he was interested in peaceful coexistence with Israel, and Ibrahim suggests that even in the midst of the 1973 war, while the Egyptian forces were still performing well, he renewed the bid for peaceful coexistence (Ibrahim 1996, 38).

Sadat's economic liberalism, alliance with the West and desire for peace with Israel were all policies strongly divergent from the Islamist vision at the time, be it the Gama'a al-Islamiyyah or the Muslim Brotherhood.¹¹² Indeed, as Ibrahim also points out, in the late 1970s, the Brotherhood became a very outspoken critique of Sadat's policies through the magazines *al-Da'wa* and *al-'Itisam*, strongly attacking the alliance with the West and the conciliation with Israel (Ibrahim 1996, 39). The April-May 1981 issue of *Al-'Itisam*, for example, argued that

“Whatever Islam does not allow we must reject and struggle to eradicate. We fear no one but God. Prisons and hanging do not frighten us. Dying for the sake of God is our dearest aspiration. From this vantage point we consider the shameful peace produced at Camp David and the treaty with the enemy of God, the Prophet, the believers, humanity, and justice to be an illusion. We believe from the depths of our heart to be a false peace.”
(Ibrahim 1996, 44)

In terms of policy preferences, therefore, the Brotherhood and the GI were both strongly opposed to Sadat's policies, especially after the peace accord with Israel. However, the two groups had drastically different understandings on what tactics to pursue: whereas the Brotherhood accepted the Egyptian state and sought to influence public policies and fight the external enemy, the GI rejected the Egyptian system as a whole and sought to overthrow the regime itself. As Ibrahim points out, the strategic principle of the Brotherhood was “an assertion of its longstanding call for the establishment of an Islamic social order on the basis of *shari'a*”, as the present order was seen as non-Islamic, corrupt and responsible for all societal ills. The tactical principle was “seeking its strategic objective in Egypt nonviolently through consciousness-raising of the Muslim masses and advice to “Muslim” rulers” (Ibrahim 1996, 39).

Low policy convergence was therefore not enough to cause an escalation of tactics, and understanding the ideological differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the GI can help

¹¹² Ironically, the contemporary instantiation of the Muslim Brotherhood is highly liberal in its economic policy, relatively accommodationist towards the United States, and generally acceptant of the peace with Israel.

us understand the divergent conclusions reached by the organizations in terms of how to respond to the political situation. But as the subsequent sections will show, even after we take into consideration ideological differences, the antagonism towards state policies was severely exacerbated by repression, and was also primarily appealing only to a very specific constituency and not to the population at large.

Kepel suggests that gama'a the student movement was initially opposed to the idea of excommunicating Muslims and using violence, but that after Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and bilateral negotiations with Israel the group began changing its tone and opposing the regime (Kepel 1985, 148). This means that the Gama'a underwent a similar process of *politicization* and ultimately of *betrayal*, just as the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. Policy convergence, both domestically but especially towards foreign policy, was therefore an important catalyst for violent escalation.¹¹³

When asked whether al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah would have participated in Sadat's assassination even if he hadn't made peace with Israel, a member of GI suggested that the policies towards Israel were only one of the reasons for opposing Sadat, but not the main reason or the sole determinant of his assassination.¹¹⁴ The peace with Israel convinced everyone that Sadat was on the wrong path, but *jihad* was already an integral part of GI's strategy at that point, along with preaching and commanding good and forbidding evil.

Sadat diverged with Islamists not just on foreign policy but also on domestic issues regarding the role of religion in the state. To a certain extent, Sadat was probably the Egyptian

¹¹³ Sadat's alliance with the West, and even attempts at conciliation with Israel began much earlier than his first trip to Jerusalem in 1977. One could argue that if concerns about foreign policy had played a determinant role, we would have expected the splits among Islamists on campuses and the GI to emerge already in the mid 1970s. However, much of this reconciliation with Israel was not publically known. The trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, on the other hand, was highly visible and highly symbolic, Sadat being the first Arab president ever to visit Israel.

¹¹⁴ Anonymous interview, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

president most sympathetic to the Islamic cause, but like the other presidents he also sought to bring Islam under the control of the state, and to use piety to boost his own legitimacy. In 1971, Islam was designated as the state religion of Egypt, and in October of the same year Sadat also released most Islamists from prison. In 1979 Sadat called for the separation of religion and politics, stating that “there would be ‘no Ayatollah laws in Egypt’,” (Roosevelt 1979) and that “those who wish to practice Islam can go to the mosques, and those who wish to engage in politics may do so through legal institutions” (Abdo 2002, 127). He warned that he “will never tolerate those who try to tamper with the high interests of the State under the guise of Islam” and he emphasized that one should “never intermingle religion with politics or the other way around.”¹¹⁵ The general union of students responded to these remarks by sending letters to the newspapers “denouncing the separation of religion and politics as heresy” (Roosevelt 1979).

In 1980 Sadat made a conciliatory gesture by declaring *shari'a* as the source of legislation in the constitution. However, by 1981 the clamp-down on Islamists on and off campuses increased, and in addition to arrests Sadat also took over 40,000 privately owned mosques, provided funds to increase security on campuses and replace some of GI's services and prohibited the wearing of veils for female students (Roosevelt 1981). The discussion of domestic or foreign policies therefore cannot be examined outside of the context of repression and attempts to co-opt the religious institutions and control the opposition. Within this context, any reconciliatory gestures seemed like empty acts, and were clearly not enough to give Sadat immunity in the eyes of the GI. Similarly to the causal mechanisms observed when examining the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, *a sense of betrayal by the national government* also played a fundamental role in the evolution of GI's strategic outlook, building on the organization's politicization and contributing to the escalation of tactics.

¹¹⁵ Egyptian Gazette, August 22, 1979.

For GI the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of *shari'a* laws were the most important goal and standard for evaluating the legitimacy of states or rulers. However, it is unclear that if Sadat had made more of an attempt to create an Islamic state he would have been spared the wrath of the GI. The GI was opposed to his foreign policies, aggravated by his repression, and they offered a religious interpretation that diverged from mainstream interpretations of Al-Azhar, which would have been the backbone of any version of an Islamic state. In fact, it is not unthinkable to imagine that if Sadat had taken more steps towards implementing Islamic legislation the GI would have felt more empowered to “promote the good and forbid the evil” on the ground and continue undertaking vigilante activities, even though these might not have escalated to an all-out war against the state.

When Mubarak came to power, initially his rapprochement with Muslim countries was welcomed by the general population and he tried to appease the opposition and allow the Brotherhood to operate, while vigorously pursuing the more militant elements among Islamists. Some of his foreign policies were strongly opposed not just by the GI but also by more mainstream Islamists, and the promulgation of religious issues within the auspices of the state did not correspond to GI’s vision for an Islamic state. In terms of foreign policy, many Islamists were opposed to Egypt’s participation in the US-led alliance against Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, and were also opposed to the Oslo peace process.

Internally, while the parliament rejected the application of *shari'a* in 1985, Mubarak continued the co-optation of Al-Azhar and encouraged prominent sheikhs to counteract the ideas of Al-Gama’a and denounce the use of violent tactics (Al-Awadi 2004, 59). By the end of the 1980s, the regime increased the “Islamisation” of the state-controlled media, and launched several Islamic newspapers that sought to present the state’s own version of Islam and its views

of Islam's role in society and politics (Al-Awadi 2004, 120). The hours of religious programming on national television increased sharply, and even entertainment programs became more "conservative" (Al-Awadi 2004, 120). Al-Awadi suggests that while some Al-Azhar sheikhs refused to participate in such a state-sponsored campaign, others took advantage of the state's need for religious credibility to push for Islamic reforms, which "gradually helped bring forward the process of the Islamisation of society" (Al-Awadi 2004, 121). As Ibrahim points out, between 1970 and 1985 "the state-supported mosques have more than doubled their number of religious educational institutions and their student intake has more than tripled," and "Publications issued by Al-Azhar, ME and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA), which affirm the officially approved version of Islam, have also increased four fold" (Ibrahim 1988, 637).

In 1994, Al Azhar gained more power, when the General Assembly ruled that Al-Azhar opinions were binding and could not be overturned by the Ministry of Culture (Abdo 2002, 67). At the same time, however, in the mid-1990s the state also began an aggressive take-over of mosques, assuming control over a majority of private mosques, demanded that prayer leaders be accredited from official seminaries or have equivalent qualifications and replaced those who failed the licensing test with state-appointed preachers (Abdo 2002, 28).

To a large extent, these policies were attempts to respond to and curb the spread of radical religious interpretations and of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah; however, it also became clear that such attempts by the regime to promote religion were not seen as enough or as adequate policies by GI. But even if the regime had given in to the demands of the GI and implemented *shari'a* laws, it's difficult to argue that during the Mubarak years the organization would have changed its tactics. Given their attacks on secular figures and participation in vigilante activities

and in sectarian clashes with Christians, the implementation of *shari'a* laws might have empowered the group to continue perceiving itself as a vanguard that was needed to implement these laws on the ground, and to actively prohibit forbidden behavior, dress or language.¹¹⁶ In other words, if the regime had fully complied with GI's demands, the group would have probably abstained from attacks on tourists and would not have sought an overthrow of the regime per se, but it would have continued low-level violence related to imposing the laws on the ground.

The state's attempt to mobilize religious symbols to counteract the impact of GI was done simultaneously with a policy of active repression and incapacitation of the group after the mid 1980s. Indeed, when the group started escalating its tactics again in the late 1980s, most clashes were with the police, and the initial state targets were the Minister of the Interior and the symbols of the police state. Therefore, while domestic and foreign policies might have aggravated the GI, it is unlikely that high policy convergence alone would have changed the strategic outlook of the group. Low policy convergence, therefore, aggravated the antagonism of the group towards the state, but also interacted with the impact of repression to result in escalating tactics. The extent to which repression contributed to the escalation of tactics is explored in more details next.

Availability of Tactics: Repression and Inclusion

In some sense, the very emergence of the GI was a legacy of the repression in Nasser's prison. The founding ideology of the organization was based on Qutb's writing in the prisons and was fundamentally impacted by the trauma of the prisons. The first student members of the GI were too young to have been imprisoned under Nasser; however, the leaders of the previous

¹¹⁶ Some argue that this sense of empowerment and self-perception as a vanguard of society is precisely what happened in Egypt after Mohammed Morsi and the Freedom and Justice Party came to power.

*Takfir wa'l Hijra*¹¹⁷ and the Military Technical Group¹¹⁸ were former Brotherhood members that had split away from the organization. Shukri Mustafa was related to a GI leader in Asyut (Ansari 1984, 128), whereas Farag's father was also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been arrested several times (Ansari 1984, 135). Therefore at least some of the leaders of the GI and EIJ were impacted by the memory of the torture in Nasser's prisons, and influenced by the debates over violent versus non-violent resistance and the legitimacy of declaring someone as an infidel. The question is why these leaders were able to appeal to a growing constituency and build an organization, and why al-Gama'a escalated tactics and over time shifted from a vocal student movement to a violent group undertaking assassinations and attacking tourists. This section focuses on the impact of repression.

When Sadat came to power, he released most of the Islamists in 1971. Many scholars argue that he actively attempted to co-opt and promote organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood and in particular the gama'a student groups, in order to combat the rise of communism on university campuses. Kepel suggests that the governor of Asyut met with GI students and encouraged them to fight against communists (Kepel 1985, 134). However, this claim is strongly disputed by GI members, who reject the implication that the group was used by the government.¹¹⁹ What remains certain, however, is that unlike the repression under Nasser, during the early 1970s Islamists had significantly more freedoms, space and social influence. As

¹¹⁷ *Takfir wa'l Hijra* (Excommunication and Migration) was founded in the early 1970s by Shukri Mustafa, who broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood and adopted a more radical interpretation inspired by Sayyid Qutb's writings. In 1977 the group kidnapped and murdered the Minister of Religious Endowments,

¹¹⁸ The Military Technical Group was one of the first Egyptian jihadi groups that sought to overthrow the state. In 1974 the group attempted to assassinate Sadat and stage a coup, but security forces intercepted the members. For more details see Rashwan 2009, page 113 and Sageman 2004, page 28.

¹¹⁹ Anonymous interview, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

a former student leader recalls, by 1980, the gama'a student groups had "full control of university campuses and could do anything."¹²⁰

As the Islamic call was gaining appeal in society and as Islamist student groups were gaining ground on campuses, the relationship with the regime also began to change. On one hand, young Islamists found themselves increasingly powerful, but on the other hand also increasingly persecuted, especially as they began being more outspoken against the regime.¹²¹ At this time, the works of Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya were widely read on campuses, as was Hassan al-Banna and Wahhabi literature sent to campuses freely from Saudi Arabia.¹²² The growing appeal of the jihadi interpretation and the emergence of GI and EIJ stemmed from the interactive effect of growing power of Islamists and escalating repression by the regime, while the state was beginning to face a legitimacy crisis by the end of the 1970s due to its domestic and external policies.

The turning point in the relationship between Islamists and the regime came in 1974, when in April the Military Technical Group tried to assassinate Sadat and stage a coup, but was intercepted by security forces (Rashwan 2009, 113; Sageman 2004, 28). Ibrahim points out that there was in fact a significant jump in unrest from the Nasser period to the Sadat period, and emphasizes that most unrest was between 1974 and 1981 (Ibrahim 1996, 72).

In 1977 all of Egypt was shaken by the January food riots, which were brutally put down by the police and army, and led to curfews in Giza, Cairo and Alexandria, over a thousand arrests, and a ban on all student strikes, sit-ins and "acts of hooliganism."¹²³ That same summer,

¹²⁰ Anonymous interview, July 25, 2012, Cairo.

¹²¹ Abou El-Fotouh's famous interruption of Sadat's speech at a student union, and his sharp criticism of the president's crackdown on Muslim preachers and student protesters became a symbol of the growing voice of young Islamists.

¹²² Anonymous interview, July 25, 2012, Cairo.

¹²³ See *Egyptian Gazette*, January 20, 21, 30 and 31, 1977.

members of the *Takfir wa al-Hijra* group (which was established by former Brotherhood follower Shukri Mustapha), kidnapped the former Minister of Religious Endowments, who has been an “outspoken opponent of the concepts and activities” of the organization,¹²⁴ and demanded the release of the jailed members. When the government refused, the group killed the hostage, which led to a new wave of crack-downs on Islamist activities.

In the spring of 1978, the regime refused to fund student union committees under Islamist control (Kepel 1985, 149), and pressured university administrators to remove gama'a members from the election rolls for student unions (Abdo 2002, 128). In the summer, Islamist student camps were also shut down. Fu'ad Qasim, a leader of the GI military wing, suggested that “the confrontation with the state began in earnest in 1978, with the arrest of some members after protests against Camp David. Soon afterward protests against al-Sadat’s offer of asylum to the Shah of Iran led to the murder of some of our members by security forces” (Qasim 1997, 315). At the same time, Ibrahim suggests that during the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood was “spared prosecution and allowed to continue under the watchful eye of the regime security apparatus” (Ibrahim 1996, 36).

The crack-down on student unions continued in the subsequent year as well. Ansari suggests that during the late 1970s, in 1980 and in 1981 house-to-house searches for hidden weapons were conducted in Asyut and Minya, which had a higher level of state repression than any other provincial capital (Ansari 1984, 131). Tensions spiked in 1980, when in April some 5,000 students protested against Copts and the Shah at Asyut University (Roosevelt 1980), which led to clashes with the police, and tensions among Christians and Copts escalated in Alexandria over some rumors.¹²⁵ In May, Sadat addressed the nation talking about the clashes in Upper

¹²⁴ *Egyptian Gazette*, July 4, 1977.

¹²⁵ *Egyptian Gazette*, April 1, 1980.

Egypt as a danger to national unity, and announced the dissolution of Coptic and Muslim societies. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as one of the most outspoken critics of the regime at the time, harshly denouncing the repression of the regime during this time, which was focused on young Islamists. A May 1981 issue of *al-Da'wa*, for instance, criticized the government for arresting thousands of members who were found innocent and for targeting youth members of Islamic groups, most of whom were college or secondary school students (Ibrahim 1996, 42).

In 1981 sectarian tensions escalated even more, with clashes and riots reaching a peak in June. In response, Sadat called for the toughest security measures, calling on governors to “use the toughest punitive articles of the law.”¹²⁶ In August, at the end of Ramadan, GI is reported to have circulated leaflets “condemning Egypt’s new materialism, and the peace with Israel and urging preparations for a Holy War by eradicating western corruption at home” (Roosevelt 1981). Only a couple of weeks later, after the return from a disillusioning trip to the U.S. (where he was met by Coptic protests and an administration that was turning its focus towards Saudi Arabia¹²⁷), Sadat began cracking down on both Copts and Islamists.

On September 4th he closed down Islamic, Coptic and opposition newspapers and arrested Islamic activists, including some members of the Brotherhood, as well as Coptic Bishops and priests and several opposition figures.¹²⁸ The next day, Sadat declared the “September 5 revolution” to “signal the inception of total confrontation with all those who manifest extremism under the pretext of religion and exploit religion for political purposes and to bring about sectarian sedition”.¹²⁹ These measures included also disbanding religious groups and

¹²⁶ *Egyptian Gazette*, June 21, 1981.

¹²⁷ See the reports of former CIA officer and diplomat Archibald B. Roosevelt, “Egypt and the Sadat ‘Crackdown’” and his remarks made at the Country Risk Meeting, October 13, 1981, both available in the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. (Roosevelt 1981)

¹²⁸ *Egyptian Gazette*, September 4, 1981.

¹²⁹ *Egyptian Gazette*, September 5, 1981.

taking over their funds and properties, dismissing journalists, TV and radio producers and university professors, and amending the law on political parties to include severe punishment for forming a partisan organization with a nature opposed to the social system, or with a military or para-military nature.”¹³⁰ Interestingly enough, only a few days later, the National Democratic Party (NDP) proposed seminars for youth about Islamic tolerance and the true meaning of *shari’a* to be run by qualified Al-Azhar sheikhs.¹³¹

Ibrahim points out that whereas Nasser ordered 14,000 arrests between 1952 and 1970, Sadat ordered 19,000 arrests between 1971 and 1981, with most unrest occurring after 1974 (Ibrahim 1996, 72–73). A report on the 1981 crackdown suggests that of the 1,500 arrests, more than 1,000 were Islamist activists (Roosevelt 1981). Among the Islamists arrested was also Mohammed al-Islambuli, an Asyut leader of GI whose brother was a lieutenant selected to command an armored transport vehicle during the October 6th parade, and who contacted Farag suggesting that he kill the President (Sageman 2004).

The crackdown in September can therefore be seen as a direct catalyst for the events that unfolded in October 1981, building on the accumulated mistrust and sense of betrayal, and contributing to a new desire for *revenge*. There are indications, however, that an attempt to overthrow the government would have occurred even without the September round of arrests. According to some of the confessions after the assassinations, Farag was talking about a plan to attack vital installations in Cairo and the homes of public officials already in March 1980, whereas others confessed that serious thinking about overthrowing the regime began in March 1981 (Ansari 1984, 126). In order to assess the impact of repression, however, a more important

¹³⁰ *Egyptian Gazette*, September 6, 1981.

¹³¹ *Egyptian Gazette*, September 9, 1981.

question is whether the GI would have still formed and would have emphasized an overthrow of the regime if Sadat hadn't started turning against the student groups by 1978.

It is difficult to fully develop a counter-factual argument about what would have happened if Sadat had not decisively turned against the Islamists, because the absence of repression arguably would have had multiple effects on society. That being said, it is telling that some young Islamists condoned the use of violence in theory before the regime began persecuting the GI. Without the regime starting to clamp down on young gama'a members and without the police reacting violently to protesters, it is reasonable to assume that some trends would have persisted, such as increased activism on campuses, clashes with communists, burning of books, involvement in the food riots, protesting against foreign policies and against Copts, and even sectarian clashes. In his memoir, Abu el-Fotouh admits that even before the establishment of GI per se, the student groups condoned the use of violence to establish an Islamic order (El-Hennawy 2010). Some experts also suggests that the young Islamists who joined the Muslim Brotherhood and split away from the emerging GI believed in the legitimacy of violence in theory, even though they did not promote violent tactics, but that as they became active within the Brotherhood, and influenced by the older generation of leaders, they began changing their views on the legitimacy of violence.¹³²

One of the GI members suggests that the organization was formed and developed a shura council because the Iranian revolution inspired them to undertake a similar popular revolution in Egypt.¹³³ What this implies is that even without repression the GI would have probably formed, contemplated the idea of a popular revolution, and at least in theory legitimized the use of violent tactics. However, it remains unclear that in the absence of the repression the organization would

¹³² Anonymous interview, June 17, 2012, Cairo.

¹³³ Anonymous interview, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

have come to regard preaching as insufficient and inefficient, would have prioritized a take-over of the regime over *da'wa*, and that tactics would have escalated from low-level vigilante activities or isolated clashes with opponents to systematic anti-state violence.

It is in this context of growing strength on campuses after a period of attempt at co-optation followed by increased targeting by the state, as well as low policy convergence and a legitimacy crisis for the regime, the differences among the student leaders exacerbated, and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah was formed by the students who refused to join the Muslim Brotherhood. After Sadat's assassination and the subsequent crackdown on the group, as well as the formal split from EIJ, the waves of repression and attempts at bargaining also continued to have a strong impact on the evolution and escalation of tactics.

The youngest members of GI who were not involved in Sadat's assassination were released in 1984, when they resumed preaching and attempting to build the organization, primarily through social services. However, when the Zaki Badr (a former governor of Asyut, a central stronghold of GI) was appointed as the new Minister of the Interior in 1986, a new stage of repression began, that included at first closing down mosques, forbidding lectures, and interference with student union elections (Al-Awadi 2004), and then arrests, torture and hostage-taking.

Members of the GI also remember the period of 1986-1989 as a time of "very aggressive repression" and a "turning point" for al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyyah.¹³⁴ During this period, confrontations with the state primarily took the form of clashes with the police. In the summer of 1987 some three thousand Islamists (both GI and Muslim Brotherhood) were arrested (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 466). The regime adopted a two-pronged approach towards GI: on one hand it arrested the members en masse, and on the other hand it attempted to convince the leaders to put

¹³⁴ Anonymous interview, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

an end to violence. The leaders were willing to consider an end to the tensions if three conditions were met: (1) the GI prisoners would be released, (2) the government would lift the ban on propaganda and rescind the order to close down GI mosques, and (3) the state would end torture and hostage taking (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 466). The government refused to meet the GI's conditions, which reinforced the *mistrust* of the government and led to a significant escalation of violence in the 1990s.

By 1989 on one hand, some of the more senior GI members arrested after Sadat's assassination were released from prison, while on the other hand the state tightened its grip, arresting more GI members, closing down mosques, and even killing some of the leaders and kidnapping women.¹³⁵ As a GI member emphasizes, at this point, not only was *da'wa* impossible because of the repression, but the organization was faced with a difficult choice: either respond to repression, or be patient and wait for a change. The fear was that a passive reaction would result in more killings and in the destruction of the group. The logic of escalation then was not just about revenge, mistrust and betrayal, but also a desire to deter the government from further repression. It is not clear, however, why the group assumed that deterrence would work, given the government's repressive capabilities and the historical precedents.

If we seek to understand why a response to this repression was seen as a better choice than patience, it is important to remember not just the founding ideology of the organization, for which the repressive state was illegitimate and un-Islamic, but also the importance of tribal and kinship ties in Upper Egypt, and the cultural emphasis placed on revenging family members. This issue will be discussed in more detail, but for now it is worth emphasizing that even without the particular ideological interpretation that the GI had adopted, revenging the kidnapping of women and of family members and trying to prevent more family members falling victim to the

¹³⁵ Ibid.

repression of the state was a generally accepted, perhaps even expected, response within the context of Upper Egypt. Thus, in 1990 the decision was made to begin confronting the state.¹³⁶

The 1990s marked a significant shift in the violent escalation of GI tactics, as the group gradually moved from targeting the Interior Minister to targeting secular writers to ultimately resorting to attacks on tourists. The period between 1990 and 1997, however, was marked by a tit-for-tat cycle of repression and aggression. After the spokesman of al-Gama'a was killed in August 1990, the organization tried to assassinate the Interior Minister, but killed the Speaker of the People's Assembly instead.

In 1992, GI killed secular writer Farag Foda in June, and GI members engaged in vigilante activities against hair salons and video stores and in clashes with Christians. In December 1992, the government declared war on the GI and embarked on a brutal and intensive raid of the Imbaba district in Cairo, one of the most impoverished neighborhoods that was considered a GI stronghold. As Abdo describes this five-week raid, "security forces raided homes and shattered shop windows, dragging residents from their houses and turning the streets into a sea of broken glass," and "used women and children as human shields against the surging mob" (Abdo 2002, 20). Fourteen thousand soldiers were deployed (23), and everyone with a beard was a suspect and temporarily detained for interrogation (Abdo 2002, 20). Toth suggests that "from among the large number of those detained, a significant but unknown proportion crossed the line from non-violence to militancy to enlist in the growing ranks of those who once had just performed good deeds and pious acts, but who were now provoked to engage in militancy and violence" (Toth 2003, 562).

Over the subsequent years, the government continued its pursuit of Islamist militants, eventually completely immobilizing the GI. The repression was particularly acute in Upper

¹³⁶ Ibid.

Egypt, which was the stronghold of the GI. In Mallawi, for example, a district town in Minya province, the government not only closed down the charity branch of the GI, but it also arrested members of the association and stormed the house of the leader and shot him. The response was a “small civil war” between the GI and the local police, and throughout 1994 and 1995 Mallawi remained “under strict martial law and a harsh twelve-hour curfew,” whereas bearded men and women wearing the *niqab* (full-face veil) were “routinely arrested, questioned, perhaps tortured, humiliated, jailed and released” (Toth 2003, 561). The tit-for-tat violence continued until 1997.

In examining the effects of repression on the strategic outlook of the GI, it is evident that once the state began the forceful repression of the organization, not only did more individuals turn towards violence, but the organization as a whole escalated its tactics. Initially these tactics manifested themselves in local wars with the police stations in Upper Egypt, but the organization also eventually expanded its targets and escalated the scope and nature of its violence, first through targeting political figures and later by attempting to weaken it through targeting tourists. As this section has suggested, however, lower-level clashes with opponents or vigilante activities and sectarian clashes cannot be attributed to state repression.

If we examine the timing of GI’s formation and of its escalation of tactics, it doesn’t only correspond with periods of repression and growing clashes with the state, but also with periods of crises in regime legitimacy. Indeed, during the period when GI first formed, the regime was contested on many fronts, and the state didn’t only clamp down against Islamists but it also cracked down on Copts and political opposition figures. How these broader issues of public support and state legitimacy affected the strategic outlook of the GI is examined next.

State Legitimacy, Public Norms and the Effectiveness of Alternative Tactics

Some scholars suggest that Egypt's 1967 defeat was one of the factors that led to a growing appeal of the Islamic cause in the 1970s (Ibrahim 1996, 36). By the end of the 1970s the disillusionment with both domestic and foreign policies led to the growing appeal of the Islamic cause and to the growth of the Islamic student movement from which GI emerged. The 1970s plunged Egypt into a debt crisis and economic hardships, and public dissatisfaction with the failure of the economic policies and rising food prices boiled over in the 1977 food riots, which some refer to as the "bread revolution" and compare in intensity and scope with the January 25, 2011 revolution.¹³⁷ On top of its domestic problems, Sadat's travel to Israel at the end of the same year further deteriorated the legitimacy of the regime.

As Ibrahim points out, between 1971 and 1981 there were sixteen demonstrations, thirteen strikes and six riots, with most of the unrest occurring after 1974 (Ibrahim 1996, 72–73). The riots of 1977 were by far the most intense outpour of public outrage during this period, spreading from Alexandria to Qena, and resulting in looting, burning of cars, trains and police stations, and open-fire clashes with the police and the army.¹³⁸ This turbulent period is in some sense reminiscent of the turmoil in the 1930s and 1940s, except the anger during the 1970s was no longer aimed at external enemies, but rather at the domestic regime, and in this context it was no longer a normal state of affairs for political groups to have armed youth wings.

In 1986 the regime once again faced a crisis when it tried to increase army service and the central security forces rioted all over the country and the army had to restore order. Some suggest that about 2,000 security officers and several hundred civilians arrested (Al-Awadi 2004,

¹³⁷ Anonymous interview, July 2nd, 2012, Cairo.

¹³⁸ See the *Egyptian Gazette*, January 20 and 21, 1977.

86), whereas others say that army forces responded brutally and killed 25,000 people in one night.¹³⁹

Given GI's ideological emphasis on popular revolution, it is perhaps no coincidence that both the emergence of the organization and the second period of violent escalation in the mid to late 1980s occurred after distinct moments of legitimacy crisis. In part, the young Islamists of the GI participated in the popular protests and manifestations of dissatisfaction and were therefore caught in the crackdowns, but on the other hand the legitimacy crises of the regime reinforced the organization's belief in the feasibility of a popular revolution both in 1981 and again in late 1980s.

The fact that the regime was facing a legitimacy crisis still doesn't explain however, why al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah opted for a violent overthrow, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood, who was also highly critical of the regime at the time and who believed in a bottom-up establishment of an Islamic state, opted for non-violent resistance and opposition. As has already been suggested, at least part of the answer lies in the fact that the gama'a students began to be increasingly targeted by the regime, whereas the Brotherhood was largely spared the repression of the younger Islamists. On the other hand, however, the geographic split that emerged between the Brotherhood and the GI can in fact be understood as an issue of state legitimacy and authority more broadly. Norms of resistance and sensitivity towards violent tactics vary not just over time but also across space, and it is no coincidence that the GI was formed by *Sa'idi* students, and that the organization has always been stronger in Upper Egypt.

The split that emerged between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah had a distinct geographical distribution. In Cairo and North Egypt, the young members of the Islamic society had a lot of conversations with Umar al-Tilmisani and other Muslim Brotherhood

¹³⁹ Anonymous interview, July 2nd, 2012, Cairo.

leaders, who convinced them to adopt al-Banna's gradualist model and centrist understanding of Islam. Young Islamists like Abu al-Fotouh, Essam el-Eryan and Ibrahim Zafrani joined the Muslim Brotherhood, bringing new energy to the organization and coming to define the new generation of Muslim Brothers. In Upper Egypt, on the other hand, the gama'a members refused to join the Brotherhood and were convinced that al-Banna's ideology of gradual change was tried already and ended up in a miserable failure. These groups adopted Qutb's notion of the vanguard that needs to isolate itself from the un-Islamic society, and it became al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, which by that point worked together with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad to assassinate Sadat. In Alexandria, on the other hand, the young Islamists didn't join either the Brotherhood or al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, but they opted to focus on questions of doctrine, religious faith and scholarly teaching and formed the backbone of the emerging Salafi movement in Egypt, which after 2011 manifested itself in the Nour party.¹⁴⁰

According to Ansari, before the split of the GI and EIJ, 65.4% of members of the merged organization were from Upper Egypt, 26.1% from Greater Cairo, and only 8.6% from Lower Egypt (Ansari 1984, 131). Breaking it further down by province, Ansari also shows that there was a high concentration in Giza, and within the Greater Cairo area, the concentration of members were in the northern areas, where most rural migrants were concentrated (Ansari 1984, 132).

The argument here is not a strictly cultural one, that would suggest that Sa'idis are somehow more prone to violence, but is rather one about different levels of state authority and state welfare, which in turn affect public loyalties, dependence on safety networks and perceptions of legitimacy. Upper Egypt has always been the periphery that remained outside the control or the main concern of the center. Economically, Upper Egypt always lagged behind, and

¹⁴⁰ Anonymous interview, June 7th, 2012, Cairo.

“state budgets and investments consistently neglected the Sa’id” (Toth 2003, 554).

Administratively, the area also always retained a much stronger autonomy than the rest of Egypt (going back to the time of the Ottoman conquest of Cairo in the sixteenth century),¹⁴¹ which meant that tribes and kinship ties remained much stronger than in the rest of the country (Toth 2003, 553). Tribes are particularly strong in Qena, Sohag, Asyut, Minya and Giza.¹⁴² In Giza many people are originally from Qena and Sohag and live according to the same tribal codes.¹⁴³

On one hand we can understand tribal loyalties and extended family ties as challenging state legitimacy and authority, and on the other hand we can see these ties as being necessary safety networks in an environment where the state systematically failed to provide welfare, security and development. The problem is further exacerbated by a strong culture of vendetta as well as the prevalence of arms. Tribes and families in Upper Egypt have also always had weapons to protect themselves. At least to a certain extent, this is once again related to the issue of lacking state authority and security, but it is also related to the existence and persistence of weapon trade in the region, linking Libya to Upper Egypt and Sinai, all three being heavily armed regions.

From the perspective of the inhabitants who regard the tribal or clan leaders on equal footing as the state, the state does not have monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. As a *Sa’idi* researcher explained, in his home village people regarded all government symbols and agents at the same level as the families: “they have weapons and we have weapons, they have spaces for them and we have a space for us [...] the state doesn’t have any right to force people or punish people without legitimacy and without justice [...] if the state crosses the line with

¹⁴¹ This was also brought up in an interview with an independent researcher, who emphasizes that Upper Egypt has historically had a problem with the upper hand of the state, and the problem is not just between the Islamist groups and the state. July 2, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁴² There are some who suggest that tribes are no longer as prevalent as before, and no longer play a dominant role in society, except perhaps in Qena. From this latter perspective family ties continue to be indeed very important, and class differences are also very salient in Upper Egypt, continuing the cleavages that emerged with the rise of the landed elite before the 1952 land reform. Anonymous interview, February 22, 2013, Syracuse.

¹⁴³ Anonymous interview, July 6th, 2012, Qena.

people from Upper Egypt, we have to punish the state [...] We are not slaves for the state and for this reason the state doesn't have any right to force us to anything.”¹⁴⁴ From this researcher's perspective, the clashes between the local population and the police or other state symbols were reflective of this contested state authority, and were much bigger and more frequent than the clashes between the GI and the police, which received all the media attention and therefore was framed as an issue of religious extremism or terrorism.

Within this context, in which (1) state legitimacy and authority is on equal or even lower footing than tribes and clans, (2) the state does not have monopoly over the use of violence, (3) police often don't even have access into small villages, it is no surprise that clashes between the GI and state authorities would escalate, especially once police officers started punishing GI family members and the population at large. This also explains why young students who grew up socialized in such an environment could be drawn to the GI, and question state authority and legitimacy once they moved to the Greater Cairo area.

This being said, it is also important to recognize that whereas these attitudes might have played a permissive role, many *Sa'idis* also condemned the tactics of the GI. As a political activist from Qena suggested, the GI was indeed very strong in the early 1980s, but it was hated by ordinary people because it was seen as extremist and not following the true Islam.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, as the organization escalated its tactics, the population started having the same image of “the terrorist” then as people have today.¹⁴⁶ Yet in small villages, there were high levels of illiteracy, much stronger tribal or clan ties, and much weaker state authority.

Even though the GI was not supported by the entire population in Upper Egypt, the conditions described provided a fertile environment for both individuals that would be attracted

¹⁴⁴ Anonymous interview, July 2, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁴⁵ Anonymous interview, July 6, 2012, Qena.

¹⁴⁶ Anonymous interview, February 22, 2013, Syracuse, New York.

to the Qutbist vision and GI ideology, and for the organization to develop and spread. Clearly, not everyone from Upper Egypt supported or joined the GI, so these conditions were not in and of themselves enough to lead to individual engagement with violence, nor were they enough to sustain a long-term violent strategic outlook on the part of the GI, who by 1997 began changing its tactics and revising its ideological tenets. But without an understanding of the contested authority and legitimacy of the state, the culture of vendetta, the strong family ties and the prevalence of weapons in Upper Egypt we cannot fully understand an important dimension that set the GI constituency apart from the Muslim Brothers, and that affected organizational dynamics.

Organizational Dynamics

One of the most remarkable patterns that emerges when examining the formation and the evolution of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, is that in addition to the majority of members being from Upper Egypt, 87.5% of the merged EIJ and GI group consisted of members under the age of 30, and only 1.8% was over the age of 40 (Ansari 1984, 133). The fact that the wide majority of GI members were so young is often given as a reason or even excuse for the appeal of violent escalation, both by outsiders and by members of the group. The logic offered is that young people are both more prone to join revolutionary movements and that they lacked an in-depth understanding of Islamic teachings and therefore could more easily accept the radical interpretations presented by the group ideologues.

As already mentioned in the discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood, the proposition here is that what sets young activists apart is not that they are violent prone, but that they are (1) more attracted by revolutionary ideas, (2) highly sensitive to the context and more prone to be reactive, and (3) more focused on immediate change, having a shorter time horizon. Yet the social

background and the political environment of these young activists plays an essential role in determining what kind of activities they will undertake.

The students from Cairo who were part of the *gama*'s groups in the 1970s joined the Muslim Brotherhood and indeed reinvigorated the organization, helping it adopt new tactics, making new inroads into society and indeed bringing about change, but not in the form of a regime change but rather in the form of dominating professional unions, entering the political scene and "Islamicizing" the society. Furthermore, once they joined the Brotherhood, these young members were under the guidance and leadership of the old generation, who remained committed to gradual and non-violent reform. On the other hand, the students from Upper Egypt, who grew up in an environment of contested state authority and legitimacy as well as frequent sectarian clashes, found the Brotherhood's "mainstream" approach too conformist, were more prone to denounce the legitimacy of the state and continue emphasizing on regime overthrow and popular revolution (especially in the wake of the Iranian revolution), were more attracted to Qutb's ideology (who also happened to be from Upper Egypt), and also more easily succumbed to participating in sectarian clashes. The age and social background of the GI constituency, and in particular the interaction of these factors with the issue of repression, can thus offer insights into why the GI was in general prone to violent escalation, and why repression led to a violent spiral.

According to the data provided by Ibrahim, the socioeconomic profiles of Islamic militants changed over time, and became poorer, younger and less educated over time. Table 1 presents the data on the age distribution of Islamic militants. Additionally, Ibrahim also reports that whereas 79 percent of militants in the 1970s were college or postgraduate students, this percentage dropped to 59 percent in the 1980s, and further to 20 percent in the 1990s. Similarly,

while no militants are reported to have been from villages in the 1970s and 55 percent of them were from large cities, in the 1970s the number of villagers raised to 7 percent, and the large city residents dropped to 34 percent, whereas in the 1990s these numbers changed to 18 percent from villages and only 15 percent from large cities.

While this information does not rely only on GI members and is a more general depiction of “Islamic militants,” it does suggest that at least by the 1990s, when the GI was the main Islamist group undertaking violence, and when the tactics were also most highly escalated in the history of the organization, many more activists were younger, poorer, less educated and from more rural backgrounds than in previous decades. Interestingly enough, this also seems to suggest that most of those arrested in the late 1970s and early 1980s could not have been the same ones involved in the militancy in the 1990s (by which time they would have been over 30 years old).

Table 6 – Age distribution of Islamic militants in Egypt, 1970s – 1990s (in percentages)

	1970s	1980s	1990s
Under 20 years old	5	11	23
20-25	28	31	48
25-30	61	53	24
Over 30	6	5	5

Source: Ibrahim 1996, p. 75.

The other thing that makes al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah different than the Muslim Brotherhood, is that it started out as a merger of two groups that had some shared ideological tenets but ultimately a different vision on what tactics to undertake. This meant that before the break-up of the GI and EIJ, there were multiple command lines and leaders competing over authority and over defining the strategic outlook of the organization. Some GI members argue that the GI leaders actually changed their mind about Sadat’s assassination because they didn’t

think that the country was ready for a popular revolution, but it was too late.¹⁴⁷ As was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood, the multiple command structure was more prone to violent escalation and to splits.

In the case of GI and EIJ, the debate after Sadat's assassination, leading to the formal split in 1984, was over leadership, tactics and theological arguments. The debates were over (1) whether to be a highly secretive and narrow group (EIJ) or a semi-public and semi-clandestine organization (GI), (2) whether to focus on both da'wa and clandestine activity (GI) or favor total secrecy (EIJ), and (3) whether Abbud al-Zumur should be the leader (EIJ) or Umar Abd el-Rahman (GI) (Rashwan 2009, 115). Sageman suggests that the factions broke along the lines of the previously established networks, with the Cairo constituency becoming the EIJ under the leadership of Al-Zawahiri, and the Sa'idis becoming the GI, which was ruled by a shura council (Sageman 2004, 34). After the split, the GI no longer made any attempts to violently take over the state, but rather focused on the combined strategy of preaching and low-level military action or vigilante activities for the rest of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In addition to the generational dimension and the contestation over leadership and overall vision, another organizational dynamic that requires attention is the further militarization of the GI after some of its members left for Afghanistan and received military training. This experience fighting an international cause led to the same *slippery slope of militarization* as we have seen occur during the early period of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Even though the GI was primarily focused on *da'wa* and *jihad* in Egypt, the organization sent members to Afghanistan in the mid 1980s.¹⁴⁸ Tal'at Fuad Qasim, for example, a leader of

¹⁴⁷ Anonymous interview, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁴⁸ Hisham Kassem argues that the government encouraged this flight to Afghanistan, and that this trend started already under Sadat and continued under Mubarak, who gave GI the option to either stay in the South or go to Afghanistan, but not come to Cairo. According to Kassem, the idea was to keep the GI out of Cairo "or send them to

the student union in Minya and subsequently of the military side of the GI, escaped from prison and joined the Afghan fighters. In a 1993 interview with Hisham Mubarak, he suggested that the GI had a strong presence in Peshawar and “on the battlefield throughout Afghanistan” in the mid 1980s, and that the main reason why members went to Afghanistan was for military training (Qasim 1997, 320–323). While Palestine directly contributed to the militarization of Muslim Brotherhood elements and the escalation of tactics, and was one of the main reasons for developing a military wing, in the case of the GI the organization was already politicized and committed to violence, but Afghanistan served as an outlet for the militaristic elements, especially in the face of repression.

This external battlefield not only helped maintain and foster this militaristic elements within the organization, but it also created international links and added a new dimension of ideological justification for jihad as a primary tactics. Saad Eddin Ibrahim also suggests that the experience in Afghanistan was visible in the increased technological know-how during the violence that escalated in the early 1990s, when the operations “became more protracted – from hours or days in the 1970s to weeks and months in the 1990s” (74). This militarization and exposure to the international jihadi movement can explain why the GI established an armed wing in 1987, and why by the early 1990s the organization shifted from clashes with the police and attacks on political figure to attacks on civilians and tourists. This shift from assassination to deliberate and intricate attacks on civilians, however, was also ultimately responsible for the decline of the organization, as the next section will reveal. Before exploring the dynamics of de-escalation, however, we summarize the causal arguments that emerge from this process-tracing exercise.


Afghanistan in the hope that they would die there; they never thought that they would come back and train.”
Interview with Hisham Kassem, June 28, 2012, Cairo.

Causal Mechanisms

This overview of the emergence and rise of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah suggests that the violent escalation of the group shared some of the causal mechanisms that we have witnessed in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood: politicization, mistrust and betrayal. For the GI there was also a slippery slope of gradual militarization that was augmented by participating in the fight in Afghanistan. These dynamics of escalation were slightly different from the Muslim Brotherhood, however, because the armed wing was not established to fight external enemies, but rather was the result of an already militarized and politicized constituency with an ideology that justified this trajectory. Once the armed wing was established, however, the tactics escalated, and with the heightened technological know-how from Afghanistan, the attacks shifted from low-scale attacks on political figures to large-scale attacks against civilians.


The analysis of the GI also reveals another important causal mechanism that was evident at the individual level when examining the Muslim Brotherhood, but which became an organizational motive for the GI: revenge. Sadat's assassination had an element of revenge, and the first attempt on the Interior Minister in 1990 was also motivated by revenge, combined with the logic of deterrence. In the face of severe repression, the group responded with violence, both out of revenge and out of desperation and a perceived sense of self-defense, assuming that a violent push-back might deter the state from further violence. Figures 11 and 12 summarize the arguments of this process-tracing analysis and identify the causal mechanisms of escalation.

Figure 11. The Mechanisms of Violent Escalation during the Early Period of the GI-EIJ Merger



Merger GI – EIJ; dual command structure; military training in Upper Egypt

Figure 12. The Mechanisms of Violent Escalation during 1986-1990



Counterfactual Analysis

The killing of the GI spokesman in 1990 was a powerful catalyst for the violent escalation of the organization, which led to the failed attempt on the Interior Minister that killed the Speaker of the People's Assembly instead. In response to this killing, the GI declared that "the man of words is dead; the time of words is over."¹⁴⁹ Given the importance of this event, we can ask a counterfactual question of whether we would have witnessed the same escalation if the spokesman had not been targeted or killed. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the answer to this counterfactual question is that if it weren't for this catalyst, other catalysts would have most likely resulted in the same escalation.

The reason for this is twofold. First, Mubarak's religious policies and the repression of the GI and of Islamists more broadly led GI leaders and followers to a growing sense of betrayal and mistrust of the regime. Second, the organization was already experiencing the slippery slope of militarization through its experience in Afghanistan and the establishment of an armed wing. As seen during the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood, having the organizational capacity and structure to undertake violence reinforces the militaristic tendency within the organization. The experience in Afghanistan added the technical know-how for more large-scale attacks, as well as an additional element of ideological justification for violent tactics.

At the same time, the regime was already on a path of repression, convinced that the best way to deal with the "threat" was to try to crush the GI, while also using it as a justification for broader repressive measures against its political opposition. Given this logic, even if the

¹⁴⁹ Interview with political analyst Hisham Kassem, June 28, 2012, Cairo.

spokesman hadn't been killed, sooner or later the repressive measures would have offered another catalyst for the organization to embark on a violent campaign.¹⁵⁰

The 1997 Nonviolence Initiative of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah

The year 1997 was a critical point in the development of the GI, as it marked the beginning of the turn towards an organizational end to violence. In July 1997 the imprisoned "historical leaders" of the organization proclaimed a non-violent declaration (Al-Sayyid 2003, 16). Some suggest that in 1997 this initiative was not much more than a small piece of paper with a couple of lines declaring that the organization would not conduct any attacks against anyone in the coming years.¹⁵¹

The initiative of the leaders did not have an immediate effect. In September the organization staged an attack against German tourists outside of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo, and in the beginning of November GI members also assaulted a police station in the town of Tama in the governorate of Sohag (Meijer 2009, 209). On November 17, 1997, the most devastating attack on tourists occurred in Luxor, but GI leaders claimed that the organization was not responsible for the attack (Nassar 2005). In fact, some suggest that this was the response of hard-line GI leader Rifaai Taha¹⁵² to the Nonviolence Initiative (Dawoud 2001).

Over the next couple of years the organization underwent internal debates over this issue, and by April 1999 the group called for a halt to all attacks against the government (Dawoud 2001). After 2001, the leaders that initiated the non-violent proclamation, working with Al-

¹⁵⁰ Of course, one can pose the counterfactual question of what would have happened if the regime had not repressed Islamists at all, but if it instead would have met the conditions of the GI for stopping violence. That's a much more difficult counterfactual to assess, since it requires a much more complicated re-writing of history than a single assassination, because it calls for assuming that the regime and the police were operating under a completely different logic, and made different assumptions about what motivated and what could control the Islamists.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Habiba Mohasen, researcher at the Arab Forum for Alternatives, July 3, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁵² Taha was one of the most outspoken opponents to the ideological revisions and was subsequently expelled from the GI shura council. In 1998 he became affiliated with Al Qaeda when he signed the jihad declaration against the United States and Israel. See Dawoud 2001.

Azhar sheikhs, produced an impressive set of ideological revisions that were published and widely distributed starting with 2002.

The next sections provide a brief overview of these ideological revisions and seek to offer a coherent story about why this change in strategic outlook came about. Before understanding why the revisions came about, it is first necessary to clarify what Nonviolent Initiative is and is not. As the discussion of the ideological changes will reveal, the changes are dramatic and of utmost importance regarding the adoption of violence as part of an organization's strategic outlook. Yet terms like "de-radicalized" can be just as problematic as using the label of "radicalized," and it is more appropriate to talk instead of an organizational disengagement from violence and de-escalation of tactics. While in the current context the organization does not endorse the use of violence, it is important not to mistake the revisions for a pacifist manifesto or a permanent and fundamental de-legitimation of all violence as a tactic more generally. While most experts agree that it is highly unlikely that the GI will resort to violence, they also suggest that such decisions are highly dependent on the context.¹⁵³ When asked if in the case of an authoritarian reversal the organization will ever consider violence again, a GI leader suggested that if democracy fails they will return to *shari'a* laws and examine what options can produce the most good and the least harm, and will try to invoke the creativity that was seen in Tahrir.¹⁵⁴ Thus, *the issue is about the effectiveness of a tactic, and violent or nonviolent tactics do not have any inherent values outside of the context and independent of their consequences.*

The Ideological Revisions

By the end of 2008 the historical leaders of the GI published twenty-six books and booklets outlining their new ideological tenets, and offering what some suggest is "a coherent

¹⁵³ Interview with Habiba Mohasen, researcher at the Arab Forum for Alternatives, July 3, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁵⁴ Anonymous Interview, July 4, 2012.

intellectual and theological position” (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 471). Rather than reviewing these books separately, this section will outline some of the major changes on issues that directly affect strategic outlook.

The revisions were not focused on offering a new interpretation of society or a new vision for an Islamic state; they were mainly focused on the issue of violence as a tactic. The revisions were only about Islamic jurisprudence, and as Rashwan points out, the new statements replaced the jurisprudence of jihad with the *jurisprudence of utility versus injury*, where avoiding injury always takes precedence over ensuring the general welfare (Rashwan 2009, 126–127). The organization reconsidered its actions and came to the conclusion that it did not achieve the benefit that they desired but rather increased the harm both to the organization and to individual Muslims, society and the state (Rashwan 2009).

The principle of avoiding harm and examining the utility of a mean is an important doctrine in Islam. For example, as Kamali points out, the doctrine of *sadd al-dhara'i* (blocking the means) regards the values of the means in relationship to the end, and certain forms of conduct are prohibited or legalized based on the benefit or harm that they lead to (Kamali 1997, 270). Thus, if the means “violate the basic purpose of *shari'a*, then they must be blocked” (270). Similarly, according “to the general principle that ‘preventing an evil takes priority over securing a benefit’” then “if the evil is either equal to or greater than the benefit, the former will prevail over the latter” (271). Furthermore, “the question of the intention of the perpetrator is, as such, not relevant to the objective determination of the value of the means. It is rather the expected result which determines the value of the means. If the result is expected to be good and praiseworthy, so will be means towards it, and if is expected to be blameworthy the same will apply to the means regardless of the intention of the perpetrator, or the actual realization of the

result itself” (Kamali 1997, 270). Kamali also links this principle to the fact that the Prophet forbade killing hypocrites and traitors during battles, for fear that it would give rise to rumors that he killed his own Companions and it would provide the enemy with an excuse to undermine the unity of the Muslim community (271).¹⁵⁵

The revisions of GI regarding the concept of *jihad* were based on the principle that “shedding blood in the name of Islam is prohibited unless violent jihad will help protect and strengthen Islam and the *umma* beyond a shadow of a doubt and at minimal cost” (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 6). Thus, Karam Zohdi and Ossama Hafez clarified that *jihad* is only justified for the stopping and prevention of external violence and for repelling external aggression, but strictly prohibited if it leads to infighting among Muslims. Saftwat Abdel Ghani suggested that “the fighting which occurred split of the *umma* (the Islamic nation) and harmed the interests of society and did not realize the benefit for the people. Consequently it became an action without meaning and legally forbidden since it lead to greater detriment” (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 473).

In the first book that was published, Osama Ibrahim Hafez and Assem Abdel-Maged Mohammed suggest that violence is prohibited if: (1) it is unlikely to attain its goals, or if it becomes an obstacle to peaceful preaching of Islam, (2) those who undertake it are incapable of doing it successfully, (3) it is harmful to *umma*, (4) it is against monotheists who are willing to live peacefully with Muslims, or against those who have not been exposed to Islam, (5) if the harm it causes is greater than the benefits for the *umma* or if peace is established (Al-Sayyid 2003, 16–17). As Meijer points out, “following the classic scholar Muhammad al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), the historic leadership holds the view that the common good is represented by protecting religion (*din*), the soul (*nafs*), reason (‘*aql*), offspring (*nasl*) and property (*mal*). Everything that

¹⁵⁵ It is important to note that, as Kamali points out, the *ulama* is in disagreement over the validity of the principle of *sadd al-dhara’i*, even though there is agreement that means that definitely lead to an evil are prohibited (Kamali 1997, 272).

endangers these five principles runs contrary to the general good (maslaha)” (Meijer 2009, 212).

The new understanding of *jihad* emphasizes the fact that it is only a means to an end, and the ultimate goal should be *da'wa* and the guidance of mankind. GI sees the problem as being one that the Islamic youth “did not take into account an important truth, that through their actions injustice and oppression increased, the number of arrests grew in number, *da'wa* was forbidden, families were threatened, corruption (mafasiid) became more widespread, while the common good (masalih) was further impaired, and the Jews could take advantage of this opportunity to sow dissension” (Meijer 2009, 212). Furthermore, the killing of civilians is also forbidden, even for the purpose of punishing the state. Regarding the state, the new statements also recognize that “if a ruler does not reject the rule of law they can still be considered a Muslim ruler and therefore it is not permissible to revolt against them” (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 472).

This issue relates to the questions of *takfir* (declaring someone as infidel) and *hisba* (promotion of good and forbidding of evil). Even though *hisba* is usually seen as one of the “collective obligations of the community” (Kamali 1997, 281), in the revisions the argument is that *hisba* is not for individual people but rather society established authorities that are charged with this task (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 473). If an individual finds a reprehensible act, the response should be to call the authorities to end the crime (ibid.). The concept of *hisba* is “redefined along nonviolent lines as the duty to call for good and ban evil, to rectify wrongdoings through peaceful methods such as *da'wa* (proselytizing efforts), counseling and advice and in rare circumstances reminding Muslims of God’s punishment” (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 8). Here once again it is important to evaluate the costs and the benefits, and an “individual must be undoubtedly able to uphold Islamic precepts without bringing harm to

himself or his family and without risking a spike in fear, agitation, or further violence within the Muslim community” (ibid.).

Regarding the issue of disbelief, *takfir* is prohibited because it leads to discord in the Muslim community, disrupts social peace between Muslims and non-Muslim civilians and “closes the door to constructive compromise between different groups in society” (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 7). Nageh Ibrahim and Ali Al-Sheri suggested that *takfir* is “based on excessively strict interpretation of Islamic teaching, stemming from a lack of understanding of the true nature of the religion, obsession with marginal issues, and the influence of teachers who are not competent scholars of Islam (Al-Sayyid 2003). Furthermore, a person’s faith is a private matter known only to God that cannot be determined by outward behavior, and individual Muslims do not have the authority to condemn others as unbelievers (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 7). Not only that, but people considered unbelievers should also be given the opportunity to understand the teaching of Islam and return to faith first (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 7).

Hamzawy and Grebowski suggest that the revisions indirectly recognize the legitimacy of the state by conceding governance to it, and they acknowledge the state as an institution well-equipped to defend Islam, implement *shari’a* where political will exists and protect the interests of Muslims and non-Muslims (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 9). The objectives are amended to include compliance with the state, nonviolent assistance to the state and nonviolent opposition to laws and positions that contradict Islam (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 10). Nageh Ibrahim, for instance, has suggested that certain decisions, like declaring war, holding peace and making peace with Muslims or non-Muslims, applying penalties and imposing tribute, are restricted to the ruler (Ismail 2006). Others, however, suggest that the revisions are not about recognizing the state or about the need to obey the ruler (the latter being an important precept in the Wahhabi

interpretation that has influenced the development of the Salafi movement in Egypt as well), but that the revisions are about the recognition that the GI lost the war with the state, which means that they have to play by the rules of the state and they have to accept the position that the state gives them.¹⁵⁶

A GI member did indeed suggest that the revisions were only about Islamic jurisprudence, and not about the legitimate enforcer of the law.¹⁵⁷ Yet, this makes the new position on political participation somewhat more puzzling (an issue that is fully addressed in chapter five). The new statements continue to denounce secular ideologies, but recognize these forces as a permanent part of Egyptian society (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 12), and consider political participation as an acceptable way to achieve key Islamic objectives such as implementing *shari'a* laws and Islamicizing society (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 11). This issue did not really come into play until after the 2011 protests in Egypt, when the establishment of the Building and Development Party was seen as one of the mechanisms and tools for promoting the group vision and goals.¹⁵⁸

In examining the ideological revisions of the GI, some scholars suggest that we cannot dismiss the possibility that the de-escalation of violence was ultimately caused by a more sophisticated understanding of Islam. Rashwan, for example, argues that “it does not seem implausible that a rudimentary understanding of Islam is what led the leaders of both Gama’*a* Islamiyyah and Islamic Jihad to tout an extremist interpretation of the Islamic faith,” in particular as the early writings of GI included references only to the most hard-line schools and did not consider more nuanced schools of Islamic teaching, whereas in the revisions the leaders

¹⁵⁶ Anonymous interview, July 2, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁵⁷ Anonymous interview, July 4, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

“retreated from their hard-line stances, openly admitting their mistakes and criticizing all that they had perpetrated under a false understanding of Islam” (Rashwan, 47).

Learning and acquiring a more nuanced understanding of Islam cannot be dismissed as an important mechanism behind the de-escalation of violence, yet without examining the political, social and organizational context in which the revisions occurred we cannot explain the timing of the Nonviolence Declaration and why learning did not occur earlier. Al-Azhar sheikhs (and at times Muslim Brothers) had issued denouncement of violence and challenged the GI ideology since the early 1980s, so the argument cannot be that GI leaders and members did not have accessed to the alternative interpretations or to certain knowledge. These alternative interpretations only became appealing or rang true at a particular point in time. The argument here is that learning did indeed occur and was an important mechanism, but it was induced by the context.

The government had been attempting to negotiate with the GI an end to violence since the mid 1980s, but none of the attempts were successful. Between 1983 and 1987 attempts at negotiation with the police resulted in relative calm, but not in a definitive organizational decision to end violence (Al-Sayyid 2003, 14). Between 1988 and 1994 Al-Azhar sheikhs became involved and undertook several attempts to convince GI leaders that violence against state and society is not sanctioned by Islam (Ashour 2010, 144). Perhaps the most concerted effort to engage Al Azhar came in 1993, when three prominent Islamist scholars tried to mediate between Gama’a and the government: Sheikh Mewally al-Sha’rawi, Sheikh Mohammed Al-Ghazali (who was close to the Muslim Brotherhood), and Sheikh Abdel-Mon’eim al-Nimr (Al-Sayyid 2003, 15). While the government brought in theological expertise, it refused to release GI members that had not been involved in violence or to allow the group to engage in preaching, so

the negotiations failed (Al-Sayyid 2003, 15). The combination of factors that eventually led to the renouncement of violence is explored in the next sections, by examining policy convergence, government policies, public attitudes and organizational dynamics.

Policy Convergence and the Logic of Violent or Non-Violent Opposition

While low policy convergence can provide a fertile ground and interact with other factors such as repression to contribute to an escalation of tactics, the de-escalation of tactics does not seem to have a relationship to policy convergence. If policy convergence were to affect de-escalation, then we would expect both the period leading up to the 1997 decision and the subsequent period leading up to the organizational acceptance of tactical de-escalation and the development of revisions to correspond to much higher policy convergence. Yet the Mubarak policies in the late 1990s and early 2000s were not coming any closer to the Islamist vision, neither in domestic religious affairs nor in foreign affairs.

Mubarak continued to embark on a foreign policy that was much more conciliatory to the United States and Israel than most Islamists would have preferred. While Egypt became increasingly outspoken in its criticism of Israel, it also retained its peace treaty with Israel, continued to pursue Israeli-Palestinian mediation efforts and kept direct and indirect communication channels with Israel open (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 325).

In domestic affairs, the regime not only did not try to appease Islamists, but in the name of fighting terrorism it also took active steps to contain the political, social and religious influence of all Islamists, be it the Muslim Brotherhood or the GI. The Mosque Act of 1996, for example, which was supported by senior ulama at Al-Azhar, required special licenses to preach or supply religious services in a mosque, and violators not only had to pay a fee but were also subjected to imprisonment for a month (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 304).

The new grand mufti of Egypt (Sheikh Nasir Farid Al-Wasil), which was appointed in 1996, was also considered a moderate in many ways, and in January 1997, for example, he issued a fatwa that the *niqab* (veil that covers the face) was not a Muslim custom (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 311). By 1996, the Supreme Constitutional Court also was proving to develop what some scholars deem to be “a liberal, rights-protecting interpretation of shari’a” (Brown and Lombardi 2005, 438), by ruling against the plaintiff whose girls were forbidden from entering the secondary school wearing a niqab, and more generally arguing for the exercise of *ijtihad* in matters that have no clear guidelines in the Qur’an.

This is not to say that there were no conciliatory gestures towards Islamic pressures. Between 1995 and 1996, Islamists brought 18 legal suits against intellectuals for blasphemy, seven books and one movie were banned, and a court injunction ordered Nasir Abu Zayid to divorce his wife on the grounds of his infidelity to Islam (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 311). In 1997, however, when another professor at Cairo University, Hassan Hanafi, was also accused of apostasy by Al Azhar ulama and conservative Islamists, “a round-the-clock police guard was posted outside his home” after three armed men tried to attack him (Murphy 2002, 225).

Overall, while society was becoming increasingly conservative and blasphemy accusations were salient during the mid and late 1990s, the regime did not increase its convergence with Islamists in its domestic or foreign policies during the mid 1990s or early 2000s. What this suggests is that policy convergence did not play a significant role in the decision to renounce violence.

Availability of Tactics: Repression and Inclusion

For both the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah, repression contributed to the escalation of tactics, in particular when it interacted with other organizational and societal

factors. In examining the revisions of the GI, scholars have suggested that repression was also an important factor that led to the decisions of the leaders to renounce violence.

In one of the first comprehensive studies of de-radicalization, Ashour argues that “intense and sustained repression was one of the factors that led the leadership [of armed organizations] to rethink the costs of violent confrontations as well as the theological legitimacy behind it” (Ashour 2009, 139). Rashwan also suggests that “between arrests, deaths in armed clashes, stiff sentences that included dozens of executions, and severe treatment in prisons and detention facilities, the ranks of the leadership and general membership were decimated,” which led the GI to reconsider “its acts and concepts”(Rashwan 2009, 124). Political analyst Hisham Kassem argues that the crackdown was so brutal that by 1995 the GI was broken, and by 2000 the thinking was that they were all going to die in prison.¹⁵⁹

Some go as far as suggesting that the revisions were a form of defeat and not ideological reassessment, as they came after a decisive military defeat that made the GI realize that armed confrontation is futile and that the revision process “was literally a matter of life and death”: more than 15,000 of its rank and file were in prison, some 2,000 members had died and 100 faced execution (Tammam 2010). The repression affected not just the rank and file, but many leaders were killed, imprisoned or had to flee abroad, where they had no impact over events in Egypt (Al-Sayyid 2003, 21).

The two years prior to the 1997 Nonviolence Declaration were marked by heightened repression not just against the GI but against all Islamists and against political opposition more broadly. The repression became more indiscriminate and widespread, and the regime used the GI and the threat of terrorism as an excuse to clamp down on its political competition and on the non-violent Muslim Brothers, who were making inroads into politics and were dominating

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Hisham Kassem, June 28, 2012, Cairo.

professional syndicates. According to Hisham Kassem, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights had evidence that seventy-five percent of the Islamists in prison were actually not involved with the GI.¹⁶⁰

In 1995 the regime made an explicit connection between the Brotherhood and the GI, claiming that the latter was the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (El Sharif 2011). In May, the police entered syndicates, which were dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, confiscated files, arrested dozens of islamists, froze their bank accounts, closed social clubs and banned meetings among Brotherhood members (Abdo 2002, 79).

In November, a week before the elections the government tried fifty-four Brothers to three to five years of hard labor, after which troops burst into the Brotherhood headquarters, seized files, expelled staff and shut down their magazine (Abdo 2002, 78). Some suggest that the 1995 crackdown, which targeted in particular the younger dynamic leadership that was becoming prominent in professional syndicates and NGOs, was the most extensive repression against the Brotherhood since 1965 (Campagna 1996, 279). As Al-Awadi notes, the 1995 elections saw some of the most coercive interference from the regime, and “apart from the hundreds who were harassed by the police and the security forces, at least 51 people were killed during the two days of the voting, 28 of them by police fire, and as many as 878 were injured” (Al-Awadi 2004, 171).

The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights also reports an alarming rise in the number of forced disappearances from five in 1992 to thirteen in 1996 and nine in 1997 (Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 2005). What stands out from the documentation of these disappearances is not just the rise in number, but also the fact that starting with 1994 most if not all of these disappearances occurred in Upper Egypt – primarily Minya, Sohag and Assiut. The

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Hisham Kassem, June 28, 2012, Cairo.

same organization also reports that prisons have become “a field of cruelty, torture and inhumane treatment,” where detainees undergo torture and mistreatment, receive inadequate healthcare, are often deprived of the right of education and of visits and contacts with the outside world (Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 2005).

This indiscriminate repression meant that the violence used by the GI suddenly had a *very high audience cost*, and was not just damaging the group but the population at large. On one hand, for the organization it became very clear that their actions were hurting the Muslim community of believers much more than they were helping bring about a popular revolution. On the other hand, for the population at large this led to *a growing condemnation of the GI*, as the next section will reveal in more detail. With the targeting of the Muslim Brotherhood, this fatigue expanded beyond Upper Egypt, where the population at large was beginning to pay a heavy price for the GI activities.

Perhaps it is no coincidence then that the 1997 Nonviolence Initiative was revealed in the middle of a military court trial. On July 5, 1997, one of the GI defendants read a statement signed by six jailed GI leaders (including Abbud al-Zumur), which called for an unconditional truce with the government (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 305). The initial decisions by the leaders to renounce violence, even if the state made no concessions, came in a context in which the organization was severely weakened, in which it became clear that the initial vision and goals of the organization were unachievable, and in which the regime was using the GI violence as an excuse to repress the population at large. As a GI leader suggests, by 1997 it became painfully obvious that GI’s strategy was failing. If we think of Islamists as being both principled and strategic, then in light of the importance given from the very beginning to da’wa and to serving the Muslim community and not just establishing an Islamic state, as the larger community was

both suffering and increasingly turning against the GI, the leaders realized that the state could not be defeated and their initial justification for violence was ineffective.

While these political circumstances made it clear that GI's vision of popular revolution was unachievable and that violence was counter-productive, it is also possible that the increased presence of Muslim Brothers in prison also accelerated the learning process and contributed to the decision of the GI leaders to renounce violence. Some suggest, for example, that Khayrat El-Shater played such a role, and that during "his earlier imprisonment in 1995, he went into extensive dialogue with prisoners belonging to radical and jihadist groups," and "succeeded in convincing a large number of their leaders to renounce violence, and adopt more moderate paths of reform" (El Houdaiby 2012).

If the repression leading up to the 1997 truce was harsh, immediately after the Luxor attack in late 1997, the government embarked on an all out war against the GI, which took a particularly high toll on the population of Upper Egypt. As some recall, after Luxor the police set fire to entire fields of sugar cane in Upper Egypt in the search for GI members, and the government's number one objective was to capture and kill as many GI members as possible.¹⁶¹

However, immediately after Luxor, the interior minister also resigned, because many Egyptians blamed the government both for failing to address the economic and social needs of the youth and for ignoring pleas from GI in the summer of 1997 to negotiate a ceasefire (Abdo 2002, 194). Thus, in the subsequent years, the regime began easing its repression and started offering GI what Ashour calls "selective inducements."

After 1998, the violence against GI members stopped, prison meals were improved, between 1999 and 2000 the GI members were gradually allowed prison visits, and by December 2001 the regime even began coordinating with GI leaders (Ashour 2010, 156). Officials began

¹⁶¹ Anonymous interview, February 22nd, 2013, Syracuse, NY.

releasing detainees held without charge and they vowed to reconsider their policy that was centered on police repression (Abdo 2002, 194).

The historical leaders were allowed to tour the prisons and talk about the revisions, and after 2001 the regime strongly encouraged the cooperation with Al-Azhar sheikhs and the publication of the revisions.¹⁶² Some suggest that allowing the organization to maintain its organizational structure in the prison gave the leadership broad authority over the members and enabled to implementation of the truce and its acceptance by all members (Rashwan 2009, 129). However, other suggest that seeing some members released but not others, and some leaders privileged by the regime, sowed a great deal of suspicion and disillusionment with the cause, and also contributed to many members giving up on their vision and just wanting to be released and return to a normal life.¹⁶³

The broad-based repression that the regime embarked on magnified and accelerated the disillusionment of the GI leaders and convinced them of the fact that violence was ineffective in the particular context at the time. The subsequent lessening of indiscriminate repression offered members incentives to accept the truce, regardless of whether some were ideologically convinced by the leaders or whether they were disillusioned with the cause and just wanted to return to a normal life.

Effectiveness of Alternative Tactics: Legitimacy and Norms of Resistance

While the period right before the Nonviolence Declaration was marked by high levels of repression and democratic deficit, the ideas of violent jihad, Islamic revolution or even the Marxist resistance that spread throughout the 1960s and 1970s were no longer salient or

¹⁶² Habiba Mohasen suggests that this was mainly a response to 9/11 and the American pressure to fight terrorism internationally. Egypt wanted to prove to the US that it is committed to fighting terrorism, and that it can do so successfully on its own, without needing American interference and involvement. Interview with Habiba Mohasen, July 3, 2012, Cairo.

¹⁶³ Anonymous interview, February 23rd, 2013 (skype interview).

appealing.¹⁶⁴ On one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood showed that non-violent tactics that focused on social and political mobilization were much more effective at Islamicizing society than violent tactics. On the other hand, the regime was challenged by the population on the basis of its economic, social and political policies, and even in Upper Egypt the Islamic cause lost its appeal. All these developments were essentials in influencing the perception that the GI was fighting a lost cause and that violence was no longer effective.

The regime closing down on the Muslim Brotherhood in 1995 and then again in 1997 might have suggested that attempts to contest elections at the national level were not very effective, and that it would be virtually impossible to bring about an Islamic state through political participation, given the undemocratic nature of the system. However, in spite of its failure to gain votes in the national elections, by 1997 the Muslim Brotherhood became a major political and social force in Egypt, making impressive inroads in society and dominating professional associations. Along with the ulama, the Muslim Brotherhood “played a key role in defining what was permitted and prohibited in cultural discourse” (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 303), and whereas the “Islamist campaign for the implementation of Shari’a had long ceased to be a legal demand per se” it nonetheless “had become a code defining the essence of cultural discourse” (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 311).

In light of the founding vision of the GI of establishing an Islamic state, the bottom-up, non-violent approach of the Brotherhood proved to be much more effective, whereas violence was imposing a growingly harsh cost on both the organization and the population at large. As the regime used the GI threat as an excuse to clamp down on the Brotherhood, young Brothers also

¹⁶⁴ As another scholar commented, by the 1990s domestic *jihad* just wasn’t trendy anymore, and if you were going to be a *jihadist*, you were going to Afghanistan to join the international *jihad*. Anonymous interview, June 7, 2012, Cairo.

became increasingly critical of the “forgiving attitude” of their organization towards more militant Islamists (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 143).

The Nonviolent Declaration was issued during a period when the regime did not gain any legitimacy in the eyes of the public, but the state itself was also not facing the types of legitimacy crises it had previously experienced. Whereas the Mubarak regime was challenged on many levels, the Islamic cause was perhaps least salient, and the perceived legitimacy of the GI among the Egyptians dropped significantly. Instead, Egyptians were much more concerned about economic and political reform. Even in Upper Egypt, where tensions escalated in June and October 1997, the cause of discontent was economic. The mass demonstrations in June 1997 were against the Agricultural Rent Liberalization Law of 1997 that was planned for implementation in October 1997, and they led to arrests of peasants and closures on several villages. The rage of some of the local population did not target the police or symbols of the state security this time, but rather the local Ministry of Agriculture offices, and the arrests and casualties affected mainly the agricultural workers (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 322). But even in the midst of these escalating tensions, the peasants ultimately attempted to find a legal solution to their cause, submitting a legal suit against the law, even though this move was unsuccessful (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 322).

That is not to deny that sectarian clashes persisted throughout the early 1990s, and in fact attacks on Copts reached a peak of 415 in 1995 (Minorities at Risk Project 2004). However, not only did these sectarian clashes decrease by 1997, but the community also became increasingly outspoken against violence. When ten Coptic youths were killed in an attack in February 1997, all Muslim and Christian community leaders condemned these attacks, and Brotherhood leader Mustafa Mashhur “denounced any injury to innocent persons as inconsistent with the injunctions

of Islam, which sanctified all human life, praising the traditionally good relations between his movement and the Copts” (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 305).

The GI never represented a large segment of the population, but as it was escalating violence, and in particular after the Luxor attack of 1997, public attitudes turned decisively against it. This *public condemnation* was crucial because it revealed how disconnected and alienated the organization was from the real Muslim community that it was claiming to represent, and because the high audience cost made it painfully clear that violence was not effective in reaching its goals. Some suggest that “it is little wonder that the first announcement of the initiative came from the leader of al-Jama’ a al-Islamiyya military organization in Aswan, one of two cities that suffered the most from the crisis in tourism” (Al-Sayyid 2003, 21). But the Luxor attack was decisive not just for the Egyptian population, but also on the international scene.

Luxor raised international attention to the fact that Egypt was facing a problem of violence, and it also put pressure on GI leaders living in Europe to denounce violence if they did not want to be perceived as terrorists. Furthermore, Hizbullah, Hamas and the Sudanese government all condemned the attack (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 144), which emphasized the extent to which this form of jihad was becoming unpopular and unacceptable both in Egypt and abroad. By 2000, the dream of an Islamic revolution lost its appeal, even in Iran the new president was a reformist, and the trauma of the Algerian civil war was fresh in everyone’s memory (Maddy-Weitzman 1999, 142).

Yet between the initial call for a truce in July 1997 and the more official renunciation of violence in 1999 the organization was split over this shift in strategic outlook. These organizational dynamics are explored next.

Organizational Dynamics

The Nonviolent Initiative caused debate within the ranks of the GI and splits over the use of violent tactics. Rifa'i Taha, a senior GI leader that escaped Egypt in 1988 and joined the Afghan fighters (Halawi 1999), was one of the most outspoken opponents of the Nonviolence Initiative. Some suggest this was primarily because he believed a truce should be conditional on the release of GI members and an ease on the pursuit of those hiding in the mountains of Upper Egypt (Dawoud 2001). According to *Al Ahram Weekly*, “the devastating Luxor massacre was widely seen as Taha’s defiant response to the cease-fire call” (Dawoud 2001). In 1998, Taha signed the jihad declaration against the U.S. and Israel, thus signaling the shift towards a global struggle that went far beyond the initial vision of the GI. This move, however, was not accepted by the other GI leaders, and the organization as a whole distanced itself from Al-Qaeda (Dawoud 2001). After the April 1999 truce declared on behalf of the entire organization, Taha resigned, and was replaced by Mustafa Hamza (Dawoud 2001).

We can therefore argue that both the initial Nonviolence Initiative and the truce declared on behalf of the organization in 1999 came *in spite* of divisions and splits in the organization. The divisions among leaders did not cause the move away from violence, but instead caused the Taha faction to initiate more attacks, presumably as an effort to spoil the attempt to settle with the regime. But it is significant that the most vocal opponents of the de-escalation of tactics lived and operated from Afghanistan.

The presence of an external frontline on one hand enabled some of the members to (1) escape repression, (2) maintain a military wing and develop their military training, (3) foster and develop a violence-oriented ideology inspired by other “global jihadists” and (4) remain detached from the costs of violence on the Egyptian society, all of which proved to be significant


obstacles to the de-escalation of violence. On the other hand, however, the availability of this external front was also an exit option for the most militaristic members of an organization, which in turn enabled the leaders in Egypt committed to a de-escalation of tactics to implement the truce at the organizational level. Thus, ***on one hand the splintering caused an immediate spike in violence as a societal outcome, but it also enabled the de-escalation of violence at the organizational level.*** However, as the Egyptian society was decisively against violence and became clearly more concerned about economic and political issues, and as the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan forced leaders like Taha to escape Afghanistan, the most violent splinters gradually fizzled off.

Some propose that a strong organizational structure enabled the GI leaders in Egypt to have authority over the members and implement the truce (Rashwan 2009, 129). Meijer also emphasizes that the prison tours undertaken after 2000 allowed the historical leadership to propagate revisionism and demonstrate “their power over their followers as well as the internal discipline within the movement” (Meijer 2009, 211). However, the tours occurred after the truce was already declared, and as already mentioned earlier, the selective release of leaders and members made many members in fact feel disillusioned with the cause. Furthermore, by 1997 the organization was completely weakened and destroyed. Therefore, ***the de-escalation of tactics came in a context of organizational weakness and overwhelming disillusionment with the initial cause, and not in a moment of organizational strength.*** This might also explain why the focus was not on setting forth an alternative agenda and model of activism, but rather to revise the founding ideology so as to still have a coherent *raison d’être* and organizational identity.

Causal Mechanisms of De-escalation

This analysis of the changes within the GI underlines that ***learning*** was an important mechanism of de-escalation. Learning occurred both in terms of theological sophistication, but also in terms of learning from the context and from the consequences of their action. Indeed the latter aspect of learning was a much more powerful catalyst of organizational change that explains much better the timing of the non-violence declaration and of the revisions. The change in tactics came after high audience costs and public condemnation of the organization led to ***widespread disillusionment*** with the initial cause among leaders, followers and sympathizers. This happened when the regime used the threat of violence to justify wide-spread repression and clamping down on all political opposition, and when the population became decisively critical of the high costs of violence, as well as significantly more concerned about economic and political issues than with the idea of an Islamic revolution. Figure 13 summarizes this argument and provides an overview of the critical events that set the path towards disengagement from violence.

Figure 13. The Causal Mechanisms of Violent De-Escalation of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah



Conclusion

The examination of the GI reveals that even though the organization is fundamentally different from the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of the founding ideology, goals and constituency, the dynamics of change are similar in both groups, and the same causal mechanisms account for violent escalation and de-escalation. The interaction of domestic and international factors and low policy convergence led to the politicization of the organization. Repeated repressive actions against the organization, in particular after an initial attempt by Sadat to appeal to and appease the Islamists, led to a growing mistrust of the regime. Sadat's shift to separate religion and politics and co-opt Al-Azhar, his take-over of mosques and prohibition of veils in schools led to a sense of betrayal among the members and leaders of the GI. When the escalating politicization, mistrust and betrayal was combined with a harsh and direct attack on the organization by killing its spokesman, the organization's struck back in revenge and assassinated President Sadat.

In the mid 1980s, when the organization began reconstituting itself, similar dynamics led to growing mistrust towards the regime, even though the organization was willing to abandon violence in return for some concessions that would give it a non-violence exit option. However, the organizational dynamics during this period were complicated by Afghanistan. On one hand, Afghanistan presented an escape option for GI members, and a way to avoid prison and torture. On the other hand, this experience led to the militarization of the GI as a whole and to a slippery slope that contributed to the establishment of an armed wing and of a much more aggressive campaign and attacks against tourists and civilians.

The impact of Afghanistan, however, becomes even more complex if we consider what happened to the organization in the late 1990s. Whereas the high audience cost imposed by the

brutal repression and the public condemnation of the GI led to leaders of the group to reconsider their strategic outlook and renounce violence, Afghanistan also present an exit option for the most militant faction that refused the disengagement from violence. In that sense, by absorbing the most radical elements of the leadership and constituency, Afghanistan in a way also enhanced the ability of the leaders to implement the organizational disengagement from violence.

The discussion of the GI underlines the fact that the changes in the tactics and ideologies of the organization can only be understood within the wider social and political context. Even when learning occurred among members and leaders, it was induced by the context. This is important if we seek to understand the strategies of the GI today, and its potential future trajectory. The organization is not principally pacifist, but it certainly recognizes that the Egyptian public does not tolerate, let alone support, an Islamist insurgency, or even a Muslim Brotherhood that is too ambitious in imposing its own views on society. Therefore, even in the face of the brutal crackdown by the military on the Muslim Brotherhood, the GI repeatedly emphasizes its opposition to violent tactics and calls for political measures to resolve the tensions.

Chapter 5

Darul Islam: The Rise and Fall of an Islamist Insurgency in Indonesia

Egypt and Indonesia both witnessed the rise of large mass-based Islamist political movements during the early 20th century. Yet, as Munhanif points out, over the course of the century these movements developed very differently in the two countries. Munhanif attributes these different patterns of Islamist mobilization and organizational development to the variations in colonial legacies and to different institutional settings in Egypt and Indonesia at the moment of the national revolutions (Munhanif 2010). In spite of these differences, however, during these periods of national revolutions and liberation struggles, what emerged in both countries is a shift in the focus of certain Islamist groups from fighting the foreign enemy to fighting the national government.

Chapter three has shown how this transformation has occurred within the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that started out as a non-violent educational initiative, but over the years became politicized, developed an armed wing to fight in Palestine and against the British forces, and ultimately turned its violence against the national government. This chapter is focused on the Darul Islam¹⁶⁵ (DI) movement in Indonesia, and its transformation from an anti-colonial fighting force to an anti-Republican rebellion that sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. While the DI differs from the Muslim Brotherhood in many fundamental ways, a focus on this shift in strategic outlook vis-à-vis the government allows us to examine whether the same causal mechanisms of escalation hold across different cases.

The Darul Islam emerged from the ranks of the anti-Dutch militia, and it transformed into an anti-Republican rebellion, led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (popularly referred to as

¹⁶⁵ The Arabic terms *darul Islam* (or *dar al-Islam*) can be translated as the abode of Islam.

Kartosuwirjo), who on August 7, 1949 proclaimed the *Negara Islam Indonesia*- NII (Islamic State of Indonesia) in West Java. While the DI was a mass-based movement that sought to establish an Islamic state, it is often also treated as a regional rebellion. After the initial proclamation of NII in West Java, the movement also spread to other provinces, where Islamist goals overlapped with separatist aspirations or other regional interests. As Formichi points out, in Aceh, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan the regional rebellions were framed in Islamic terms only after linking up with the DI, whereas in West Java “the platform for an Islamic state had first been developed and implemented when there was no unitary national government to challenge” (Formichi 2012, 167). This chapter is therefore primarily centered on West Java, where the DI emerged, and where the movement was most clearly an Islamist rebellion rather than a separatist movement. Table seven provides an overview of the other regional rebellions that in time became affiliated with DI.

Table 7. Regional Rebellions Associated with the Darul Islam

Region	Start Rebellion Against Government	Main Leader	DI Affiliation	End Rebellion¹⁶⁶
West Java	1949 (August 1949 – NII proclaimed)	S.M. Kartosuwirjo	DI center; original NII	1962 – Kartosuwirjo & leaders executed; others surrendered
Aceh	1953	Daud Beureueh	1953 – Beureueh declares Aceh part of NII 1955 – Beureueh appointed VP for NII; Aceh declared federal state within NII	1959 – agreement with central government
South Sulawesi	1950	Kahar Muzakkar	1952 Muzakkar named commander of the 4 th TII Division in S. Sulawesi	1965 – Muzakkar & his minister of defense killed
Central Java	1949 ¹⁶⁷	Amir Fatah	1949 – Islamic State of Central Java proclaimed (Amir Fatah was a close associate of Kartosuwirjo; rebellion considered a DI rebellion, though weak links to main DI)	1950 – main leaders and many members surrendered; agreement based on amnesty
South Kalimantan (Borneo)	1950	Ibnu Hadjar	1954 Hadjar becomes TII commander for Kalimantan	1963 – leader arrested

As the discussion below will reveal, the DI had a different vision of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia than the Muslim Brotherhood. Nonetheless, the focus on the causal

¹⁶⁶ DI elements persist to this day in Indonesia, as the conclusion of the chapter will briefly touch upon. Nonetheless, the episodes included in this table represent distinct rebellions that did come to an end, even though attempts to revive the DI might have persisted subsequently.

¹⁶⁷ The rebellion that became associated with DI started in 1949, but van Dijk (1981) notes that in many ways it had its roots in the previous “social revolution” and local rebellion of 1945.

mechanisms of violent escalation and the transformation from anti-foreign to anti-government makes for a particularly relevant comparison to the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, even though relatively little has been written about the DI compared to contemporary violent groups in Indonesia or in the Middle East, the organization provided the seeds for subsequent militant groups, such as al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah. As Formichi notes, there is “little use in analyzing the 1970s-1980s jihadist phenomenon without first looking into its roots in the late colonial period” (Formichi 2012, 1).

This chapter follows a similar structure as the chapters discussing the Egyptian cases. The main investigation here is centered on understanding the causal mechanisms of escalation in the West Java DI group, although the dynamics of organizational demise are also considered. In doing so, the chapter provides a brief overview of the rebellion and its main ideological tenets and policy goals, after which it discusses the social and political context in which the escalation occurred, as well as the organizational dynamics that facilitated escalation and led to the end of the rebellion. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of what causal mechanisms emerge from this analysis, and a brief overview of the demise of the Darul Islam movement.

The Rise and Evolution of the Darul Islam

The roots of the Darul Islam movement can be traced back to the political activism of Kartosuwirjo during the 1930s and 1940s, and his break with the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia – Indonesian Islamic Union Party) and later with Masyumi, primarily because of his ardent support for non-cooperation with the Dutch and for basing the new Indonesian state on Islamic legislation. Even though the Darul Islam did not exist as a distinct organization at the time, this political activism helped Kartosuwirjo define and refine his ideological principles and

vision for an Islamic state, while setting the groundwork for the subsequent development of the movement in West Java.

Kartosuwirjo came from a low-priyayi¹⁶⁸ background and was educated in the Dutch schooling system in Indonesia (Formichi 2012, 15). He was originally from Central Java, but he moved to West Java, where he became involved with Sarekat Islam (the Islamic Union), and married the daughter of its chairman (Formichi 2012, 34; Boland 1971, 56). Sarekat Islam was the oldest mass-movement in Indonesia, that first emerged in order to protect the economic interests of the Muslim batik traders against the powerful Chinese textile industry (Formichi 2012, 21). In the early 1920s the movement became increasingly Islamicized and eventually split into a socialist wing and an Islamist wing (Formichi 2012, 24). After changing its name to Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia – PSII (Indonesian Islamic Union Party) in 1929, the organization shifted from being an Islamo-socialist group to an Islamic party committed to pan-Islamism, striving for the unity of the Islamic community across the world first, and national freedom second (Formichi 2012, 51). The PSII also had a “long-standing tradition of non-cooperation” with the Dutch, which was inspired by Gandhi’s anti-colonial movement in India (van Dijk 1981, 30). Focusing on the concepts of self-reliance (*swadeshi*) and repudiation of the existing colonial structure, this stance was maintained until the late 1930s.

Kartosuwirjo first became involved with Sarekat Islam in 1928, and he became a regular contributor to the party’s newspaper (Formichi 2012, 26). In 1931 Kartosuwirjo was elected as the general secretary of the party, and in 1936 as its vice president. However, after 1937 PSII reversed its stance on non-cooperation and Kartosuwirjo was asked to retract his statements on the need for non-cooperation as well (van Dijk 1981, 35). Kartosuwirjo remained a strong proponent of non-cooperation, which led to his expulsion from the party in 1939. This led him to


¹⁶⁸ Priyayi refers to the Javanese administrative-aristocratic elite (Ricklefs 2012, 12).

found a counter-PSII in Malangbong, which some suggest served as the background to Darul Islam (Boland 1971, 56). This new party, which is sometimes referred to as the “Second PSII” promoted the policy of non-cooperation, and it established an Islamic school for the training of a future Islamic leadership (van Dijk 1981, 36, 38). Van Dijk suggests that this institute was instrumental in building up the future Darul Islam cadre, because it provided Kartosuwirjo with an opportunity to expound his views on Islam and to develop person ties (van Dijk 1981, 43).

During the 1940s, Kartosuwirjo shifted its political activism to Masyumi.¹⁶⁹ In 1945, Kartosuwirjo became the executive committee secretary of Masyumi, and over the subsequent two years he served as a party representative in the Preparatory Committee for Independence (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat – KNIP) (Formichi 2012, 80). However, over the subsequent years Kartosuwirjo also parted ways with the mainstream contingency within Masyumi and gradually began shifting from national politics to defending West Java from the Dutch. It is during this period that Kartosuwirjo began laying the foundation for the DI movement, by transforming the West Java branch of the Masyumi into the Darul Islam group (Formichi 2012, 81), establishing the Tentara Islam Indonesia – TII (Indonesian Islamic Army) in February 1948, and then drafting the constitution of the Negara Islam Indonesia- NII (Islamic State of Indonesia) in August 1948. The ultimate break with Masyumi occurred when Kartosuwirjo proclaimed NII as a parallel Islamic state in August 1949. Figure fourteen provides a concise overview of Kartosuwirjo’s political activism, the evolution of the Darul Islam movement and the rise of the Islamic State of Indonesia – NII.

¹⁶⁹ Masyumi, whose name is derived from Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council or Indonesian Muslims) was established by the Japanese in 1943, and it consisted primarily of the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (Ricklefs 2012, 62).

Figure 14. Timeline of Kartosuwirjo's Political Activism and the Rise of the NII



This early history of Kartosuwirjo's involvement in politics points to a very different foundation and logic for the DI than the Muslim Brotherhood, even though both organizations merged strong nationalist and religious sentiments and sought independence from foreign powers and ultimately the establishment of an Islamic state. Hassan al-Banna started as an educator, interested in spreading a particular religious interpretation and in transforming society, and over time became increasingly politicized. Both his religious view and his anti-British stance had widespread public appeal across Egypt. Kartosuwirjo, on the other hand, was involved in politics long before he established the DI, but his strong non-cooperation stance pushed him to the margins of the political sphere. The DI emerged from the political fringes, had a strong regional appeal, and was founded as an alternative political and military structure.

Based on this, we would expect the DI to start with a much more antagonist stance towards the government and towards the Dutch than the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet perceiving of itself as a state, the DI at times adopted a much more accommodating stance towards foreign powers than the Muslim Brotherhood, and as the chapter will reveal, the organization also underwent a slippery slope of escalation that only gradually drove it to use violence against domestic targets.

During 1930s and early 1940s, Kartosuwirjo's activism was contained to non-violent methods and political means, as exemplified by his work with PSII and Masyumi. Yet, as the following discussion of ideology will reveal, he was strongly opposed to cooperation with and subservience to the Dutch, which led him to break away from mainstream groups, gradually abandon national politics and turn against the Republican government and army.

As Formichi notes, by 1946 Kartosuwirjo was still participating in the political process in the rank and file of Masyumi, upholding the party's commitment to parliamentary struggle,

cooperation and unity” (Formichi 2012, 89). In fact, in July 1946 he gave a speech calling for national unity and warning his audience that ideological differences and conflict among Indonesians would only benefit the Dutch. Instead, Indonesians should first achieve complete independence, and then settle their differences in a democratic fashion (van Dijk 1981, 84–85).

However, when the Dutch invaded West Java at the end of July 1947, Kartosuwirjo turned his attention from national politics to the defense of West Java. Thus, he rejected the position of Junior Minister of Defense (Formichi 2012, 81, 97). In August he invoked the notion of *perang sabil* (war on the path of God), calling upon the Muslim community to establish a *dar al-Islam*, implement Islamic legislation and rise up against the Dutch and all enemies of the religion and the state (Formichi 2012, 103). In November 1947, Kartosuwirjo founded the Dewan Pertahanan Ummat Islam (Defense Council of the Islamic Community) and the Majelis Ummat Islam Indonesia (Council of the Indonesian Islamic Community), both of which were “designed to intensify and coordinate the struggle of the local Islamic community against the Dutch” (van Dijk 1981, 84).

After the Renville Agreement of January 1948 and the order of the Indonesian Republican troops to evacuate West Java, delegates of five Masyumi branches from West Java, as well as representatives of other Islamic groups, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, attended a conference whose aim was “to establish an Islamic state and army” (Formichi 2012, 114–115). By March 1st, Masyumi suspended its activities in West Java, various militia that had been active in the fight against the Dutch merged to form the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII – The Indonesian Islamic Army), and Kartosuwirjo was elected as the imam of the Islamic community in West Java (Formichi 2012, 116). In addition to an armed force to defend against the Dutch, it was also resolved that there would have to be an organization in charge of administration in West

Java – thus, Darul Islam was officially established (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 1–2). When the Dutch created the State of Pasundan in West Java in March, Kartosuwirjo responded by proclaiming the Provisional Islamic State of Indonesia in West Java (Nasution 1965, 86).

From this pronouncement of a provisional Islamic state in West Java, in the subsequent months Kartosuwirjo took the next necessary steps towards turning the Islamic State of Indonesia into a reality. Thus, in August 1948 he released the Constitution of the Islamic state, which was to be a republic, led by an imam and based on *shari'a* law (Formichi 2012, 121). At this point in time, the Islamic army was focused solely on opposing the Dutch, and in seeking to establish an Islamic state, Kartosuwirjo was not necessarily anti-Republican, but merely pro-Islamic legislation. In October, he reached out to the Republican government asking for support in the struggle against the Dutch, and he also distributed copies of the Constitution of the Islamic State of Indonesia to national leaders, military commanders and the leaders of the major Islamic organizations (Formichi 2012, 123–125). In December 1948, Kartosuwirjo declared a holy war against the Dutch, and argued that the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state was the continuation of this independence struggle, on the same plane as Soekarno's struggle, rather than in opposition to it (Formichi 2012, 127–128).

The turning point for the Darul Islam movement turning anti-Republican came in 1949. When Republican troops returned to West Java in January 1949, they did not recognize the authority of the DI troops and refused to join the ranks of the TII. This led to the first clashes between Republican troops and DI troops, and it prompted Kartosuwirjo to issue an ultimatum in February 1949, which asked the Republican troops to either join the DI or to leave the region (Formichi 2012, 130). Not only did TNI (Indonesian National Army) troops not join the TII, but

in April 1949 they began cooperating with the Dutch in clearing out DI strongholds in West Java (Formichi 2012, 130). This created a vicious cycle that led to growing DI attacks on Republican troops, as well as to increasingly aggressive military responses by the national army. By April 1949 almost a thousand soldiers were captured by the DI, the army killed a dozen DI members and increased patrolling in the region, which led many political organizations to express concerns at the ruthlessness of the national army in response to the DI (Formichi 2012, 131).

The ultimate split with the Indonesian Republic came when Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) on August 7, 1949, thus effectively creating a parallel state in West and Central Java. The vision was for the NII to ultimately encompass the entire archipelago and be recognized as a de facto and de jure state based on Islamic law (Formichi 2012, 136). In the meantime, however, the NII was to be in a state of war and therefore ruled by Islamic martial law (Formichi 2012, 136).

After the proclamation of the NII, clashes between DI troops and Republic troops escalated. By March and May 1950 DI was also reported to attack the civilian population (Formichi 2012, 152). Over the subsequent years, the Darul Islam rebellion spread across the archipelago and linked up with other regional rebellions. In 1952, for instance, the rebellion in South Sulawesi joined the NII, and Kartosuwirjo named the Sulawesi leader commander of the TII division there. In 1954 Kartosuwirjo named the leader of the rebellion in South Kalimantan TII commander for the region, and in 1955 Aceh was proclaimed as a federal state within the NII and the leader of the rebellion was appointed as Vice President of NII (van Dijk 1981).¹⁷⁰

As the DI rebellion gained strength, its activities began expanding beyond clashes with the Republican troops. According to van Dijk, DI members raided villages and towns, burned

¹⁷⁰ While the rebellions in Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi joined the umbrella of the NII, the link between these rebellions should not be over-estimated, especially in regard to command and control.

down houses, engaged in looting, robbed banks, stole medical equipment from hospitals and coordinate prison breaks (van Dijk 1981, 104). Villages were attacked either because they were suspected to support the Republican Army, or in order to collect tax or war booty (van Dijk 1981, 105). Villagers were also at times kidnapped, either as punishment for crimes committed “in the eyes of the Islamic State of Indonesia,” or in order to be recruited for the Islamic Army (van Dijk 1981, 105). Buses travelling between Jakarta and Bandung were often robbed and passengers sometimes killed. Similarly, private or government-owned bungalows in holiday resorts were often raided. In March 1955, for example, a Central Government bungalow was attacked, in June 1956 a villa belonging to the Department of Education was raided, and in October 1956 both of these properties were attacked again (van Dijk 1981, 103).

Such DI activities had a devastating effect on the civilian population. According to van Dijk, whereas over fifty-two thousand people were evacuated or fled their homes in 1951, this number grew to over three hundred thousand in 1958 (van Dijk 1981, 105). Similarly, whereas over four thousand houses were burnt and four hundred fourteen people were killed in 1951, the civilian victims reached over two thousand in 1957, and the number of burnt houses reached over eighteen thousand in 1961 (van Dijk 1981, 105).

The DI rebellion attained its greatest strength in West Java in 1957, when it comprised 13,129 men (van Dijk 1981, 102). However, after the military offensive by Republican troops intensified, when a general amnesty was declared in 1961, many DI members surrendered (van Dijk 1981, 126). In 1962, many of the remaining leaders were arrested or executed, and after Kartosuwirjo’s execution the movement effectively died off.

In order to understand how and why the DI rebellion escalated, turned against the Republican Army and then started targeting civilians, the next section will examine the

ideological tenets at the heart of the NII project. The analysis will then trace the establishment of the NII by closely examining the events between 1947 and 1949. The mechanisms of escalation will be explored by zooming in on the period between 1949 and 1951 when the DI started confronting Republican troops and attacking civilians, and on the period between 1958 and 1962, when the civilian costs reached unprecedented peaks, but when the rebellion also ultimately died off.

Kartosuwirjo and the Ideology of the Islamic State of Indonesia

Understanding Kartosuwirjo's political involvement with Sarekat Islam and with Masyumi provides insights into the founding ideology of the Darul Islam movement. Just like the SI/PSII, the Darul Islam was a religious nationalist movement with an anti-colonial and anti-capitalist outlook (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 3). The DI was also strongly anti-communist, primarily because of the secularism of the communist party. As Formichi points out, the major tenets of the DI ideology included criticism of colonial policies and of government interference in religious matters, promotion of socio-economic justice, nationalism and Islamic modernism (Formichi 2012, 38).

Within this general agenda, there were certain issues that Kartosuwirjo was not willing to compromise on, such as national independence and the establishment of an Islamic state, and other issues where the organization displayed pragmatism and flexibility. For instance, archival documents reveal that at the end of Dutch rule, DI attempted to negotiate with the Dutch, and that the organization actually incorporated several Dutch deserters and former soldiers of the Dutch Colonial Army (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 3). DI also reached out to Western powers, seeking their support and stressing the movement's value "as an instrument in

combating Communism” (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 10) and emphasizing opportunities for Western enterprise (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 11).

In this regard, a letter sent on behalf of the NII to the American Embassy in Djakarta in 1953 offers a telling story. Signed by the Armed Forces’ Supreme Command of the Negara Islam Indonesia (and distributed also to the Embassies of Britain, France, Netherlands, Australia, Philippine, Pakistan, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Yemen, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Lebanon), the letter claims to seek to establish “mutual understanding between the Government of the Negara Islam Indonesia (N.I.I) and foreign diplomatic services of the Free World attached to the Republik Indonesia” (Armed Forces Supreme Command of the Negara Islam Indonesia 1953, 1). The letter claims that the Republican government intends to declare war on the NII and the Islamic community in Indonesia, and that this threat is “exactly a Communist threat and a Communist-inspired deed, which also directly affects the interests of the Free World in the Indonesian empire and in South-East Asia on the whole” (Armed Forces Supreme Command of the Negara Islam Indonesia 1953, 1). This letter reinforces the notion that the Darul Islam did not just strive for an Islamic state, but that it perceived itself as the embodiment of that state,¹⁷¹ and in this capacity it was willing to negotiate with foreign powers as long as the national independence was not compromised.

The anti-colonial sentiments and the religious fervor were the defining elements of the DI throughout the history of the organization. For Kartosuwirjo these two issues were inseparable. As Formichi points out, the “vision of the anti-colonial movement was framed within the understanding that only through religion – ‘with Allah and for Allah’ – could the Indonesian people be freed from the physical and ideological oppression of the West, and that the future of Indonesia as an independent nation-state could only be ensured if based on Islam and on

¹⁷¹ In spite of its ambition to be the embodiment of a state, in reality the DI only remained a state on paper.

sharia law”(Formichi 2012, 9). Achieving national independence was “not important for its own sake, but rather for the sake of creating an environment favourable to the implementation of Islamic laws and the establishment of a government based on Islam” (Formichi 2012, 40).

Kartosuwirjo argued that all religion is inherently political (Formichi 2012, 40), thus reinforcing the notion that Islam is a comprehensive system in which the religious and the political cannot be separated. However, in fusing revolutionary nationalism with Qur’anic precepts (Temby 2010, 5), the DI ideology was not based on contemporary Middle Eastern sources, but on interpretations of centuries old classical jurisprudence texts (Bubalo and Fealy 2005, 86). Furthermore, Kartosuwirjo was drawn towards mysticism, asceticism and “magical ideas on invulnerability” (Boland 1971, 56; van Dijk 1981, 28), which fit well with the local concepts of power that understood “authority as something bestowed either from a previous king or a bupati,¹⁷² or directly through God’s blessing” (Formichi 2012, 35).

Kartosuwirjo’s vision for an Islamic state is reflected in the constitution of the NII and in the criminal code of the NII. Whereas the other Islamic groups in Indonesia held the idea of an Islamic state as a future aspiration and attempted to achieve it by promoting the adoption of Islamic legislation in the new republic, for DI the issue was black and white: either the new Republic would immediately become an Islamic state by adopting the NII constitution, or the very legitimacy of the Indonesian Republic would crumble and DI would assume the role of the Islamic state. From this perspective, Soekarno’s attempt to appease both religious groups and secular groups and religious minorities by promoting the Pancasila was insufficient and unsatisfactory.¹⁷³

¹⁷² Bupati refers to regent.

¹⁷³ As will be explained in the subsequent section, Pancasila refers to five principles: belief in one God, respect for human values, democracy, social justice and nationalism.

Formichi hints that this vision for establishing a sovereign state emerged as early as July 1947, when the Dutch invasion of West Java inspired Kartosuwirjo to invoke the notion of *perang sabil* and call for a holy war against the Dutch. Kartosuwirjo drew parallels to Muhammad's struggle, and compared the breach of the Linggadjati Agreement with the breach of the *Hudaibiyah* treaty, which paved the way for Muhammad's attack on Mecca. Formichi points out that Muhammad's "victory over the polytheistic Arab tribes became the key to interpreting the breach of the Linggadjati as an opportunity that legitimized the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Islamic state" (Formichi 2012, 104).

The NII constitution, which was released in August 1948, held that Islamic law would be applied to all Muslims in the state, whereas other believers would be free to perform their religious duties (Boland 1971, 1959). The highest authority of the Islamic state would be the shura council (*madjlis sjuro*), "but in case of emergency the ultimate power would be in the hands of the Imam, who would have to be Indonesian, Muslim, obedient to God and the Prophet" (Boland 1971, 59). The imam would be supported by a council for giving considered legal opinions, and in daily administration he would appoint an imamate council. Taxes would disappear and be replaced by *infaq* ("spending of contribution"), and "important and responsible civil and military posts would be given only to Muslims" (Boland 1971, 59).

Formichi argues that there is a slight shift in Kartosuwirjo's focus and ideology between the NII constitution and the NII criminal code, which were issued one year apart. Whereas the NII constitution gave the Islamic State "a political-administrative structure, the same goal pursued by the Masyumi intellectuals in the 1950s," the criminal code was centered on "the day-to-day lives of the Islamic state's citizens" (Formichi 2012, 194–195). The NII criminal code that was applied once the NII was declared set out the fundamental obligations under Islamic martial

law, which was necessary given that the Islamic state was at the time at war. These obligations included: (1) surrendering “financial surplus to the treasury as contribution towards jihad”; (2) prescribing the death penalty for hypocrites, sinners and enemies of state; (3) participating in jihad against those who waged war on the state and those who supported the enemy; and (4) differentiating between the community of the Islamic State and the community of the infidel oppressor” (Formichi 2012, 137–138). This focus on devising the political and legal structure for an Islamic state stands in sharp contrast with al-Banna’s vision of gradual Islamization of society from the bottom-up, and the emphasis the Brotherhood placed on social and educational activities and societal transformation through *da’wa*.

Kartosuwirjo’s vision for how to strive for the Islamic state and what tactics are acceptable shifted over the years, as reflected in his changing understanding of the concept of *jihad*. Before the establishment of the Darul Islam, Kartosuwirjo emphasized the positive struggle of the tongue and of the heard, and considered the struggle of the sword to be negative and destructive (Formichi 2012, 63). From this perspective, the “struggle” was similar to the vision of a comprehensive Islam promoted by Hassan al-Banna, as it included social, economic and political prescriptions. These included working for the benefit of public interest, promoting co-operatives and self-reliance and implementing Islamic politics (Formichi 2012, 63).

By the 1940s, Kartosuwirjo was much more ambiguous about the means through which to undertake *jihad*. According to Formichi, by September 1947 he “had dramatically reduced jihad’s much wider semantic field, only retaining its ‘warfare’ meaning” (Formichi 2012, 106). In 1948, when the Islamic Army was formed and the DI emerged and declared a provisional Islamic state in West Java, only the Dutch were pronounced as the enemy, and not the Republic (van Dijk 1981, 88). Yet, a year later, when clashes between the Republican troops and the DI

troops erupted in West Java, the Indonesian Republic also became an enemy, and the DI entered a triangular war against the Dutch and the Republic (van Dijk 1981, 91). Some suggest, that by the time the Darul Islam became a full-fledged anti-Republican rebellion, it displayed a doctrine of jihad that was similar to the Salafi understanding, which at that point had not arrived in Indonesia yet (Solahudin 2013, 3).

Why did the Darul Islam take such a decisive turn against the government within the course of one year? Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, whose violent escalation occurred *in spite* of the gradualist founding ideology of the organization, in the case of the Darul Islam, the ideological commitment to the establishment of an Islamic state played an important role in placing the organization in a zero-sum relationship vis-à-vis the national government. However, these ideological principles don't fully explain why Kartosuwirjo broke away from the mainstream Islamic groups that were also strongly supportive of an Islamic state, and which agreed to the formation of an Islamic defense force against the Dutch. To better understand the timing of the anti-Republican turn and the mechanisms of escalation, the next sections examine more closely the issues of policy convergence, government repression, public norms of resistance and organizational dynamics.

Policy Convergence and the Logic of Resistance

As the discussion so far has emphasized, the two primary policies of concern for Kartosuwirjo and the Darul Islam were national independence and domestic policies regarding religious affairs. In terms of the latter issue, the main concern was establishing an Islamic state, based in Islamic legislation, but also promoting religiosity in society more broadly, and implicitly countering the growing Marxist and communist trends, which were regarded as secularist and anti-Islamic. In fact, in the letter sent to the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, the DII

explicitly states that Islamism and communism are “two totally different ideologies” that are colliding (Armed Forces Supreme Command of the Negara Islam Indonesia 1953, 1).

The emphasis in this section is on West Java, but in other regions where local rebellions eventually joined the NII the grievances were multifaceted, and therefore policy preferences were not just focused on national independence and religious affairs, but also on other policies towards the region. In Aceh, for instance, the concern was not just implementing Islamic legislation, but also the provincial status of Aceh, the cuts in funding for religious schools, the reduced authority of Islamic courts, and the prevalence of non-Acehnese troops (Aspinall 2009). In South Sulawesi, on the other hand, van Dijk called the rebellion one of disaffected guerillas, and he argues that conflict broke out in 1950 primarily about the degree of autonomy of East Indonesia and the stationing of Javanese troops in the region (van Dijk 1981, 163).

Indonesia’s national independence was decided during the tumultuous years between 1945 and 1949, when the new Indonesian state was very weak and had little territorial control and authority. The Japanese defeated the Dutch in 1942 and occupied the archipelago, but by the end of 1944 they promised to work towards Indonesian independence in the near future (Feith 1968, 7). To this end, the Investigating Committee for the Independence of Indonesia was established in 1945, whose role was to work on a draft constitution for the future independent state. It is within this context that debates over the role of Islam emerged. Whereas Islamic leaders sought to draw on Islamic legislation, Soekarno promoted the notion of Pancasila (Five Principles), which considered the pillars of the Republic to be: “One Deity, just and civilized Humanity, Indonesian Unity, and People’s rule guided wisely through consultation and representation, in order to achieve Social Justice for the whole Indonesian people”(Feith and Castles 2007, 50).

In the June 1st, 1945 speech in which Sukarno proclaimed the principle of Pancasila, he argued that the state has to be based on representation and deliberation, and if Islam really is “a religion which is alive in the hearts of the masses,” then leaders should “move every one of the people to mobilize as many Muslim delegates as possible for this representative body” (Feith and Castles 2007, 45). This argument was clearly not satisfactory to those pushing for an Islamic state, such as Kartosuwirjo. A compromise was reached on June 22nd in the form of the Jakarta Charter, which called for the obligation to follow Islamic *shari’a* law (Kahin 2012, 43). However, after Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed independence on August 17, 1945, the Jakarta Charter was dropped from the constitution that was adopted on August 18th.

During this period Kartosuwirjo was still politically active within Masyumi. In the subsequent years, however, not only did the Jakarta Charter remain off the table, but the Dutch re-occupied areas of Java and Sumatra by 1946 (Feith 1968, 9). That same year also witnessed the “July 3rd Affair,” when the nationalist-communist Tan Malaka attempted a coup d’état (Feith 1968, 9). In November 1946, the Linggadjati Agreement, signed under pressure from Britain, required Netherlands to recognize the Indonesian Republic as the *de facto* authority in Java and Sumatra and work towards the achievement of a sovereign federal state of Indonesia within a Netherlands-Indonesian Union (Feith 1968, 9–10). The Islamic national front strongly opposed this agreement because the union would be under the authority of the Dutch Queen (Formichi 2012, 96).

By the end of 1946 Masyumi called “for armed opposition against a Republican government that pursued overtly accommodationist policies” and publicly proclaimed their intention to “bring down the Indonesian government with arms” (Formichi 2012, 96). The party did not start an actual revolt or armed opposition against the government, but in the summer of

1947 Masyumi withdrew from the cabinet (Formichi 2012, 97). On the military front, clashes with the Dutch continued, and on July 21st, 1947 the Dutch launched a full-scale armed attack on parts of Indonesia, invading West Java.

It is against this political background that Kartosuwirjo decided to abandon national politics and focus on military resistance to the Dutch. Dropping the Jakarta Charter from the constitution was a sore point of low policy convergence, but it was not enough to drive Kartosuwirjo to take any decisive measures against the government. Formichi argues that the Dutch invasion of West Java is what pushed Kartosuwirjo to abandon formal politics (Formichi 2012, 89). Kartosuwirjo declined the post of Junior Minister of Defense on July 3rd, just before the full-scale invasion, but in a context where not only was the Linggadjati Agreement seen as a betrayal of national interests, but the Dutch were breaking even this agreement and continuing military attacks. Therefore, the prevalence of the *external threat to the Muslim community* and to national independence was a powerful necessary condition for Kartosuwirjo's dissatisfaction with politics and the beginnings of the DI. Yet with this external threat also came the seeds of disillusionment with the national government.

This disillusionment was growing not just from opposition to the negotiated agreements but also from the fact that in September 1947, the government started clashing with armed guerillas and clamping down on criticism of the Republic. For example, a *Sabilillah*¹⁷⁴ leader in a village in West Java said that the group should destroy the republic, and he was killed under accusations of treason. Formichi notes that his killing diminished the trust of former Islamic

¹⁷⁴ The Sabilillah was a "citizen militia in the guerilla war against the Dutch" that was formed in November 1945 at the first Masyumi congress held after independence. It was envisioned as a being complementary to *Hizbullah*, the military group formed by the Japanese as the armed branch of Masyumi, and was open to all those could not enter the military units of the latter organization (van Dijk 1981, 76).

militias in the Republican troops and within a couple of months clashes spread (Formichi 2012, 101).

In 1947, Kartosuwirjo was strongly opposed to the Dutch occupation and critical of the government, but not explicitly anti-Republican. In November he formed the Defence Council of the Islamic Community and the Council of the Indonesian Islamic Community to coordinate the struggle against the Dutch (van Dijk 1981, 84). Yet he didn't form the TII and the Darul Islam itself until February 1948, when following the Renville Agreement Republic troops were ordered to evacuate West Java. In this context of extreme external threat to the region and a *sense of betrayal* by the TNI (Indonesian Republican Army) troops that obeyed the Dutch and left, Islamic leaders from several organizations attended a conference that sought to establish an Islamic state and army (Formichi 2012, 114–115). On March 1st, the merging of various Islamic militias into the TII was completed,¹⁷⁵ the DI was formed as an organization to oversee the administration of the new Islamic state and army, and Kartosuwirjo was elected as imam and commander (Formichi 2012, 115–116).

When the Dutch created the state of Pasundan in West Java on March 19th, Kartosuwirjo responded by proclaiming a provisional NII in West Java (Nasution 1965, 86). Thus, we can see that low policy convergence, and in particular issues regarding national independence and Dutch occupation had a powerful impact on Kartosuwirjo, and were the catalysts for his disillusionment with national politics, and the creation of the TII, DI and provisional NII in West Java. This underlines the fact that in spite of the ideological differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and the DI, in response to salient external threats and low policy convergence both organizations

¹⁷⁵ Hizbullah and Sabilillah had actually been ordered by Soekarno to merge into the TNI National Army in January, but most militias refused to follow the orders and continued to act as separate armies (Formichi 2012, 95), refusing to be evacuated out of West Java after the Renville agreement (Kahin 2012, 56).

went down a comparable path of increasing disillusionment with the regime, and a growing sense of betrayal by the government.

The external threats in Indonesia escalated by the end of 1948, as did the strength of the communist movement. On the communist front, the leader of the communists in the 1920s, Musso, returned from exile in August 1948, assumed leadership over the communist party and greatly expanded it (Feith 1968, 11). On September 18, 1948, communist leaders in Madiun (East Java) proclaimed a revolt against the Soekarno-Hatta government, but after a month of bloody battles the rebellion was crushed and Musso was killed (Feith 1968, 11). While Kartosuwirjo was strongly opposed to communism on the basis of its secularism, these developments did not cause any shifts in his strategies. In August 1948 he drafted the NII constitution, which he handed to all the major national leaders in October. At this point, Kartosuwirjo still sought co-operation with the government, and was primarily focused on fighting the Dutch.

In terms of the Dutch expansion, on December 19th the Dutch Army invaded Central Java and captured the President, Vice President, Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence (Formichi 2012, 126–127). This caused the DI to call for a holy war against the Dutch, and according to a report by the British Foreign Office, the Dutch offensive “provided the excuse that the Republican Government had ceased to exist,” therefore inspiring the DI, which claimed to be “the true representative of Indonesian nationalism,” to declare an Islamic State of Indonesia in August 1949, even though at that point the national leaders had been released (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 2).

The NII was not proclaimed as a state until eight months later, but the capturing of the national leadership prompted Kartosuwirjo to think of the NII even more so in national terms

rather than merely in terms of an Islamic state in Western Java. He called a meeting with his closest associates to discuss the “prospects of the Islamic state,” and in his call for a holy war, he urged the Indonesian Islamic Army to “guide and assist people with a view to completing the Islamic Revolution and to see to it that the Islamic State of Indonesia is founded throughout the whole of Indonesia” (van Dijk 1981, 90).

It is also likely that these events of December 1948 convinced Kartosuwirjo of the vulnerability of the Republican leaders when confronted with the Dutch. He also seemed convinced at the time that any future negotiations would not result in “anything more than a ‘Puppet State’,” and that “there is nothing for the Indonesian Islamic community, especially those living in Republican territory, to do other than to be ready to accept God’s gift, to pursue a jihad fi Sabilillah, to oppose the enemy of Islam, the enemy of the State, and the enemy of God, and last but not least, to establish a State blessed and offered by God, an Islamic State of Indonesia” (Formichi 2012, 127–128).

This disillusionment with the national leadership and the Republican approach to national independence grew even deeper in the aftermath of the Dutch offensive, when TNI troops started returning to West Java in January 1949. The DI issued a decree that blamed Republican troops for abandoning the region and then returning and expecting to take charge of the NII territory (Formichi 2012, 129). Since the Republican troops left West Java, Kartosuwirjo saw himself as the “overlord” of the region, and “claimed the right to demand that all guerilla troops operating in West Java accept his authority” (van Dijk 1981, 89). Thus, on January 25th 1949, TII troops disarmed a brigade of the national army, and when they were attacked back, Kartosuwirjo regarded this as a challenge to his authority and “the beginning of the ‘first triangular war in Indonesia’, namely between his troops, the Republican army and the Dutch Occupational

Forces” (van Dijk 1981, 91). In February, DI presented the Republican Army with an ultimatum: it could either leave the region or join the DI ranks (Formichi 2012, 130).

As the Republican Army refused to join the DI and accept its legitimacy as the governing authority over West Java, clashes between the TII and the TNI escalated. The ultimate sense of *betrayal* came when by April the TNI was beginning to collaborate with Dutch troops against the DI (Formichi 2012, 130). It is in this context that the DI turned decisively anti-Republican, and shifted from an anti-colonial armed faction to a rebellion against the Republican government. The DI increased its attacks on TNI soldiers, and by April almost one thousand Republican soldiers had been captured (Formichi 2012, 131). At the same time, the TNI response to the rebellion also grew in harshness, being criticized by political organizations for its ruthlessness (Formichi 2012, 131). It is at this juncture of *persisting threats posed by the Dutch* and a growing sense that the Republican government was *weak and betrayed the national and the Islamic cause*, that the DI proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia on August 7, 1949.

After the proclamation of the NII, the policies of the Indonesian Republic continued to diverge with the vision and goals of the DI. The Round Table talks held at the Hague between August and November 1949 eventually resulted in the formation of the Republic of United States of Indonesia (RUSI) on December 27, 1949. While this included the old Republic of Indonesia and fifteen other states established by the Dutch in the areas under their control between 1946 and 1949, the agreement also placed a very heavy national debt on the new federation, as it had to accept 4.3 billion guilders of the Netherlands Indies state debt (Feith 1958, 1). By May 1950, RUSI and the Republic of Indonesia began devising plans for a unitary state, drafting a constitution in June and July of 1950, and approving it on August 15, 1950 (Feith 1958, 4–5). On

August 17, the unitary State of Indonesia was declared, and in October the Natsir cabinet was formed.

The fact that the newly established Indonesian state was not based on Islamic legislation but rather on Pancasila, did not adopt the NII constitution, and did not recognize the legitimacy and authority of the NII were reasons for Kartosuwirjo to continue opposing it, but they did not drastically change the strategic outlook of the DI, which was already set on the path of confrontation with the regime. As the political crisis in Indonesia deepened in the subsequent years, as the communist party grew in power and influence, and as Soekarno reaffirmed his belief that the Indonesian state cannot be based on Islamic legislation¹⁷⁶, the number and scale of attacks by DI increased, and the NII expanded to incorporate South Sulawesi and Aceh as well.

While policy convergence played an essential role in the formation of the DI and the initial shift from being anti-Dutch to being anti-Republican, the *demise of the DI was not affected by issues of policy convergence*. By the late 1950s and certainly in 1962, when the DI in West Java ceased to exist, government policies continued to diverge from the NII vision. The debate over the Jakarta Charter and the implementation of Islamic legislation re-emerged in 1957 and continued through 1959, when on July 5th the President issued a decree that re-adopted the 1945 constitution (Wahid 2007, 80). In 1960, the government established the State Institute for Islamic Studies (Wildan 2010), but in the same year Soekarno also banned Masyumi and introduced a resolution that allowed him to ban and dissolve parties whose principles conflicted with those of the state (Wildan 2010).

¹⁷⁶ One of the most controversial statements, known as the “Amuntai speech”, was made by Soekarno in January 1953 during a visit to South Kalimantan. The President is reported to have said, “The state we want is a national state consisting of all Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic, such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands and Sulawesi, will secede. And West Irian, which has not yet become part of the territory of Indonesia will not want to be part of the Republic” (Feith 1958, 159).

The communist PKI was also beginning to gain significant strength by the late 1950s, even in West Java. A 1958 letter from the British Embassy in Jakarta notes that “the local elections and other indications have proved that the communists are the majority party throughout Central and East Java, and in certain areas outnumber all other parties combined” (British Embassy Djakarta 1958b, 2). With the growing power of the PKI came also greater opposition to the communists, taking the form of the formation of the Anti-Communist Front in January 1958 in West Java (British Embassy Djakarta 1958a), anti-communist demonstrations throughout Sumatra, South Kalimantan and Surabaya, as well as local army bans of communist activity in 1960 (British Embassy Djakarta 1960c; British Embassy Djakarta 1960d). Yet in spite of the popular and army concern vis-à-vis the communists, a 1960 Presidential initiative to form a new Parliament brought about “a big proportionate increase in Communist representation” (British Embassy Djakarta 1960b) and a substantial shift to the Left, consolidating the PKI as one of the powerful political groups in the country (British Embassy Djakarta 1960a).

If policy convergence alone were to determine DI’s strategic outlook, given these developments we would have expected the rebellion to escalate its attacks and intensify by 1961 and 1962. Yet the opposite happened. To fully understand the rebellion’s evolution and demise, the next sections consider levels of repression, organizational dynamics and public norms.

Availability of Tactics: Inclusion and Repression

As the previous sections have shown, before founding the Darul Islam movement, Kartosuwirjo participated in the political process and was an active representative of Masyumi. Starting with 1947 he intentionally renounced formal politics and began the groundwork for the NII and DI. Thus, it was not exclusion from politics that drove Kartosuwirjo to start transforming

the West Java branch of the Masyumi into what would later become the Darul Islam. Instead, external threats and the inability of the newly established Republic of Indonesia to stand up to the Dutch forces played a much more powerful role.

Once Kartosuwirjo set out to establish a parallel state and an alternative defense force, the issue of political inclusion was no longer about participation in the political process of the Republic, but rather about the acceptance of the NII/TII authority and the adoption of the NII principles, as developed in the constitution of the Islamic state. It was on these grounds that the DI differentiated itself from Masyumi and other groups advocating for an Islamic state within the framework of the Republic, which ultimately led to Masyumi denouncing the separatist element of the DI in December 1949 (Formichi 2012, 148).

The issue of inclusion in the case of the Darul Islam also needs to take into consideration the incorporation of irregular guerillas into the national army, and not just issues of political participation. As Feith notes, “as a result of the revolution, and the Japanese occupation which preceded it, at least half a million young men were torn out of civilian life in cities, towns, and villages, particularly in Java and Sumatra” (Feith 1958, 25). After the proclamation of independence, *Hizbullah*, for instance, also greatly expanded “into a powerful guerilla organization,” claiming a membership of 300,000 in early 1946, and about 20,000 to 25,000 armed men (van Dijk 1981, 75). One of the challenges immediately after the proclamation of independence in 1945 was to incorporate these irregular units, such as *Sabilillah* and *Hizbullah* into the national army (or more specifically, into the *Siliwangi* Division, which was the West Javanese Division of the national army).

By March 1946, Colonel Nasution already hinted at tensions between the Army of the Indonesian Republic (TRI) and irregular units, which according to Formichi he had tried to

incorporate into his own division for several months (Formichi 2012, 94). As mentioned in the previous section, deadly clashes between the *Sabilillah* units and the national army erupted in West Java as early as September 1947, when one of the local guerilla leaders was executed for treason when he suggested to turn against the Republic. But these early clashes were symptomatic of a greater challenge of demobilization and integration of irregular units, especially during a time when the Dutch threat and therefore motivation for armed struggle continued.

In January 1948 Soekarno ratified the order to integrate *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* troops into the National Army, but many of these militias refused to follow these orders and withdraw to Central Java (Formichi 2012, 95). In February 1948, right before the formation of the Islamic National Army and Darul Islam, hostilities between *Sabilillah* and *Hizbullah* units and the *Siliwangi* Division erupted once again in West Java. According to van Dijk, this was not simply because of opposition to the Renville Agreement (and therefore issues of policy convergence), but also because of resentment that guerilla members “were often passed over for promotion” and felt discriminated against (van Dijk 1981, 80). Formichi also reports that *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah* troops were frustrated that TNI units were better armed but unwilling to fight, often abandoning the battlefield in the face of the Dutch (Formichi 2012, 95).

This failure to successfully integrate irregular troops into the national army suggests that the formation of Darul Islam and the Islamic Army at the end of February 1948 was *not solely in response to external threats*, but also in response to a growing sense of **betrayal** by and **disillusionment with** the national army and the national leadership more generally. As we have seen in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood fighters in Palestine, this sense of betrayal was exacerbated by the fact that these irregular units had acquired a positive reputation as anti-

colonial fighters and national heroes. Failing to integrate and promote these soldiers within the ranks of the national army was tantamount to failing to recognize their contribution to the national struggle. When this was accompanied by arrests and an active anti-TII policy, the sense of *mistrust* and betrayal were severely exacerbated.

The first signs of the government actively turning against the Darul Islam came in August 1948, when the head of the Majelis Islam was arrested in Bogor for forming a TII branch (Formichi 2012, 117). Yet this was not enough to push the DI to turn against the government. When the Republican troops started returning to West Java in December 1948 and January 1949, their refusal to recognize the DI authority in the region provided a breaking point. A DI report from the British Embassy in Jakarta suggests that whereas the DI troops were previously loyal to the Republic and only demanded wide measures of local autonomy, the return of the troops led to a shift in the DI not only because it was seen as an intrusion on their autonomy, but also because the Republican troops threatened the TII monopoly of loot. Therefore, the Islamic army resisted Republican forces, inflicted many casualties, and from there “open warfare subsisted” (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 2). The fact that in 1949 the Republican army started collaborating with Dutch forces in order to destroy the DI strongholds (Formichi 2012, 130; British Consulate General in Batavia 1949) only served to deepen the antagonism towards the national government and to reinforce the sense of betrayal and mistrust.

The unfolding of events during the critical years of 1948 and 1949 suggests that the external threat from the Dutch was the most important factor that led to the formation of the TII. However, this external threat alone cannot explain why the TII turned anti-Republican and the NII came to become a state within a state. On one hand, the NII was an ideological project, and Kartosuwirjo’s insistence on the implementation of certain Islamic principles cannot be ignored

during this period and in subsequent developments. Yet on the other hand, events on the ground led to a growing sense of mistrust towards the government and betrayal by the Republican army. When government troops evacuated the region and the TII started seeing itself as the sole defender and the legitimate army of the region, this organization also took a life of its own. As such, it desired authority, supplies and recognition. All these were challenged when the Republican troops returned to the region, when the government started turning against the TII, and especially when the TNI collaborated with the Dutch to destroy the Islamic Army.

The combination of these factors explains why during this same time period, Kartosuwirjo refused to respond to two letters sent by Hatta, one from his exile in December 1948, and one after he had returned to Yogyakarta in 1949. In these letters, reportedly Hatta “asked if the Darul Islam and the Republic could elaborate a common strategy of defence against the Dutch; if Kartosuwirjo was interested in receiving a Republican medal for combat; and if he would reconsider his position on the Republic once and independent state of Indonesia was established” (Formichi 2012, 149). Given the circumstances on the ground, Hatta’s concessions were insignificant in alleviating the distrust and sense of betrayal, and signaled no intention to implement any Islamic legislation or to benefit the TII troops. Therefore, even though the Masyumi leadership at the time “was sure that once the Dutch had left, the situation would be easily revolved by removing the source of discontent in West Java” (Formichi 2012, 133), the DI rebellion continued even after the formation of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia in December 1949, and after the declaration of the State of Indonesia in August 1950.

After the NII was proclaimed in August 1949 and the TII and TNI were set on a path of collusion, subsequent attempts to negotiate with the DI or to incorporate the Islamic Army into the Republican Army failed. After the formation of the Republic of the United States of

Indonesia in December 1949, the Hatta cabinet took several steps in order to facilitate the rehabilitation of guerillas. According to Feith, this involved including guerillas in educational institutions, setting up training centers, allowing many ex-fighters to enter the government services, and starting a resettlement program for ex-fighters that would take fighters that were not accepted into the army to South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan (Feith 1968, 81). Yet at the same time, in March 1950 the government also undertook a large number of arrests against suspected supporters of DI (Formichi 2012, 152) , and after an attempt to negotiate with the DI failed, the government took a small-scale military action against the DI in June 1950 (Feith 1968, 82). It was also clear that the Minister of Defense at the time was in favor of large-scale operations against the DI, but the government proposed to first achieve settlement by negotiations and only undertake military operations if the negotiations would fail (British Embassy Djakarta 1950). Not only did this reinforce mistrust, but there were also no signals that the government had any intention of adopting Islamic legislation, and the Dutch threat continued to persist, as evidenced by Westerling's attempt to seize Bandung in January 1950.

Thus, in August 1950, the NII issued a statement that argued that “the unitary Republic was ‘a modern form of colonialism’,”¹⁷⁷ that the “transformation was in opposition to the principles of the 1945-49 revolution,” and that “it is impossible for the Islamic guerrilla to surrender its weapons’, because doing so would be the greatest betrayal to the Indonesian people” (Formichi 2012, 154). The fact that the founding principles of the DI still played an important role in the opposition to the state is revealed by the fact that Kartosuwirjo showed much more willingness to negotiate and renewed his demand for an Islamic state when the Natsir cabinet was formed, which gave Masyumi a strong political presence. In October, for instance,

¹⁷⁷ The subtext was that the Republic was a form of Javanese colonialism. I am grateful to Mark Woodward for pointing this out.

Kartosuwirjo sent a letter to Sukarno and Natsir welcoming the accession of Natsir's cabinet and urging the government to oppose communism and to proclaim Indonesia as an Islamic state (Kahin 2012, 76).

Natsir's cabinet was sympathetic towards the DI to the extent that it opposed a harsh military response and opted for negotiations and amnesty instead. On November 14, 1950, the government announced that it was giving guerillas an opportunity to report to the authorities and surrender themselves and their arms. In return they were promised admission into the armed forces or into the police (van Dijk 1981, 110).

While this overture from the government seemed impressive, there were also reasons to be suspicious. On one hand, as van Dijk points out, in September 1950 Natsir revealed the plan to reduce the size of the army and discharge about 80,000 soldiers (van Dijk 1981, 110–111). On the other hand, when a local DI leader surrendered in Central Java, his treatment by the TNI officers after the surrender “was not reassuring for other Darul Islam members and made them less willing to enter into talks with the government” (Kahin 2012, 77). Yet that being said, it is important to note that in Central Java Natsir's amnesty had significantly more success. Van Dijk notes that Natsir's offer set negotiations in motion, and at the end of November 1950 an agreement was reached on the content of the amnesty offer. The DI leader Amir Fatah and 2,000 of his men pledged to comply, and Amir Fatah was supposed to go to West Java and convince Kartosuwirjo to capitulate, though it is doubtful that he ever attempted that (van Dijk 1981, 144).

As the amnesty offer failed to achieve the desired results in West Java and did not demobilize the TII there, the government resorted to repressive measures, but this time aimed not just at armed guerillas but also at Masyumi members that were accused of being DI

sympathizers. In December alone 3,400 arrests were undertaken, and in some areas of West Java, the local authorities forbade Koran recitals and Muslim public sermons (van Dijk 1981, 112).

Kartosuwirjo made one last attempt to gain the recognition he desired from Natsir in a letter dated February 17, 1951. He stated that “If the government of the Republic of Indonesia was prepared to recognize officially the proclamation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (N.I.I.) as legitimate, then he could guarantee that the Republic would have a friend in life and death (that is, the N.I.I., against every sort of danger from abroad or from within their borders)” (Boland 1971, 61). On the other hand, if “this was not agreed, the Kartosuwirjo could no longer hold himself responsible for the fate of the country and people of Indonesia, neither before the Judgement Seat of history nor before the Judgement Seat of God” (Boland 1971, 61).

Not only did the NII not receive the recognition it demanded, but in March 1951 Natsir’s cabinet was replaced by the Sukiman cabinet, who took a much harsher stance against the DI. This approach became the predominant response to the DI over the next decade. By 1953, when Soekarno reiterated the importance of ending the NII (Formichi 2012, 160), the Darul Islam considered that the Republican government declared “war against the NII and the Indonesian Islamic Community” (Armed Forces Supreme Command of the Negara Islam Indonesia 1953). The confrontation between the DI and the Republic continued to escalate, taking an increasing toll on the civilian population in West Java. Another attempt at negotiation did not come forth until the government called for another amnesty of guerillas in 1961.

When the guerillas were given the chance to surrender in 1961, this time many DI members did so, including the principal military commanders (van Dijk 1981, 126). After Kartosuwirjo and his wife were capture on June 4, 1962, one of his sons “issued an instruction in the name of the *Imam* and President of the Islamic State of Indonesia ordering all *Darul Islam*

members who were still fighting to surrender” (van Dijk 1981, 126). The majority of members complied and swore allegiance to the Indonesian Republic on August 1st, 1962 (van Dijk 1981, 126). With that, the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java came to an end.

The 1961 amnesty offer was much more effective than Natsir’s 1950 amnesty because it came at a time when the DI as an organization was weak, and when it was clear that the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia in the entire archipelago was not feasible. In 1950, the DI did not trust the government, as already shown, but the organization was relatively strong, the leadership was highly motivated ideologically, and the prospect of establishing an Islamic state still held a shimmer of hope, as evidenced by Kartosuwirjo’s letters. By 1961 the repression of the DI severely weakened the organization. But the weakness was not just military. Perhaps even more important than the military weakness was the growing public opposition to the DI violence, and the gradual fading of the NII vision, as other regional DI rebellions were also subsiding. As the Egyptian cases have revealed and as will be discussed in the next section, these dynamics can lead to a growing sense of disillusionment with a cause, which in turn facilitates its ultimate demise.

Public Norms, State Legitimacy and the Viability of the NII

The Darul Islam emerged during a time of great political turmoil and struggle against colonialism, when many social organizations were militarized and violent norms were prevalent. At the time, most Islamic groups called for the establishment of an Islamic state, and the notion of a unitary Indonesian state was challenged on many fronts. Thus, even if not supportive, the public was initially at least tolerant of the Darul Islam. By 1960, however, the norms of resistance and the prevalent views towards the Islamic state changed, the Darul Islam rebellions

in Aceh and Central Java subsided, and the public became more supportive of harsh measures against the Darul Islam.

In the wake of the independence struggle, several prominent Islamic groups considered the fight against the Dutch a holy war. In 1945 Masyumi proclaimed armed resistance to the Dutch to be *jihad*, and on November 20, the chairman of the Masyumi shura council, who was also the founder and chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), called upon “all Muslims to defend the newly independent Indonesia from the ‘infidels who obstruct our independence’,” declaring it an individual duty (Formichi 2012, 81, 85–86). The Masyumi bulleting *al-Djihad* asked its readers to “rise in an Islamic revolution as a free and independent ummah ‘demanding freedom for its religion, people and islands’” (Formichi 2012, 87).

At a NU meeting in Surabaya in October 1945, the organization declared that the defense of the independence and of Islam was a holy war, and that resistance to renewed colonial conquest was a personal duty (Ricklefs 2012, 70). At a NU congress in March 1946 it was decided that “all Muslims – men and women, adults and children, armed and unarmed – living within a 94 km radius from occupied areas had the individual religious duty to fight the Dutch,” whereas those living outside this perimeter had “a collective duty (*fard al-kifaya*)” (Formichi 2012, 86).

Formichi points out that the modernist¹⁷⁸ wing in charge of Masyumi’s central board was reluctant to call the entire community to such a duty, and the party developed a general understanding that only a portion of the population is to undertake *jihad* (Formichi 2012, 86–87).

¹⁷⁸ The two mainstream strands of Islamic thinking and practice in Indonesia are the modernist (or reformist) movement, and the traditionalist movement. The modernists, associated with Muhammadiyah, suggest that religious practice should be based on the Qur’an and Sunnah, they promote the notion of *ijtihad*, and reject local religious interpretations and practices. For traditionalists, who are associated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the ulama have monopoly over religious interpretations, following the Syafi’i school of law for legal matters, the Ash’ariyah teachings in theology, and incorporating local practices of Islam (Burhanudin 2007, 11). Whereas Muhammadiyah is mainly an urban phenomenon, the NU is largely based in the rural areas.

For this reason, Masyumi had formed *Hizbullah*, which was to serve as its armed wing, and in November 1945 it also formed *Sabilillah*, aimed at the “general mobilization of the Islamic population” (van Dijk 1981, 76).

In addition to these armed groups under the umbrella of Masyumi, other armed wings and military training camps were also established in order to fight for independence. *Peta*, the Protectors of the Fatherland, was created in 1943, and it included officials, teachers, *kyais*, and Indonesian soldiers from the former Dutch colonial army (Ricklefs 2012, 68). *Barisan Pelopor*, the Vanguard Column, also began guerilla training in May 1945 (Ricklefs 2012, 68).

Resistance to occupation and the formation of armed factions was therefore a prevalent and acceptable phenomenon at the time that Kartosuwirjo decided to abandon formal politics. Furthermore, as previously mentioned by the end of 1946 Masyumi also openly called for “armed opposition against a Republican government that pursued overtly accommodationist policies” (Formichi 2012, 96). This was a similar context to the one in Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s, to the extent that the social context was permissive of violent escalation, political dissent was militarized, and there as a growing availability of ammunition and technological know-how to undertake violence. These conditions were not sufficient to lead to violent escalation on their own, but they certainly facilitated such escalation when grievances against both the external threat and against the government escalated.

Enveloped in the issue of national independence were also questions about the nature and territory of the new state. This led, on one hand, to regional tensions around local autonomy and resistance to Javanese predominance, and on the other hand to debates around the religious character of the state. Masyumi considered the formation of an Islamic state one of the two pillars of its political agenda, but it sought to do so through parliamentary consultation (Formichi

2012, 87). NU also supported the Jakarta Charter and implementation of *shari'a* legislation, as it considered the Pancasila a man-made ideology in contradiction to the Islamic belief in One God, and its propagation a case of apostasy (Arifianto 2012, 94).¹⁷⁹ Yet, NU also believed in the pursuit of the religious agenda through non-violent political participation.

Given this context, at the time Kartosuwirjo formed the TII and the Darul Islam there was a certain level of public sympathy for his project, and there were large numbers of irregular guerillas that he could draw into the TII. As the Darul Islam proclaimed the NII and began shifting to an anti-Republican stance, the mainstream Islamic organizations also began distancing themselves from the DI and condemned the violence and the separatist element, while also being strongly opposed to adopting repressive measures against the DI.

In December 1949, for example, Masyumi condemned the DI for using the banner of Islam to pursue a separatist agenda, and it renewed its commitment to pursuing an Islamic state through parliamentary methods (Formichi 2012, 148). At the same time, Masyumi also pushed for a “political solution” to the DI “problem,” hoping to be able to transform the organization into a civilian one (Formichi 2012, 149). In January 1950, Muhammadiyah and NU members of Masyumi in Ponorogo, East Java, condemned the DI as “unhealthy and un-Islamic because of its violent methods” (Formichi 2012, 149).

Formichi suggests that in 1949 and 1950 the public discourse about the DI violence was centered on the idea that “the religious movement had been hijacked” (Formichi 2012, 172). In political circles, especially those dominated by Masyumi, there was a strong push for

¹⁷⁹ As the discussion in chapter seven will show, starting with the 1970s the NU underwent a period of ideological reform, dropping the calls for an Islamic state and reframing its theological position so as to recognize the compatibility of Pancasila with Islamic principles. For an overview of the reforms in NU see Arifianto 2012. Munhanif also notes that even before that, the traditional ulama never developed the ideology of an Islamic state, and that NU was the most pragmatic political actor in the struggle for an Islamic state, seeking mainly to protect its religious beliefs and practices (Munhanif 2010, 241).

negotiations and finding a political solution to the rebellion (Foreign Office Research Department 1957; British Embassy Djakarta 1953a). While the army was generally more supportive of military action against the DI, in December 1951 a battalion is reported to have deserted when it received orders to undertake operations against the DI (Foreign Office Research Department 1957, 4).

The anti-colonial struggle and the resulting prevalence of armed bands and violent norms, as well as the public toleration of the DI during its formative years did not have a causal effect in terms of driving the organization towards violent escalation. Instead, these norms should be treated as enabling conditions that facilitated the rise of the DI, and ultimately its shift towards being anti-Republican. However, as the DI violence took a rising toll on the civilian population in the 1950s, the growing public condemnation and the shift in norms of resistance and of expressing grievances did assume a much more powerful causal role. Public condemnation and even support for harsh measures against the DI weakened the organization by affecting both its following and its morale, and ultimately leading to disillusionment with the DI cause.

In Central Java, the Republican government argued that one of the reasons why the DI leader accepted the amnesty at the end of 1950 was lack of support from the local population (van Dijk 1981, 144). In West Java, there started being signs of “public indignation against violence” by August 1953 (British Embassy Djakarta 1953b). Yet earlier that year, the issue of the Islamic nature of the state was still a salient concern for a significant portion of the population. These feelings were flared up by the President’s Amuntai speech in January 1953 stating that a unitary state cannot be based on Islamic legislation. This speech led to strong protests throughout the archipelago, and Masyumi leader Kiai Isa Anshary suggested that the speech helped the DI by “shutting the door for the Islamic community” that was pursuing the

vision of an Islamic state through parliamentary channels (Feith 1958, 160). By March, the Nationalist Party claimed that the speech inspired greater DI activity in the field (British Embassy Djakarta 1953a, 2), and in April a conference of ulama concluded that Indonesian Muslims had to “elect only those candidates, who aspired to the implementation of the teachings and laws of Islam in the state” (Nasution 1965, 103).

The debate over Islamic legislation and the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter re-emerged between 1957 and 1959, but then it decisively ended when Soekarno re-implemented the 1945 constitution in July 1959 and then banned the movements for the creation of an Islamic state. As previously shown, by 1961 the President dissolved the Parliament and installed a new one, the number of parties was reduced from twenty-eight to eight, Masyumi was banned, and the only parties that were recognized as legal had to recognize Pancasila. The NU was one of the eight recognized parties, and it dropped the call for the Jakarta Charter but instead continued to exert influence and protect the interest of its constituency by controlling the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

By 1961 then, the call for an Islamic state died down. Soekarno’s Presidential decrees made it evident that fighting for the implementation of the Jakarta Charter was a lost cause. As the unitary state was becoming entrenched, the Central Javanese DI rebellion subsided and the Acehese rebellion ended with an agreement,¹⁸⁰ the prospects of the NII surviving or thriving as an Islamic state were also quickly dissipating. Furthermore, for the Muslim community of Indonesia the debate over Islamic legislation was eclipsed by the much higher concern over the growing prominence of the communist party.

¹⁸⁰ It should be noted that in Aceh there also started being public opposition to the violence and support for negotiation as early as 1953 (van Dijk 1981, 321–322).

The PKI not only started growing in strength as early as 1952, but it had also been seeking to discredit the Masyumi in the 1950s by actively attempting to associate them with the DI. A British Embassy dispatch suggests that this policy went as far as calling on the government “to take measures against all people supporting the extremist Moslem insurgents” and creating an armed “battalion of volunteers to take the field against the armed gangs” (British Embassy Djakarta 1953c). In this context, the NII not only seemed like an unfeasible project, but the DI was being used to undermine an important political player in the Muslim community.

These factors, along with the rising toll of the rebellion on the civilian population decreased public support for the DI. In areas such as South Kalimantan, public rallies called not just for the dissolution of the communist party, but they also supported “firm measures” against groups that were opposed to the Pancasila, and condemned the DI rebellion to be “counter-revolutionary and a-national” (British Embassy Djakarta 1960c). In order to win over the population, the Indonesian government also started in 1958 to provide food and aid, and carried out development works in the areas damaged by the conflict. Solahudin argues that “by 1962 this strategy had turned the tide against the rebels” (Solahudin 2013, 41).

Boland also points out that from about 1960 Kartosuwirjo’s following began to decrease, as followers deserted, were taken prisoners, or “lost their belief in their leader when he was wounded by a bullet on April 24th, 1962, and appeared to be not invulnerable at all” (Boland 1971, 62).¹⁸¹ Formichi also notes that at the time the Soekarno regime pursued a campaign to portray the DI as “a group of bandits who had attacked Dutch and Republican soldiers in equal measure, terrorizing the civilian population and destabilizing the country” (Formichi 2012, 181).

¹⁸¹ As previously mentioned, Kartosuwirjo drew on mystical elements to build up his charisma and leadership. This led some of his followers to regard him as invulnerable and as *Ratu Adil* (just king). This claim was falsified when he was wounded by the bullet, even though he still holds this status for some of his followers. I am grateful to Mark Woodward for clarifying this point.

The public discourse focused “on the rhetoric of national betrayal”, and the DI “became associated with violence and, ultimately, with defeat” (Formichi 2012, 182). In the aftermath of Kartosuwirjo’s capture and execution, the government portrayed the DI as “a terrorist movement supported by antinationalist and anti-Republican forces, whose costs were borne most heavily by the civilian population, whereas the public debate on Kartosuwirjo’s ideology remained absent (Formichi 2012, 183).

It is these dynamics that made the 1961 amnesty offer much more effective, and which combined with a strong military campaign ultimately led to the end of the DI in West Java. The extent to which organizational dynamics played a role in the escalation or demise of the organization is examined next.

Organizational Dynamics

When Kartosuwirjo formed the Darul Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia, the state structure that he created was based on historical Islamic concepts (Nasution 1965, 86). At the head of the state was the *Imam*, who was assisted in matters of principles by an advisory board (Dewan Fatwa), whose members were appointed by the Head of State (Nasution 1965, 86). On administrative issues the President was assisted by the Cabinet (Dewan Imamah). Under the cabinet lay a series of territorial hierarchies, from regencies to sub-districts and villages (Foreign Office Research Department 1957). Much of this organizational structure remained largely on paper, even though the emphasis on hierarchical structures and the powerful role of the Imam played an important role for DI.

According to article three of the NII Constitution the highest authority lay with the Parliament (Madjelis Shuro), except in cases of emergency when the ultimate power would be in the hands of the Imam (Boland 1971, 59). In addition to the civilian administration, the Islamic

state also included the Islamic Army (TII) and a police force that reached down to the village level (Nasution 1965, 87). Kartosuwirjo was the Commander-in-Chief of the TII, and subordinate to him in West Java were three brigades and a total of twenty battalions (Foreign Office Research Department 1957).

The NII was set up as a “system of administration on a federal basis” (Foreign Office Research Department 1957). The headquarters were in West Java, but by 1957 the NII claimed seven territorial administrative districts, with local governments in West Java and Aceh, and nine military districts:¹⁸² West Java, Central Java, East Java, Sulawesi, Aceh, North Sumatra, South Sumatra, West Java (southern district) and Borneo (Foreign Office Research Department 1957). Whereas Kartosuwirjo was the supreme Commander-in-Chief, Daud Beureueh, the leader of the rebellion in Aceh, was commander in chief over Aceh, North and South Sumatra (Foreign Office Research Department 1957). A British Foreign Office report on the DI suggests that in 1957 it was doubtful that Kartosuwirjo had any real control over operations outside West Java, and that “Almost certainly, Atjeh, Celebes [Sulawesi] and Borneo go their own way in military and in civil affairs” (Foreign Office Research Department 1957).

In 1957, the DI leaders claimed a total of 138,500 regular forces spread over the eight territories, a total of 69,500 reserves and 723,000 sympathizers, as summarized in the following table. These numbers were clearly strongly inflated by the movement, but even as such they reveal the fact that the movement was highly dependent on public support. This was at least in part because the DI conceived of itself as a state, and as such its main source of financial support came from the taxes that it was collecting from the people (Nasution 1965, 87). This meant that the organization was forced to be sensitive to audience cost. It also meant that as the local population was evacuating the areas of DI control in the tens and hundreds of thousands of

¹⁸² As emphasized earlier, however, the extent of central DI’s control over other regional commands is questionable.

people, and as the government arrested sympathizers and came down on the population at large, the organization was bound to become severely weakened.

Table 8. Darul Islam Membership in 1957, as Claimed by the Movement Leaders.

	Regular Forces	Reserves	Sympathizers
Aceh	25,000	10,000	150,000
Central Sumatra	10,000	8,000	40,000
South Sumatra	5,000	4,000	22,000
West Java	30,000	20,000	150,000
Central Java	7,500	4,000	30,000
East Java	5,000	2,500	24,000
Sulawesi	50,000	16,000	285,000
Borneo	6,000	5,000	22,000
Total	138,500	69,500	723,000

Source: "Darul Islam in Indonesia," Foreign Office Research Department, July 30, 1957, DH 1015/122 INDON/18/57

In terms of its constituency, the Islamic Army drew on the guerilla units that emerged during the struggle for independence. As van Dijk points out, some of these guerillas were strictly local in character, some were ideological, whereas others had a strong ethnic character (van Dijk 1981, 343–344). This exacerbated the problem of forming a professional national army and demobilizing the rest of the guerillas. One of the estimates was that between 1951 and 1952 about 250,000 to 300,000 people required assistance to return to civilian life (van Dijk 1981, 351).

The strong presence of former guerillas within the DI, the fact that the administrative structure was developed after the formation of the armed wing, and the reports that the civilian administration within the NII was subordinated to the military leadership (van Dijk 1981, 122), all suggest that from its inception the DI was militarized. The Egyptian chapters have shown that the creation of an armed wing can create a slippery slope of militarization and lead to a shift from being anti-occupation to being anti-government. Given DI's *militarization* from its very

start, and the important role played by guerilla fighters, it comes to no surprise that TII took on an anti-Republican stance once its authority, its monopoly over loot and its legitimacy were questioned.

The structure of the NII as a federal state that competed for authority and legitimacy with the Indonesian Republic also turned the relationship with the government into a zero-sum game, at least for Kartosuwirjo, for whom the ideological principles of the Islamic state were critical. This is fundamentally different than the founding mission and the organizational structure of the Brotherhood, who could promote its vision of bottom-up societal Islamization through a variety of tactics and via diverse organizational units. DI's set-up as an alternative state prevented the ability to co-opt the organization through political participation or through more limited political concessions. But ultimately, as it set the DI in opposition to the Republic, as the unitary state became solidified and entrenched, the foundation of the NII as a parallel project also began crumbling.

The structure of the NII also placed the main authority and source of ideological argumentation in the persona of Kartosuwirjo. By 1962, Kartosuwirjo was in his mid 70s¹⁸³, suffering from diabetes and malnutrition (Solahudin 2013, 42), and as previously mentioned he also proved not to be invulnerable. This aggravated the *organizational weakness*, which facilitated the mass surrenders in response to the 1961 amnesty offer.

Causal Mechanisms


The main focus of this chapter has been to understand what dynamics account for the rise of the Darul Islam and for the organization's shift from fighting external forces to fighting the Indonesian Republic. Unlike the Egyptian cases explored in the previous chapters, the DI was a

¹⁸³ Solahudin reports that according to an internal NII document, Kartosuwirjo was 55 years old when he was captured (Solahudin 2013, 43).

politicized and militarized entity from its inception. But similar to the early period of the Brotherhood, this militarization led to a slippery slope that eventually made the organization turn against the government. This was not an issue of competition over leadership and authority within the organization, as was the case in Egypt, but more an issue of protecting organizational interest and authority, while also remaining devoted to the founding principles.


Whereas the DI differs from the Muslim Brotherhood on many ideological and organizational grounds, the groups share two causal mechanisms that in the presence of an external threat led to violent escalation and a shift to opposing the regime: a sense that the government has *betrayed* the Islamic community, the nation and the freedom fighters of the group; and a growing sense of *mistrust* in the government. Figures 15 and 16 summarize how these mechanisms came into play.

Figure 15. The Formation of the Islamic National Army (TII): Casual Mechanisms during 1947-1948




The Darul Islam and the Islamic Army were formed in the face of salient external threats from the Dutch forces, and after a growing sense of mistrust and disillusionment with the government. This disillusionment came from the fact that the Republican Army started clashing with the *Sabilillah* fighters, it proved incapable of adequately demobilizing and incorporating the irregular guerilla units, and it submitted to orders to evacuate West Java. In the face of growing external threats both to the region, which was transformed into the state of Pasundan, and to the Republic, whose leaders were captured by the Dutch in December 1948, the Darul Islam began assuming more and more the responsibility of a state. As the Indonesian Republic proved vulnerable, and especially after it was perceived as untrustworthy and having betrayed the DI and implicitly the Islamic community, the Darul Islam not only became anti-Republican, but it also proclaimed an Islamic State, which it sought to eventually extend to the entire archipelago. Figure 16 captures the causal mechanisms that account for this escalation and anti-Republican shift.

Figure 16. The Start of the Triangular War: Causal Mechanisms of Escalation during 1948-1949



Once the Darul Islam was set on a path of collision with the Republican Army, the tit-for-tat violence escalated, reinforcing the feelings of mistrust and betrayal. In this context, especially as external threats persisted and the newly established Unitary State of Indonesia did not follow the Islamic model that Kartosuwirjo envisioned, the DI refused to negotiate with the government, and it refused to lay down its arms. However, when Natsir's cabinet was appointed, who was much more sympathetic to the Darul Islam cause than other political groups, Kartosuwirjo attempted to negotiate with the government, which led to an amnesty for guerillas. Yet this amnesty was largely ineffective, partly because of the existing feelings of mistrust, and partly because the government had already revealed plans that the armed forces were to be reduced, making incorporation into the army unlikely. When the government began a new wave of arrests, it reinforced once again the sentiment of mistrust, making the DI unwilling to negotiate once again. Figure 17 captures these failed attempts at negotiation.


Figure 17. Failed Attempts at Negotiation: 1949- 1950



Whereas most of the attention of the chapter was spent on understanding the causal mechanisms of escalation, the discussion has also offered clues as to what contributed to the demise of the organization. The DI does not present a process of de-escalation, and as such we cannot talk about mechanisms of de-escalation.¹⁸⁴ Instead, the DI rebellion in West Java ran out of steam and eventually withered away after the death of Kartosuwirjo. The main reason for this is that the organization became severely weakened from a combination of repressive measures, loss of public support, and bans on all movements seeking to establish an Islamic state. In this context of weakness, even though grievances and reasons for mistrust persisted, the organization went a similar sense of *disillusionment* as we have seen with the GI in Egypt. However, the organization never reached a point of purposefully abandoning or rejecting violence. Instead, a new amnesty offer managed to attract many members and military leaders, and eventually led to the organization's demise. This process is captured in figure 18.

¹⁸⁴ Even though there was no de-escalation as such, it is perhaps relevant to note here that according to a DI fighter that was detained with Kartosuwirjo, the leader expressed disappointment with the fighters who surrendered but he also recognized that the form of *jihad* “must be changed because the conditions for *jihad* were not met” (Solahudin 2013, 207 – 208, note 59). This conclusion holds a fascinating similarity to the core argument of GI's ideological revision.

Figure 18. The Demise of the Darul Islam



Conclusion

The history of the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java suggests that certain causal mechanisms of escalation hold across national contexts and organizational specificities. The presence of an external threat or occupying force can be a powerful incentive for military resistance. Yet once an armed entity is established, the switch from fighting the external enemy to fighting the government can be surprisingly easy, especially if the organizational interests and values are at stake, and if the domestic regime inspires mistrust and a sense of betrayal. Ultimately, violent escalation follows the logic of grievances, whether they are aimed at an external enemy or whether they are caused by the government through a combination of divergent policies and repressive measures.

Whereas the DI was founded on a different ideological foundation than both the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, the overall argument that Islamist resistance groups are both principled and strategic stands. Ideological principles per se were not the main drive for violent escalation; but the ideological commitment to the establishment of an Islamic state was an important element of the DI overall strategy, and presented a major roadblock for negotiations between the group and the regime. As Formichi suggests, "for Kartosuwiryo, 'ideology' dictated the goals of the effort, while 'reality' determined its means in accordance with the current time and society" (Formichi 2012, 90).

In that sense, it is also relevant that Kartosuwirjo sought to establish an Islamic State, and not just to change particular policies at the national or regional level. This meant that there were much fewer options for accommodation or political inclusion, and that the authority and legitimacy of the DI were in direct competition with the authority of the state. In Aceh, where the grievances and demands were primarily regional, an agreement over regional autonomy was

possible. However, Kartosuwirjo's project did not seek regional autonomy but an alternative vision for Indonesia. As such, as the process of independence was finalized, and the Indonesian state began consolidating its form and its power, this vision was bound to decline.

Some authors suggest that to a certain extent the DI vision continues to this day. Ramakrishna, for instance, considers the Jama'a al-Islamiyah (JI), which is examined in the next chapter, the "latest manifestation of the historic subculture" of Darul Islam (Ramakrishna 2009, 115). The International Crisis Group, which has offered some of the most in-depth examination of the JI network and activity has also pointed out the links to the DI, arguing that the DI movement has produced a variety of splinter groups and offshoots and that it continues to inspire new generations of young militants (International Crisis Group 2005). Perhaps the most detailed and recent examination of the attempts to revive the DI movement after 1962 is offered by Solahudin, who carefully traces the revival of the DI network and its connection to the JI (Solahudin 2013).

Yet, as Solahudin's account makes clear, the movement that emerged from the ashes of the DI rebellions did not have the same organizational structure of the NII as a parallel state but rather transformed into an amorphous clandestine movement. This movement underwent some ideological revisions, and changed its tactics as well as the nature of its opposition to the regime. The DI during the 1970s and 1980s was no longer a rebellion attempting to establish a parallel state and clashing with the Republican Army, but rather a clandestine network giving rise to numerous splinter groups and offshoots, many of which became increasingly involved in unprecedented terrorist activities.

Because of that, this chapter has focused on the initial DI rebellions, centering on the events in West Java. The chapter has therefore talked about the demise of the DI and the end of

the rebellions. The next chapter will briefly explore the nature of the DI revival after the end of the rebellions, and focus on understanding the rise and evolution of the JI. As the discussion will reveal, whereas some links to the original DI can be established, organizations such as al-Jama'a al-Islamiyah represent a drastically different type of organization.

Chapter 6

Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyah and the Ambiguities of Disengagement from Violence

The previous chapter has traced the rise of the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java and has offered an explanation of why the insurgency died after the death of Kartosuwirjo. The Islamist insurgencies that started in the late 1940s and 1950s throughout Indonesia and became affiliated with the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) eventually died off by the mid 1960s. However, the Darul Islam as a network and the idea of the NII continue in Indonesia to this day. Yet the movement that emerged from the ashes of the initial DI rebellions took on a very different form than Kartosuwirjo's vision of a parallel state. It is from this reinvented Darul Islam that al-Jama'a al-Islamiyah (JI) emerged in 1993. Whereas scholars generally consider JI as a continuation of the DI struggle and legacy, analysts have also pointed out the ideological similarities to al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah in Egypt, who is said to have inspired the founding principles of the JI.

The organization gained international attention when it was associated with the October 2002 attacks in the most popular nightspots in Bali. Over the subsequent decade JI members staged a high profile violent campaign against tourists and Western targets. There continues to be debate on the extent to which most of the attacks are the responsibility of the organization as a whole or of factions within the organization. Some voices within the JI have publicly condemned the violence, and most members have disagreed with the attacks, including the spiritual leader and former emir of the organization, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Yet these disagreements have been primarily tactical and not principled, and the organization has not undergone the same sort of transformation that the GI has experienced in Egypt. While some defectors have spoken out

against the terrorist attacks on the basis of principle, their attempts to push for ideological revisions or for disengagement from violence have not had widespread results.

The JI therefore makes for an excellent case to examine what factors pull an organization towards or away from de-escalation, and to understand cases of failed de-escalation. Unlike the Egyptian cases, where the analysis traced the causal mechanisms of escalation and de-escalation, here the focus is on understanding how the contestation over violent tactics has evolved over time, and why the JI as an organization has not officially renounced and denounced violence. The JI is significant because if we were to place its strategic outlook in the categorization offered in chapter two (table three), it wavers between being actively violence and passively violent, continuing to survive and evolve without switching to a nonviolent strategic outlook. Understanding why the organization continues to pursue this path is relevant on its own terms for theory development, but also as a point of comparison with the Egyptian GI as a case of failed de-escalation. While the two organizations are not identical, as the discussion will reveal they share many similarities in ideology, background and goals, which make for a particularly suitable contrast.

The first part of the chapter briefly examines the transformation of the DI after the end of the rebellions in order to evaluate the extent to which the JI can be considered to carry on Kartosuwirjo's struggle. After revealing the circumstances under which the JI emerged as a distinct organization, the chapter explores the evolution of the JI after its return to Indonesia, and the contested escalation of violence. The chapter concludes with a discussion of why the JI has not denounced violence and with the challenges of counter-terrorism in Indonesia.

The Darul Islam Movement after 1962 and the Emergence of the JI

Most work on the Darul Islam in Indonesia is focused on the rise and fall of the various regional rebellions in the 1950s, with special attention on West Java, universally considered the heart of the rebellion. However, recently Indonesian journalist Solahudin has brought to light the evolution of the DI movement after the end of the rebellions and its revival during the 1970s and 1980s, drawing extensively on internal documents, personal interviews and interrogation depositions (Solahudin 2013).

Solahudin suggests that Kartosuwirjo's will sent the message to his followers that his aspirations for an Islamic state would be realized in the future (Solahudin 2013, 44–45). This message was accompanied by Kartosuwirjo's emphasis when he was captured that the Darul Islam struggle was entering a stage of *hudaibiyah*,¹⁸⁵ which implied a temporary truce that would ultimately lead to victory (Solahudin 2013, 43).

A few months after Kartosuwirjo's death, Ahmad Sobari, who claimed that Kartosuwirjo had entrusted him the interim government of the NII, attempted to revive the movement by forming the Negara Islam Tejamaya (Tejamaya Islamic State), but its influence and scope was limited to the small area in West Java (Solahudin 2013, 45). Ironically, by 1965 many DI leaders and former soldiers began collaborating with the army against the PKI. The DI leaders were

¹⁸⁵ The Treaty of Hudaibiyah was an agreement signed between the pagan and polytheistic Quraysh tribe, who controlled Mecca, and Muhammad, who after growing tensions with the Quraysh fled Mecca in 622 and settled in Medina (Pipes 1999; Smith 2006, 147). The agreement came about in 628 CE, when Muhammad wanted to organize a pilgrimage to Mecca but was declined entry into the city (Smith 2006, 148). The treaty held that the two sides “agreed to put down fighting on the part of people for ten years, during which period the people were to enjoy peace and refrain from fighting with each other”, and “that whosoever likes to enter the league of Muhammad and his alliance may enter into it; and whosoever likes to enter the league of the Quraysh and their alliance may enter it” (Smith 2006, 150). After signing the treaty, there was a report that the Quraysh had murdered a Muslim, but Muhammad ordered to release the captured Quraysh so that “they may prove guilty of breach of trust more than once (before we take action against them)” (Smith 2006, 152). In Medina, Muhammad built up his military power and entered in an alliance with the Bani Khuza'a tribe, whereas the Quraysh allied with the Bani Bakr tribe, and old rival of Bani Khuza'a. When in December 629 Bakr members killed several members of the Bani Khuza'a tribe, Muhammad decided to attack Mecca and refused the offer of material compensation for the deceased. Given the strength of the Muhammadan army, the Meccans surrendered in January 630 (Pipes 1999; Smith 2006, 153–154).

offered weapons in exchange for their help, and as the International Crisis Group points out, this cooperation was desirable both because of the opposition to the communists and as a way of avoiding further arrests (International Crisis Group 2005, 3). After 1965, the cooperation with the army grew even closer (Solahudin 2013, 49), and by the late 1960s DI elements were beginning to re-emerge, with Aceh leader Beureueh at the helm (International Crisis Group 2005, 3). However, the movement that was rising from the ashes of the old rebellions was significantly different than Kartosuwirjo's NII in many ways.

First, unlike the initial "abode of Islam," which implies a concrete territory and which aspired to be a self-sufficient state with its own army and administrative structure that was even seeking recognition from foreign embassies, the movement that was re-emerging after the late 1960s was a fractioned, clandestine network that was mainly striving to continue the idea of an Islamic state rather than embody it. The New Order took advantage of these divisions and manipulated various DI factions against each other, so that Kartosuwirjo's legacy was primarily ideological (Ramakrishna 2009, 83). Yet even ideologically, Solahudin shows how the movement reinvented itself and adjusted to the new context.

In spite of its collaboration with army and intelligence officers (some of which had once served in the *Hizbullah* wing, the predecessor to the TII), the new DII was from the beginning decisively anti-government, and "adopted a structure intended for war against the Indonesian government" (Solahudin 2013, 4). In 1967 DI members Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir set up a clandestine radio station in Solo that broadcast calls for *jihad* in Central Java (Ramakrishna 2009, 88), and by the early 1970s the newly emerging DI was actively seeking funds from Libya, organizing military training and preparing to wage *jihad* to uphold Islamic law in Indonesia (Solahudin 2013, 59).

According to Solahudin, because Libya would only give weapons and funds if there was political upheaval in Indonesia, in March 1976 DI members decided to form a *jihadi* organization that would undertake various terrorist attacks, such as hijacking a plane and bombing civilian targets (Solahudin 2013, 62). This group set up explosives at a Christian hospital, Methodist church, a cinema and bar and even a mosque (Solahudin 2013, 62–63). The different DI elements involved in these attacks were subsequently collectively labeled by the government as Komando Jihad, and the Indonesian intelligence agency BAKIN allowed this to occur before decisively moving in and rounding up the people involved (Solahudin 2013, 65).¹⁸⁶

After the wave of arrests in 1977 and then again in 1980, the DI leaders decided to change the structure of the movement, adopting a division of labor among propagation, education, logistics and finance, and shifting from Kartosuwirjo's hierarchical model to a cell structure (Solahudin 2013, 72). Every cell was to have between five to ten members, and only the cell leader would have contact with the director or branch head (Solahudin 2013, 72). This *usroh* (family) model was inspired by the Islamist groups in Egypt, and was subsequently also adopted by non-violent groups such as the tarbiya student movement or the Hizbut Tahrir.

In addition to the new structure, by the 1980s, after the old generation of DI leaders were all in custody, the new attempts to revive the movement for an Islamic state were also marked by a geographic shift from West Java to central Java, and new ideological tenets (Solahudin 2013, 75). Inspired by translations of Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi,¹⁸⁷ the new Islamist vision emphasized much more a political understanding, placing a heavier focus on the notion of *tawhid*

¹⁸⁶ Some suggest that Ali Moertopo, the head of Special Operations, in fact was actively involved in reviving the DI elements and creating Komando Jihad, providing patronage in exchange for support for the Golkar party (Sidel 2006, 208).

¹⁸⁷ Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi was one of the earliest articulators of Islamism and one of the most prolific Sunni Islamist writers. Mawdudi espoused the concept of an Islamic state based on the principle of *tawhid* (oneness) and sole sovereignty of God, and he promoted the idea of spreading Islamic norms in order to guide the society on the Islamic path and bring about an Islamic state. He is also credited with first developing the idea of a new age of *jahiliyya*, which was subsequently developed in greater detail by Sayyid Qutb. See Euben 2009, chapter 3.

(oneness) and giving rise to a *takfiri* strand within DI thinking (Solahudin 2013, 78). The notion of oneness implies that absolute authority to make laws must rest only with Allah, and the acceptance of Allah’s law became the “sole indicator of faith,” which in turn implied that to reject Islamic legislation equated to being an unbeliever (Solahudin 2013, 78).

Solahudin argues that in the early 1980s, partly as a result of the discussions with Muslim Brotherhood member reaching at the Arabic Language Education Institute, the DI changed its views on *takfir* and confined it to the government and its agents (Solahudin 2013, 101). From this perspectives, fellow Muslims were not unbelievers but merely victims of an anti-Islamic government (Solahudin 2013, 101). Inspired by the Iranian Revolution and angered by the 1982 move to make Pancasila the only ideological basis for the state, the DI sought to assassinate the President, but several plans failed (Solahudin 2013, 110–115). The group then decided to attack Bali, which according to Solahudin was the first time that foreigners were a target since fighting the Dutch; however, the attackers died in an explosion on the way to Bali (Solahudin 2013, 123–124).

This spurred a new wave of crackdowns, which pressed DI members Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar to flee to Malaysia and escape the order for their arrest (Solahudin 2013, 125). During the same period, DI members also started going to Afghanistan, which infused the movement with new ideas about global jihad and the establishment of a caliphate (Formichi 2012, 189; Solahudin 2013, 140). It is against this background of DI affiliation, exile in Malaysia and training in Afghanistan that Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir declared the JI as a new organization on January 1, 1993.

The Establishment of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah

Some consider JI as the manifestation of the jihadist faction of the Darul Islam (Formichi 2012, 190), emerging out of frustration with the quietist approach to implementing an Islamic state (Abuza 2009, 195) (Abuza 2007b, 1). Others point to rising disagreements between Masduki, the emir of the DI, and Abdullah Sungkar (Temby 2010; Solahudin 2013). The growing contention between the leaders was not necessarily over violence, but over religious beliefs, authority and money.

Ajengan Masduki came from a traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama background, and therefore was leaning more towards mystical beliefs and Sufi practices. Abdullah Sungkar, on the other hand, leaned much more towards the purist approach of salafis, and therefore considered Masduki's beliefs and practices as "un-Islamic" (Solahudin 2013, 145; Temby 2010, 32; Machmudi 2008, 42). Solahudin reports that Sungkar went as far as repeatedly warning Masduki to abandon Sufi teachings (Solahudin 2013, 150). But beyond disagreements over mysticism and purism, Abdullah Sungkar and Ba'asyir also began developing a different understanding of what form the struggle for an Islamic state should take.

Solahudin suggests that the trigger for Sungkar establishing the JI was when he was instructed to open up Darul Islam embassies in a number of Islamic countries. Sungkar refused, arguing that the DI was not equivalent to a state, because an Islamic state would need to have control over a territory and to uphold Islamic law in that territory (Solahudin 2013, 149). Whereas Masduki believed in the old NII model and thought the movement still had a stake in the Islamic state, Sungkar considered that the DI lost the Islamic State and the NII structure was no suitable anymore.¹⁸⁸ Sungkar and Ba'asyir considered that in their context it was instead much more appropriate to think of an Islamic community, or in other words a *jama'a*. The state

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Nasir Abas, June 26, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia.

was an ineffective institution because the structure could be easily infiltrated and dismantled by the authorities, whereas a society built on cells avoided mass exposure (Temby 2010, 34).

As early as 1976 Sungkar and Ba'asyir decided that it would be more beneficial to form a *jama'a*, since the Prophet's instructions mentioned that the only legitimate struggle was via a community (Solahudin 2013, 84). The two even discussed this idea with twelve religious scholars in Solo, but the latter rejected the idea. Solahudin points out that it is not clear why Sungkar and Ba'asyir abandoned the idea to form their own group at that point, but instead they both joined the DI movement instead (Solahudin 2013, 84). It is therefore no coincidence that when Sungkar decided to split from Masduki, the newly established group would be called *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah*. Temby cites JI leader Abu Rusdan as saying that:

"We wanted to think concretely [...] The ideal of an Islamic State is not gone. What's gone is the starting point that we still have an 'Islamic State.' [...] Our starting point would now be with the jamaah." (Temby 2010, 34)

As important as these divergent views and visions are, Sungkar's break with Masduki was ultimately also an issue of authority and monetary quarrels. When Masduki visited Afghanistan together with Sungkar and Ba'asyir in 1988, Machmudi suggests that Sungkar became the spokesman of the group because of his Arabic knowledge, gave rise to frictions between the leaders and led to Sungkar attempting to demonstrate his dominance over all Afghan veterans (Machmudi 2008, 42). When Sungkar students criticized DI elders for their Sufi beliefs, Masduki moved to sideline him and formed a financial investigation team to look into how Sunngkar was using DI funds (Solahudin 2013, 151).

Insider accounts also suggest that in addition to the ideological differences, Sungkar was accused for not submitting regular financial reports and for not paying the share of contribution towards the DI headquarters.¹⁸⁹ When Masduki tried to replace Sungkar as Foreign Minister, the latter refused to be replaced given his strong links to Afghanistan, and instead moved to create his own organization.¹⁹⁰ Nasir Abas recounts how in January 1993 the DI members in Afghanistan were told that Sungkar and Ba'asyir split up from the DI, and every member was asked separately whether they would choose to follow Masduki or Sungkar. If they chose Masduki they were to return to Indonesia or Malaysia, if they would choose Sungkar they could stay in Afghanistan. For Abas the choice was strategic and not ideological as he wanted to remain in Afghanistan, and therefore he took a new oath to follow Sungkar.¹⁹¹ With that he was no longer considered part of the NII, but became officially a member of the new JI.

Everybody who remained in Afghanistan became part of the JI, the NII group there was disbanded, and the training camp at Towrkham came under the control of the newly established organization (Abas 2011, 95). The JI remained in Afghanistan until 1995, when the Taliban conquered Kabul. After leaving Afghanistan for a couple of years, JI leader Hambali returned to Afghanistan in 1997 to re-establish links, when there was a new wave of Arab fighters setting up camps in Afghanistan. With the help of Hambali, who by 1998 assumed responsibility for the Malaysia and Singapore region within the JI structure (*The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* 2004, 151), a new wave of JI members started training with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan between 1998 and

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Muhammad Wildan, June 10, 2013, and interview with Nasir Abas, June 26, 2013, both in Jakarta, Indonesia.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Nasir Abas, June 26, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

2000.¹⁹² But during the same time period the situation in Indonesia changed drastically, and after the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Sungkar and Ba'asyir returned to Indonesia with their JI cadres.

The remainder of the chapter examines the evolution of the JI and its contested relationship with violence, focusing on the period after the organization returned from exile in Malaysia and started re-organizing in Indonesia.

JI's Return to Indonesia and the Contested Escalation of Violence

In February 1998, Al Qaeda issued its famous fatwa calling for jihad against the West and for a war on the United States and its allies. This fatwa led to a debate within the ranks of the JI on whether the focus of their struggle should continue to be Indonesia or whether it should become the global struggle (Solahudin 2013, 8). In August, Ba'asyir and Sungkar wrote a letter to Darul Islam figures in West Java with the message from Osama bin Laden, but the idea was rejected (Solahudin 2013, 172). Whereas many leaders from Java and Sumatra refused to join bin Laden's war on the grounds that the conditions in Indonesia were different and terrorist attacks would be counter-productive, other leaders from Malaysia, such as Hambali, Mukhlas, and Imam Samudra, wanted to join the anti-Western struggle (Bubalo and Fealy 2005, 85). Thus, some JI cadres and leaders went back to Afghanistan and trained with Al Qaeda, under the leadership of Hambali. In Indonesia, however, the fall of President Suharto in May 1998, opened the space for the other JI leaders to return and for the organization to develop its base in Indonesia.

In spite of the political openings JI did not join the non-violent political arena. Instead, it became involved in the clashes that broke out between Christians and Muslims in Ambon (in the Maluku Islands) in the beginning of 1999, and in Poso (Central Sulawesi) in 2000. The direct attacks on Muslims in Indonesia turned the debate over fighting the near versus the far enemy irrelevant, and "opened the door to *jihad*" (Solahudin 2013, 173–174).

¹⁹² Ibid.

In the summer of 1999, the JI collected funds for the struggle from the Action Committee on Crisis Management (KOMPAK) that was under the auspices of the Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia (DDII) (Solahudin 2013, 175), and by the end of the year it became involved in the fighting in Ambon. The organization established two separate paramilitaries to carry out the fighting: Laskar Mujihidin in Maluku and the Laskar Jundullah in Central Sulawesi (Abuza 2007b, 1). By late 1999 JI leader Hambali also established a separate small team, the Badar Battalion Islamic Army (Tentara Islam Batalyon Badar –TIBB), which was to undertake secret operations against priests, churches and members of the Christian community who played a role in Poso and Ambon (Solahudin 2013, 179).

By the summer and fall of 2000, JI members began organizing attacks on Christian places of worship and priests, and it staged a failed assassination attempt on Philippine’s Ambassador in Jakarta (Solahudin 2013, 180–181; International Crisis Group 2011; Oak 2010, 993; Abuza 2007a). The first large-scale attack came in December 2000, when on Christmas day twenty-five bombs detonated in eleven cities across Indonesia, killing nineteen and wounding one hundred and twenty (Solahudin 2013, 181; Bubalo and Fealy 2005, 80; Oak 2010, 1014). The International Crisis Group reports that the attacks were staged by Hambali’s faction, though Abu Bakar Ba’asyir most likely knew about the attacks (International Crisis Group 2011, 3; International Crisis Group 2002, 5).

This level of violence against places of worship was controversial even within the JI, and many Afghan alumni disagreed with the attacks, especially as one of the perpetrators admitted that he had not found weapon stockpiles in the churches, which had been the allegation of the group undertaking the attacks (Solahudin 2013, 184). It is therefore problematic to treat this level of escalation as a JI strategy rather than the outburst of a militant faction within the JI network.

The story becomes even more complicated because whereas Ba'asyir was most likely aware of the plans to attack the churches, he neither planned nor opposed them, and in August 2000 he also established the Mujahidin Council of Indonesia (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia –MMI) as a forum for all movements seeking the implementation of *shari'a* law in Indonesia. The MMI is an interesting entity as it strives to “create a conducive condition for the peaceful implementation of Islamic Shari'a” (Wahid 2007, 86), it accepts membership from any group in society and it seeks to involve state institutions, “because without the state’s authority the enforcement of the Shari'a will not be effective” (Wahid 2007, 82).¹⁹³ The MMI was criticized by a number of JI followers who regarded it as the abandonment of the founding principles as a secret organization struggling to counter society (Zuhri 2010, 261), and who decried working with representatives of Muslim political parties (International Crisis Group 2002, 3).

Whereas Ba'asyir began coordinating a non-violent struggle for the implementation of *shari'a*, Hambali's Badar Batallion continued to target places churches in 2001, bombing a church in Jakarta and a church in Central Java in July 2001, and planning an attack on a service held at a mall in Jakarta in September 2001 (Solahudin 2013, 1984). Hambali and members of the JI cell in Malaysia also coordinated with Al Qaeda to attack American, Israeli, British and Australian diplomatic missions in Singapore at the end of 2001 and in 2002, but the Singaporean security service intercepted the plot and arrested many of JI's members in Singapore (Solahudin 2013, 185; Ramakrishna 2004, 1).

Hambali, however, was not arrested, and began new plans for a major attack in 2002, together with Imam Samudera, Ali Imron, Umar Patek, Dulmatin, Amrozi, Mukhlas and Srijjiyo (Solahudin 2013, 186). Solahudin notes that initially the plan was to attack an Australian school

¹⁹³ While the MMI accepts the Indonesian Republic as a state, it denounces its democratic form as an embodiment of polytheism and it condemned Abdurrahman Wahid's government as infidel because of its support of democracy and cooperation with Jews (Wahid 2007, 99).

in Jakarta, but because this would result in schoolchildren and Indonesian guards being killed the plans switched to a mine in Lombok that was run by an American company (Solahudin 2013, 186). However, these plans were also changed when it became clear that most workers were Muslim, and the new target was set on Bali, in spite of Ali Imron's hesitation to bomb public places outside of the conflict zones in Ambon and Poso (Solahudin 2013, 187).

Hambali was also planning simultaneous attacks coordinated with Al Qaeda against U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam and Cambodia; however, these plans were spoiled when Al Qaeda leader Omar al-Faruq was arrested by the Indonesian police in June 2002 and handed over to the CIA (Vaughn et al. 2009, 8). After al-Faruq's confessions became public, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir held several meetings in which he "argued strenuously that bombings and the armed struggle for an Islamic state should be put on hold for the time being because they would have negative repercussions for the movement" (International Crisis Group 2002, 4). It is important to emphasize here that Ba'asyir's opposition to major attacks was not based on any principled condemnation of violence as a tactic, but on the fact that the attacks would be counter-productive. As we have seen with the GI in Egypt, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, this does not necessarily reflect a purely strategic attitude, but can also be interpreted as a commitment to the religious precept that violence should be avoided if its cost outweighs the benefits.

In spite of Ba'asyir's warning against major attacks, on October 12, 2002 the JI faction planning attacks coordinated bomb explosions at two clubs in Bali killed over two hundred people and injured three hundred and fifty (Oak 2010, 1014). This was the first large-scale attack on tourists and against the "far enemy" in Indonesia, and once again it created disagreements

among JI members, many of which considered that the greater priority should be the near enemy and that the benefits of the attacks were outweighed by the cost (Solahudin 2013, 192).

After the 2002 Bali attacks, another faction within the JI, this time led by Noordin Mohammed Top, started coordinating attacks against Western targets, staging one major attack every year between 2003 and 2005. On August 5, 2003 the group attacked the Marriot hotel in Jakarta, killing twelve people and injuring almost one hundred and fifty (Oak 2010, 1014). On September 9, 2004, a blast in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta killed nine and injured one hundred and eighty (Oak 2010, 1014). On October 1, 2005, suicide bombers struck Bali once again, killing twenty and injuring one hundred (Oak 2010, 1015). The International Crisis Group notes that most JI members criticized the actions of Noordin Top not on moral grounds but because they generated public outrage and were expensive (International Crisis Group 2007, 4).

During this period in which Noordin Top's cells organized yearly attacks against Western targets, the JI became involved in the communal conflict in Poso. As Solahudin notes, between 2003 and 2006 the JI military team was responsible for dozens of attacks against Christians. In November 2003 a Christian minister and his driver were found dead near Poso, in May 2004 a Central Sulawesi prosecutor was shot dead in what was deemed to be the act of a JI cell, and in November 2004 a village chide in Poso was found beheaded with the blame once again going to a JI cell (Oak 2010, 1014). In May 2005 a bomb exploded at a market in Central Sulawesi, killing twenty-two and injuring seventy, in an attack that authorities also attributed to JI cells working with local affiliates (Oak 2010, 1015). On October 29, 2005, three Christian schoolgirls were beheaded in Poso, and a local JI cell leader claimed responsibility for the attack (Oak 2010, 1015). Another bomb exploded at a Christian market (pork market) in December 2005, killing eight and wounding forty-eight (Oak 2010, 1015). October 2006 also witnessed attacks on

Christian pastors in Palu (Central Sulawesi) and in Bandung (West Java), and in June 2007 a Christian teacher was killed in Palembang (South Sumatra) (Oak 2010, 1015).

Whereas JI actions in Poso did not stir much controversy, a new wave of criticism of attacks that resulted in Muslim casualties came at the end of 2006 with the translation of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's book "A Correction of the Results of Jihad to Date" (Solahudin 2013, 197). This will be addressed in greater detail in the discussion of ideology, but for now it is important to note that the arguments caused debate within the JI and a shift back towards local issues. Large-scale actions against Western targets subsided after the second attack on Bali in 2005, until Noordin Top organized another attack in July 2009, this time on Marriot and Ritz Carlton, killing seven and injuring fifty-three people (Oak 2010, 1015).¹⁹⁴

This was the last large attack staged in Indonesia to date,¹⁹⁵ and it led to a renewed debate over the usefulness of violent tactics. Since 2009, violent episodes have continued in Indonesia, but as the International Crisis Group notes, they have been primarily the acts of small groups that act independently of large organizations (International Crisis Group 2011), have no trained leadership or lengthy indoctrination process, and often blur the lines between jihadists and "Islamist thugs" (Jones 2012a).¹⁹⁶ JI members have been associated with military training in Aceh, but the organization as a whole has been primarily focused on strengthening its base and focusing on local grievances such as the police or the Ahmadiyah sect (International Crisis Group 2011). This lull in violence, however, does not mean the organization has ideologically renounced violence, but is primarily a reflection of JI's current weakness.


¹⁹⁴ The International Crisis Group notes that in December 2007 a plan to bomb a café in West Sumatra was aborted at the last moment and the perpetrators were arrested shortly after (International Crisis Group 2009).

¹⁹⁵ The organizers of the 2009 attacks on the Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels also planned to kill President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, but the plot was intercepted (Jones 2012b).

¹⁹⁶ Sidney Jones points out that the number of plots by small groups in fact seemed to skyrocket between 2010 and 2011, even though they only resulted in the death of ten police officers in 2010, and three police officers in 2011 (Jones 2012b).

The general overview of violent tactics associated with the JI and factions emerging within its ranks is captured in Figure 19. The remaining sections of the chapter will examine what dynamics led to the violent escalation, and why in spite of contestation over tactics and debate over the usefulness of large-scale attacks, the JI has not undergone a similar process of de-escalation as the Egyptian GI.

Figure 19. Violent Tactics Associated with JI and JI



Ideological Justifications for Violence

As previously mentioned, many scholars discuss the JI as a continuation of the Darul Islam, and in doing so they imply a certain level of continuity in both the social network and in terms of ideological principles. Ramakrishna, for instance, considers the JI to be “the latest manifestation of the historical subculture” of Darul Islam (Ramakrishna 2009, 115), a part of a “charismatic group” that shares certain core beliefs and a common identity, in spite of being heavily factionalized (Ramakrishna 2009, 105). These core beliefs include: 1) an intense sense of existential identity anxiety and fear of group extinction in the face of Westernization, secularism, nationalism or other cultural threats, 2) an almost pathological propensity for black-and-white, categorical thinking, 3) a strong sense of moral entitlement and acute sense of being victimized, 4) large power-distance orientations engrained in Javanese traditionalism, and 5) desire to purify the Islamic community (Ramakrishna 2009, 83–85). Beyond these attributes, however, Ramakrishna suggests that the JI represents a more virulent part of the DI movement, and points out that unlike the DI, which sought to establish an Islamic state, JI (at least before 2002) was concerned with a caliphate and wanted to extend the struggle to other countries with ethnic Malay communities (Ramakrishna 2009, 86).

Whereas the DI and the JI followers might have some common psychological attributes, as Ramakrishna suggests, in terms of religious understanding, founding ideology and acceptable tactics there are some important differences that go beyond merely struggling for a state versus a caliphate. Indeed both groups adopted an understanding of Islam as a comprehensive system, and believed that political life had to be structured based on the Islamic model. Yet as the previous chapter has shown, Kartosuwirjo’s movement emerged out of anti-colonial fervor, and his understanding of both jihad and of who the enemy is changed over time. The vision was to

establish an Islamic state as an alternative to the Indonesian Republic, which at the time that the DI was formed seemed to be crumbling under Dutch pressure. The Republic and its troops were not initially seen as the enemy, but became the enemy once they were perceived as betraying the national and the religious cause and once they started clashing with the DI on the ground.

The JI grew out of the DI legacy, but its founding ideology had a significantly different starting point. The JI leaned much more towards a salafi orientation, envisioned itself as a society first, struggling to reform the state and ultimately establish a caliphate, and was inspired by Qutbist notions of fighting apostasy and overthrowing the state. From its inception, the JI perceived the state as an enemy, and violence against the state was an acceptable tactic. While over the years debates emerged within the ranks over the notion of *jihad*, it was mainly a debate about the timing, target and scope of the struggle.

The JI leadership designed a set of guidelines known as “General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al Jamaah al Islamiyah” (Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al Jamaah al Islamiyah, or more commonly referred to as PUPJI), which was strongly inspired by the writings of Najih Ibrahim and the guidelines of the Egyptian GI.¹⁹⁷ Solahudin argues that Sungkar obtained the Egyptian book from GI activists in Afghanistan and adopted all the principles, but made some changes that were inspired by the DI doctrine of *hijrah* (flight), and also added the vision of establishing a caliphate (Solahudin 2013, 153–154). Abas notes that knowledge of PUPJI principles is restricted to leaders within the organization, and that PUPJI is “a set of broad guidelines allowing for initiative to be conferred upon the regional leadership” (Abas 2011, 113–114).

¹⁹⁷ The influence of the GI on the JI ideology is contested. Muhammad Wildan, for instance, argues there is no JI document or statement that states it is adopting the GI model, and the DI had already offered a clear system with rules, canons and mechanisms. Interview, June 10, 2013, Jakarta. Nasir Abas also recognizes that the influence of the GI has been just in terms of the ten principles included in PUPJI, because they are general principles about Islamic faith. Interview with Nasir Abas, June 26, 2013, Jakarta.

Like most Islamist groups, including the DI, MB and GI, the JI adopts the notion that Islam is a comprehensive system. Out of the ten principles in PUPJI, principle three states that “our understanding of Islam is *shumul* (comprehensive)”, and the tenth principles starts by stating that “Our implementation of good deeds for Islam is pure and complete in manner” (Abas 2011, 115, 117). Solahudin argues that another text that the organization uses for potential members states that Islam does not recognize the division between faith and Islamic law and “whoever divides them and takes only one of them is deviant, an unbeliever and apostate” (Solahudin 2013, 159).

This understanding brings the JI much closer to the Qutbist thinking, which according to Solahudin inspired DI leaders like Aceng Kurnia after the death of Kartosuwirjo, when the remnants of the DI tried to re-organize and lead a process of ideological renewal (Solahudin 2013, 4–5). It is this adaptation of the original DI ideology that JI inherited. As we have seen from the previous discussions on Egypt, from this perspective, the doctrine of *tauhid*, or oneness of God, implies that only Allah has the right to govern and formulate laws, and whoever infringes upon that is seen as an unbeliever (Solahudin 2013, 4–5).

As previously mentioned, unlike the DI, the JI believed that it is first important to develop a counter-society, and only after that a counter-state, which would be the stepping stone towards the restoration of the Caliphate (Pavlova 2007, 781–783). The fourth principle of PUPJI states that “the objective of our struggle is for mankind to serve Allah alone by the re-establishment of the *Khilafah* (Caliphate) on this earth” (Abas 2011, 115), whereas the tenth principle notes that “our implementation of good deeds for Islam is pure and complete in manner, by means of being in *Jamaah*, then *Daulah* (state), then *Khilafah* (Caliphate)” (Abas 2011, 117).

This long-term goal of establishing a Caliphate is envisioned as proceeding in stages. In order to establish a state, first it is necessary to establish a *jamaah* (or society), which implies a “rightly guided leadership” as well as a *tanzim sirri* (secret/ clandestine organization) (Abas 2011, 118–119). Solahudin notes that Sungkar was inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood activist Sheikh Munir Muhammad al Ghadhban, who called for preaching openly but organizing secretly (Solahudin 2013, 152).

After the establishment of the organization it is important to develop the strength of the organization, which includes physical training and military exercises as well as economic strength and funding (Abas 2011, 119–120). The next step of employing the organizational strength to uphold the Islamic state is to be carried out “at places of conflict for the care of the Islamic community who are under attack, wherever that place may be in this world” (Abas 2011, 121).

It is only after these initial steps that JI envisions establishing a secure base (or *qa'idah aminah*) in a particular region where Islamic law can be implemented, after which it is possible to develop state like administration that can carry out interstate diplomatic relations, and ultimately establish a Caliphate as “an Islamically administered federation which implements Islamic law in accordance with the guidance of the Prophet Muhammad” (Abas 2011, 122–123).

In terms of acceptable tactics, the JI is also similar to the Egyptian GI, but it adds the notion of *hijrah* (migration). Thus, the proscribed methods of the JI are: 1) preaching (*da'wa*), 2) education (*tarbiyah*), 3) promoting the good and restraining from that which is forbidden (*'amr ma'ruf wa nahi an munkar*), and 4) emigration (*hijrah*) in order to save the faith (*iman*) and the belief (*aqidah*), and struggle in the path of God (*jihad fir sabilillah*) (Abas 2011, 112). Abas notes that in regards to the military aspect of *jihad*, the struggle must be undertaken when the

amir of the group “has already pronounced or declared war or authorized involvement in war to assist the Islamic community,” but “without the permission of the Amir of Al Jamaah al Islamiyah and the Fatwa from the Fatwa Council of Al Jamaah al Islamiyah then the members of Al Jamaah al Islamiyah are not allowed to undertake the business and capacity of warfare, and furthermore, may not carry out military acts” (Abas 2011, 122).

Whereas the founding ideology legitimized military struggle in the defense of the Muslim community, as we have seen from the overview of the JI-related attacks, what that actually implies on the ground has remained contested. The communal violence in Poso and Ambon were perhaps the clearest examples of attacks on the Muslim community, and that is where the JI as an organization was explicitly committed to becoming engaged in military defense. Yet the Christmas church bombings were organized by a faction, and they raised controversy among Afghan alumni over whether it would ever become acceptable to target places of worship in the defense of the Muslim community (Solahudin 2013, 184).

The plans to coordinate activities with Al Qaeda and the attacks against Western interests also came under criticism from JI leaders such as Ba’asyir, primarily on the grounds that they had or would have negative repercussions for the movement (International Crisis Group 2002, 4). In an interview with Scott Atran, Ba’asyir for instance disagrees with bin Laden’s notion of total war and killing Americans wherever they may be, arguing that “if this occurs in an Islamic country, the fitnah (discord) will be felt by Muslims,” which is why Americans should be attacked in their own country (Ba’asyir 2005, 25). Ba’asyir also revealed that he considered the Bali perpetrators martyrs, because “they all had a good intention (niat), that is, Jihad in Allah’s way,” and “they are right that America is the proper target because America fights Islam” (Ba’asyir 2005, 18). Thus he concludes:

“So in terms of their objectives, they are right, and the target of their attacks was right also. But their calculations are debatable. My view is that we should do bombings in conflict areas (war zones) not in peace areas. We have to target the place of the enemy, not countries where many Muslims live.[...] In my calculation, if there are bombings in peace areas (where there is no fighting), this will cause fitnah (discord) and other parties will be involved. This is my opinion and I could be wrong. Yet I still consider them mujahid. If they made mistakes, they are only human beings who can be wrong. To err is human. Moreover, their attack was part of their (Muslim) self-defense.” (Ba’asyir 2005, 18).

In spite of these debates and controversies, the leaders of the movement did not issue the same level of comprehensive ideological revisions as was the case in Egypt. At the end of 2006 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s book was translated into Indonesian, and it criticized attacks that caused Muslim casualties and that brought greater costs than benefits (Solahudin 2013, 197). Former JI leader Nasir Abas also began speaking out against the JI violence, criticizing the Bali attacks based on Quranic principles about the reasons for war and the issue of civilians. He emphasizes that Islam allows war only when a peace treaty was violated, when the enemy began fighting or when there was a threat of war and the formation of fitnah (discord) (Abas 2011, 227). Furthermore, he also emphasizes that Islam calls for just behavior during warfare. He critiques the Bali attacks because among other issues, there is for instance no evidence that the tourists “were from the side which was in agreement with the actions of their governments who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Abas 2011, 259). Furthermore, even when reprisal is carried out, it can only be carried out on the doer, through instruments of the same sort, in the same manner, and only by the victim or the victim’s representative (Abas 2011, 260).

Since leaving the JI and speaking out against the violent attacks, Nasir Abas has also worked with ex-prisoners, trying to convince them to join the anti-terrorism campaign. About fifty of them have agreed to do so, writing opinion letters and giving speeches, primarily arguing that Indonesia is currently not the place to undertake jihad because it is not a conflict area and the

battlefield is not clear. However, if conflict in Ambon and Poso were to break out again, that would constitute symmetric warfare where armed struggle can be justified.¹⁹⁸

At the end of 2010 a JI affiliated press also released a publication entitled “Political Vision of the Islamic Movement,” which accused many jihadists in Indonesia of acting “without taking into consideration public opinion, costs and benefits, the importance of delegitimizing the enemy and the need to have a work plan and strategy” (International Crisis Group 2011, 6). The publication argued that “in assessing costs and benefits of a jihad operation, those involved need to study the local sociopolitical context to understand the likely impact,” so that “no action should be taken without considering religious law, political context and the realities of the movement” (International Crisis Group 2011, 6).

Whereas these reconsiderations are important, they did not lead to any fundamental strategic shifts within the JI as whole, and to the same fundamental changes in ideology or structure as in Egypt. However, as the International Crisis Group points out, the JI as an organization and the jihadi ideology in Indonesia has shifted in recent years, though not necessarily in the direction of disengagement with violence. Instead, the JI has decentralized and turned primarily into a network of cells, and the notions of *jihad* as an individual duty have become more prominent, reinforcing that shift towards individual initiatives and small group actions outside of organizational hierarchies (International Crisis Group 2011).

The ideological tenets held by the JI members play an important role as an inspiration and motivation for violent struggle. Yet while these beliefs are necessary, they are not sufficient in explaining the timing and the immediate triggers of violent attacks, and in particular of the violent escalation that culminated in large-scale terrorist attacks. The remaining sections explore

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Nasir Abas, June 26, 2013, Jakarta.

the potential impact of government policies and external pressures, public attitudes and organizational dynamics.

Policy Convergence

As an organization concerned with the implementation of Islamic legislation and with the creation of Caliphate, JI is arguably sensitive to government policies regarding religious life and Islamic legislation, as well as to issues pertaining to the global Muslim community more broadly. Of course, whether this sensitivity is the cause or the trigger for its actions and for any shifts in its strategic outlook is a separate question.

After the fall of Suharto, Indonesia on one hand moved towards greater incorporation of *shari'a* principles in the national law, but on the other hand, as Otto notes, most of the changes “can also be interpreted as the successful efforts by the state to incorporate, subjugate, and control Islamic law as a subsidiary part of national law and governance” (Otto 2010, 480). For groups desiring the establishment of an Islamic state, the expanding jurisdiction of the religious courts, the national laws on Islamic economics, the Islamic law compilations issued by the government and the growth in regional adoption of Islamic regulation should have been perceived as favorable policies, bringing the state that much closer to the adoption of Islamic legislation. At the end of the day, however, Indonesia’s constitution has remained secular, and Islamic banks and religious foundations are now regulated and supervised by national agencies (Otto 2010, 480). Furthermore, the two largest mainstream Muslim organizations in the country, NU and Muhammadiyah, are supportive of Pancasila and decisively opposed to re-instating the Jakarta Charter and imposing *shari'a* laws.

What this means is that government policies after 1999 were therefore neither fully convergent nor completely divergent with the vision of the JI. This suggests that domestic policy

convergence is unlikely to be the major trigger for JI affiliated attacks, and unlikely to lead to any drastic shifts in strategic outlook. If we look at the timing of changes in religious affairs after 1999, we also find a very weak link to the JI strategies.

After the JI leaders returned to Indonesia and began re-organizing, it became clear from the 1999 elections that the democratic opening would not lead to the establishment of an Islamic state. The only parties supportive of establishing an Islamic state by adopting the Jakarta Charter, the PPP, PBB and PK, received 10.7 percent, 1.9 percent and 1.36 percent of the votes, respectively (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 34). It is entirely plausible that this reinforced among JI members their opposition to parliamentary politics and democracy, and that it proved the futility of political participation for achieving an Islamic state. Sidel, for instance, argues that “the context for the onset of jihad in 2000 was one of disappointment if not despair with regard to the precipitous decline and ongoing reversal of Islam’s gains in the 1990s” (Sidel 2006, 211).

However, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir did not completely discount the potential impact of non-violent lobbying, even though he did not revise his overall ideology or implement any drastic changes within the JI. In August 2000, he helped establish the MMI (Mujahidin Council of Indonesia), which proposed changes to the criminal code and pushed the Parliament to propose the Jakarta Charter once again during the annual assembly (Wahid 2007). Even though the MMI initiatives failed to achieve the desired results, both the timing and the targets of the violence suggest that it is unlikely that the JI affiliated violence that was beginning to emerge by 2000 was caused by these negative outcomes. Instead, the JI affiliated violence was primarily in response to the growing communal violence in Ambon and Poso, as will be revealed shortly.

As the JI faction led by Hambali switched from attacking Christians to attacking tourists and Western targets, and as the Noordin Top faction continued the attacks against Western

targets, it is unlikely that these incidents were triggered by domestic policy convergence, because after 2001 de-centralization was favorable to the push for Islamic legislation, especially in Aceh. As Otto points out, Act 18/2001 on the special autonomy of Aceh became “the legal basis for the provincial government of Aceh to issue a number of regional regulations called ‘*qanun*’ (Arabic for law) on several contested issues” (Otto 2010, 452). Between 2002 and 2003 Aceh enacted several such regulations with regard to *shari’a* courts, worship, intoxicants, gambling and relations among sexes (Otto 2010, 462). After 2004 regional autonomy was expanded even further. Beyond Aceh, some 160 such religious regulations have been enacted in at least twenty-four provinces (Otto 2010, 461). Others suggest that there are 30 districts that are implementing some degree of *shari’a* (Abuza 2007a, 31).

Besides the increased ability to implement Islamic regulations through de-centralization several other factors also favored the Islamist agenda. During Megawati’s presidency, with the appointment of Hamzah Haz as Vice President, debate over the Jakarta Charter was re-opened in 2002 (Abuza 2007a, 29), polygamy occurred openly and trouble-free, and the “government’s control and supervision of religion seemed to lose some of its strength” (Otto 2010, 453). In 2003, the National Assembly passed a law that made teaching of religion compulsory in both public and private schools and that required all schools to build Muslim prayer rooms (Abuza 2007a, 30).

After 2004 there was also movement towards both increasing the penetration of Islamic regulation and towards greater control over religious issues. The supervision of religious courts, for instance, was transferred from the Ministry of Religion to the Supreme Court, but in 2006 the jurisdiction of religious courts was expanded over economic issues and strengthened in inheritance cases between Muslims (Otto 2010, 454). In 2005 the quasi-official Ulama Council

of Indonesia issued hard-line fatwas banning secularism, religious pluralism and inter-faith marriages or prayers, and called for a ban on the Ahmadiyya group (Abuza 2007a, 86; Otto 2010, 455). The draft bill of the new criminal code presented to the President in January 2005 included some references to sexual morality and virtuous behavior, but the bill was shelved (Otto 2010, 473).

In 2008 an anti-pornography law was passed and it was supported by the secular Golkar Party and the PD (Democratic Party) (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 41). What is particularly interesting about this law is that it also allows members of the public to participate in “preventing the spread of obscenity” (Otto 2010, 475). In 2008 the Indonesian Supreme Court also issued a Compilation of Economic Sharia Law, which is not a law itself but which contains guidelines on property, contract, almsgiving, gifts and *shari'a*-based accountancy (Otto 2010, 475). That same year, a new Sharia Banking Act was passed by parliament, which incorporates Islamic banking into the national banking system and creates a committee composed of officials from Bank Indonesia, the Ministry of Religion and *shari'a* experts to incorporate the MUI issued relevant fatwas into the Bank’s regulations (Otto 2010, 476). Last but not least, in June 2008, a joint decree was issued by the Minister of Justice and Minister of Religion warning the Ahmadiyya adherents to return to true Islam, but also calling for an end to attacks on the group (Otto 2010, 455–456).

The initiatives towards greater incorporation of Islamic regulations documented here suggest that JI affiliated violence occurred *in spite* of the government accommodating religious aspirations, albeit to a limited extent. Therefore we can conclude that low policy convergence on domestic issues is not what triggered the violence. On the other hand, moves towards higher policy convergence might have convinced some leaders to pursue non-violent tactics as well, but

these developments were not enough to bring about any drastic ideological revisions or comprehensive disengagement from violence, as we have seen in Egypt. The political openings contributed to Ba'asyir's attempt to also push for an Islamic state through legal, non-violent manners, through the establishment of the MMI. Yet neither the MMI nor the Islamist parties, such as PBB, PPP or PK/PKS were able to revive the Jakarta Charter or to implement drastic changes to the religious character of the state.

Policy convergence, however, is not just about religious legislation and the creation of an Islamic state. As already mentioned, policy convergence also depends on the foreign policies of the government and to the safety of the Muslim community more broadly. In the case of Indonesia, this refers primarily to the extent to which Indonesian foreign policies are seen as subservient to Western powers and detrimental to the Muslim community worldwide, as well as the extent to which fellow Muslims are safe in different areas of Indonesia. On these issues, policy convergence had a much more powerful role in triggering violent escalation.

The most powerful aspect of policy convergence was the communal conflict that broke out in Ambon between 1999 and 2002, and in Poso between 1998 and 2005. The most unequivocal involvement of the JI as an organization in violent tactics was in response to these two communal conflicts, where the organization sought to protect its fellow co-religionists.

In both Central Sulawesi and in Maluku the fighting started with small incidents between Christian and Muslim youth gangs, which then escalated and spread until armed groups engaged in "violent pogromlike attacks on entire neighborhoods and villages populated by residents identified as believers in the opposing religious faith" (Sidel 2006, 155). In Poso (Central Sulawesi), a human right group estimated that more 140 people had been killed and nearly 2,500 homes destroyed by the end of 2001 (Sidel 2006, 165). In Ambon (Maluku), by early March

1999, there were over 100 casualties and as many as 70,000 refugees fled the city (Sidel 2006, 178). By January 2000, “official sources estimated that more than 1,6000 people had been killed in Maluku Utara since August 1999, and tens of thousands displaced by the violence” (Sidel 2006, 182).

The killing of 27 Muslims in Ambon on Christmas Day 1999, the massacre of hundreds of Muslim villagers in Tobelo, the large number of Muslim internally displaced people and the alleged participation of Protestant police officers in the violence all raised serious concerns for the welfare of the Muslim community in Maluku, not just among the ranks of the JI but also for Islamic organizations and political parties in Jakarta (Sidel 2006, 183). In January 2000, the leader of Muhammadiyah Amin Rais “joined other leading politicians at a rally in early January in Jakarta, attended by an estimated 100,000 militants, in calling for jihad to save muslims in Maluku” (Sidel 2006, 183). By May 2000, about 3,000 Laskar jihad recruits and hundreds of other Muslim paramilitary troops arrived in Maluku, and over the subsequent months staged aggressive paramilitary attacks on Christians (Sidel 2006, 184).

Sidel 2006 argues that the violence in both Central Sulawesi and in Maluku erupted during a time of great uncertainty and anxiety around religious identity and authority, as growing decentralization and the introduction of competitive elections threatened to change the existing power structures. Outside of these two regions, however, the conflict was framed by Salafi groups as an attempt to destroy the Muslim communities. Hasan for instance shows how after the conflict in Maluku broke out, Salafi leaders deployed three major frames. First, they argued that remnants of a separatists group from the 1950s that was supported by Netherlands “deliberately instigated the conflict in an effort to set up a Moluccan state that would be based on Christian principles” (Hasan 2006, 108). The second frame was one of Muslim cleansing and Christian

conspiracy to expel all Muslims from the Moluccas (Hasan 2006, 108). To this end, magazines such as *Media Dakwah* published accounts of Christians attacking praying Muslims, raping women and killing hundreds of injured Muslims and pregnant women, and amateur films were distributed that displayed atrocities committed by Christians (Hasan 2006, 109). The third frame accused the Zionists for inciting the conflict in order to destabilize Indonesia (Hasan 2006, 110). These frames effectively created a sense of an *existential threat to the Muslim community* in the Maluku, which led to a sense of solidarity among Muslim groups across the ideological spectrum, but which also led to a growing sense of urgency around the adoption of defensive *jihad* in Poso and Ambon.

The first large-scale attack organized by the Hambali faction, the Christmas Eve bombing of December 2000, was certainly triggered by the communal conflict, even though it is reported to have also received funding from Al Qaeda. The attack was caused by strong feelings of *fear* and *revenge*. But the incident set a powerful precedent for JI leaders to form their own teams and pursue *jihad* on their own, outside of the formal JI structure. These organizational dynamics will be explored in greater detail below, but here suffice it to say that *salient threats to the Muslim community* in different regions of Indonesia played a powerful role towards escalation. However, the resolution of these conflicts did not prevent JI factions from continuing to undertake attacks against Western targets, in the name of defending the broader Muslim community.

Perceived salient threats to other Muslim communities outside Indonesia also played an important role for JI members. Whereas most Islamist groups around the world invoke the well-being of the *ummah*, the JI is significantly more “international” than many other Islamist groups, and certainly much more interconnected to Muslim struggles outside of Indonesia than the

Egyptian GI. This is not just an issue of founding ideology and the aspiration for re-establishing a caliphate, but also an issue of constituency, networks, and structure. Before the JI was established as a separate group from the NII, its future leaders and members were in exile in Malaysia and had trained in Afghanistan, where they worked closely with separatist rebels from Mindanao in southern Philippines. As Abas reveals, “the connection held between al Jamaah Al Islamiyah and the Moro State Fighters has been one of close involvement since around 1985 in Pakistan and Afghanistan” (Abas 2011, 153–154). Many members of the NII who later joined JI “acknowledged themselves by the name Mujahidin of the Philippines” (Abas 2011, 154). In 1994, the JI also set up a training camp in Southern Philippines for the Moro Islamic fighters (Abas 2011, 156). Last but not least, the structure of the JI into *matiqis* (regions) also reveals the organization’s regional if not global character, as it included areas of command for Malaysia and Singapore (*Mantiqi 1*), as well as Mindanao in South Philippines (*Mantiqi 3*).

Whereas Ambon and Poso were triggers for JI involvement in communal conflict and for Hambali forming a faction that escalated tactics and organized the Christmas church bombings in 2000, events in Mindanao in 2000 triggered a different level of escalation, namely from communal conflict to targeting political actors. In April 2000 the Estrada regime in Philippines “waged an all-out war” against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Swain 2007, 14). It is therefore no coincidence that in the middle of their involvement in violence against Christians in Poso and Ambon, JI members also staged an attack against the Philippines Ambassador in Jakarta. While the assassination failed, the shift in target represents an important escalation that once again underlines the *slippery slope* of militarization, and the ease with which political actors or government representatives can become the targets of violence if they are perceived to put the Muslim community in danger. This slippery slope led to even further escalation and

another shift in target after 9/11, when the United States started training the Philippine army's anti-terror unit and encouraged the country to crack down on its terrorist group (Swain 2007, 14). It is at this point that Hambali collaborates with Al Qaeda elements and plans the first Bali attack, which was the first terrorist attack against tourists and perceived Western targets in Indonesia.

It is no coincidence that the attacks against the Philippine Ambassador and the first Bali attacks were undertaken by Hambali, with the help of Mukhlas, who became one of the bombers for the Bali attacks. As Abas reveals, Hambali was sent by the NII leader Masduki to live in Mindanao in 1991, along with other NII members, such as Fahim, Nasrullah and Shamsudin, who had belonged to Mukhlas's detachment at the Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy (Abas 2011, 49). Nasrullah was also sent to Mindanao again in 1994 to help set up a training camp for the Moro State Fighters (Abas 2011, 156–157). These connections between the JI members responsible for the violent escalation in 2000 and for Bali 1 and the Moro Islamic Fighters reinforce the argument that the situation in Mindanao and the situation of Muslims in Southern Philippines were salient issues for the Hambali faction.

Once Hambali established the precedent of a JI faction pursuing *jihad* on its own, targeting political actors and staging large-scale attacks against tourists, Noordin Top's faction continued along the same line starting in 2003.¹⁹⁹ In fact, the International Crisis Group suggests that the trigger for the 2003 Marriot attacks was the fact that members from Hambali's team had leftover explosives from the Bali bombings, and Noordin did not want these explosives to go to waste (International Crisis Group 2006, 3). By 2003 the United States was fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan, which was also seen as an attack on fellow Muslims, which might explain why

¹⁹⁹ The International Crisis Group points out that Noordin also trained in Mindanao, went to Ambon, and had strong ties to Mukhlas, who had been his mentor and who continued to give Noordin Top materials for religious discussion groups even while on death row (International Crisis Group 2006).

after 2003 all the major attacks in Indonesia were against American allies or Western tourists. As the subsequent discussion on norms will reveal, public opposition to the U.S. war in Iraq was widespread among all sections of the Indonesian society.

By 2005 Noordin claimed to have formed a separate Al Qaeda group of the Malay Archipelago. Whereas American foreign policy and President Megawati's initial pledge immediately after 9/11 to help US counter-terrorism efforts²⁰⁰ played an important role, it is perhaps also no coincidence that this happened after the situation in Southern Thailand became increasingly tense in 2004, escalating from the imposition of martial law in January, to Thai security forces killing thirty-two people in a historical mosque after militant attacks in April, and ultimately the Tak Bai incident, where the military crackdown on demonstrations killed eighty-seven people (Laohasiriwong and Chee 2007, 25). The link between the repression in Thailand and the escalation in Indonesia, however, is not as strong and clear as between the violence in Poso and Ambon and the repression of MILF in the Philippines.

The Ambiguous Effects of Political Openings

The examination of the GI has revealed that whereas repression was not the initial catalyst for violence, it nonetheless reinforced the logic of grievances and led to a spiral of escalating violence that ultimately led to large-scale attacks on civilians. On the other hand, after the organization has revised its ideology and completely disengaged from violence, the political openings in 2011 and 2012 reinforced the preference for non-violent strategies such as participation in the political process.

²⁰⁰ Megawati was the first leader to visit Bush after 9/11 and pledged to help, even though later Indonesia took a very firm line on certain things and opposed the war in Iraq, sending a "very calibrated message so as not to draw attention to itself as a target of terrorism." Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy for Political Affairs, Office of the Vice President, remarks at Jakarta Foreign Correspondent Club panel discussion on de-radicalization in Indonesia, October 18, 2012, Jakarta.

In Indonesia repression certainly reinforced the logic of grievances within the DI elements re-emerging in the 1970s and 1980s, as briefly discussed above. Given JI's roots in the NII, in many ways the founding ideology of the organization, the legitimization of violence and even the adoption of the clandestine cell model are therefore in response to Soeharto's repressive measures. However, the political openings after 1998 represented an important shift and reversal of repressive measures against NII elements and clandestine Islamist opposition groups. Even though military training was clearly conducted under Sungkar, therefore signaling intention to one day stage violent attacks, the impetus for the initial violent escalation in 1999 and 2000 was not repression by the Indonesian regime, but rather the growing threat to the Muslim community in Poso and Ambon, as the previous section has revealed. That being said, as the previous section also discussed, the harsh repression undertaken in April 2000 in Southern Philippines against MILF did have a powerful impact on certain constituencies of the JI, and pushed the Hambali faction to escalate its tactics. This suggests that repression does reinforce the *logic of grievances* and *existential fear*, even when it is not done by one's own government.

The timing of the attacks in Indonesia underlines that the lack of repression is not enough to prevent escalation. The political context after 1998 opened the space for legal and non-violent avenues of contestation or for struggling for the establishment of Islamic legislation. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has attempted to take advantage of this space and has pursued the JI vision through multiple avenues, establishing the MMI in 2000 and the JAT in 2008. JI as an organization has also focused more and more on *da'wa* and religious education, especially since 2006 (Abuza 2007b, 4). Yet the *political openings were not enough to lead to major ideological revisions or to reinforce collective disengagement from violence*. Aside from the violent work of Hambali and Top's splinter groups, JI resumed military activities in Poso between 2003 and 2006. As has

already been mentioned, if violence breaks out in Poso and Ambon they are considered legitimate battlefields. Because of this, any disengagement from violence on the part of JI members is conditional on the stability in Central Sulawesi and Maluku.²⁰¹

Ba'asyir argued in 2002 against organizing large-scale attacks because the timing was not right and because they would not be effective given the context. However, Ba'asyir has also made it clear that whereas the timing for armed struggle is not right, *jihad* against the U.S. and Western allies is a religious obligation (Woodward, Amin, and Rohmaniyah 2010, 9).

Some reports pointed to the fact that the attacks came two days before a court was to deliver its verdict on some of the suspects of the 2002 Bali bombings, arguing that JI members called the attacks a warning to President Megawati not to clamp down on militants (The Straits Times, 2003). However, the first large-scale arrests of JI members in Indonesia did not occur until October 2002 in the aftermath of Bali 1, therefore well after the initial escalation in Ambon, the Christmas bombings, the attempt on Philippine's Ambassador and other attempts at malls in Jakarta. Hambali also started plotting with Al Qaeda by December 2001, which led to massive arrests in Singapore that same month. The arrests after Bali 1 rather than causing further escalation actually led to criticism of the Bali attacks. As Solahudin points out, the crackdown affected not just the perpetrators but also JI members who were opposed to the attacks, which "generated considerable resentment towards the perpetrators," especially since the costs of the attacks outweighed their benefits (Solahudin 2013, 192).

Some suggest that it wasn't until the 2003 Marriot attacks that the Indonesian government started admitting that terrorism was a problem. After the attacks the Vice President made it a point to tell people that there are terrorists living among them, and TV channels aired

²⁰¹ Anonymous interview, October 15, 2012, Jakarta.

shows about people being sworn in as terrorists.²⁰² Other actually say that it took the Embassy attacks and Bali 2 and arrests of senior JI leaders for Indonesians to accept that there was a problem.²⁰³ Nonetheless, the yearly attacks between 2002 and 2005 were matched with frequent arrests of terrorist suspects and JI members, such as in January, February and April 2003 (Oak 2010, 1016), August 2003 (Vaughn et al. 2009, 15), June 2004 (Abuza 2007a, 49), June and July 2005 (Abuza 2007a, 59), June 2007 arrest of the two most senior leaders (Solahudin 2013, 195; Abuza 2007b, 1), January 2008 and August 2009 (Oak 2010, 1016). Solahudin argues that the June 2007 capture of JI interim commander Zuhroni and military chief Abu Sujanaka crippled the organization and forced it to shift its attention “away from militancy towards Islamic propagation” (Solahudin 2013, 195).

Even though the JI was severely weakened by these arrests, compared to the GI in Egypt the organization was still able to operate and pursue *da'wa*, and after September 2008 many members also had the option to join Ba'asyir newly establish JAT. Because of this, while the JI was weakened, it did not reach the same level of organizational crisis as the GI in Egypt. In spite of its emphasis on proselytizing, it also did not undergo the same drastic transformation and revision as the GI.

Indonesia “has prided itself on treating terrorism as a crime, to be addressed by civilian law enforcement agencies” (Jones 2012b). However, the hunt for terrorist suspects has at times led to deadly clashes and gun battles. In October 2003, a key JI operative and bombmaker was killed, and in November 2005 another bombmaker and Malaysian leader was killed (Oak 2010, 1016). In January 2007, government forces were alarmed by the large number of militants converging near Poso and organized a raid that set off a gun battle, which killed fifteen suspected

²⁰² Anonymous interview, October 31, 2012, Jakarta.

²⁰³ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy for Political Affairs, Office of the Vice President, remarks at Jakarta Foreign Correspondent Club panel discussion on de-radicalization in Indonesia, October 18, 2012, Jakarta.

fighters and a police officer (Abuza 2007b, 4). In March of the same year, Detachment 88 arrested seven and killed one in East and Central Java (International Crisis Group 2007, 1). In a September 2009 raid in Solo, police shot dead Noordin Top and several of his accomplices (Solahudin 2013, 198), and in October of the same year Noordin's accomplice and protégé was also killed (Oak 2010, 1016).

The lethality of some of the raids has not had a drastic impact on the JI strategy and has not been a major factor in the escalation of tactics by the factions of Hambali or Noordin Top. However, they have led to an increase in individual initiatives to undertake *jihad* against police officers (International Crisis Group 2011), as well as to public apprehension about government policies towards the JI. The latter issue of public norms is addressed more explicitly in the next section.

Public Attitudes, State Legitimacy and the Legacies of Authoritarianism

The examination of the GI in Egypt has revealed that the move towards ideological revisions and disengagement from violence came primarily from a growing sense of disillusionment with the mission, arising in a context of organizational crisis and strong public condemnation. The previous section has shown that in the case of the JI, the arrests of the top leaders has severely weakened the organization, but not to the same level of deadlock as in Egypt. This section will reveal that the Indonesian case also differs in terms of public attitudes. Public opposition to the JI attacks did rise significantly after Bali 2, so that by 2006 when the organization shifted towards *da'wa* activities it was in a context of weakness, public opposition to attacks and growing support for the United States and even the American-led war on terror. However, the public does not seem convinced that the JI is to blame for the violence, and the organization was never faced with the same levels of public condemnation as the GI in Egypt.

Together, these two differences (organizational dynamics and public attitudes) explain why in spite of a growing shift towards *da'wa* over armed struggle, the Indonesian Jama'a has not undergone the same radical transformation as the Egyptian Gama'a.

Post 1998 Indonesia faced numerous episodes of violence in the name of religion, ranging from town riots, anti-witchcraft campaigns, inter-religious pogroms, Islamist paramilitary mobilization and terrorist attacks (Sidel 2006). Sidel argues that this religious violence erupted "amid heightened states of uncertainty and anxiety as to religious identities and their boundaries, and attendant efforts toward the (re)definition of the self and the (re)articulation of claims of authority" (Sidel 2006, 13). Other authors point out that the system of power that replaced the new order has seen "rise of hooligans and thugs organized in party militia and paramilitary forces, many of which have taken over some of the functions of the security forces proper" (Hadiz 2004, 619). Yet in spite of this prevalence of violence, the Indonesian public is widely opposed to attacks against civilians, and has become increasingly critical of violent tactics such as suicide attacks since the rise of terrorist attacks in their country. Whereas there has been some support for jihad in Ambon, there has been much less support for attacks against tourists, and JI has always remained a fringe movement in society.

A 1999 U.S. State Department poll, for example, found that 40 percent of Indonesians said that bombing civilian targets were often or sometimes justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies (Terror Free Tomorrow 2014). These attitudes have shifted dramatically since then, and in the last decade public opposition to attacks has steadily increased, reaching higher levels than in Egypt, for instance, as revealed by table 9.

Table 9. Public Opposition to Suicide Bombing in Egypt and Indonesia 2005-2013²⁰⁴

	EGYPT Attacks against civilians often or sometimes justified	EGYPT Attacks against civilians rarely or never justified	INDONESIA Attacks against civilians often or sometimes justified	INDONESIA Attacks against civilians rarely or never justified
2005	N/A	N/A	15	84
2006	28	70	10	89
2007	8	83	10	90
2008	13	80	11	87
2009	15	75	13	85
2010	20	80	15	82
2011	28	72	10	88
2012	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2013	25	73	6	93

Source: Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, available at: www.pewglobal.org

Given Abu Bakar Ba'ashir's view that the cost of the armed struggle needs to take into consideration the context and factors such as public opinion, it comes to no surprise that he has placed the emphasis on proselytizing, and that the JI as a whole has shifted much more towards *da'wa* since 2006. In addition to growing opposition to attacks against civilians, decreasing levels of opposition to the United States and decreasing levels of support for Al Qaeda can also explain why by 2011 the JI placed much greater focus on local enemies such as the police, Christians and the Ahmadiyya rather than foreign enemies, and has exhibited much greater willingness to join coalitions with non-jihadist groups (International Crisis Group 2011).

A fascinating aspect of Indonesian public opinion is that immediately after the first Bali attacks in 2002 there was widespread disbelief that such an attack could be undertaken by Indonesians. Instead, conspiracy theories abounded, and many people believed that the attacks were in fact the doing of the United States or of Israel, in order to draw the Indonesian

²⁰⁴ The question was phrased as: "Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?"

government into the American-led war on terror. Even Vice President Hamzah Haz stated that there is no terrorism or extremism in Indonesia, commenting that “I don’t know about Jema’ah Islamiah, I just know that Abu Bakar Bashir has an Islamic boarding school in Ngruki (Solo). That’s what I know” (Haz 2002).

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir himself stated in an interview with Scott Atran:

“In Bali, where 200 people died, it was American’s bomb. That was mini nuclear and Amrozi (the Bali plotter who bought the explosives) doesn’t have the capability to do that. [...] He didn’t make that bomb. America did. There much evidence and so the police dare not continue the investigation. The bomb in Bali that killed 200 people was America’s bomb, not Amrozi’s. According to Engladrn’s expert, that bomb was not Amrozi’s bomb. [...] hat bomb was CIA Jewish bomb. The Mossad cooperates with the CIA” (Ba’asyir 2005)

It is telling that whereas 75 percent of respondents held a favorable view of the United States in 1999 (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2002), by 2003 that number dropped to 15 percent, and 72 percent of the respondents were opposed to the American-led war on terror. A BBC poll reveals that in June 2003, 60 percent of Indonesians considered the United States more dangerous than Al Qaeda (Terror Free Tomorrow 2014). Such pervasive skepticism of the United States counter-terrorism efforts did not cause the Hambali or the Noordin Top factions to undertake the attacks, but they sent important signals about levels of public opposition to the “far enemy,” and enabled the proliferation of arguments that the global Muslim community, and in fact even the Indonesian Muslim community, was threatened by the United States and its allies.

As terrorist attacks continued, however, both the government and the public shifted their attitudes. On the government side, this meant a growing commitment to eliminate the threat, and for the public it meant decreasing sympathies for the Al Qaeda message and growing support for

the United States.²⁰⁵ By 2009, 76 percent of respondents in Indonesia suggested that their country should do more against terrorism in the world (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2009). Table 10 captures how the public attitudes have changed over the years.

Table 10. Indonesian Public Attitudes towards the United States, the American led war on Terror and Al Qaeda

	Favorable view of the United States	Unfavorable view of the United States	Opposition to the American led war on terror	A lot/some confidence Osama bin Laden is doing the right thing in world affairs
2003*	15	N/A	72	57
2004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2005	38	57	42	35
2006	30	67	57	33
2007	29	66	56	38
2008	37	53	N/A	36
2009	63	30	34	24
2010	59	34	23	24
2011	54	40	33	24

Source: Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, available at: www.pewglobal.org

* Non-national sample

In spite of these shifts in public opinion, the JI is still not facing the same level of widespread condemnation that the GI has witnessed in Egypt. This is because 1) there is still ambiguity in public opinion regarding JI activities and culpability in terrorist attacks, 2) terrorism is not considered as serious of a problem as corruption, ethnic tensions or even immorality, and 3) there continues to be mistrust of government, cynicism towards the “hunt for terrorism,” and fear of human rights abuses in the name of security.

There seems to be a disconnect in Indonesian public attitudes between on one hand opposition to violence against civilians, and on the other hand believing that groups such as Al

²⁰⁵ Oak argues that public sympathy towards the United States has improved significantly after the post-tsunami assistance, as well as the Cairo speech in 2009 and the strategic partnership with the Indonesian Foreign Minister in February 2009 (Oak 2010, 1003).

Qaeda or JI are “doing the right thing” or are pursuing a justifiable mission. The poll results included above reveal that in 2011, for instance, 88 percent of respondents thought that attacks against civilians are never or rarely justified, but that same year 24 percent had a lot or some confidence that Osama bin Laden is “doing the right thing in world affairs.” Similarly in 2006, 89 percent believed that attacks against civilians were never or rarely justified, but in a different poll 17.4 percent agreed with the mission of the JI (Oak 2010, 1002).

In order to understand public attitudes towards the JI, it is worth drawing a brief comparison to attitudes towards the FPI, an Islamist groups that undertakes vigilante activities and often attacks civilians. Personal interviews reveal that some people believe that while the violence itself might not be right, the FPI is usually only reinforcing the law and attacking vices that are already outside of the law. As an interviewee mentioned, “if a pub is supposed to close at 10pm but the police doesn’t do anything to implement it, then the FPI steps in and does something”.²⁰⁶ Thus, there is a difference between views on the tactic itself, and perceptions of the underlying mission of extremist groups. As Ulil Abshar Abdalla, an Islamic scholar associated with the Liberal Islam Network observed, groups such as the FPI understand that most people don’t agree with the Ahamadiyya, for instance, and “from that common ground it can mobilize support, not for the violence but for the cause, so that ambiguity and conservatism reinforce each other.”²⁰⁷ Furthermore, the FPI is connected to many religious leaders that argue their actions are justified.²⁰⁸ Like the FPI, the JI also understands that most people are worried about the communal conflict in Ambon and Poso, and it also has a strong network of schools and Islamic scholars that justify armed struggle both in Poso and Ambon and against the West.

²⁰⁶ Anonymous interview, June 22, 2013, Depok.

²⁰⁷ Interview with Ulil Abshar Abdalla, June 12, 2013, Jakarta.

²⁰⁸ Anonymous interview, June 22, 2013, Depok.

Public opinion polls reveal that the Indonesian public is highly concerned with issues of morality, and that it in fact considers terrorism a less significant problem than political corruption, ethnic tensions and the growing immorality. In a non-national sample in 2002, 96 percent of respondents believed that immorality is a very big or a moderately big problem, and only 77 percent of respondents considered terrorism to be a very big or moderately big problem (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002). The same poll revealed that 99 percent of respondents considered corrupt political leaders to be a very big or a moderately big problem, and 92 percent considered ethnic conflict to a very big or moderately big problem. By 2007, in spite of the rise in terrorist attacks, only 85 percent of respondents considered terrorism to be very big or moderately big problem, compared to 97 percent considering corrupt political leaders to be a very big or moderately big problem, and 76 percent placing the emphasis on ethnic tensions (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007).

In this context, there is a pervasive fear among political leaders that cracking down on extremist groups will be perceived as being anti-Islamic. On one hand, “there is a myth among bureaucrats and law enforcement officers that if you stop people from making trouble you can be accused of being anti-Islamic.”²⁰⁹ On the other hand, the democratic system also enforces a tough competition for votes, and some politicians try to “exploit Muslim sentiments,” so that there is a “public race for displaying Islamic symbols.”²¹⁰

As the polls reveal, however, the most acute problem for most Indonesians is considered to be corruption. The polls ask specifically about corrupt political leaders, but when it comes to hard-line Islamist groups, police corruption also plays an essential role. Returning to the comparison with FPI, police officers often either ignore their vigilantism, or they strike deals

²⁰⁹ Interview with Ulil Abshar Abdalla, June 12, 2013, Jakarta.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

with such groups and allow or even incite violence in order to offer protection brackets to local businesses.²¹¹ Sidel points out that FPI itself was created with the blessing and rumored active support of Major General Djaja Suparman, the new commander of the Greater Jakarta Regional Army Command and a close ally of Wiranto, the Defense Minister and Armed Forces Commander in chief (Sidel 2006, 139). In November 1998, more than 100,000 volunteers from the ranks of FPI and other Islamic groups were “armed with bamboo sticks, sharpened spears and other makeshift weapons” and mobilized to join police and military troops in providing security for a special session of the Consultative Assembly (Sidel 2006, 138). Sidel argues that “by late 1998 this new form of violence – crudely armed Islamic militia attacks on student protesters and on seamy business establishments – in the name of the faith had emerged as a subcontracted, supplementary form of state power” (Sidel 2006, 140). This history of law enforcement and the state using Islamic vigilantism reinforces public cynicism as well as ambiguity regarding the extent to which violence can be blamed solely on Islamic groups.

When it comes to the JI, one problem related to police corruption is that it enables the group to spread its ideology in prison and to continue operating even with most of its leaders and many members behind bars. In 2012, an expert noted that the main JI ideologue at the time was Abdu Rahman, who still works behind the scenes and publishes from the prison. Other JI leaders also have blackberries and maintain their facebook pages from prison.²¹² But it is not only corruption that is the problem, but also inadequate policies. For instance, visits to prison are not monitored, and sometimes there are Quranic study groups during visiting hours, and the mindset of the wardens is that the people are good if they are doing sermons. Prisons also don't assess

²¹¹ Anonymous interview, October 31, 2012, Jakarta.

²¹² Anonymous interview, October 15, 2012, Jakarta.

inmates and mix them together, combining hardliners with foot soldiers, so that foot soldiers actually become more involved after prison.²¹³

Another problem is that the “hunt for terrorists” is widely perceived by the public to be used as a way to save face and eclipse internal corruption scandals. There is high public skepticism towards the Densus 88 raids, because the raids are often done right after corruption cases against the police.²¹⁴ Furthermore, the brutality that Densus 88 often resorts to when pursuing terrorist suspects is raising fear about human rights abuses and a reversal to the sort of repressive measures undertaken by Soeharto. As some have noted, “Densus 88 basically has license to kill and has become untouchable,” so even if sometimes they kill the wrong people, the government doesn’t acknowledge it, which leads to backlash and produces endless conflict.²¹⁵ The issue becomes even more complicated, because when someone is killed by Densus 88 they are called martyrs, and nobody in the community has the courage to say that they are not martyrs.²¹⁶

Aside from concerns over human rights abuses, the fear of a slippery slope to an authoritarian past and to the return of the military into the political realm is very real, and something that policy makers are acutely aware of. The Deputy for Political Affairs in the Office of the Vice President, for instance, has noted that Indonesia has been lauded for dealing with political violence in a way that made sure not to bring the military back into domestic policing. Nonetheless, when considering a bill on mass organizations the government has struggled how to deal with groups like JAT because there is a lot of weariness in society about a blanket law to

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Anonymous interview, October 31, 2012, Jakarta.

²¹⁵ Interview with Muhammad Wildan, June 10, 2013, Jakarta.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

revoke permits of particular groups because of the fear of a slippery slope, and because of the dilemma on how to find the right balance between freedom of association and law and order.²¹⁷

Civil society leaders have acknowledged that there is a very high degree of skepticism among the public and a very low acceptance of any policies that might resemble repression.²¹⁸ Because of that, when the government and the police begin to talk about security threats, there is always a suspicion that it is just a pretext to increase the security apparatus, especially if the military signals that it wants to become involved in the process, such as after Bali 2.²¹⁹ Thus, “as soon as people see a security law, they perceive it as a slippery slope to bring the generals back in.”²²⁰ Some scholars argue that this trauma of the New Order is partly responsible for why the state has been inadequate in dealing with groups such as the FPI, even though at a deeper level this problem is also a symptom of the fact that the project of Indonesian national integration has failed, and that the government has not been able to develop a substantive notion of national unity.²²¹

In this context, there is a widespread “climate of popular apprehension” and incredulity with regard to the JI (Pavlova 2007, 778). Many Indonesians, for instance, do not see Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as being connected to violence, especially as there is no evidence to directly connect him to any of the attacks, but rather perceive him as a very pious religious scholar.²²² In fact, some PKS politicians like to visit Ba’asyir in prison, because he is a household name, and it is a way to get media attention for supporting the Islamic cause, and a way for them to negotiate their

²¹⁷ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy for Political Affairs, Office of the Vice President, remarks at Jakarta Foreign Correspondent Club panel discussion on de-radicalization in Indonesia, October 18, 2012, Jakarta.

²¹⁸ Anonymous interview, October 31, 2012, Jakarta.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Interview with Ali Munhanif, Director of the Center for the Study of Islam and Society at the Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic University in Jakarta, November 2, 2012, Jakarta.

²²¹ Interview with scholar Bahtiar Effendy, November 1, 2012, Jakarta.

²²² Anonymous interview, October 31, 2012, Jakarta.

identity and appeal to the more conservative base. However, they don't visit any of the JI members who were actually involved in undertaking the violence.²²³

Similarly, the JI itself as an organization was considered by many an invention of the war on terror. As Pavlova points out, President Yudhoyono himself declared that he would ban the JI only if there is proof that the organization actually exists (Pavlova 2007, 778).

Given these pervasive public attitudes, while there might not be support for violent attacks on civilians, there is also no widespread public condemnation of the JI, allowing the organization to persist and metamorphose into various groups. These public attitudes themselves are not sufficient to cause the JI to engage in violent tactics, but they are a necessary factor for allowing the organization to persist without feeling the pressure to drastically revise its ideology or strategic outlook.

Organizational Dynamics

Organizational dynamics played an essential role in explaining both the violent escalation in the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the push for de-escalation within the GI. In the case of the Brotherhood, the creation of the Secret Apparatus led to multiple lines of command, competition over authority and the militarization of some of the constituency and leadership, leading to violent escalation. In the GI case, organizational crisis after long periods of repression helped lead to disillusionment with the cause, and ultimately to disengagement from violence.

In the case of the JI, organizational dynamics are also an essential part of the causal story, playing a necessary role towards violent escalation, and explaining why the group never underwent the same drastic changes as the Egyptian Gama'a. The organizational structure, the presence of multiple lines of command and the leadership vacuum after Sungkar's death were

²²³ Ibid.

necessary factors for violent escalation. The structure and constituency of the organization also made it more prone to cooperate with Al Qaeda or to come to the defense of the Moro fighters. When it comes to de-escalation, organizational dynamics also explain why imposing any drastic changes is very difficult given the de-centralization of the JI, and the lack of an organizational crisis is a necessary part of the explanation for why the group has not undergone the same re-inventing as the GI in Egypt.

When the JI was established, the organization was structured with the amir (at the time Abdullah Sungkar) as the highest leader, to be assisted by a legislative shura council, a fatwa council, a council on activity decisions and a central command council (Abas 2011, 125–127). However, in emergency conditions only the central command council remains active, and the legislative and fatwa councils are deactivated. Abas notes that as a member of JI he only remembers the legislative and the fatwa councils being active during the formation of the JI, but afterwards the only council helping the amir was the central command (Abas 2011, 126). Abas also notes that under the principle of *tanzim sirri* (secret organization), the council members are not exposed to members below them (Abas 2011, 126).

The central command unit is further divided into different sections: calling and guidance, education, military training, carrying out military operations, human relations and politics (Abas 2011, 130–131). Aside from the top decision-making units, the JI had a decentralized structure that follows the *usroh* (family) model of small clandestine units, organized into cells that have operational autonomy at the ground level (Zuhri 2010, 260), sections, platoons, companies and finally battalions (Abas 2011, 125–126). The JI was also divided into four regional areas of command, also known as *mantiqis*. Mantiqi 1 oversaw activities in Malaysia and Singapore, mantiqi 2 included most of Indonesia, mantiqi 3 included Sabah in Malaysia, East Borneo and

Central Sulawesi in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, and after 2002 also Poso, which had until then been handled by the central command council (Abas 2011, 131–132). While some suggest that there is also a mantiqi 4 that is centered on Australia (Zuhri 2010, 260), Abas argues that never in fact existed (Abas 2011, 132).

This structure and the division into regional commands meant that on one hand there was an international constituency that was much more sensitized to the Al Qaeda message and to the struggles of Muslim communities in the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. On the other hand, this structure also opened up the possibility for multiples lines of command. Abudllah Sungkar was a strong, charismatic leader that was considered also a great ideologue (Wildan 2011). After his death in November 1999, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir became emir, but he was mainly an Islamic scholar and teacher, and a much weaker leader, which opened up a power vacuum in the organization. Abas in fact suggests that Ba’asyir never had the desire or aspiration to become amir of the JI (Abas 2011, 329).

Nasir Abas also points out that Ba’asyir’s appointment as amir caused great controversy and disagreements within the JI, “with the result that there were remonstrations, and unpleasant backbiting” (Abas 2011, 328). When Ba’asyir then also became the leader of the MMI in August 2000, the disagreements within JI deepened, and a faction emerged that called for Ba’asyir to immediately resign from the position of MMI amir, which he refused (Abas 2011, 329). Ba’asyir remained as amir of both organizations, but appointed Ustadh Zulkarnain as the “executor of the duties of Amir of Al Jamaah Al Islmiyah”, and in April 2002 he was replaced by Abu Rusdan (Abas 2011, 330). Abas mentions that in response to the disagreements arising over the post of amir of JI, some members started leaving the organizations, and several senior members “retired themselves because of their feelings of disappointment with the posture undertaken by Ustadh

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir" (Abas 2011, 330). Other joined the MMI, and even issued a false statement in the name of Ba'asyir that JI members should follow suit and also become members of the MMI, which cause even more confusion among the rank and file (Abas 2011, 331).

It is important to emphasize here that the growing disillusionment with the leadership of the JI, and perhaps even with the organization, was not the same type of disillusionment with the founding vision and mission as the GI members experienced in Egypt in the late 1990s. The disillusionment with the cause among GI members led them to disengage from violence. In Indonesia, however, the disillusionment was with the leadership, and Nasir Abas points out that this in fact pushed some of the members to pursue *jihad* on their own, and instead of belonging to an organization to connect with people with a similar vision and mission from various different organizations (Abas 2011, 331). Thus, disillusionment with the leadership in this instance enabled violent escalation.

In this context of factionalism, disagreements over leadership and an organizational structure with multiple regional commands and specialized areas of activity, Hambali and Mukhlas²²⁴ were able to coordinate attacks without the knowledge or the approval of the entire leadership, and to recruit members from the JI network for the operation without the knowledge of their division leader (International Crisis Group 2006). However, there is evidence that Ba'asyir knew of Hambali's plans, but neither ordered them nor tried to stop them (International Crisis Group 2006). Scott Atran suggests that when Hambali was placed in charge of *mantiqi 1*, which was responsible mainly for economic activities, he was dissatisfied and wanted to play a more active role in conflict zones, but the leader of *mantiqi 3* was opposed to Hambali "muscling in on his area" (Ba'asyir 2005, n. 5). However, Hambali was able to send fighters to Ambon (in *mantiqi 2*), which encouraged him to extend his conception of *jihad* to all of Indonesia and the to

²²⁴ Hambali was the head of *mantiqi 1* until April 2001, after which Mukhlas replaced him (Abas 2011, 132).

“globalize” jihad and target Western audiences (ibid.). Atran’s argument reinforces the idea that the power vacuum after Sungkar’s death led to competition over authority, but also that the communal conflict led to slippery slope of violent escalation.

Noordin Top also took advantage of the power vacuum and factionalism, and even more disagreements emerging within the JI after the Christmas bombings and the first Bali bombings. These attacks were considered controversial and stirred debates among JI members. The fact that Top claimed to be in charge of the JI military wing during the 2003 Marriott attacks suggests that he was also seeking to exert his own authority. Abu Dujanah, who at the time was on the central command council, knew of Noordin Top’s plans for the Marriott attacks in 2003, but also adopted the same hands-off approach as Ba’asyir (International Crisis Group 2006).

The problem is on one hand the absence of a strong charismatic leader that can impose control and also offer an alternative ideological framework. As many have noted, Ba’asyir’s response to initiatives from below is typically “you guys understand the field, so I leave the decision to you.”²²⁵ But on the other hand, the problem is also the fact that there is no system of reward and punishment within the organization. While there is a disciplinary committee, it is not effective.²²⁶ This problem is exacerbated by the ideological principle of *tanzim sirri* (secret organization), which means that as a JI member you are supposed to protect the organization, and you cannot betray anyone, and certainly cannot turn in your friends to the enemy.²²⁷ In fact, Abas notes that Ba’asyir has called him a kafir not because of his ideological statements, but because he exposed the organization.²²⁸

²²⁵ Interview with Taufik Andrie, Research Director at the Institute for International Peace Building, October 15, 2012, Jakarta.

²²⁶ Interview with Nasir Abas, June 26, 2013, Jakarta.

²²⁷ *Bid.*

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

The decentralization and factionalism described above not only enabled violent escalation, but it also makes comprehensive disengagement from violence difficult, even when there are voices starting to speak out against violence. In fact, some point out that after Bali 2 there was a special order from JI leaders not to follow splinters and to engage in such attacks, but there is no strong leadership and no hierarchy or structure to implement this order.²²⁹

What is particularly interesting about the JI as a case is that even though the organization was faced with internal disagreements, competition over leadership, factionalism and arrests of the main leaders, its weakness never reached a point of organizational crisis that pushed the leaders to re-think their mission, as we saw in Egypt. This is at least in part because violent factions have been able to operate outside of the JI structure yet still recruit from among the JI constituency, whereas leaders such as Ba'asyir have been able to take advantage of political openings and pursue their mission through legal organizations like MMI or JAT, whose members are nonetheless an active recruiting pool for violent factions. This ability of different factions to form alliances or undergo a metamorphosis and survive, when combined with the ambiguity in public attitudes addressed above, explains why we have not seen the same drastic push for comprehensive revisions within the JI.

Conclusion

The examination of the evolution of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah points out that there are some similarities in terms of causal mechanisms of violent escalation with the Egyptian cases investigated in this study. Like the GI, the Jama'a was founded on an ideology that accepted and justified armed struggle, and this was an important necessary condition for the violence, but it is not a sufficient explanation for the actual timing and nature of violence undertaken. Instead,

²²⁹ Interview with Noorhuda Ismail, Executive Director of the Institute for International Peace Building, October 18, 2012, Jakarta.

some of the dynamics that occurred within the Jama'a are reminiscent of the early violent escalation within the ranks of the Brotherhood, in spite of the ideological differences. Thus, the violent escalation after JI's return to Indonesia occurred in response to perceived existential threats to the Muslim community, as well as competition over authority and the presence of multiple lines of command. Furthermore, the slippery slope of militarization was also evident in the Indonesian case, as the scope of the armed struggle gradually escalated from involvement in communal conflict, to attempting assassinations of political leaders, and ultimately staging large scale attacks against civilians.

The growing civilian casualties, and especially Muslim casualties, have also raised criticism from within the organization and from the public. However, unlike the Egyptian Gama'a, the Indonesian JI was never faced with the same level of public condemnation, or with the same level of organizational crisis. Part of the reason is the legacy of authoritarianism and the high levels of public skepticism towards the government, the police and the military. The Indonesian public opposes violence against civilians, but it is simultaneously also worried about the "return of the generals," as well as uncertain that the JI (or an indigenous Indonesian network) is fully or solely responsible for the violence. This public ambiguity, combined with police corruption and an ineffective correction system have enabled the JI to persist and survive. While the democratic openings after the fall of Suharto have increased the cost of violence and made *da'wa* a lot more appealing as a tactic than *jihad*, these openings have also enabled parts of the JI to undergo a metamorphosis and continue under the umbrella of the JAT. Once again, the fear of a reversal to repressive measures makes the government weary of outlawing groups such as the JAT.

Yet this does not necessarily spell gloom for Indonesia. In fact, given the country's history and the prevailing public attitudes, religious groups do represent a very delicate matter. Understanding the importance of this dimension suggests that instead of adopting a harder stance against terrorism, a more effective policy would be to address the problems that make the public so cynical. This would imply addressing political corruption, implementing police reform and countering the prevalence of racketeering, improving the correction system and addressing the prevalence of thugs, gangs and paramilitary entities often hired by legal entities.

Chapter 7

Non-violent Repertoires and the Appeal of Party Politics

Understanding Non-violent Choices

This study has focused on the question of violence, examining when and why Islamist groups adopt or abandon violent tactics, and what dynamics underlie violent escalation or de-escalation. But this investigation raises several other questions. First, what happens *after* de-escalation? Do groups become largely inactive, or do they pursue their goals through non-violent tactics? If the latter is the case, then do they choose political or non-political avenues of activism? Do they form political parties and seek to make a difference through formal political structures, or do they remain outside of the political system? And last but not least, do groups that have disengaged from violence follow the same logic as groups that have always been non-violent, or are they conceptually different?

Non-violent activism can take many forms, and is much more widespread than violent manifestations of Islamism. Scholars have documented for instance the spread of nonviolent civil disobedience in the Middle East (Crow, Grant, and Ibrahim 1990; Stephan 2010) and put forward models for nonviolent resistance and peace-building based on Islamic concepts (Abu-Nimer 2000; Esack 1997; Abu-Nimer 2003). However, these works also point out that there are not just pervasive myths about the ineffectiveness of nonviolence in the Middle East, but also obstacles to the adoption of Islamic frameworks of nonviolent activism and peace-building. Such obstacles include, for instance, the acute technocratic and political stagnation, the co-optation of religious figures that are used as a tool to maintain the status quo and prevent social and political change,

patriarchal social structures, obedience to and self respect for hierarchy and discouragement of self-examination (Abu-Nimer 2003, 113–116).

There is a growing literature that has emphasized the strategic logic of non-violent resistance, which argues that non-violence is in the aggregate more effective than armed struggle (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). However, this project has shown that violence is not necessarily adopted because it is considered the most effective tactic, but that it often emerges from a slippery slope that might in fact start with non-violent resistance. Furthermore, Hamid also points out that for Islamist groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood defiant forms of non-violent resistance are difficult and not particularly effective because when Islamists are involved in civil disobedience the international community fails to deliver the same level of condemnation of repressive regimes as it does in the case of non-Islamist campaigns of non-violent resistance (Hamid 2009).

Recent research that explores the shift from armed struggle to non-violent resistance offers some preliminary hypotheses on what causal mechanisms can account for such transformation. Dudouet, for instance, argues that at the societal level, “demilitarization mechanisms” include the adoption of nonviolent resistance as a form of reversed outbidding, or mirroring of other actors or as a step towards coalition building (Dudouet 2013, 409). However, as Dudouet also notes, de-escalation is a separate process from the adoption of non-violence, which reinforces the argument that what happens after demobilization and demilitarization needs closer empirical investigation. This chapter shows that in the case of the GI de-escalation was not followed by the adoption of a non-violent model of activism but rather by inactivity. The JI, on the other hand, has gradually shifted to primarily non-violent tactics without categorically renouncing or denouncing armed struggle.

The alternative to armed struggle is not just non-violent resistance, especially in the case of Islamist groups, for whom religious propagation is an essential duty. Islamist groups can engage in different types of non-violent activism, and choose among political or non-political forms of propagation. The literature on the non-violent aspects of Islamism has paid a lot more attention to the political aspirations of Islamist groups than to non-political movements. Much of the research in political science has focused on whether political participation changes Islamist groups and makes them more “moderate,” either ideologically or behaviorally.²³⁰ This line of argumentation tends to assume that the decision to enter politics is primarily a strategic decision, motivated by the desire to gain power, protect their social service networks, or gain other spoils from politics. Wickham’s most recent analysis of the Brotherhood, however, points out that “observable changes in Islamist group rhetoric and behavior cannot be explained as an outcome of *either* strategic adaptation *or* ideational change but rather exhibit features of both” (Wickham 2013, 17).

This chapter follows the same line of argument, but instead of focusing on the effects of political participation on the Muslim Brotherhood the analysis here asks why Islamist groups choose to enter the political process in the first place. The discussion will show that the decision to form a political party is often a contested issue. Furthermore, many groups (especially Salafi groups) are principally opposed to the notion of democratization and therefore forego the option to enter the political process, even when the political opening allows for such a strategy.²³¹

This abstention from politics has received much less attention in the literature. Wiktorowicz, for instance, suggests that Salafi groups in Jordan abstain from formal politics

²³⁰ This literature is discussed in greater detail in Chapter two.

²³¹ For a more detailed discussion of the complexities of salafi views towards political activism, see Utvik 2014. As he notes, the rejection of politics is not always absolute but rather pertains to the circumstances, and salafi thinkers like Abd Al-Khaliq have in fact developed a strong argument for political participation in order not to hand over political victory to the enemies of the faith (Utvik 2014, 10–11).

because it implies greater monitoring and control by the state, which does not make it worth compromising their beliefs (Wiktorowicz 2000). Looking at “utopian Islamists” in Indonesia, Hilmy argues that these groups choose extra-parliamentary struggle to reject democracy for both principled and practical reasons. At a rhetorical level, these groups justify their abstention from politics in terms of maintaining the purity of the faith. At a practical level, however, these groups have also recognized that political parties have been unable to impose *shari’a* law in Indonesia, and that they are unable to gain access to formal political structures (Hilmy 2010).

Whereas Salafi interpretations reject democracy as a system of governance and political participation out of principle, the political openings in Egypt after 2011 have led to the formation of several Salafi parties. Al-Anani and Malik argue that this enthusiastic rush into electoral politics occurred primarily because Egyptian Salafis saw it as a necessary tactic for protecting their vision and mission, especially in light of the perceived secular and liberal threats to the Islamic identity of the country (al-Anani and Malik 2013). Utvik also argues that the Egyptian Salafis decided to run in elections out of the concern that staying out of politics would mean becoming marginalized or losing relevance as a movement. However, he suggests that this engagement with politics set them on the same path of pragmatism and compromise that the Brotherhood also followed previously (Utvik 2014).

The focus of this chapter is to better understand how Islamist groups make these choices among various non-violent strategies, and to offer some preliminary answers as to why Islamist groups decide to enter, abstain from or exit the political system. The chapter will show that opting for formal political channels is not solely a strategic choice, and that abstaining from politics is also not purely ideological. Instead, both groups that abstain from politics and organizations that choose to enter formal politics are both principled and strategic, continuously

adapting to their environments and re-negotiating their identities and principles, driven by their mission to succeed in promoting their religious understanding.

In this regard, Egypt and Indonesia provide a telling comparison. For some groups in Indonesia forming a political party became an appealing strategy, whereas for others the political option remained (or became) unappealing. In Egypt, on the other hand, after the fall of the Mubarak regime the appeal of politics was very high for Islamist groups, and even Salafi groups that had denounced party politics as being un-Islamic formed a political party and entered the political arena, changing their stance on the legitimacy of forming political parties. As Khalil Al-Anani notes, “the post-25 January Revolution phase triggered something of an ‘explosion’ in religiously inspired political formations”(El-Anani 2011).

A wide variety of Islamist parties emerged, ranging from the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood (whose Islamic agenda was relatively subdued) to the Building and Development Party affiliated with al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Salafi Nour party, as well as many smaller Salafi parties such as the Virtue Party (al-Fadyla) or the Authenticity Party (Al-Assala).²³² Interestingly enough, even members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who believe that partisan politics is religiously prohibited, established a political party, Al-Salama Wal Tanmiya (The Peace and Development or also referred to as the Safety and Development Party), but they did not participate in elections because they still maintain that going through elections is religiously forbidden.²³³

This chapter provides a brief overview of these divergent reactions to political openings in Egypt and in Indonesia, and in doing so it attempts to address three questions: 1) what happens after de-escalation, 2) when do Islamist groups choose to form a political party and when do they

²³² See Egypt Electionnaire, available at <http://egypt.electionnaire.com/parties/>, accessed on November 27th, 2012.

²³³ Interview with Habiba Mohasen, researcher at the Arab Forum for Alternatives, Cairo, July 3rd, 2012.

abstain from politics, and 3) are groups that disengaged from violence different from non-violent groups? Drawing on the theoretical framework developed at the outset of the study in order to explain the strategic outlook of Islamist groups, the discussion shows that both political and non-political forms of activism can be interpreted as tactical choices aimed to maximize the benefits in terms of the overall vision and mission of the organization, relative to alternative options. Just as decisions about violence are made in response to complex interactions between organizational dynamics, public attitudes and government policies, choices about political or non-political forms of activism are also made in response to similar considerations.

Egypt after the “Arab Spring”: The Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah and the Allure of Politics

The examination of the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyyah in chapters three and four have explored the transformations in strategic outlook in regard to the use of violence, showing why violent escalation occurred, and under what conditions the groups disengaged from violence. However, what happens after disengagement is a separate question, and the two groups have followed different trajectories. The Muslim Brotherhood underwent a gradual transformation starting in the 1970s, rejuvenating its preaching and social services but also entering political syndicates and by the mid 1980s considering formal entry into politics. While the debate over forming a political party was controversial within the organization, the group underwent a new stage of politicization, so that by 2011 it was well placed to become one of the most influential political actors in Egypt. When the Brotherhood officially formed the Freedom and Justice Party after the fall of Mubarak, the organization had a well-established and developed political wing, a political platform, members with experience in parliamentary politics and a strong capacity for mobilization.

Unlike the Brotherhood, after the Non-Violent Initiative of the GI, the organization did not develop a clear alternative vision for non-violent activism, and it remained largely inactive until the political openings of 2011. When the group formed the Building and Development Party, this new form of politicization occurred practically overnight. Even though this seemingly impulsive drive to form political parties displayed by both the GI and other Salafi groups seems like an instance of crude opportunism, a closer look at these groups and the socio-political context in Egypt reveals that the decision to enter politics was both principled and strategic.

The Gradual Politicization of the Muslim Brotherhood

After the execution of Sayyid Qutb in 1966, in response to international pressures from other Arab and Muslim countries, Nasser started releasing many of the imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood members and easing restrictions on the group (Al-Awadi 2004, 35). When Sadat came to power, he released most of the Brothers in 1971, and issued a general amnesty that set all remaining Brothers free in 1975 (Zollner 2008, 48). Sadat restored the confiscated Brotherhood properties, permitted the Brothers in exile to return to Egypt, allowed the movement to reclaim its headquarters, hold meetings and publish, and he encouraged the building of religious centers and of mosques outside the supervision of the state (Al-Awadi 2004, 36-37). Abdo suggests that the President went as far as holding secret meetings with the Brotherhood in an attempt to gain their cooperation (Abdo 2002, 121).

In this new context, the Brotherhood had once again the space to pursue multiple forms of activism outside of formal political institutions. The MB focused on rebuilding the organization and gaining official recognition of the state. In terms of the first goal of rebuilding the cadre and the organization, the Brotherhood focused on university campuses in order to revive and rebuild its membership, especially after 1976 (Al-Awadi 2004, 42). This was

particularly effective for a couple of reasons. First, the regime actively encouraged Islamist activism on campuses at the time in order to undermine the growing leftist student movement (Abdo 2002, 121). But campuses also proved to be a very fertile recruiting ground, drawing a new generation of highly educated and highly motivated young members into the Brotherhood. This new wave of recruitment led to a revival and transformation of the Brotherhood, which by the 1980s became one of the most powerful forces on Egyptian campuses, and one of the most visible movements in civil society and in professional syndicates. While some of the arenas were new areas of activism for the Brotherhood, overall the organizational revival represented a continuation of Hassan al-Banna's original vision to transform and Islamize society from the ground up through non-violent methods.

Muslim Brotherhood members frequently talked on campuses, organized summer youth campus and distributed publications such as *al-Dawa*. Even though much of the growth of Islamism on campuses during the 1970s initially was not centrally coordinated by the Brotherhood itself, but rather occurred "without a centralized group leading the way" (Abdo 2002, 112), by the end of the 1970s the emerging Islamist student movement crystallized into the emergence of the Salafi group in Alexandria, the GI faction in Upper Egypt, and the MB contingency in Cairo, as discussed in chapter three. As Abdo points out, these young "Islamist icons" that emerged on campuses "transformed the universities into the laboratories in which ideas about religion were increasingly applied to real life" and then later "they turned their skills and ideas directly to society, as leaders in the professional syndicates, as members in the national parliament and professors in universities" (Abdo 2002, 113).

In regards to the second goal of gaining official recognition from the state, Umar Tilmisani, who became the new General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, filed a court case in

1977 against Nasser's decision to disband the organization. This case was continuously delayed and was never settled (Al-Awadi 2004, 38–39). However, the late 1970s and 1980 presented the Brotherhood with other opportunities to enter the political system, some of which Tilmisani and other leaders actually refused. For instance, Al-Awadi reports that the Brotherhood refused a presidential offer to participate in parliament as affiliates with one of the three main political platforms, “since they saw themselves as representing an independent trend in society that should have separate representation in parliament” (Al-Awadi 2004, 40). When Sadat founded the Consultative Council in 1980, Tilmisani also refused Sadat's offer to have a seat on the council, in an attempt to maintain the independence of the movement (Al-Awadi 2004, 41). Last but not least, Tilmisani also refused Sadat's offer to register the movement as a charitable organization, so that the movement “would not be reduced to a charitable organization dependent for its financial survival on the Ministry of Social Justice” (Al-Awadi 2004, 41).

Just like Hassan al-Banna, who was critical of the divisions produced by partisanship (*hizbiyya*), Tilmisani also spoke out against partisanship in 1978 and 1979, on the grounds that party manifestos were dependent on changes in leadership and personality and did not relate to the interests of the nation and the *umma*, and because partisan divisions were tearing society apart (Al-Awadi 2004, 39). However, individual members of the MB were permitted to participate in elections under the banner of existing parties, and they secured six seats in the 1976 election, and five seats in the 1979 election (Al-Awadi 2004, 41).

In spite of Tilmisani's criticism of partisanship, it is under his leadership and vision that by the mid 1980s the Brotherhood entered a new stage of politicization. As described in chapter four, by 1979 Sadat began to turn against all Islamists, be they Muslim Brotherhood or student activists, and following his death a new wave of repression was brought onto Islamists groups.

But Mubarak subsequently allowed exiled Brothers to return and the resumption of Islamist publications. With the easing of tensions, by 1983 Tilmisani began considering political participation through parliamentary politics (Al-Awadi 2004, 56). Thus, in 1983 the General Guide held a large meeting in Cairo in which Tilmisani sought to convince other representatives and officials of the movement about the political path (Al-Awadi 2004, 56).

A former leader of the Brotherhood recalls that the political openings of the 1970s and 1980s did drive some Brothers to consider political participation. The growing political activism of the early 1980s that manifested itself through participation in professional syndicates, student unions and even parliamentary elections was a prelude to the next stage of politicization of the organization, and a tactic used to signal the Brotherhood's presence and growth in the political scene. The idea of establishing a political party, however, was only openly discussed within the organization during the second half of the 1980s. Between 1985 and 1989 the Brotherhood underwent significant internal discussions and debates on this issue, and by 1989 (after Tilmisani's death in 1986) the Brotherhood decided to eventually form a political party and enter the political system more formally.²³⁴ The details on how that would be achieved, however, remained to be seen, especially since they were highly dependent on the political context and the level of opening from the regime. What also continued to be debated until 1994 were the specifics of the Brotherhood political platform, and in particular issues such as the rights of women and Copts.²³⁵

In 1984 the Brotherhood joined forces with the New Wafd party, and the joint ticket won them fifteen percent of the vote, which catapulted them to the position of main opposition force. In 1987, the Brotherhood joined forces with the Socialist Liberal Party in an "Islamic alliance"

²³⁴ Anonymous interview with formal Brotherhood leader, July 4, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

²³⁵ Anonymous interview with Brotherhood member, July 22nd, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

and won 60 seats (Metz 1990). With this significant presence in the parliament, the Brotherhood members initiated debates on reform and the establishment of *shari'a*, while outside of parliament Brothers were beginning to dominate professional syndicates, student unions, and faculty clubs, while also establishing well-developed social service networks (Al-Awadi 2004, 111). In 1990, the Brotherhood boycotted the elections, but after 1995 the Brotherhood continued fielding candidates during every election in spite of the growing repression by the regime.

Given this growing politicization of the Brotherhood since the 1980s, it came to no surprise that after the fall of Mubarak the organization took advantage of the political opening to form the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and contest elections. Given the Brotherhood's powerful mobilization potential and strong cadre with electoral experience, it also came to no surprise that the group benefited from a strategic advantage over all its political competitors other than the remnants of the previous regime. However, even though the formation of the FJP was a natural progression and the culmination of decades of politicization, the initial decision to pursue formal political avenues was highly controversial.

Entering politics was hotly debated within the movement, both among younger and older generations of the Brotherhood, and among senior members of the Guidance Council (Al-Awadi 2004, 56). The decision to ultimately enter formal politics represented both a principled and a strategic adaptation to the new political environment. From the early days of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna's stance regarding political participation was ambivalent, and this attitude also defined the views of the older generation of leaders, such as Tilmisani, who had participated in the early development of the Brotherhood alongside al-Banna.

Today, members of the Brotherhood argue that Hassan al-Banna was not opposed to politics per se, but to the nature of politics at the time, which was defined by corruption, social

divisions, and manipulation by the British. It was because of the circumstances at the time that he was therefore opposed to the idea of forming a political party and that he denounced *hizibiyya* (partisanship). Given the political openings after the Arab Spring, the argument goes that forming a political party is a natural progression that is consistent with Hassan al-Banna's ideological tenets.²³⁶ Al-Banna was not actively seeking political power, but the nature of the Brotherhood mission and vision of comprehensive Islam made it inherently political, making al-Banna declare in 1946 that “we don't seek power, power seeks us.”²³⁷ Forming a political party after the “Arab Spring” is therefore not only a natural progression, but as some Brothers declare “our duty.”²³⁸

The relationship to politics, however, is not as unproblematic as Brothers present it today when retrospectively looking at the evolution of their movement. Gamal al-Banna, for instance, suggests that Hassan al-Banna hated politics and that he was first and foremost a teacher, who considered the Brotherhood to be an organization for all aspects of life and therefore much bigger than just a political party.²³⁹ From his perspective then, the Brotherhood changed significantly after Hassan al-Banna's death. Others also emphasize that for Hassan al-Banna the vision was for the idea of the Brotherhood to dominate and come to power, whereas Qutb's views on the role of the vanguard and on the importance of a strong organization transformed al-Banna's vision to emphasize the importance of the organization itself coming to power.²⁴⁰ During the debates on whether to enter the political process in the 1970s, some members of the

²³⁶ This argument was expressed by all active members of the Brotherhood interviewed for this project.

²³⁷ This statement appeared in a 1946 issue of *Al-Musawar*, which was presented to me during an anonymous interview on July 9, 2012, in Cairo, Egypt.

²³⁸ Anonymous interview, July 22, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

²³⁹ Interview with Gamal al-Banna, June 17, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

²⁴⁰ Anonymous interview, June 7, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

Guidance Council, such as Mahmoud Abdulhalim, wanted to push the Brotherhood in a much more cultural direction, focusing on publishing rather than politics.²⁴¹

Tilmisani, who is generally considered very close to Hassan al-Banna's ideology, justified political participation after 1983 on several grounds. First, he argued that building an organization and engaging in the political process can occur simultaneously, and that the Brotherhood should stop functioning as a secret organization and instead explore all possible means of propagating their ideas. Tilmisani also proposed that the Brothers needed to become more experienced in the political process, and that their presence in parliament would give them both an opportunity to reform laws based on *shari'a* and to gain access to ministers and officials "who could be persuaded of the movement's non-violent approach to state and society" (Al-Awadi 2004, 57).

Understanding these ideological legacies and tensions within the Brotherhood regarding the issue of political participation helps us gain a more complex understanding of the group's relationship to politics and the challenges arising out of this relationship after the "Arab Spring" than we can gain from treating the group as a purely strategic political actor. Al-Banna envisioned a gradual Islamization of society that evolved from individual transformation and ultimately ended in the transformation of the state. This teleological view conceived of the Islamization of the state emerging organically from the growth of the movement and the shift in societal values. The main question from that perspective would be whether the reformation of the individual and the society has been extensive enough to lead to the last stage of transforming the government. The Qutbist vision, on the other hand, focused on strengthening the organization, which could ultimately play the role of a vanguard that would assume the responsibility to

²⁴¹ Anonymous interview, July 9, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

transform the state. From this perspective the main concern is whether the organization is strong enough to be able to assume the role of the vanguard.

Some suggest that after Umar Tilmisani's death, Qutbist ideas came to be much more predominant within the Guidance Council of the Brotherhood.²⁴² Whereas both al-Banna's vision and Qutbist ideas about the role of a vanguard are acceptant of, and even conducive to political participation, understanding the rise of Qutbist ideas²⁴³ within the leadership of the organization can explain why the priority of the Brotherhood after the 1980s was to take advantage of *any* opportunity to strengthen the organization, expand the cadre and raise the public profile of the Brotherhood. This is important, because it implies that the "readiness" of society to organically transform the state is overshadowed by questions about the readiness of the organization to assume a leadership role and steer the state in the right direction.

Others, however, considers that overall the Brotherhood is still devoted to the bottom-up model of change that proceeds from transforming the individual to changing society, rather than the more Leninist top-down approach that seeks to capture the state. From this perspective, the Brotherhood's decision to compete in elections even when they were not free and fair was a form of "political *da'wa*," a way not to gain power but rather to gain visibility, be able to connect with the public and disseminate the message of the Brotherhood (Shehata 2012). Since the Mubarak regime tolerated around election time certain forms of political activities that were otherwise not allowed, such as rallies, banners and the distribution of political material, for the MB fielding candidates was not about gaining seats in parliament, but rather around engaging in political

²⁴² Anonymous interview, June 17, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

²⁴³ It is important to emphasize that here the focus is on Qutbist ideas about the importance of organizational strength, and that this does not refer to Qutb's views on violent regime overthrow or on *takfir*. These notions have been consistently rejected by the mainstream Brotherhood since the mid-1960s.

activities that were usually prohibited and making itself known and heard to wider segments of society (Shehata 2012, 127).

From the perspective of the Brotherhood, the January 25th revolution could be interpreted as a critical historical juncture to fulfill the mission of transforming the state and assuming the group's rightful position in society. In some sense, the revolution was "the end of history," as some have suggested.²⁴⁴ But neither Al-Banna's vision nor the Qutbist vision truly problematized what forming a party would mean for the movement, since it was presumed to be a natural stage of development. To a certain extent then, after the fall of Mubarak regime, the Brotherhood could regard its political victory as a fulfillment of its long-term mission, and as evidence that the time is ripe to focus on the last stage of government and transforming the state. As a member declared,

*"the changes after the revolution make it necessary to begin the stage of state and government; most of Egyptian people trust the Muslim Brotherhood as the main party movement in Egypt; all of them say that you must do something to save Egypt, so we have no choice; we must have political party, we must go to parliament, we must share our opinion on economics and government."*²⁴⁵

But not having a clear sense of what the relationship between the movement and the party was, and the engrained focus on group loyalty and secrecy posed significant problems for the Brotherhood once it did win the elections. Elshobaki identifies several challenges that emerge from the dual loyalty of the Brotherhood to evangelizing and to political activism. Having an official political party forces the organization to reconsider its founding values, as it has to open

²⁴⁴ Anonymous interview, July 22nd, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

its doors to more than just devout followers, to become more flexible and pragmatic, and soften its ideological lines. But as a political party, the Brotherhood also needs to move beyond an oppositional stance and develop its ability to govern, as well as normalize its relationship vis-avis the state (Elshobaki 2012).

The tensions emerging from the pragmatic need to compromise and cooperate with liberal and secular forces as well as the demand for transparency in democratic political processes on one hand, and the principled devotion of the Brotherhood to its constituency, religious mission and organization on the other hand, is what pushed the group to make many mistakes of governance. The accumulation of these mistakes, and the ambiguity of the relationship between the movement and the party ultimately drove the public to oppose the Brotherhood and call for its removal from political office. Understanding the ideological underpinnings of the Muslim Brotherhood's participation in politics and conviction of historical mission can help explain the political polarization emerging after the fall of Mubarak, and it can also help us appreciate why the recent public opposition to the Brotherhood is more than just a political blow and instead represents an existential crisis for the organization.

How the group will emerge from this crisis therefore depends not only on whether the current military-dominated government will eventually ease the repression of the organization, but also on whether and how Brotherhood leaders will re-envision their religious and historical mission. In Indonesia large mass-based Islamic groups like the NU and Muhammadiyah responded to political pressures by reforming their ideological tenets and re-interpreting their own relationships to politics and government. This allowed them not only to survive and continue their non-political goals, but also to grow and prosper. Unfortunately, the Egyptian

Brotherhood seems to currently lack charismatic, high-profile and reform-oriented leaders that could push for such ideological transformations.

The Political Openings of 2011 and the Entry into Politics of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya's founding ideology was more revolutionary, and envisioned the transformation of the state occurring through the violent take-over by a vanguard. The ideological revisions after 1997 were primarily concerned with the question whether violence was appropriate and effective, but they did not put forward a comprehensive model of non-violent alternatives. The organization no longer denounced political participation as it had before, arguing that it could indeed be an acceptable tactic for achieving key Islamic objectives, such as the full implementations of *shari'a* (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 11). Even though the ballot box was in principle accepted, participation in the particular context of the Mubarak regime was still rejected because there was "very low utility for opposition" and participation "would legitimize the political system."²⁴⁶ The group therefore held that it would be in its interest to stay away from politics until it could re-establish a relationship of trust with the state (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 11).

Even though Najih Ibrahim argued that the political context was prompting the group to postpone political participation and focus instead on *da'wa* and the provision of social services (Hamzawy and Grebowski 2010, 11), the GI remained largely inactive. As some have suggested, a main criticism staged against the revisions is that the group criticized the violent revolution but failed to offer and promote an alternative.²⁴⁷

As a GI leader notes, members were released in waves, and even when they were out of prison they were under security control and they refrained from any preaching, political activities

²⁴⁶ Anonymous interview, July 4th, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

²⁴⁷ Anonymous interview, June 7, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

or even traveling outside of Egypt.²⁴⁸ In the case of the GI, then, what followed after disengagement from violence was inactivity rather than non-violent activism or civil resistance. This was not just because of the lack of organizational capacity, which the Brotherhood also faced when its members were first released from prison, but also because there was no ideological framework for non-violent activism, and because the Brotherhood was already emerging as the dominant Islamist force in civic society, in professional syndicates, social services and even parliamentary opposition. Thus, the GI lay largely dormant.

After the January 25th revolution, however, the GI re-emerged both as a social and as a political actor. The movement formed a political party, the Building and Development Party, and it started to revive the old network of the GI and form civic associations and charity networks. The decision to form a party was surprisingly uncontroversial within the organization, even though it can also be seen as both a principled and a strategic decision.

The party defines its platform in terms of holding Islam as its frame of reference and aiming to “retain the Islamic identity of this country” (Tarek 2011). The Building and Development Party aims to derive solutions to social, political and economic problems from the modern application of Islamic law, and it seeks to establish strong Islamic values in society in order to combat injustice, corruption and moral decay. The party wants to promote the Islamic *hudud* (criminal punishment) laws, and to support the role of the family and of women in accordance with Islamic principles (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2011). A GI leader suggested that the party sees itself as being ideologically somewhere in the middle, between the Muslim Brotherhood, which is seen as too realistic and prioritizing the political

²⁴⁸ Anonymous interview, July 4th, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

reality over the text, and the Salafi parties, that are closer to the text and that adopt literal interpretations both in politics and in appearance.²⁴⁹

From an ideological standpoint, the GI formed the party in order to promote its principled position on social, political and economic issues, impact the future of the country and protect the future of Egypt from being defined by secular and liberal forces. From a strategic perspective, establishing a political party was on one hand a way to establish a legal presence and rebuild the organization, and on the other hand a way to make sure that the Brotherhood doesn't monopolize the religious agenda in politics and exclude the GI. In order to establish a presence and rebuild its cadre and network of support, in addition to forming a party, the GI formed a series of civic associations, which they intend to spread all over the country.

In terms of parliamentary politics, as an observer pointed out, the GI initially considered running with the Muslim Brotherhood, but once it realized that the MB was dominating the list, the Building and Development Party joined forces with the Salafi Nour party instead. This was a much more fruitful marriage of convenience, as Nour has a stronghold in Alexandria, whereas the GI continues to have its strongest base of support in Upper Egypt.²⁵⁰ When they combined their constituencies, the Islamic block was able to make significant inroads into politics, gaining more than 25 percent of the seats in parliament.

For the GI the goal after the "Arab Spring" was to rebuild its organizational strength and strengthen both its political presence and its social movement. Even if politics would have proceeded as normal in Egypt, sooner or later the group would have been faced with the same principled questions as the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of defining the relationship between the party and the movement. With the political space currently closing for Islamist forces in Egypt,

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Anonymous interview, June 7, 2012, Cairo, Egypt.

the GI faces an even more immediate pressure to clearly define its ideological framework for non-violent Islamic activism, its relationship to politics, and its relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Mixed Appeal of Politics in Indonesia

Unlike Egypt, where both the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah decidedly renounced violent tactics at different stages of organizational development, in Indonesia the JI has reduced its violent activities and criticized large-scale attacks against civilians, but it has not undergone the same drastic transformation as the GI. Also unlike Egypt, the political openings after the fall of Suharto were not sufficient to drive either the JI or other hard-line groups to formal participation in electoral politics. Even though the justification given is typically principled opposition to democracy, both hard-line groups and mainstream groups across the ideological spectrum display both principled and strategic considerations in their decisions to enter or exit politics.

Hard-line Groups and the Refusal to Enter Politics

The discussion of the JI in chapter six has shown that even though the organization has not officially renounced violence, in recent years it has shifted its focus to *da'wa* and to building its membership base. Furthermore, following the leadership of the spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, many members have become involved with the MMI or joined JAT, which are both above-ground legal organizations. The JI never gave formal political participation any serious consideration. The justification has been primarily ideological, based on its principled opposition to democratization as being antithetic to the concept of a true Islamic state that takes God as the only sovereign. While this principled opposition is certainly significant, given the socio-political context in Indonesia, one can also see that the abstention from politics and the diversification of

tactics through the MMI and JAT is much more effective than formal political participation would be.

Forming a political party would not bring the JI any strategic advantages. First, the organization would not be able to win enough votes to become a significant political actor. This is partly because the organization does not have a solid power base or strong leader that could lead such a party, but also because the religious political sphere in Indonesia is already “full,” with all mainstream religious trends having formal or informal links to political parties.

Baswedan, for instance, notes that since 1999 only seven parties have succeeded to emerge as significant political players: the secular PDIP, and “Islamic-friendly” parties like PPP, PBB, PKS, PKB, PAN, and Golkar (Baswedan 2004). But within what he calls “Islamic-friendly” parties there is also a lot of diversity, both in terms of ideological tenets and goals, and in terms of constituency. The mainstream NU and Muhammadiyah, who are by far the largest Islamic organizations and have millions of followers across the archipelago, are unofficially linked with PKB and PAN respectively, which base their party platforms on Pancasila. Even though Golkar is primarily secular and nationalist, Baswedan points out that it has attracted leaders with strong Islamic credentials, thus signaling that it “welcomes Muslim aspirations” (Baswedan 2004, 674). PBB, PPP and PKS all base their party platforms in Islamic principles, even though only PBB and PPP openly call for the implementation of *shari’ah*.²⁵¹ As Hilmy notes, “utopian Islamist” groups that reject political participation in Indonesia are well aware of the fact that in spite of the fact that these parties have been able to gain some electoral support they have failed to actually Islamicize the state and reinstate the Jakarta Charter (Hilmy 2010, 253).

²⁵¹ The discussion of the PKS will show that the initial PK party also called for *shari’ah*, but after the poor electoral performance in the 1999 election, the PK changed into the PKS and in that transformation it also dropped the call for *shari’ah* legislation and emphasized the promotion of Islamic principles instead.

As already seen from the discussion of Egypt, political participation is not just about winning votes or about affecting policy, but also about other benefits, such as gaining access to resources, protecting organizational interests or gaining public visibility. However, even when taking these benefits into account, it becomes evident that the JI would not benefit greatly from forming a political party, and that its connection to the MMI and JAT has been a much more effective strategy.

The MMI is an alliance of Muslim organizations that was established in August 2000 during the first national congress of *mujahidin* (Muslim warriors), which was attended by a wide variety of Muslim activists and leaders across the ideological spectrum (Hilmy 2010, 109). The congress elected Ba'asyir as the spiritual leader as well as the leader of the advisory council. The MMI calls for the implementation of *shari'a* in Indonesia, rejects human-made ideologies that are contradictory to Islam, and it strives for the establishment of an Islamic state.²⁵² In order to achieve these goals, the MMI holds it necessary to involve all levels of society, including state institutions (D. Wahid 2007, 82). The group lobbies Muslim parliamentarians, while also promulgating the enactment of Islamic legislation at the local level (Hilmy 2010, 112–113). Ba'asyir himself has written numerous letters to political leaders inside and outside of Indonesia, inviting them to embrace Islam (Hilmy 2010, 131, note 47).

Even though the MMI limits its activities to lobbying, without entering formal institutions, the organization has additional access to the government's ear through its cooperation with the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI). The MUI was established by Suharto in 1975 and envisioned as playing an advisory role to the government on religious matters, and

²⁵² Wahid points out that unlike the DI that envisioned a parallel state, the MMI struggles “for the implementation of Islamic Shari'a, and not the establishment of an Islamic state,” so that the “implementation of Islamic Shari'a does not have to be vis-à-vis the state's authority” (D. Wahid 2007, 88).

serving as a “mediator between the government and the *ulama*” (Ichwan 2005, 48).²⁵³ In June 2006 the MUI formed a “united front” with forty other organizations, including the MMI and the hard-line FPI (Wilson 2008, 205). Even though the *fatwas* that the MUI issues are not legally binding, the council’s prominence in religious discourse both at the national and at the local level make it a crucial ally for organizations such as the MMI.

The ability to enter the national religious discourse offers hard-line groups a much more appealing and effective avenue to pursue their goals than formal political participation does. As Hilmy notes, “utopian Islamists” have realized that “transforming the power structure into an ideal Islamic policy from within would be an impossible mission, given the pragmatic compromises and conflicts of interests that would inevitably involve them” (Hilmy 2010, 164). In that regard, Hilmy notes that the PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) serves as a “bitter lesson” that confirmed the “suspicion that the parliamentary stage was nothing more than a political trap for morally committed Islamists,” given the party’s shift towards the center and away from pushing for the implementation of *sharia*’a (Hilmy 2010, 165). However, a closer look at PKS reveals that the party is not as purely strategic as many critics (both Islamists and secularists) claim, but that instead the party is very skilled at negotiating its identity and balancing the needs and values of the movement with the pragmatic requirements of the party.

The availability of non-violent non-political avenues for pursuing their goals and promoting their worldview offers incentives for groups like the JI to prioritize *da’wa* over armed struggle, and it also limits the appeal of entering formal politics. Thus, their abstention from

²⁵³ As Ichwan points out, even though the MUI is funded by the government, considers itself to be the main national authority in Islamic affairs, and it calls upon the state to adopt its legal opinions, it is technically an independent non-government organization that issues *fatwas* and non-legal recommendations known as *tausiyahs*. Ichwan also argues that in the post-Suharto era the MUI has in fact distanced itself from the government, especially during Wahid’s presidency.

politics is not just principled, but also strategic. However, the Indonesian case also displays examples of large, mainstream, non-violent organizations like the NU, who have substantial potential for electoral success, but who have loosened their links to political parties after initially entering the political process.

The next two sections examine the political oscillations of PKS and NU, in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of political Islam in Indonesia, and to expand the questions of choosing to enter, abstain or exit the formal political process to non-violent religious groups. This brief overview will show that these groups are also both principled and strategic in their choices, and that the Indonesian social and political context offers diverse avenues for Islamic (and Islamist) groups to pursue their goals and strive to achieve their religious missions.

PKS, Centrist Islamism and the Negotiation of Religious and Political Identities

The Justice and Prosperity party (PKS) has its roots in the non-political religious tarbiyah student movement of the 1980s. During the 1970s the Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council (DDII), under the leadership of former Masyumi chairman Muhammad Natsir, promoted Islamization on campuses and encouraged students to study in the Middle East. There, many Indonesians came in contact with the Muslim Brotherhood, and returned to Indonesia seeking to emulate the Brotherhood model of non-violent activism, and translating the works of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb (Jung 2009, 200). Some suggest that Natsir sent Abu Ridho (one of the founders of tarbiyah) to Saudi Arabia specifically to study the Muslim Brotherhood's curriculum.²⁵⁴ When these scholars came back, they started interacting with students at mosques

²⁵⁴ Interview with Hermawan Eriadi, November 8, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

around universities, and they organized Islamic trainings at the Bandung Institute for Technology, and subsequently at other prestigious universities.²⁵⁵

Thanks to these initiatives, Indonesia, like Egypt, witnessed a similar growth of religious study groups on campuses during the 1980s. This movement became known as the tarbiyah student movement, which was inspired by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and adopted the same model of “family” cells (*usroh*) as the Egyptian organization. Because of the repressive political context under Suharto,²⁵⁶ however, the movement was more secretive, and exclusively focused on *da'wa* and grassroots activism, and it did not adopt a confrontational stance towards the secular state (Temby 2010, 27).

As the Islamic student movement grew stronger, it began to formally organize its activities through the University Institute for Islamic Propagation (LDK), and during the 1990s tarbiyah members controlled almost all student governments at the major universities (Munhanif 2010, 371). By 1998, tarbiyah activists also founded the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI), which brought together the nation-wide *da'wa* groups in an Islamist student movement (Munhanif 2010, 372; Machmudi 2008, 44).

Tarbiyah's founding ideology was very similar to the Brotherhood's ideology, to the extent that it promoted the notion of comprehensive Islam and it believed in gradual non-violent Islamization that proceeds from the individual to the society and ultimately the state. But the movement adopted the Brotherhood ideology of the 1970s and 1980s, which was decidedly non-violent, placed less emphasis on anti-Western sentiments, and also was beginning to be much more politicized and acceptant of political parties. From the beginning tarbiyah considered

²⁵⁵ Ulil Abshar Abdalla suggests that because PKS draws its social base from secular universities with very high credentials (the so called Ivy League of Indonesia), many people give credence to its religious interpretations. Interview, June 12, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁵⁶ The Campus Normalization Act of 1978, for instance, specifically banned political activities by students.

Islamic parties as a necessary means to bring gradual changes in the state (Machmudi 2008, 44). Nonetheless, tarbiyah remained purposefully non-political, primarily because it wanted to avoid both repression and co-optation by the regime.²⁵⁷ Some suggest that one of the reasons why the tarbiyah movement emerged and spread so effectively across campuses was the disillusionment of young students with both the forced adoption of Pancasila by all Islamic groups, and with the co-optation of the main Islamic groups, NU and Muhammadiyah, which were no longer truly independent from the regime.²⁵⁸

After the fall of Suharto, the new political openings prompted the student movement to consider whether it should enter formal politics. Tarbiyah held a poll on campuses asking its senior members whether the movement should establish a party, a non-governmental organization, or remain unchanged as a student movement.²⁵⁹ Over sixty percent of respondents favored forming a political party, so PK (the Justice Party) was established in 1998.²⁶⁰ PK was conceived as a *da'wa* party based on an Islamic ideology, and seen as a tool for *da'wa* and for building an Islamic state (Jung 2009, 204). After the establishment of PK, all members automatically became party members, all religious training and activities were taken over by the party, and the leaders of the tarbiyah movement were included in the consultative board (Majelis Shura) of the party (Machmudi 2008, 72).

As was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid 1980s, the decision to form a political party was also contested by the Indonesian students. This was not because of ideological

²⁵⁷ Interview with Wahyu Bhukti Prasajo, district level coordinator of PKS scout group, June 22, 2013, Depok, Indonesia.

²⁵⁸ Interview with Hermawan Eriadi, November 8, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁵⁹ Interview with Hermawan Eriadi, November 8, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶⁰ Anonymous interview with PKS leader, November 6, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

opposition to democracy, as expressed by “utopian Islamists,”²⁶¹ but rather on the grounds of readiness and the impact of political participation on *da'wa*. The proponents of forming a political party considered that the movement was ready to move its proselytizing beyond universities and into the parliament, and that it was necessary to make sure that Islam would not be ignored by the new regime (Jung 2009, 203). However, some opposed the formal entry into politics because the movement did not yet have a political infrastructure and because they were much better at working within the community and focusing on societal change through education and *da'wa*.²⁶²

Some suggest that even Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the first president of PK, and former PKS leader Hidayat Nurwahid, didn't think that it was the right time to form a party.²⁶³ Machmudi argues that there was also a small contingency that disagreed with the transformation of the movement into a party because they preferred that the party be no more than a political wing of the movement. According to him, those who did not admit the existence of a political party were excluded from tarbiyah membership (Machmudi 2008, 73).²⁶⁴

Even though most tarbiyah members automatically became members of the party, during the 1999 general legislative elections PK only gained 1.4 percent of the vote. The first president of PK, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, was appointed as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, but not having met the electoral threshold of 2 percent, PK formed a new political party, the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS). The poor electoral performance of 1999 made it clear that for the 2004 elections PKS had to move beyond its tarbiyah core membership and attract new votes. PKS

²⁶¹ Munhanif does note that some hard-line Islamists students rejected democracy as un-Islamic, which led to the Hizbut Tahrir movement emerging on campuses as a more radical alternative to compete with KAMMI (Munhanif 2010, 373).

²⁶² Anonymous interview, November 6, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶³ Interview with Hermawan Eriadi, November 8, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶⁴ A PKS political leader offered a different account, stating that some students from the tarbiyah movement joined Golkar and some PPP, and that those who did not agree with PK did not actually leave the movement. Anonymous interview, June 10, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia.

therefore dropped its call for *shari'a*, and instead of running as an Islamist party it re-branded itself into a party fighting corruption and working for clean governance.

Under this new platform, PKS was able to win 7.34 percent of the vote in the 2004 legislative elections and 7.88 percent in the 2009 elections (Sunny Tanuwidjaja 2010, 34). Hidayat Nurwahid was chosen as the Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly in 2004, and he resigned as President of PKS. The preliminary results of the recent 2014 legislative elections show that PKS won 6.92 percent of the vote (Arifianto 2014). These results make it evident that the party is much more successful electorally when it presents itself as a centrist party that embodies Islamic values than as an Islamist party calling for *shari'a* laws. However, this need to accommodate centrist voters also reflects the tensions that emerge when a religious movement establishes a political party.

As a party, the PKS is pressed to continue expanding its membership in order to increase votes. It is this political need that is pushing the movement to expand its membership beyond its initial intellectual and urban religious base and attempt to recruit in villages. These new members are recruited into the party and trained, but this is different than the recruitment that happened in the tarbiyah movement, as it places less emphasis on religion and more emphasis on politics. The emphasis is on common values, and in areas with non-Muslim majorities the party is also recruiting non-Muslims into its membership.²⁶⁵ What this signals is that the movement is increasingly focusing on political caderization rather than purely Islamization. It comes to no surprise then that to this day there continue to be debates within the movement, as some senior leaders want to focus on *da'wa*, whereas others want to focus on politics.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ Interview with Hermawan Eriadi, November 8, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶⁶ Anonymous interview, November 6, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

The pressure to appeal to centrist voters and to brand itself as a moderate party also poses ideological tensions for its members. PKS no longer brands itself as an Islamist party, but rather as a party that embodies Islamic principles while accepting Pancasila. Instead of pushing for the implementation of the Jakarta Charter, PKS speaks instead of the Medinah charter, which is generally considered a more pluralist and inclusive model, and as Hidayat Nurwahid argued, the basis for a civil society order and for the modern nation-state (Hilmy 2010, 199). From this perspective, instead of focusing on how to institutionalize Islam as a state system, the party is more focused on how basic Islamic values are “embedded in the political practices of the state and in the management of societal affairs” (Hasan 2009, 7). As a political leader of PKS explained, “there are many aspects of Islamic laws that are implemented in daily life, and we don’t have to restrict it to Islamic legislation; so it is Islamic to think about justice and welfare.”²⁶⁷ In 2009, the party campaigned under the slogan of “a party for all of us,” and it affirmed its theological affiliation with mainstream Indonesian Islam (Hasan 2009, 20).

This centrist religious stance is quite a departure from the original tenets of the tarbiyah movement, and it has led to some divisions within the party among those who seek to occupy a centrist political space and those who want to remain committed to Islamist goals (Collins 2003, 16). The joke among political analysts is that the PKS is split into two wings: the justice wing, and the prosperity wing. Many consider the party today to have transformed into a purely pragmatic political actor that plays the political game like any other party.²⁶⁸ This skepticism is further reinforced by the growing allegations of corruptions against party leaders.²⁶⁹ In spite of these scandals, however, the party has succeeded to maintain about the same level of support, as

²⁶⁷ Anonymous interview, June 10, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁶⁸ Interview with Ulil Abshar Abdalla, June 12, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia; and with Yon Machmudi, June 14, 2013, Depok, Indonesia.

²⁶⁹ For instance, former PKS president Luthfi Hasan Ishaq was sentenced to 16 years in prison in December 2013 for money laundering and corruption in an attempt to change beef-import quotas (Jakarta Post 2013).

evidenced by the result of the 2014 legislative elections. Personal conversations with PKS activists at the local level also reveal that many of the cadres continue to be loyal to PKS because of their religious devotion to the Islamic mission that they consider PKS to represent.

How has PKS managed to maintain this balance between pragmatism and religious devotion, and why does it succeed in retaining its base in spite of political scandals? I argue that PKS, like other Islamic groups discussed here, continues to remain both principled and pragmatic in its political approach, and that it has managed to maintain its power base by carefully re-negotiating its identity and providing an organizational and ideological framework that can satisfy both the religiously devoted cadres and the politically motivated elites.

Ideologically, the cadres remain committed to the idea of an Islamic state, but they recognize that politically the party needs to accept Pancasila and focus on Islamic values and substantive manifestations of *shari'a* rather than focusing on an Islamic state. As a member explained, “PKS accepts Pancasila as the rule of the game but not as the party ideology; Pancasila is how the people of Indonesia communicate with each other [...] but Islam is the ideology of the party.”²⁷⁰ From the perspective of the political leaders, “Islamic values are not focused on artificial Islamic symbols but on the core values of Islam – fairness, justice, fight against corruption, democratic system based on values.”²⁷¹ At the national level the party also often chooses to focus on uncontroversial issues like Islamic banking and finance, or frames other concerns in non-religious terms.²⁷² At the local level, however, there has been a growing trend across Indonesia to pass *shari'a* bylaws (Sunny Tanuwidjaja 2010).

²⁷⁰ Interview with Wahyu Bhakti Prasajo, district level coordinator of PKS scout group, June 22, 2013, Depok, Indonesia.

²⁷¹ Anonymous interview with PKS leader, June 18, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁷² A PKS affiliate mentioned that, for instance on the issue of alcohol, PKS doesn't have to oppose it on the grounds of being *haram*, but it can instead emphasize health risks and use common reason. Thus, the party seeks to promote its Islamic mission by finding common values with others. Anonymous interview, June 18, 2013, Jakarta, Indonesia.

PKS leaders and cadres furthermore converge on the notion of first and foremost reforming individuals, which is the first step towards transforming society, as Hassan al-Banna suggested. Thus, the cadres are convinced that the political leaders of PKS adopt the same Islamic values.²⁷³ The tarbiyah movement, for instance, emphasized cultivating the “perfect character,” and members were not fully admitted until they displayed personal commitment. All members had to show qualities such as uncontaminated faith, correct worship, perfect morals, strong and healthy body, punctuality, and good management (Machmudi 2008, 63). Thus, a PKS member confessed that his vision is for tarbiyah people to become in charge of law enforcement, courts and other important areas, because they have the right Islamic values, and this would bring about a “smooth revolution.”²⁷⁴

Organizationally, PKS enjoys an effective division of labor between the *da'wa* activities at the grassroots level, and the political activities of its party members, and between its national political campaigns and the local level activities. At the grassroots level, the cadres are still committed to the original tarbiyah ideology, and they only engage in religious activities without being exposed to political activities. Some followers are indeed questioning whether the political elites of the PKS are following the same ideals and whether political participation is in fact successful in influencing the political system rather than the system influencing the party. However, the emphasis placed on obedience to the leader and cadre loyalty helps prevent more defections.²⁷⁵

Caderization and developing organizational strength is a crucial aspect of PKS, and as seen from the discussion of the Brotherhood ideology, this is not just an issue of increasing votes

²⁷³ The need to “prove” one’s religiosity might also explain why PKS leaders often resort to symbolic signals of religiosity, such as visiting Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in prison.

²⁷⁴ Interview with Wahyu Bhukti Prasajo, district level coordinator of PKS scout group, June 22, 2013, Depok, Indonesia.

²⁷⁵ Interview with Yon Machmudi, June 14, 2013, Depok, Indonesia.

but also has an ideological underpinning (at least for the religiously devoted members of the movement). Having a strong organization, with individual members embodying Islamic values and fully committed to the religious mission, is considered the foundation of transforming and reforming society. In addition to the strong emphasis placed on developing and training the cadres, the decision-making apparatus within the organization also reinforces the belief of the members that the movement as a whole is following the right path.

The group has a *shari'a* council, whose decisions must be obeyed and are unquestionable.²⁷⁶ Parliamentary and political decisions are made by a shura council, which consists of 100 representatives chosen to represent members in various provinces, and which was established to give expert advice and deliberate party strategy and party positions on political issues (Jung 2009, 216). Additionally, there is also a central board, and a disciplinary court that is appointed by the central board.²⁷⁷ Thus, when asked why there is no greater disillusionment with PKS in response to corruption accusations, a member stated that “we trust our leader; we have the same vision; and we trust the system.”²⁷⁸

It is telling in this regard that in the summer of 2013, presumably in response to growing accusations of corruption in the media as well as an early preparation for the 2014 elections, the PKS distributed an internal document entitled “Cadre Leadership Development.” One can interpret this document on one hand as an attempt to reinforce this very trust in the system and in the leadership, and on the other hand as a genuine attempt to improve the skills and professionalization of the cadre and leaders at all levels of the party. The book-length document details the party’s strategies for leadership development and assessment, and astutely integrates

²⁷⁶ Interview with Wahyu Bhekti Prasajo, district level coordinator of PKS scout group, June 22, 2013, Depok, Indonesia.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

this emphasis on leadership within the mission and vision of PKS. The document clearly links capacity building and institution building to its ability to realize the goals of the *da'wa*, and grounds its strategies for leadership development in both religious thought and in leadership theories drawn from psychologists like Maslow and Steve Zaccaro, and businessman Stephen Covey.

The discussion of the origins and evolution of PKS suggests that in spite of allegations that the party has become purely pragmatic, PKS continues to be both principled and strategic. Understanding the ideological nuances that inspire its power base can help us understand why the party continues to have stable political support in spite of major corruption scandals against some of its leaders. Even though the movement is founded on the same principles as the Muslim Brotherhood, the organization has adopted a somewhat different approach to negotiating its religious and political identities. As long as the party can maintain the balance between political pragmatism and religious devotion, political participation through formal institutions will continue to remain a very appealing strategy.

The Political Oscillations of the Nahdlatul Ulama

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), or “The Revival of Religious Scholars,” is the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, and one of the largest Islamic organizations in the world, attracting millions of followers across the Indonesian archipelago.²⁷⁹ The organization was formed in 1926 by traditional religious scholars in response to the establishment of Muhammadiyah and the

²⁷⁹ The estimates of NU’s memberships vary. In 1996, Fealy and Barton estimated that NU had 35 million members (Barton and Fealy 1996, xviii). In 2009, Bush estimates that the organization has 50 million members (Bush 2009, 2).

spread of modernism in Indonesia, which were perceived as threatening the authority of the *ulama* as well as traditional rituals and practices.²⁸⁰

In its early stage, the organization was non-political, focusing primarily on education and social welfare, and focusing on running a large network of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools). However, as was the case with the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood, colonial policies gradually politicized the organization, which in the 1930s started cooperating with other Islamic organization to campaign against colonial policies that were seen as inimical to Islam (Barton and Fealy 1996, xx). When the Dutch created a “colonial parliament,” they also encouraged Islamic leaders to enter the political arena (Munhanif 2010, 255–256). Under the Japanese occupation, both NU and Muhammadiyah became further politicized, especially after the creation of the Masyumi party, which included both traditionalist and modernist leaders. Through this politicization, NU and Muhammadiyah were able to control the administration of religious affairs at the local level, which was previously done by low ranking bureaucrats (Munhanif 2010, 263).

In 1952 NU split up from Masyumi and formed its own political party, primarily because the Minister of Religion, who had been from NU, was replaced by a Muhammadiyah politician (Munhanif 2010, 289). Even though many older Islamic boarding school teachers (*kyais*) were not in favor of political activity, most NU leaders were supportive of the push for forming a political party in order to protect the organization’s interests and religious, educational and socio-economic goals (Jung 2009, 71). The decision to form a political party was therefore very

²⁸⁰ Here, it is worth emphasizing again that in the Indonesian context “traditionalism” and “modernism” do not have the same meaning as in the colloquial usage of these terms in other contexts, which typically associates traditionalism with conservatism. One of the main differences between traditionalists and modernists is that the former believe that only authoritative *ulama* can understand the *Qur’an* and the *hadith*, which means that their opinions are followed without further investigation of the sources, whereas modernists believe in the practice of *ijtihad*, or independent rational-legal interpretation of the texts (Jung 2009, 35). But modernists and traditionalists also disagree over the latter’s acceptance of local religious customs and incorporation of traditions that predate the arrival of Islam in Indonesia (Arifianto 2014, 127).

strategic, to the extent that the organization was primarily interested in having access to state resources and protecting its interest. But it is misleading to completely detach these pragmatic considerations from the religious mission, since the main interests and goals that NU sought through politics were to protect its traditional religious beliefs and practices, and the authority of the *ulama*. More specifically, for NU one of the main incentives for entering politics was to control the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This position is explicitly admitted by the NU in its 1952 platform, which calls on the state to institute *shari'a* laws and to give *ulama* a “privileged role in the highest level of government” (Arifianto 2012, 92).

During its early days of politicization (in the 1952, 1954 and 1968 platforms), NU supported the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the constitution and the adoption of *shari'a* laws (Arifianto 2012, 92). However, as Munhanif notes, the NU never actually developed an “ideology of Islamic state” (Munhanif 2010, 241). The support for the Jakarta Charter was instead “a political statement drawn from their important reference of classical intellectual tradition, especially Islamic jurisprudence and law” (Munhanif 2010, 241). Furthermore, as a political party NU was willing to cooperate closely with the secular Indonesian National Party in the 1950s and 1960s (Arifianto 2012, 92).

During the 1970s, the NU became “the boldest and most defiant critic of the New Order Government” (Nakamura 1996a, 70). By the late 1970s a new generation emerged within the ranks of the NU, who pushed for reform both in terms of the organization’s theological frame and in terms of NU’s relationship to politics. In 1979, for example, Achmad Siddiq proposed that Pancasila and Islam can complement each other (Nakamura 1996b, 102). At the 1984 national congress, NU announced a set of comprehensive ideological revisions, which included: 1) the adoption of Pancasila as the sole ideological principle and the abandonment of calls for *shari'a*;

2) the advocacy of liberal principles of democracy, human rights and religious tolerance; and 3) the withdrawal from politics and focus on religious propagation and social services.

In terms of the first issue regarding the adoption of Pancasila as the sole foundation (*asas tunggal*), this was a significant shift in NU's theological interpretation, as it held that the "demand on formalization of Islamic law is sectarian in nature and incompatible with the principle of equality for all citizens," especially since in Indonesia, "a person's primary position is as a citizen of the state and not as an adherent of any religion" (Ghazali 2012). The argument was that Indonesia was so religiously diverse that it required a secular state so as not to privilege one religion over the other (Arifianto 2012, 107). Furthermore, Abdurrahman Wahid argued that there is no textual support for the establishment of an Islamic state, and that "a society that already practices Islam wholeheartedly and thus, already follows the rules specified by the *shari'a*, does not need to establish an Islamic state" (Arifianto 2012, 106). However, as Wahid himself recalls, "it was only after clarifying that Pancasila should neither be treated as a religion in the life of the nation nor be made to contradict religion that the congress was able to adopt the state ideology as its sole basis" (A. Wahid 1996, xiv).

The 1984 congress also called for the promotion of liberal principles, such as human rights, democracy and religious tolerance. Before the congress, as early as 1980, Abdurrahman Wahid had argued that Islam calls for the development of tolerant attitudes, and that religion should "demand only the foundations for life; it should not advocate theocracy or a dominant role in government" (Nakamura 1996b, 107–108).

A third major decision taken at the 1984 congress was to withdraw from politics and return to the 1926 charter, which was solely focused on social and religious activities. Barton suggests that this decision to exit politics was due to "a recognition that party-political activity in

the name of Islam was both counter-productive for the *umat* (community of believers), and, inasmuch as such activity gives rise to sectarianism, is unhealthy for society at large” (in Ramage 1996, pp. 233-234). Abdurrahman Wahid argued that this exit from politics was in response to the depoliticisation policies of the New Order and the “unrelenting government proscription of Islamic politics,” which meant that continued political participation would have compromised the NU and turned it “unable to protect its institutional interests or the interests of the *umat*” (Ramage 1996, 234). Ramage argues that in Wahid’s view, “NU as an Islamic force for democracy and religious tolerance could only be fostered outside the formal structure of New Order party politics” (Ramage 1996, 235).

These revisions were not without controversy. As former NU chair Abdurrahman Wahid notes, the 1984 National Congress brought about “dramatic and bitter debate” over the question of considering Pancasila or Islam as the organization’s sole foundation (A. Wahid 1996, xiv). On one hand, many have argued that the decisions to adopt Pancasila and to exit politics were strategic decisions and “a political move designed to effect a reconciliation with the state” (Bush 2009, 191). As Bush points out, the return to the 1926 charter “was used to release NU from a politically unfavorable alliance (with PPP), allowing its leaders to simultaneously seek a more profitable relationship (with Golkar) and lay the groundwork for the development of a vibrant and sometimes oppositional civil society movement” (Bush 2009, 189). According to Bush, the move was also used by Abdurrahman Wahid “to achieve rapprochement with the regime,” and later when modernists began to gain power “to counter both the state and political Islam” (Bush 2009, 189).

Even though the decision to exit politics might have served certain political purposes, the revision presented at the 1984 congress represented more than just a strategic adaptation to the

political environment and reflected a more fundamental transformation of NU's ideology.²⁸¹ But it is important to emphasize that whereas NU underwent a fundamental process of secularization, exiting politics did not necessarily signify the de-politization of the movement as a whole. Not only did Aburrahman Wahid continue to remain involved in politics, but the civil society activities of the organization turned NU into an important watchdog of the state. Rather than pushing for an a-political stance, the ideological revisions transformed the organization's understanding of the political, or as Bush suggests, it reconstructed the definition of the political (Bush 2009, 189).

Under the new vision, politics was no longer about winning seats in parliament but improving the lives of the citizenry and about "the development of values of liberty that are true and democratic, to foster a mature citizenry that understands its rights, responsibilities and obligations to seek the well-being of all" (Bush 2009, 189). From this perspective, even though the organization exited formal party politics, its civil society activities took on a political nature. As Bush notes, "by educating villagers about the hegemonic networks of local government officials, military officials and business leaders that were oppressing them, they were able to generate more widespread political participation and efforts by the citizenry to oppose such oppressive structures and systems" (Bush 2009, 189).

The fact that the exit from politics was not synonymous with a complete de-politicization of the movement, even though it contained a principled dimension and was not just a tactical move, became evident after the fall of Suharto, when Abdurrahman Wahid formed the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the organization had to define its relationship to the party. From a strategic perspective, it was clear that NU's broad base of support could translate into significant

²⁸¹ As Arifianto suggests, this reform was possible thanks to the presence of "moral authority leaders" such as Abdurrahman Wahid, and facilitated by an organizational culture that has historically tolerated dialogue and new religious ideas (Arifianto 2012).

electoral support, and that the PKB had the potential to become an important political player. As Jung notes, because it was widely believed that NU could easily win elections, many wanted the organization to regain its political influence, and many kyais wanted to have a political vehicle to represent their voices in politics (Jung 2009, 142). NU was also concerned because the modernist movements were establishing political parties (Jung 2009, 142).

Bush's reports on the debates about the relationship between the movement and the party that occurred during NU's national congress in November 1999 suggest that this was not merely a debate over strategy. At a more fundamental level, this was also a debate over ideological interpretation and over how to pursue the religious mission. Bush notes that the Recommendation Committee initially stated that "NU members are encouraged to exercise their political rights freely in accordance with their political aspirations and in a critical and rational manner" and that "all NU leaders from the subdistrict to the national level are ordered to maintain NU as a socio-religious organizational, not a political organization, and because of this to see that NU remains critical of all parties, and that it controls the party that is seen as the political vehicle for its members" (Bush 2009, 161).

However, the delegates from East Java were much more strongly supportive of using PKB as the party of the organization, and therefore their recommendations were that "with regard to NU members exercising their political rights, they must do so in a responsible way, to encourage the emergence of a lifestyle that is democratic, constitutional, law abiding, and capable of developing a mechanism of consultation and consensus for problem solving" (Bush 2009, 162). Therefore, "the existence of a political party should be viewed as an effort to actualize political energies, and as such should be considered carefully as a potentially effective way to channel the aspirations of NU members, while not violating the spirit of Khittah [Charter]

‘26’ (Bush 2009, 162). The final wording that was approved reinforced the socio-religious identity of the organization, but also called on members to keep in mind the historical relationship between NU and the PKB, and it called for the formation of a political committee within the NU (Bush 2009, 163).

The relationship between the NU and PKB has remained contentious since 1999, both for ideological and for political reasons. Politically, divisions and conflicts within the leadership of the organization led to a decoupling of the PKB from NU in 2004 and a split of the PKB into two separate factions (Jung 2009; Arifianto 2014).²⁸² Some suggest, however, that the rifts between PKB and NU leaders are healings, and that for the 2014, PKB legislative candidates have actively campaigned in NU strongholds and emphasized the historical connection between the party and the organization (Arifianto 2014, 7).

While the connection between the NU and PKB is certainly beneficial for electoral mobilization, ideologically the separation of party politics from the socio-religious dimension of the organization also means that cultural and religious support for NU does not necessarily have to translate into particular partisan preferences. Thus, many members “are culturally NU, but not politically NU.”²⁸³

This brief overview of the political oscillations of the NU has shown that even when groups have the organizational capacity to gain votes, formal political participation is not always the most effective strategy for pursuing the religious mission. While decisions to enter or exit politics have a strong aspect of political expedience, as Bush also concludes, “the religious and the political are deeply intertwined” as motivating forces (Bush 2009, 187). Understanding the

²⁸² In a personal interview, an NU member also suggested that the decoupling of the NU and PKB is merely temporary and political because of the divisions at the highest levels of leadership. Anonymous interview, October 19, 2012, Jakarta, Indonesia.

²⁸³ Interview with Hairus Salim, Deputy Director of LKiS, October 25, 2012, Yogyakarta.

founding ideologies of a group and the foundation of their religious visions can help us better understand the framework through which strategic calculations are made, as well as what tactics are available for followers to choose from.

Conclusion

The main goal of this project has been to understand what dynamics underlie violent escalation and de-escalation. This chapter has attempted to move the analysis to the next stage and offer some preliminary remarks about what happens *after* de-escalation, and how Islamic groups more broadly (and not just groups that have previously employed violent tactics) chose among alternative non-violent tactics. Whereas there has been a growing literature on the choice of Islamist groups to enter politics, much less attention has been paid to why groups (hardline or mainstream) might choose to abstain from politics, or even exit formal political channels. This is an important gap in the literature that deserves a lot more attention.

This chapter has shown that the relationship to formal politics is not as simple as the literature often assumes, and that Islamist (and Islamic) groups are both principled and strategic, continuously adapting to their socio-political environments, re-negotiating their identities and evaluating what tactics are most effective in pursuing the religious mission. The decision about whether to enter formal politics depends on strategic considerations, such as whether groups have the organizational capacity to mobilize political support, gain votes and have a policy impact, as well as principled considerations about which tactics are most beneficial for the pursuit of the religious mission. In understanding these choices, strategic considerations and principled commitments are deeply intertwined, and as I have argued in chapter two, tactical considerations can lead to a re-evaluation of the fundamental principles and overall religious mission.

The analysis presented here has examined both groups that have previously employed violent tactics, and non-violent groups across the ideological and theological spectrum, such as the centrist Islamist PKS and the traditionalist and pluralist NU. This raises the question of whether de-escalated groups are conceptually different from non-violent groups that have never adopted violence. The first obvious significant difference among the groups examined, which makes it seem like we are discussing apples and oranges, is the drastically different ideological foundations. The ideological spectrum for non-violent Islamic groups varies widely, and it can span from hard-line groups, to mainstream organizations, and liberal groups with strong pluralist and pro-democratic perspectives. But it is also important to keep in mind that not all groups that resort to violence do so on principled grounds, as the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood reveals. Because violent escalation can occur through a process of gradual militarization and a slippery slope, we cannot assume that all groups that ever resort to violence are necessarily founded on hard-line ideological principles. Even non-violent groups can become vulnerable to violent escalation, depending on the socio-political context.

The preliminary discussion offered here does suggest that both de-escalated and non-violent groups are similar to the extent that they are both principled and strategic in their decision-making, and to the extent that they are sensitive to public attitudes and political opportunities. But the section has also shown that non-violent tactics, like violent tactics, are not adopted in an ideological or political vacuum. Groups that had resorted to violence in the past inherit a complicated relationship to the state, which is difficult to overcome. Beyond that, depending on their founding ideology they might also lack a clear vision for non-violent activism or clear definition of the political.

In this regard, it is telling that after de-escalation, the GI for instance, remained largely inactive until 2011. This was partly because in spite of its Nonviolent Initiative the state continued to maintain a close watch on it and continued to deeply mistrust its intentions. But the organization also lacked a coherent vision for non-violent activism, and it did not clarify its relationship to politics or to the state in ideological terms after it had admitted that the violent revolutionary approach was ineffective and mistaken.

The relationship of Islamic groups to the political process deserves more detailed attention than could be offered in this overview chapter. The discussion offered here has attempted to show that the decisions to enter, exit or abstain from politics are not as unproblematic as is often assumed by the scholarship or claimed by the groups themselves. The decision to enter formal politics is not solely strategic, and the abstention from party politics is not as principled as groups often like to claim. Understanding how Islamic groups negotiate their political and religious identities and balance the pressures emerging from their religious and political missions can help push forward the literature on how political participation affects Islamist groups, and help us gain a better appreciation of what exit options can reinforce violent de-escalation.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The main goal of this project has been to understand how change happens in Islamist groups, and what causal mechanisms account for violent escalation and de-escalation. In doing so, the study has started from the assumption that Islamist groups are neither static entities nor ontologically predisposed to violence. Instead, violence is merely a tactic that is adopted at particular points in time. It can become institutionalized and legitimized, but it can also be abandoned and de-legitimized.

The theoretical framework presented in Chapter two has argued that change occurs as a form of both principled and strategic adjustment to external pressures and incentives, whose impact is shaped by ideological interpretations, organizational dynamics and public norms. Violent escalation emerges from the interaction of grievances caused by external factors (repression, low domestic policy convergence and salient threats to the *umma*) with intra-organizational competition over authority and public norms of resistance. De-escalation, on the other hand, occurs when organizational crisis and widespread public condemnation of the group lead to a re-evaluation of the cost of violence and a re-thinking of the overall mission and vision.

The empirical chapters have traced the process of change during key periods in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, the Darul Islam and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah. These investigations tested the extent to which the theoretical framework explains the strategic outlook of these groups, and also inductively uncovered what causal mechanisms underlie the dynamics of violent escalation of de-escalation in these cases. This chapter summarizes the findings of the case studies and integrates them into a broader discussion of the

literature on Islamist groups, offering some reflections on policy implications as well as some suggestions for future research.

Escalation versus De-escalation

Effectiveness of Violence and Non-violence

There is a strong tendency among social scientists to view both violent groups and non-violent social movements or interest groups as pragmatic and strategic. The analysis presented in this dissertation confirms that for the Islamist groups under study the effectiveness of various strategies played a crucial role in determining what tactics were adopted by the organization. However, evaluating the effectiveness of a particular tactic does not occur in an ideological vacuum, and purely rational-choice approaches fall short in their underestimation of the role of ideas in these cost-benefit calculations. Indeed, cost-benefit calculations occur all the time, but they are made in reference to a group's fundamental goals and vision and not in terms of absolute costs or benefits. In other words, cost-benefit calculations are translated through the ideological preferences of a group, so that the same tactic might have different benefits to different groups even within the same social and political context, based on their ideological preferences and goals.

In the cases presented in this study, cost-benefit calculations were particularly salient for disengagement from violence. The argument that violence is too costly is consequential both for the Egyptian Gama'a, where the organization underwent ideological revisions and organizational reforms to de-institutionalize and de-legitimize armed opposition to the state, and for the Indonesian Jama'a, where the group sees *jihad* against the West as legitimate but it opposes undertaking large-scale terrorist attacks within the country. But again, these cost-benefit calculations are embedded in a larger theological argument about the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in*

bello notions that are attached to the concept of *jihad*. For the Egyptian group, it became evident that violence was causing *fitna* (discord) in society, and that it was causing greater harm than good for the Muslim community and for the organization. For many leaders of the Indonesian Jama'a, large-scale attacks within Indonesia are not beneficial because they have high Muslim casualties, and they lead to arrests, which prevent the organization from growing and undertaking proselytizing and education.

In order to better understand how Islamist groups calculate costs and benefits, this study suggests that it is important to understand both the ideological reference point for each group, as well as the nexus between organizational dynamics, government policies and societal norms.

The Role of Religious Justifications

This study argues that religious justifications are important to understand as a reference point for cost-benefit calculations and for understanding the overall vision and mission of Islamist groups. But the empirical investigation has also shown that religious interpretations are not static or permanent. Learning can and does happen, and the religiously-derived ideological tenets of groups do change and adjust over time. Thinking of ideology as a two-pronged concept that entails both fundamental principles and day-to-day tactics can help explain how change can happen and be driven by adaptation to a particular social and political context. But this two-pronged view is also helpful for not conflating tactical change with more fundamental adjustment to the overall vision and mission of a group. At times, tactical changes can lead to more fundamental ideological changes, but other times they are only tactical adjustments.

The link between religious justifications and actual behavior is driven by the context. Even though this is a study exclusively focused on Islamic movements, the analysis places these groups and their tactics in their broader context. What this framework and the comparative study

of Egypt and Indonesia reveals is that while religious justifications might play an important role for mobilization, violent tactics are adopted when there is a broader precedent for violence in society, which is unrelated to the issue of religious interpretation and justification, or when there are organizational dynamics and pressures conducive to escalation. These societal and organizational pressures are more powerful catalysts for the adoption of violent tactics than simply the adoption of a hard-line religious interpretation.

In other words, adopting hard-line religious interpretations can justify violent escalation if there is a context conducive to violent clashes, as the examination of the GI clashes with the police has shown, and it can be a necessary but not a sufficient cause for staging attacks. The history of the Darul Islam has also shown that strongly-held religious beliefs by the leader can stand in the way of negotiations with the government. The examination of the JI reveals that the adoption of the salafi jihadi ideology plays an essential role in understanding the rise of violence in Indonesia, but the catalyst for JI-related violence actually came from external threats to the Muslim community and from specific organizational dynamics. This being said, the spread of the notion that *jihad* is an individual duty rather than an organizational duty poses a serious challenge, as it makes small-scale violent escalation dependent on individual conditions and motivations and not just socio-political or organizational context, adding an extra layer of complexity and making perfect prevention nearly impossible.

Whereas much of the research on violent Islamist groups has focused on the potential negative impact of religious interpretations, this study has also shown their potential powerful positive impact. The early history of the Muslim Brotherhood reveals that Hassan al-Banna's views on the nature of the struggle were important in preventing violent escalation and expelling violent tendencies from the organization. In talking about the transformation of the GI, its leaders

also talk about the learning that occurred in prisons and during their meetings with Al Azhar sheikhs. The analysis suggests that religious justifications for non-violent action actually give leaders a powerful exit option, and a way to disengage from violence but still maintain their credentials.

The discussion of contemporary Indonesian public attitudes vis-à-vis groups such as al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah has shown that Islamist groups can be very skilled at navigating public ambiguities. In spite of general opposition to violence against civilians, groups like the JI or the FPI (which often resorts to vigilante activities) have been able to escape widespread public condemnation by taking advantage on one hand of the prevalent societal concerns about immorality or communal conflict, and on the other hand of the high public skepticism towards the police and the government because of high levels of corruption and a history of state-sponsored violence.

Policy Convergence

Understanding the ideology, vision and mission of Islamist groups is essential, but it is not enough for understanding their behavior, because all behavior occurs in a particular social and political context. The rhetoric of Islamist groups is often tied to what they perceive as policy failures on the part of the government, primarily in terms of implementing religious legislation, but also in terms of external affairs, in particular if the safety, well-being or autonomy of the Muslim community is perceived to be at stake. Thus, as expected, in the cases analyzed low policy convergence between government policies and the vision of the organization increases the group's grievances. Yet, these grievances alone do not make the groups justify employing violent tactics against a regime.

While low policy convergence can increase antagonism towards the regime, higher levels of policy convergence also do not necessarily lead to de-escalation of tactics if the violence threshold has already been breached. The early history of the Muslim Brotherhood shows that policy concessions can at times encourage leaders to negotiate and abandon for instance political ambitions in return for policy changes, but overall higher levels of policy convergence don't have a powerful direct impact on group strategies. This is particularly the case if a group has already legitimized or adopted violent tactics.

The empirical analysis reveals that whereas government policies on religious or foreign affairs alone did not lead to violent escalation in the periods under investigation, perceived existential threats to the Muslim community acted as powerful catalysts for a non-violent movement to pick up arms, or for a movement that already justifies violence to mobilize support. The early history of the Muslim Brotherhood has shown that the Palestinian tensions and the tensions with British forces in Egypt led to the politicization of the group, and to the eventual development of an armed wing to defend against these external threats. But once mobilized, this armed resistance can lead to a slippery slope of militarization, so that the violence eventually turns from the external enemy to the government and even civilians.

Reducing or eliminating the external threat to the Muslim community might remove a powerful catalyst for violent escalation, but the case studies suggest that may not be enough for de-legitimizing violence or completely de-escalating tactics. Once the communal conflict in Ambon and Poso ended, the JI was no longer participating in paramilitary activities there. However, this cessation of violence was purely conditional, and as soon as tensions escalated the JI members mobilized again. The end of the conflict did not lead to any reconsiderations on the usefulness of violence as a tactic on any principled ground, and it did not prevent JI from

continuing to pursue military training. Furthermore, once militarized and escalating violence, factions such as Hambali's group often continue the violent escalation regardless of the initial impetus for violence.

The Multi-faceted Legacies of Repression and the Double-edged Sword of Democratization

One of the goals of this study was to understand why the literature has come to contradictory conclusions about the impact of repression, with some scholars arguing that it leads to violent escalation and radicalization, and others arguing that it can also account for the abandonment of violence. Employing process-tracing and exploring the mechanisms of both violent escalation and of de-escalation reveals that repression does indeed reinforce grievances, and it can also instill mistrust of the government and a sense of betrayal. While these are important causal mechanisms of violent escalation, repression alone is not a catalyst for violence in the cases that have been examined, and violence also happens in the absence of repression. Repression does however make hard-line interpretations more appealing, especially for young members, and it pushes groups towards clandestine activity. Once violence is adopted, repression can also lead to growing antagonism and escalating tactics and scope of violence.

Very high levels of repression can also lead to an organizational crisis, which in turn can then lead to de-escalation *if* there is also strong public condemnation of the group undertaking violence. This was the case with the Egyptian GI, which is why scholars have arrived at the conclusion that repression can lead to de-radicalization. This study, however, argues that it is not repression doing the strongest causal pulling in the case of the GI, but rather the organizational crisis that was caused by the repression. This is an important distinction, because 1) repression does not always lead to an organizational crisis, and 2) there are also non-repressive measures that can lead to organizational demise.

Here the Indonesian cases are particularly telling. Regarding the first point, the history of the NII and JI shows that highly repressive measures do not always lead to organizational crisis. Leaders can go into exile and mobilize support, rejuvenate the cause, find new alliances and even gain military training and “harden” their ideology. On the other hand, non-repressive measures can also lead to organizational demise. The co-optation of DI cadres and the prospects of being incorporated into the armed services is just one example of how appealing exit options can lead to mass defections and facilitate the demise of an organization.

This being said, if violence is already legitimized, the lack of repression alone is not enough to lead to de-escalation, as the violence in Indonesia post 1998 emphasizes. The opening of the political system and the possibility of political inclusion are not enough to “moderate” groups, and are not always appealing to Islamists, as will be discussed in greater detail below. This was evident both when examining Kartosuwirjo’s activism before establishing the DI, and from the fact that groups such as JI or FPI do not even consider the option of forming a political party and participating in politics. This is an important phenomenon that the “inclusion-moderation” literature has largely ignored.

Whereas the possibility of political inclusion does not always “moderate” or appeal to all groups, democratizing the playing field and opening up the political space can raise drastically the relative cost of violence, by significantly reducing the cost of the non-violent legal alternatives of preaching and education. As seen in the case of the JI, these openings are not enough to push the organization to undergo a fundamental change, nor are they enough to prevent violent splinters from emerging. But this new political opportunity structure has pushed leaders such as Ba’asyir and many of his followers to pursue their vision through above-ground organizations like JAT. The JAT is still considered to be linked to military training and to serve

as a recruiting pool for violent mobilization, especially when it comes to the communal conflict in Ambon and Poso. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the JI has shifted much of its focus from armed struggle to *da'wa* in recent years, and the possibility to focus on education or preaching represents an important exit options for both leaders and cadres.

Public Attitudes and Social Context

This study argues that in order to understand the tactics and strategic outlook of an Islamist groups, the analysis needs to take into account the social milieu within which the organization operates. Public opinion, prevailing norms about the adequacy, legitimacy or effectiveness of violent *or* non-violent tactics, as well as public condemnation, toleration or acceptance of particular groups, are all crucial factors in shaping an organization's strategic outlook. When it comes to violent escalation, the prevalence of violent norms of resistance did not in and of itself cause violence in any of the cases, but it represents an important permissive condition for such escalation. On the other hand, strong public condemnation of violent attacks and of the groups undertaking such attacks exerts a powerful pressure on mass-based groups like the GI. This pressure is particularly acute for leaders, who when faced with strong public condemnation and organizational crisis are forced to re-think the mission of the group and to push for reform.

During the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood, most political groups in the country had an armed faction that was politically visible and active, and violent outbursts against British forces were frequent. In this context, creating an armed faction against foreign forces did not defy prevalent norms. This social milieu facilitated the appeal of many young Muslim Brothers to use the Secret Apparatus for domestic political purposes as well. However, once Nasser gained popularity and legitimacy, public appeal for violent tactics decreased significantly, and

even though many Brothers were “radicalized” in prison, it was primarily young Brothers and Islamists from Upper Egypt who were attracted to Qutb’s militant interpretation, whereas the mainstream organization denounced violence.

If we compare the situation of the 1940s and 1950s with events in Egypt since 2011, and in particular since the Brotherhood was deposed from power, it also becomes clear that public attitudes play an essential role in determining how the organization deals with crises. The brutal crack-down of Brotherhood protests, the scores of arrests and killings occurring in 2013 have undoubtedly convinced some young Islamists that violent tactics and armed defense might be necessary. While it is difficult to assess with certainty how many reports of arms at Brotherhood protests are true or fabrications, it is perfectly conceivable that some individual members might have used violence against their opposition or the police. Yet the organization as a whole abstained and warned against adopting a strategy of violent resistance (even though some of Morsi’s initial rhetoric included references to martyrdom and defending the legitimate leaders with one’s life). It is unlikely, however, that we will see any major violent Islamist factions or groups emerge, and this is primarily because in the current context the Islamists have lost public legitimacy, and violent opposition to the regime is widely condemned.

The history of the GI is also telling in this regard. When the organization started organizing large-scale attacks on tourists, public condemnation of such tactics rose sharply. Since the group was founded with the vision of inspiring a popular revolution, public opinion is an essential element of its considerations. Public opposition, condemnation and even ridicule convinced the group that the violent campaign was ineffective and that the popular revolution they were aiming for would not succeed. Under these circumstances, the leaders were open to working with Al-Azhar to revise their ideological tenets, and disengage from violence.

In Indonesia, the legitimacy of the newly established Indonesian Republic and the widespread public appeal of non-violent grassroots Islamic groups like Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama also facilitate the growing disillusionment with the Darul Islam rebellion, aiding the trend of disarmament among its members. The story of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah on the other hand, is somewhat more complex. Cynicism towards the police and the government that is left-over from the Suharto era, as well as criticism of the brutality of Densus 88 special forces and fear of a reversal to human rights abuses make for a social milieu that is much more ambivalent about the JI than the Egyptian public was towards the GI. Many Indonesians, for example, refused to believe that the first attacks staged by factions of the JI could have been undertaken by Indonesians. Instead, conspiratorial views were much more prevalent. In the more recent period, the fact that major counter-terrorist campaigns always seem to occur when the police is involved in corruption scandals or the regime faces other legitimacy issues, is also raising skepticism among the population.

In this context, the JI as an organization and the historical leader Abu Bakar Ba'ashir are also much more ambiguous about the stance on violence, and the organization has not undergone the same revisions as the Egyptian GI. Ba'ashir has established the JAT, which operates as a legal grassroots movement, but which many recognize often also serves as an ideological incitement or even recruiting ground for militant actions.

The cases presented in this study emphasize not just that public opinion is relevant, but that it is also inextricably connected to the political context and the policies of the government. Changing public attitudes therefore, is not just a matter of presenting counter-narratives, but also a matter of changing policies and enhancing government credibility and legitimacy.

Organizational Dynamics

Organizational dynamics emerge as one of the most important factors for both violent escalation and for de-escalation in all four case studies. Two organizational features are particularly important: strength and cohesion. Strength refers primarily to organizational capacity, in terms of having resources, adherents and mobilization potential. Coherence on the other hand refers primarily to the extent to which there is a unitary line of command or whether there are factions within the organization and competition over authority. This feature, however, also depends on the presence of a strong leader, who might be able to unite and/or control factions and impose authority.

When an organization is strong and cohesive, its strategic outlook is mainly determined by the leadership. Thus, during the early history of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna was able to maintain authority and command of a growing organization and prevent violent escalation, even when some members were considering violent tactics. His vision was one of gradual Islamization of society and not of confronting or overtaking the government, and before the establishment of the Secret Apparatus he was capable of maintaining a non-violent strategic outlook. During the early history of the Darul Islam, on the other hand, Kartosuwirjo's vision was to establish an alternative to the Republic, which implied creating an alternative structure for an Islamic state, and creating the Islamic Army. This vision defined the strategic outlook, and as soon as government troops were perceived as betraying the Islamic and the national cause, they were considered to be aligned with the enemy.

But cohesive organizations can sometimes run out of steam and become weak. In those circumstances, public attitudes and exit options become particularly important in determining how leaders will respond to this weakness. In the case of the DI, by 1962 Kartosuwirjo's Islamic

State was losing support, and facing both defections and military defeat. Thus, most leaders in West Java surrendered, and the DI rebellion died off. In the case of the GI, when the weakness reached a point of crisis, in a context of widespread public condemnation of the group, the historical leaders decided to transform the organization and undergo drastic ideological and tactical revisions.

The cases examined in this study indicate that strong but fragmented organizations are perhaps the most dangerous, as the competition over authority makes them particularly prone to violent escalation. This was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood, after the establishment of the Secret Apparatus, when Hassan al-Banna's leadership was weakening, and it became even more acute after his death. This was also the case with the JI after Sungkar's death in 1999. Under Sungkar's leadership, the de-centralized structure, multiple lines of command and multiple regions of operations did not threaten the overall cohesiveness of the organization. After his death, however, leaders such as Hambali and Noordin Top sought to assert their authority, and in the face of external threats they staged increasingly large and lethal attacks.

The empirical discussion also reveals that there is a powerful slippery slope of militarization and escalation that occurs once violent tactics are considered. On one hand, as we have seen during the early period of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is an organizational slippery slope. The creation of an armed wing can create a slippery slope, as this entity acquires a life of its own, becomes defined by its own logic and needs, and can ultimately compete over the authority and the guidance of the organization. On the other hand, there is also a tactical slippery slope, as witnessed by all four groups in this study (the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyyah, Darul Islam and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah). Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Darul Islam started with a very limited justification of violence against foreign aggressors. But

once the capacity for violence was developed, the interaction with the government, the growing sense of mistrust and betrayal by the regime and the prevalence of violent norms of resistance led to an escalation of violence against the government. Similarly, the history of the GI and the JI show how violence can escalate from clashes with the police or participation in communal conflict to ultimately large-scale attacks on civilians.

The Egyptian cases also reveal the importance of the generational and the geographic divide. Young members have short time horizons, which depending on the context and the prevailing norms of resistance can also make them prone to violent escalation and hard-line interpretations. But as the 2011 uprisings have shown, in different contexts the same short time horizon can push the youth to the streets through non-violent resistance.

Geographical differences can also be significant to the extent that they represent variation in public norms, constituency or state legitimacy. Areas at the periphery of state control or allocation of resources, where the legitimacy of the central government is questioned and the monopoly over the use of violence is feeble, are more prone to organizations that adopt hard-line interpretations or undergo violent escalation. This was most clearly exemplified by the discussion of Upper Egypt. Nonetheless, in order to understand the behavior and trajectory of the groups under study, it is necessary to understand their local, national and global context and frame of reference.

Merging the Local, National and Global

In an interview with Jakarta's *Tempo* magazine, former FBI agent turned security consultant, Ali Soufan, commented about the spread of terrorism to Southeast Asia that "it's all based on local incubating factors [...] there is no cookie cutter approach, no global solution, no one size fits all" (Soufan 2012, 62). For the most part, this is certainly true, and like with any

other social problems, there is never a universal solution that can apply to all cases. Yet, examining only the local dynamics and ignoring the regional and international influences misses an important dimension about the diffusion of ideas and the role of watershed events in international politics that serve to mobilize support for violence or non-violence. The international dimension does not just include the spread of Al-Qaeda's ideology or the Afghanistan training camps, as policy-makers often like to point out, but also the foreign policies of Western powers and political dynamics in the region.

One of the most fascinating dynamics that is emerging from the analysis is that international factors play a crucial role for the violent escalation of tactics in all four cases, whereas domestic factors play a much more important role when it comes to de-escalation and disengagement from violence. Indeed, even when we examine groups that are primarily or even solely domestic, international factors, be they perceived threats on the Muslim *umma*, the foreign policies of the regime, or actual military training, play an essential role in politicizing and militarizing the group.

In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, the formation of the Secret Apparatus to defend against the British forces in Egypt and to fight in Palestine created a parallel structure and an entity that took on a life of its own, and that eventually competed over authority and sought to control the organization as a whole. Furthermore, the experience fighting in Palestine militarized many of the members and made it much easier to see the appeal and potential effectiveness of using violent tactics domestically.

In the case of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah, Sadat's negotiations with Israel also helped politicize the group when it first emerged. But more importantly, after the mid 1980s when GI members went to Afghanistan, they came back more militant and with increased technological

know-how. This enabled the shift from low-level clashes with the police at the local level and assassination attempts on the political leaders associated with repressive policies to more intricate and large-scale attacks on tourists.

In the case of Darul Islam, the fight against the Dutch forces also led to the same slippery slope of organization development as we have witnessed during the early period of the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization formed armed battalions to fight against the Dutch, it won recognition and respect for that role, and after independence when the fighters were not included in the national army, the transition to an armed rebellion against the state was an almost natural progression.

The history of the Jama'a al-Islamiyyah in Indonesia also reveals a similar escalation as the history of the JI after being exiled and the members gained experience in Afghanistan. The militarization, technological know-how and ideologization of the global *jihad* led the group, or at least some factions within the group, to organize large-scale and highly visible attacks in its own country.

Whereas this international dimension played a crucial role in the escalation of tactics, domestic dynamics played a much more significant role in the de-escalation of tactics. As previously mentioned, in the case of the GI the de-escalation was primarily in response to organizational crisis and public condemnation, whereas in the case of the JI the democratic opening of the political sphere has given many JI members exit options and significantly decreased the cost of focusing on *da'wa* and educational activities.

Causal Mechanisms of Violent Escalation

In addition to exploring how individual factors impact the propensity to violence or the possibility of disengagement from violence, employing process-tracing in the case studies has

also uncovered through what causal mechanisms escalation or de-escalation has occurred.

Whereas in each case the dynamics of change occurred within a particular social and historical context, the empirical investigation has revealed some common patterns and generalizable causal mechanisms that hold across regions and time periods, and which could be tested in other cases that are beyond the scope of this project.

As already mentioned in the discussion of organizational dynamics, all cases revealed a common theme: the powerful effect of the slippery slope. For non-violent groups, politicization can lead to a slippery slope into violence, in particular if violent norms of resistance prevail. For groups that already employ violence, there is also a slippery slope of escalating tactics, enabling a shift from defending one's community or fighting external aggressors to proactively targeting government figures and ultimately civilians.

The Egyptian cases reveal that the interaction of three powerful mechanisms can account for violent escalation: 1) politicization of the group in response to low policy convergence and salient external threats to the Muslim community, 2) a sense of betrayal by the national leadership, and 3) mistrust of the government. The Muslim Brotherhood was politicized both by the presence of British troops and by the situation in Palestine, whereas al-Gama'a was politicized by the economic and foreign policies of Sadat, which led to harsh crackdowns on demonstrations. Government policies can reinforce the sense that the leadership has betrayed both the organization and the national or the religious cause, whereas repression reinforces mistrust in the regime. Once a group loses trust in the regime, negotiations or limited concessions are unlikely to be effective, as the regime has no credibility.

The Egyptian cases also emphasize the powerful role of revenge and of militarization. Revenge can be a powerful motive both at the individual and at the organizational level, and it

can interact with a desire for deterrence. Militarization can occur at two levels: it can be a militarization of institutional structures, as happened in the Muslim Brotherhood after the creation of the armed wing; or of tactics, as was witnessed by al-Gama'a after it participated in struggle in Afghanistan.

The Darul Islam as an organization was already politicized and militarized when it was created, but the evidence also shows that betrayal and mistrust played a powerful role in escalating tactics and shifting the target of violence from external enemies to the government. What both the DI and the JI emphasize, however, in terms of mechanisms of violent escalation, is the powerful role of salient threats to the Muslim community. For the DI it was the Dutch that presented a powerful motivation, and for the JI the communal conflicts offered the most powerful tool for mobilization and violent escalation.

These findings reinforce recent arguments that collective “radicalization” can emerge from a cycle of action and reaction between the group and the state (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), and that “radicalization” needs to be examined in the broader social, political and organizational context (Taylor and Horgan 2006). This study, however, refines our understanding of how relative deprivation and grievances can escalate to violent acts by emphasizing on one hand the importance of mistrust and a sense of betrayal, and on the other hand pointing to the powerful role of militarization of both organizational structures and of tactics. The analysis emphasizes the slippery slope of escalation at the organizational level, but it does not conceive of it as either an inevitable or an irreversible process. During the critical points when escalation happens, both groups and governments have powerful agency, and competition over authority within the organization, as well as government repression play an important role in reinforcing the shift towards violence.

The concept of slippery slope also explains how groups that initially use armed struggle against foreign aggressors can shift to domestic targets and ultimately escalate to acts of violence against domestic civilians. This transformation has been largely understudied and eclipsed by work that focuses on the opposite and more recent transformation from targeting the “near enemy” to shifting to the “far enemy” by joining Al Qaeda. In the cases of Egypt and Indonesia, however, the empirical discussion has shown that fighting a foreign enemy in the name of national independence can easily escalate into clashes with the domestic regime, if the latter is perceived as betraying the national cause. Furthermore, these early armed struggles during formative historical periods in a nation’s history have long-lasting legacies on the development of subsequent Islamist groups, as evidenced by the impact of Darul Islam on the JI in Indonesia, and the emergence in the 1970s of hard-line groups from the ashes of the repressed Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This suggests that even if terrorism does occur in global waves (Rapoport 2002), in specific national contexts there may be important historical legacies and ideological continuities between different manifestations of armed struggle, which blur the boundaries between waves such as what Rapoport considers the anti-colonial wave and the religious wave of terrorism.

Causal Mechanisms of De-escalation and Disengagement from Violence

In the cases examined here, violence is primarily driven by the logic of grievances. The study finds that de-escalation, on the other hand, is driven by the logic of disillusionment. The most powerful causal mechanism that pushed the leaders of the GI to implement reform was the widespread disillusionment with the cause, driven both by organizational crisis and by widespread public condemnation. Whereas previous research has emphasized the role of disillusionment in driving individuals to disengage from violence (Bjorgo 2009; Horgan 2009),

this study has shown that when disillusionment accumulates among both leaders and followers, it can be a powerful mechanism for collective de-escalation and for a re-thinking of the mission and vision of the organization. But in the case of the GI, disillusionment was also accompanied by learning, and genuine re-thinking of religious principles.

In the Indonesian case, the JI has avoided widespread public condemnation and has not faced the same level of collective disillusionment, as elements of the constituency and leadership have metamorphosed into above-ground entities like the MMI or JAT, which maintain an ambiguous relationship to violent tactics. This has enabled leaders and cadres to pursue the mission through various means and organizational structures, while the most violent-prone elements can be easily recruited by hard-line factions or other groups.

Understanding the importance of collective disillusionment can help solve the puzzle as to why some scholars argue that repression leads to violent escalation, whereas other consider it a powerful cause of de-radicalization. Repression reinforces grievances, but in some cases it can also lead to organizational crisis. When the organizational crisis is accompanied by widespread public condemnation of the group, collective disillusionment ensues, which is a powerful mechanism of de-escalation. However, as previously emphasized, organizational crisis can occur from a variety of factors and not just repression.

The empirical analysis of de-escalation has also revealed that exit options are important not just in cases of individual disengagement, but they can also play a role at the organizational level. In the case of the GI, the ability for the small violent faction to break off and join the global jihadi cause in Afghanistan enabled the historical leadership to implement reform at the organizational level. In Indonesia, on the other hand, violent splinter groups have been much more powerful, having access to resources and also competing over authority within the JI. In the

absence of a strong push for de-escalation from the leadership and a strong hierarchical structure, this has led to a significant growth in violence.

Non-violent Choices and the Appeal of the Political Process

The main focus of the dissertation has been to understand the dynamics of violent escalation and de-escalation. Since the research on disengagement from violence is relatively new, very little attention has been paid to what happens *after* de-escalation, in particular at the organizational level. Two lines of research offer potential answers. First, there has been a growing body of research in Comparative Politics on why Islamist groups join formal politics and how it affects their ideology, mainly grounded in the inclusion-moderation debate. However, this work largely ignores the question of why some Islamist groups abstain from politics, or detach themselves from political parties.

Second, new lines of inquiry are beginning to emerge in security studies and peace research, which explore the shift from armed struggle to non-violent resistance, offering some preliminary hypotheses on what causal mechanisms can account for such transformation (Dudouet 2013). However, de-escalation and disengagement from violence are conceptually and empirically different from adopting non-violent resistance, and what is needed is a more comprehensive discussion of what happens after de-escalation and how Islamist groups choose among different tactical options within the non-violent repertoire.

In order to start addressing some of these questions, Chapter seven has examined the debates and concerns surrounding political participation versus other non-violent tactics in the context of the Muslim Brotherhood, GI and JI. The chapter also extended the analysis to two groups that have never employed violence against the state, PKS and Nahdlatul Ulama, in order

to better understand how mainstream Islamic groups across the ideological and religious spectrum chose among alternative non-violent tactics.

The preliminary investigation of these five groups has revealed that the relationship to formal politics is more complicated and contested than is often discussed in the literature, and that Islamist (and Islamic) groups are both principled and strategic. The decision to enter politics is not purely pragmatic or universally accepted on pragmatic grounds, as is often assumed in the literature. Entering politics is often contested, and once formal political participation is adopted groups are faced with a delicate challenge of balancing the pressure to succeed politically with the needs and principles of their religious propagation wing. In attempting to reconcile the needs and interests of the political and the socio-religious wings, groups are often forced to revise their principles and re-negotiate their identities. Nonetheless, the pragmatic and centrist rhetoric often adopted by the political leaders of Islamist groups should not be mistaken for a complete abandonment of the religious mission, especially at the level of followers and local cadres.

On the other hand, the abstention from politics is not based solely on ideational grounds, as the groups themselves would like to claim. Instead, the relationship to formal politics depends on both strategic considerations, such as whether groups have the organizational capacity to mobilize political support, gain votes and have a policy impact, as well as on principled considerations about which tactics are most beneficial for the pursuit of the religious mission. Strategic considerations and principled commitments are therefore deeply intertwined, and religious groups continuously adapt to their socio-political environments, re-negotiating their identities and evaluating the feasibility and benefits of alternative paths.

The discussion in Chapter seven also reveals that de-escalation is not necessarily accompanied by the adoption of a non-violent agenda, and reversely, the shift to primarily non-

violent tactics does not always signify a complete renouncement of violent tactics. The Indonesian JI, for instance, has been prioritizing nonviolent and above-ground tactics because of the nature of the political opportunity structures, but this has not translated into a categorical adoption of nonviolent resistance as an alternative to armed struggle.

The examination of the GI, on the other hand, has shown that the 1997 Nonviolence Initiative marked the renouncement and de-institutionalization of violence within the organization, but it did not offer an alternative model for non-violent resistance. This was partly because of the relationship of mistrust with both state and society that it inherited, but also because ideologically the organization did not clearly delineate a new vision for its relationship to politics and its role in society. It was only after the political openings of 2011 that the GI started engaging in such ideological and strategic discussions about its new place in the Egyptian social and political sphere. This implies that what scholars have identified as mechanisms of “demilitarization,” such as, the adoption of nonviolent resistance as a form of reversed outbidding, or mirroring of other actors or as a step towards coalition building (Véronique Dudouet 2013, 409), are in effect mechanisms that only explain the adoption of non-violent resistance and not demilitarization per se.²⁸⁴ Implicitly, Chapter seven calls not only for additional research on how Islamist groups decide among non-violent tactical choices, but also for more careful differentiation between the mechanisms of de-escalation, and the mechanisms that drive the adoption of political or non-political non-violent choices.

²⁸⁴ Dudouet does recognize the conceptual difference between demilitarization and the adoption of non-violent resistance and mentions different types of possible transitions from armed to unarmed resistance. Her focus, however, is exclusively on groups that do adopt unarmed resistance, and in that context there is still at times a conflation of the two separate processes of demilitarization and adoption of nonviolent resistance.

Future Directions

This study has offered a theoretical framework for understanding how change happens in Islamist organizations, and what dynamics underlie both violent escalation and de-escalation. The case studies have also inductively uncovered causal mechanisms of both escalation and de-escalation. This type of analysis would greatly benefit from future research that tests the generalizability of these causal mechanisms and examines the extent to which they can explain violent escalation or de-escalation in other Islamist groups.

Even though the study has underlined the role of ideology and of religious interpretation, the actual mechanisms of escalation and de-escalation are not explicitly related to religious interpretations per se. Future research would therefore benefit from examining more closely if and how the religious aspect of Islamist groups impacts the causal mechanisms of escalation and de-escalation, and the extent to which these mechanisms also explain change within non-religious actors that resort to violent tactics.

Last but not least, Chapter seven has provided some preliminary insights into why Islamist groups enter, exit or abstain from formal political channels. The chapter has focused mainly on showing that these choices are contentious and on examining how groups balance pragmatic and principled considerations. In order to fully understand how these decisions come about and what factors impact various non-violent choices, however, future studies should undertake process-tracing, and expand the scope of research to other cases beyond Egypt and Indonesia.

Policy Implications

Governments have responded to violent non-state actors in a variety of ways, from brutal repression or military intervention to attempts at co-optation and control. No policy has proven

infallible, and more often than not government responses have mixed effects. By examining the dynamics of both violent escalation and de-escalation, this study is in a unique position to consider these mixed effects and evaluate to what extent different policies impact the propensity to de-escalation or reinforce violent escalation.

The study confirms the argument that repression reinforces the logic of grievances and that it installs mistrust in the government, which are powerful mechanisms that contribute to violent escalation. However, in the cases examined, repression alone is neither sufficient for escalation, nor is it the main factor that makes groups adopt violent tactics, as is often argued in the literature on contentious politics. Instead, repression reinforces grievances and mistrust of the government, which interact with policy convergence, other external threats and with organizational dynamics in order to produce violent escalation.

Sometimes the escalation is at the level of the group; other times it only operates at the individual level. Youth in particular is particularly prone to expressing grievances through violent outbursts, because of short time horizons. In Egypt, easing the repression of Islamist groups during the 1970s and the political openings of 2011 provided incentives to engage in non-violent political activism, even though political openings were not what actually caused groups to renounce and denounce violence. The examination of the JI in Indonesia also reveals that the lack of repression and the democratization of the political space are not enough to fully prevent violent escalation, even though they certainly reinforce a shift towards prioritizing violent tactics over non-violent tactics.

The opening of the political sphere has led JI leaders like Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to pursue the vision of an Islamic state and Islamic caliphate through legal, non-violent means; but it has not led to a denunciation or permanent renouncement of violent tactics. As Ba'asyir himself has

hinted at, democratization has increased the cost of violence, while decreasing the cost of proselytizing and education. However, armed struggle remains a justified tactic, and any threats to the Muslim community, especially in Ambon and Poso, make armed resistance seem necessary. For JI factions like the one led by Hambali or Noordin Top, who are more closely aligned with the global jihad ideology and who have strong ties to the Moro fighters in the Philippines, threats to other Muslim communities, such as the one in Mindanao or in Iraq, also raise the appeal of armed resistance.

Given the importance of the communal conflict in stirring violent escalation, Hall's remark that "priority in policy should be given to resolving the conflict rather than to efforts to eradicate terrorists" seems particularly relevant (Hall 2007, 104). Hall in fact argues that "peacemaking, through successful negotiation and settlement of territorial disputes, and peacebuilding, through support for peace agreements and processes of reconciliation, are the most effective police areas through which to control of terrorism in these new democracies in Southeast Asia" (Hall 2007, 104).

This stands in sharp contrast with Abuza's recommendation to toughen counter-terrorist measures and regulation of civil society in Indonesia (Abuza 2007). His analysis and policy recommendation, however, ignore the crucial dimension of public perception and psychological legacies from the authoritarian past, as discussed in much greater detail in the chapter on the JI. Instead, what might be much more effective and conducive towards a social milieu that fosters non-violence and disengagement from violence is (1) more sensitive counter-terrorist operations that respect human rights, (2) police reform so as to reduce corruption, racketeering and the frequent resort to the use of "gangs" for security and protection, and (3) increased

transparency at all levels of the government, but in particular in the area of counter-terrorism, so as to reduce public cynicism and the prevalence of conspiracy theories.

Salient external threats to the Muslim community also played a powerful militarizing role in the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood, and facilitated the shift from fighting foreign forces to eventually targeting domestic actors, even though the founding ideology of the Brotherhood did not legitimize the use of violent tactics internally. The same slippery slope also occurred in the case of the Darul Islam, who started out with the intention of only fighting the colonial forces. The powerful role played by perceived external threats to the community raise important concerns about foreign military interventions. The fact that international factors play a critical role towards violent escalation, yet domestic factors are more important for de-escalation and disengagement from violence also raises an important warning against overly interventionist foreign policies by United States or other world powers.

The experience in Indonesia also raises a cautionary note about the “global war on terrorism.” Whereas Australia and the United States have been very involved in Indonesia’s campaign against terrorism, there needs to be a deeper recognition of the negative side effects such policies have at the level of public opinion. If “fighting terrorism” is perceived as being a campaign of “the West” that serves mainly the interests of the United States and Australia and in fact interferes with domestic affairs and diminishes the sovereignty of the state, then the general public will continue to have ambivalent feelings towards groups such as JI, which in turn affects the calculations of these groups about the utility, cost and legitimacy of militant rhetoric and violent tactics.

This project also offers some food for thought regarding the question of whether policy concessions work or not. The findings of the analysis suggest that policy convergence is an

important element in the story of violent escalation, but it is only one factor that on its own does not lead to violent escalation. In other words, divergent policies that do not meet the vision of a group are not enough to radicalize a movement in the absence of other pressures and threats. On the other hand, policy convergence plays no role in the de-escalation of tactics. This implies that adjusting domestic and foreign policies to meet the demands of a group that is already violent has no effect on the de-escalation of tactics in the absence of other changes in policies towards the group itself, organizational dynamics and public attitudes.²⁸⁵

In terms of political inclusion and attempts at co-optation in the hopes of “moderation,” the study has shown that in the cases examined political inclusion is not driving the causal story of de-escalation, and the appeal of formal politics depends on the strength and mobilization potential of an organization, as well as on what other alternatives are available. That being said, as emphasized above, democratic openings strongly impact the cost of violence and offer powerful incentives to prioritize non-violent tactics. The history of the Darul Islam also teaches us that the prospects of being included in the national army and other material incentives to leave the rebellion can play a powerful role in weakening an organization.

This suggests that offering appealing exit options and various forms of inclusion in the state structure and integration in society can be a powerful alternative to repression in terms of causing an organizational crisis, which in turn is a first step towards de-escalation. This is a powerful lesson of this study, because it is all too often that governments justify repression or harsh measures in the name of effectively crushing rebellions. But these measures always have negative effects on at least some segments of the population, in addition to being ethically

²⁸⁵ This study has purposefully excluded Islamist groups that make territorial claims, so this conclusion does not apply to such cases.

problematic. The fact that non-repressive measures can also be effective in weakening organization is an imperative message.

This study has also revealed that public attitudes play a crucial role, especially when it comes to de-escalation. The findings show that when a group is faced with an organizational crisis, widespread public condemnation of the group can reinforce disillusionment with the mission, and push leaders to work towards de-escalation. As the Indonesian discussion of the JI has revealed, public repugnance at violence against civilians is not enough to have this disillusioning effect if society does not actually condemn the group for violence. But the complexity of public attitudes in Indonesia also suggests that shifting such views is not merely about clever public diplomacy or “hearts and minds” campaigns. Any superficial attempt to change public opinion without fundamentally changing the political reality and the government policies that inform such views is bound to fail, if not backfire.

For example, many public diplomacy efforts are aimed at undermining the credibility of leaders. This ignored the fact that a powerful mechanism of escalation is mistrust of government, which means that any campaign sponsored by the government can very likely backfire. Instead of solely focusing on discrediting the ideologues of the groups, more comprehensive policies and reforms that can instead restore the credibility of the government and trust in public institutions are much more likely to be successful.

The findings of this study also point to the fact that merely emphasizing the strategic superiority of non-violent resistance (as has been the trend with much normative work coming from peace studies), in the absence of addressing the larger socio-political context in which groups operate, will not be sufficient either to prevent future violent escalation or to cause de-escalation. The reasons are twofold. First, as the dynamics of escalation have shown, violence is

not always adopted because it is considered the most strategic option. Second, recognizing that violence is more costly than non-violence can lead to a temporary prioritization of non-violent tactics, but it is not enough to cause long-term renouncement or denunciation of violence.

Taken together, these insights suggest that a comprehensive and long-term strategy aimed at reducing political violence should not be about fighting the “bad guys” or brainwashing the masses, but about designing exit options from violence, reducing social grievances and solving conflicts, promoting trust in the government, and undertaking democratic reforms that promote pluralism, dialogue, respect for human rights, and multiple avenues for expressing views and pursuing religious missions. Of course, this does not mean that pluralist democracies are immune from future violent attacks. But it does serve as a cautionary warning against allowing the erosion of civil liberties and respect for human rights in the name of countering terrorists.

APPENDIX 1

Typology of Regime Openness and its Effects on the Availability and Effectiveness of Tactics

		Islamists repressed		Islamists not repressed	
		Islamists excluded	Islamists included	Islamists excluded	Islamists included
General Repression	No general participation	UNIVERSALLY CLOSED AND REPRESSIVE - <i>Non-violent tactics unavailable</i>	REPRESSIVE AND SELECTIVELY CLOSED - Islamists given carrots and sticks - <i>Political participation only nonviolent option; particularly appealing</i>	CLOSED AND SELECTIVELY REPRESSIVE - Islamists given carrots and sticks - <i>Nonviolent options other than political participation are possible</i>	SELECTIVELY CLOSED AND REPRESSIVE - Islamists co-opted - <i>Non-violent tactics possible and most appealing, political participation particularly effective</i>
	General participation	REPRESSIVE, AND SELECTIVELY OPEN - Islamists targeted for exclusion & repressed - <i>Non-violent tactics unavailable</i>	REPRESSIVE PARTICIPATORY - <i>Political participation only nonviolent option</i>	SELECTIVELY PARTICIPATORY AND REPRESSIVE - Islamists given both carrots and sticks - <i>Nonviolent options other than political participation are possible</i>	OPEN, SELECTIVELY REPRESSIVE - Islamists co-opted - <i>Non-violent tactics possible, including political participation</i>
No general repression	No general participation	CLOSED, SELECTIVELY REPRESSIVE - Islamists targeted - <i>Non-violent tactics unavailable</i>	SELECTIVELY CLOSED & REPRESSIVE - Islamists given carrots and sticks - <i>Political participation only nonviolent option, and particularly effective</i>	UNIVERSALLY CLOSED AND NON-REPRESSIVE - <i>Nonviolent options other than political participation are possible</i>	NON-REPRESSIVE, SELECTIVELY OPEN - Islamists co-opted - <i>Non-violent tactics possible, including political participation (particularly effective)</i>
	General participation	SELECTIVELY FREE AND OPEN - Islamists targeted - <i>Nonviolent tactics unavailable</i> - <i>Violence publicly condemned</i>	OPEN, SELECTIVELY REPRESSIVE - Islamists targeted - <i>Political participation only nonviolent option</i> - <i>Violence publicly condemned</i>	NONREPRESSIVE, SELECTIVELY OPEN - Islamists targeted - <i>Nonviolent tactics possible</i> - <i>Violence publicly condemned</i>	FREE AND OPEN - <i>Non-violent tactics possible, including political participation</i> - <i>Violence publicly condemned</i>

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. - Political Science, Syracuse University, June 2014

- Comprehensive Examinations, April 2010: International Relations, Comparative Politics
- Certificate in University Teaching; Certificate in Middle East Studies

M.A. - Political Science, Arizona State University, May 2007

- Major: International Relations, Minor: Comparative Politics
- Thesis: " Hamas: From Social Movement to Political Party"
- Committee: Dr. Colin Elman (Chair), Dr. Miriam Elman, Dr. Carolyn Warner

B.A. - *Summa Cum Laude*, Political Science and Economics, Monmouth College, December 2001

- Monmouth College Honors Student.

ADDITIONAL TRAINING

- Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research (IQMR). Syracuse, NY. June 2010.
- Peace and Conflict Resolution Program. American University. Fall 2000

PUBLICATIONS

Ioana E. Matesan. 2012. "What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24: 671-705.

Ioana E. Matesan. 2012. "The Impact of the Arab Spring on Islamist Strategies." *Journal of Strategic Security*, 5(2): 27-46.

Ioana E. Matesan and John Gay. 2011. "El Arish and the Sinai Peninsula Underworld, Egypt." *National Strategy Forum Review*, 20(3).

Hechter, Michael, Ioana E. Matesan and Chris Hale. 2009. "Resistance to Alien Rule in Taiwan and Korea." *Nations and Nationalism*, 15(1): 36-59.

BOOK REVIEWS

Shiism and Politics in the Middle East, by Laurence Louër. H-Net Reviews (May 2013)

HONORS AND AWARDS

Department of Political Science Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2013-2014, Syracuse University

National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, Award No. SES – 1160391, 2012-2013

Betsy and Alan Cohn Graduate Award, 2012

Maxwell Dean's Summer Fellowship, Summer 2011

Hassan Yabroudi Award for best graduate paper in Middle Eastern Studies at Syracuse University, Spring 2011

- Paper "What Makes Negative Frames Resonant? Hamas and the Appeal of Opposition to the Peace Process"

Roscoe Martin Research Grant, Summer 2010

Goekjian Scholar 2009-2010

- Financial support for research during the summer of 2009 and participation in a year-long series of interdisciplinary Goekjian Scholars Seminars

Hardt Graduate Fellowship in Religion, Conflict and Peace Studies, Arizona State University, Spring 2008

Travel Grants:

- Syracuse University Department of Political Science Travel Grant (Spring 2009, Spring 2012)
- Graduate Student Organization Travel Grant, Syracuse University (Spring 2013)
- Graduate Student Association Travel Grant, Arizona State University (Fall 2006)
- Department of Political Science Travel Grant, Arizona State University (Fall 2006)

Undergraduate Honors and Awards

- Monmouth College Wall Street Journal Award (2001)
- Monmouth College Political Economy and Commerce Department Award in Economics (2001)
- John Clay Economic Writing Prize, Monmouth College (2000, 2001)
- Kenneth E. Critser Prize, Monmouth College (2000)

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

"Divergent Legacies of Authoritarianism: Islamic Politics in post-Mubarak Egypt and in post-Soeharto Indonesia." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Convention, Chicago, August 29 – September 1st, 2013.

"The Appeal of Violent and Non-Violent Tactics: Egypt and Indonesia in Comparative Perspective." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, April 3-6, 2013.

"Renouncing Violence: A Cross-Regional Examination of De-radicalization." Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, April 1-4, 2012.

“The Effects of Political Integration on the Strategic and Tactical Moderation of Islamist Groups.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New York City, February 15-18, 2009.

“ Hamas: From Social Movement to Political Party.” Paper presented at the Graduate Workshop on Religion, Economics, and Politics, Alexandria, Virginia, June 2008.

“Evaluating Islamist Militancy: Context, Motivations and Policy Implications.” Co-authored with Carolyn Warner (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science). Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, San Francisco, March 2008.

“Resistance to Japanese Rule in Taiwan and Korea.” Brown bag presentation with Michael Hechter, Chris Hale and Taylor Shepherd, at the Center for Asian Research, Arizona State University, April 2007.

"Fabricating Terrorists: An Evaluation of Al-Qaeda's Construction of Fundamentalist Collective Identities." Paper presented at the Midwest Association of Political Science Conference, Chicago, April 2007.

“Realism and Grand Strategy in the Age of Terrorism.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association-West Conference, Las Vegas, September 2006.

“ Hamas: The Rise of a Religious Political Party.” Paper presented at the Middle East and Central Asia Conference, Salt Lake City, September 2006.

TEACHING AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

Instructor, Syracuse University (Summer 2011, 2012, 2013)

Designed and taught an intensive upper division Political Science class on “Terrorism and Film.” The course fulfilled two goals: First, it exposed students to the major theoretical contributions and debates in the study of terrorism; and second, it examined the broader issue of asymmetric conflict through the prism of cinema.

Graduate Assistant, Middle East & North Africa Programs, Executive Education, Maxwell School at Syracuse University (Fall 2011 – Summer 2013)

Designed and implemented curriculum as part of a program management team for two international fellowship programs sponsored by the U.S. Department of State's Middle East Partnership Initiative: *Civic Education & Leadership Fellows (CELF)* and *Leaders for Democracy Fellowship (LDF)*. Mentor for academics in *CELF*, helping them to develop individual work plans, and writing mentor for *LDF* fellows. Facilitated discussion sessions and workshops, as well as liaised with university faculty to help them meet the training needs of international fellows, organized panel presentations and special speaker engagements.

Teaching Assistant, Syracuse University (Fall 2008 – Spring 2011)

Teaching Assistant for “Introduction to International Relations” (Fall 2008, Spring 2010, Fall 2010), “Realism and Power Politics” (Spring 2009), “Foreign Policymaking” (Fall 2009), and “Introduction to Political Analysis” (Spring 2011).

Teaching Assistant, Arizona State University (Spring 2006 – Spring 2008)

Teaching Assistant for “Law and Society” (Spring 2006), “Realism in International Relations” (Fall 2007), “International Security” (Spring 2008), “Religion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (Spring 2008) and “Current Global Controversies” (Spring 2008).

Teaching Associate – Future Professoriate Program, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University

Attended and organized professional development workshops on various aspects of college teaching. Assigned new graduate students to student mentors, helped organized the department orientation, and served as a mentor for an incoming PhD student.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCEGraduate Assistant, Conference on History, Method and the Future of Security Studies- Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods (Summer – Fall 2013)

Participated in a symposium on qualitative and multi-method research, co-sponsored by the Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods, the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and *Security Studies*.

Graduate Assistant, Project on Post-Conflict Justice and Islam- Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University (Summer 2011)

Collected information on inter- and intrastate conflicts in the Muslim world for a project organized in co-ordination with the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC). Assisted with research on the compatibility of Islamic law with International Humanitarian Law, and on Islamic perspectives on post-conflict justice.

Research Assistant, Global Black Spots Research Project – Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism and Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Syracuse University (Fall 2010-Spring 2011)

Used open source information to analyze anomalous security events and to trace insecurity flows in the Sinai Peninsula.

Research Assistant, Project on Spoilers of Peace – Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC), Syracuse University (Fall 2009-Spring 2010)

Participated in an interdisciplinary research group that examined the issue of peace spoilers from a cross-regional perspective. Examined how “spoiling dynamics” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contribute to political configurations that weaken the viability, implementation and sustainability of the peace process.

Research Assistant – Syracuse University (Summer 2010)

Assisted Dr. Colin Elman and Dr. Matthew Cleary with their on-going research projects. Duties included copy editing, proofreading and running preliminary statistical tests.

Research Assistant - Arizona State University (Spring 2005- Spring 2008)

Assisted Dr. Colin Elman and Dr. Ileana Orlich on their on-going research projects. Duties included, but were not limited to, historical and archival research, creating bibliographies and

databases, editing grant proposals, proofreading manuscripts, and proofreading translations from Romanian into English.

SERVICES

- Graduate representative, Promotion and Tenure Committee, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University (Fall 2010)
- Graduate representative, Faculty Search Committee, Department of Political Science, Syracuse University (Fall 2010)
- Session chair, “The EU after Lisbon” Conference, Syracuse University (March 2010)
- Undergraduate honors thesis reader
- Political Science Research Workshop discussant
- Reviewer: *Maxwell Review*, *Journal of Strategic Security*
- Graduate Association of Political Science, Arizona State University, Vice-President (2007)
- Undergraduate Academic Advisor, Arizona State University

OTHER EXPERIENCE

- Executive Director - Arapamesu Foundation, Phoenix, AZ, January 2003 - December 2005
- Political Organizer - U.S. Presidential Campaign, Phoenix, AZ, June 2003 - November 2004
- Political Organizer - Greenpeace, New York City, NY, Summer 2001
- Political Organizer - California Peace Action, Berkeley, CA, Summer 1999
- Intern - NGO Committee on Disarmament (United Nations), New York City, NY, Summer 2001
- Intern - The Fund for Peace, Washington, DC, Fall 2000

MEMBERSHIPS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

- Democracy in the Middle East Project, Syracuse University (2008-2009)
- International Studies Association
- American Political Science Association

LANGUAGES

- Fluent in English, Romanian, German.
- Advanced knowledge of French.
- Learning Arabic.